First Question: On Hatred, Which Is Opposed to Dilection

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is a motion of the appetite by which we are ill-affected toward something. For just as love is a consonance of the appetite with that which is fitting to it, so hatred is a dissonance toward that which is repugnant, or evil. Now hatred is twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or aversion, by which we turn away from something (a thing or a person) as evil or harmful to us; when there is question of a person it is called hatred of a quality;

2. hatred of enmity or malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which, from displeasure at some person, we will evil to him, because it is evil to him, that is, stopping in his evil, so that, namely, it may go ill with him.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity is opposed to love of benevolence. But as love of concupiscence disposes to love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter hatred: for from the fact that we turn away from someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we will evil to him, and regard his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. - According to his essence, God cannot be had in hatred, because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not have God in hatred. But insofar as from him there comes to us an effect which we regard as evil, he can be had in hatred by us (cf. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), for example, insofar as he prohibits sins or punishes sinners.

This is a sin, and always mortal, unless it is done from indeliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to turn away from the highest Good, in whom there is nothing to be turned away from; or to will evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest of all sins: 1. because it is directly opposed to the dilection of God, which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue, charity, and therefore it is also directly opposed to the infinite goodness of God; 2. because precisely that by which something is mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had in itself, essentially, and explicitly in hatred of God, while in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively, and according to another; therefore hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. - But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former is opposed to the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter to his external manifestation and glory.

He sins by hatred of enmity a) who wills God not to be, or not to be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; - b) who is saddened concerning his perfections or rejoices concerning offense against him, concerning the violation of God's precepts; - c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to lessen his external glory, because it is displeasing to God. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because it is God's evil.

946. Hatred of neighbor. - Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if he is had in hatred according to that which is evil in him (Wis. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), for example, insofar as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause deserves. On the contrary, it is a sin if he is had in hatred according to something which is good in him, for example, insofar as he is pious, just, prudent, etc.¹ - Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we will evil to him as evil, so that it may go ill with him, is always a sin. Thus he sins who 1. desires the inconvenience of neighbor as such and taken absolutely; 2. rejoices concerning his evil as it is evil to him; or 3. is saddened concerning good as it is good to him.

¹ Some say that hatred of abomination, not of a quality but of a person, insofar as this person is held as unworthy of all dilection, is always a sin and most grave, because it is to exclude from beatitude. But this is already hatred of enmity, as being hatred of the person according to himself: already to will that he have no good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal from its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). Nevertheless it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, as if it is done from a sudden motion of anger, but also from lightness of matter, for example, if we wish a slight evil to neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily simple displeasure is without imprecation of evil. Nevertheless this is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because it will easily happen that the evils which here and there befall neighbor are pleasing.

Hatred of neighbor, if it is considered on the part of the disorder of the one sinning, is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most greatly disordered toward him.² Nevertheless it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely, of the harm inflicted on neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc., are greater.

² Namely, other sins against neighbor participate in the character of hatred, Cajetan notes.

947. Hatred of neighbor is multiple in species. - Hatreds of a quality of neighbor differ in species according to specifically diverse motives, for example, to hate neighbor because he is pious or because he has brought about a just damage.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that diverse evils befall him are probably of the same species, because these evils are sought for him only under the general character of evil; whence the evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary, hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict diverse evils on neighbor are certainly of diverse species, because the desire of committing a sin has the malice of the work with all the circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus the will of taking away reputation and the will of killing differ.

948. Observations. - 1. Formal hatred of oneself is not given, as being repugnant to nature.

2. To will evil to someone insofar as it is a good for him or for others is not hatred; indeed, it is licit, if the order of charity is preserved (cf. n. 889). Nevertheless it would be a sin to will the evil of another against the order of charity, that is, on account of a good which does not equal it: thus a son cannot will the death of his father on account of the inheritance (cf. props. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

3. Hatred of abomination concerning only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but hatred in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing, that in a brother we hate fault and defect of good, pertains to love of the brother: for it is of the same character that we will the good of someone and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking hatred of a brother simply (by not willing good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is cured with difficulty; nevertheless penitents often confess as hatreds things which are not such, or at least are not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at, speak to, or salute someone, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it must be investigated whether these things are not mere natural aversion from a true or apparent offense, - or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, - or a desire of evil from an honorable end. But if they do not wish a grave evil to neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of dilection, nor is another grave inconvenience feared from that affection (for example, contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge), they are to be absolved.

5. St. Alphonsus observes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him, and it may go ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and a sin. - But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is contrary to your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and a sin, if it is without reason: such it will not be if he is a very harsh person, provided contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge are absent."

6. Hatred of neighbor formally, according to the character of the object, and therefore more directly, arises from envy, through which the very good of neighbor is rendered saddening and consequently hateful. But dispositively it arises from anger: for first, through anger, man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure, as it has the character of revenge; but, anger persevering, man comes to considering and seeking the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the character of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).