Imperfections

A SIN is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God. For a bad human act is a disturbance of right order either because in itself it is against right reason, as murder or suicide, or because it is against the command of a legitimate superior, which imposes a strict obligation, and which right reason bids us obey. But such a disturbance of right order is against the law of God.

Every voluntary act against right reason is an offence against God and a sin, for although the sinner in committing sin does not always think explicitly of God, yet he always apprehends that he is doing a wrong action, an action which his conscience condemns, and in the condemnation of conscience is implicitly contained the condemnation of God himself.

A sin must be distinguished from an imperfection, which is either negative or positive. A negative imperfection is merely the omission of a good action which is not of precept; and such an omission when grace moves one to perform the act, though not a sin, yet is a falling short of the perfection which was within one’s reach. A positive imperfection is a violation of God’s will made known to us, but which does not strictly oblige us. God wishes a religious to observe his rule, but frequently this does not bind under sin. A positive imperfection, then, is a falling short not only of the perfection which was offered to us and which we might have had, but also of that which God wished us to have, though he did not oblige us to have it.

III. Obligation of following counsel. 1. There is not, as is clear, an obligation of doing what according to itself is more perfect, but here and now is less perfect. Thus, for example, often here and now it is better to study, although prayer according to itself is more perfect.

2. Another question is whether there is an obligation of preferring what here and now is more perfect (understand: what is held by the one about to act here and now as more perfect) to an action or omission which here and now is less perfect. This question today is sharply disputed. Now some¹ affirm the obligation of doing what here and now is held by the agent as more perfect. Others² deny it, and it seems one must agree with them. For first, the more perfect does not oblige from the object, since it is not prescribed; nor from the fact that its omission could not be made for an honorable end, for it can be omitted on account of the honorable end of a less good work. Then, if the obligation of doing what is more perfect were admitted, by the same reason there would have to be admitted an obligation of doing it in a more perfect manner, and therefore from actual charity. But no one will have affirmed an obligation of this sort.

Objection 1. Since man is wholly ordered to the end, the order of reason requires that he attain the end as much as he can attain it. But one who prefers the less perfect to the more perfect does not satisfy this obligation.

Response. From the fact that man is wholly ordered to the end, it does not follow that he must attain the end as much as he can attain it. For if this were admitted, man would not only have to choose always what is more perfect, but also to perform it in the more perfect manner, that is, from actual charity. But at least the latter, as we noted above, no one will have admitted. It suffices that man always and in all things behave rightly toward the end; it is not required that always and in all things he behave toward the end in the more perfect manner.

Objection 2. No honorable end can be assigned on account of which the less perfect is preferred to the more perfect. An end of this sort does not consist in the fact that the more perfect is omitted precisely and only because it is pleasing to omit it, since such a volition would be idle, lacking pious utility or just necessity (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 3). Nor does it consist in the end on account of which the less perfect is placed; for that end indeed suffices for placing the less perfect considered separately, but not for placing it when the more perfect occurs. In a word: no honorable reason is given for choosing the less perfect before the more perfect.

Response. Someone cannot honorably prefer the lesser good to the greater good by judgment; but he can honorably prefer it in desiring and choosing, because on the one hand the more perfect does not oblige by reason of itself or from the object, and on the other hand the less perfect, by reason of its own moral goodness, can be desired and chosen (cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 23, a. 8, ad 9).

Objection 3. In Matthew it is declared: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind";³ these words are difficult to explain in the opinion of the adversaries.

Response. These words are sufficiently explained concerning charity above all things, which is to be shown to God, the Supreme Good.

St. Thomas does not treat the question in a special article, but many texts are found which state our proposition clearly enough; wherefore it is pleasing to cite some of them. First he has these words: "The observance of each of them in some special case pertains to counsel in a qualified sense, namely, in that case; for instance, when a man gives some alms when he is not held to give, he follows the counsel of poverty as regards that deed; likewise when someone does not follow his own will in some deed which he could licitly do, he follows the counsel of obedience in that case" (I-II, q. 108, a. 4). From these things it is clear that St. Thomas supposes that also in particular, or in the concrete, there truly are better works to which a man is not held and which he can licitly omit. Then in the disputed question De veritate, q. 23, a. 8, ad 9, refuting the objection in which the choice of the lesser good is asserted to be perverse, he responds thus: if "someone by judgment prefers that which is less good to the greater good, there will be perversity of choice; but not if he prefers it in desiring; for man is not held to pursue better things always in acting." Finally, in II, dist. 39, q. 3, a. 3, ad 6, where he speaks of the obligation of conscience, which is the practical dictate of reason showing what must be done here and now, he says: "When conscience dictates to someone that it is good to do some work of counsel: if he does not do it, he does not sin, because he does not apprehend it as a due good and subject to precept."

St. Alphonsus does not explicitly treat the question, but he concedes that those who confess only some imperfections, about which it is doubted whether they reach venial sins, are absolved conditionally. Therefore he seems to deny that imperfections are necessarily venial sins.

Besides, note:

a) By the consent of all, one who neglects what here and now is more perfect can sin by reason of an inordinate motive, scandal, or contempt; furthermore he can expose himself to the danger that divine aids be diminished.

b) In practice it is often difficult to determine what here and now is more perfect, all the more because the reason that someone not be overwhelmed by excessive efforts, nor tortured by scruples, easily brings it about that what in itself is less perfect becomes here and now more perfect, or equally perfect.

c) "As regards the direction of souls, one must insist more closely on a pure and holy intention than on a longer examination of betterness. He who seeks God with a sincere will is led not so much by fear of sin as by the joy of love, and, arranging ascents in his heart, will freely fulfill all things which he perceives to be useful for greater holiness. In this sense is to be understood that very well-known saying of St. Augustine:⁴ 'Love, and do what you will.... Let the root of love be within; from that root nothing can exist except good.'"⁵

¹ Thus, for example, De Lugo, De poenit., disp. III, sect. 1, nn. 9-10; Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, t. III, p. 532.

² Thus, for example, Cajetan on II-II, q. 186, a. 2, ad 2; Prummer, Man. Theol. Mor., bk. I, n. 131, and bk. II, n. 324; Kruysbergs, in Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1929, p. 425.

³ Matt. 22:37.

⁴ VII In Ep. Jo., 8.

⁵ Cruysberghs, in Collectanea Mechliniensia, 1929, p. 429.

I. Notion. Imperfection is sometimes taken for a wholly involuntary transgression of a precept, such as involuntary distractions during prayer, involuntary excesses in indignation, jesting, laughter, etc. Now although these things do not contain sin, nor can all of them be avoided, nevertheless let us strive to lessen them.

Imperfection by force of the word is the absence of some perfection. It is distinguished as negative and positive. Negative imperfection is the mere absence of perfection; positive imperfection, which is also called privation, is the absence or lack of a perfection which it is fitting should be present in someone, and it is had when someone deliberately chooses the less perfect, according to what was said in n. 213.

II. Morality. 1. Negative imperfection - for instance, lack of the holiness of the Blessed Virgin Mary - as is clear, is not sin.

2. In what respect positive imperfection is sin we explained in n. 213.

Imperfections.—The description of venial sin just given indicates that it is a voluntary transgression of the law of God in matters of lighter importance, and is thus distinguished from the various classes of moral imperfections. These latter imperfections are:

(a) natural imperfections, which are the falling short on the part of good acts of the higher degree of goodness they might have possessed. Since man is finite by nature, it is inevitable that he be limited in the good he does; and hence this kind of imperfection is not a transgression or a sin;

(b) personal imperfections which are voluntary but not transgressions, are acts or omissions whose motive is reasonable, but which are contrary to that which is of counsel. Example: to omit hearing a Mass that is not obligatory, when one is able to assist at it, but has a good reason for staying away;

(c) personal imperfections which are transgressions but not voluntary, are acts or omissions done without deliberation, but which are opposed to some law of less importance. Example: To pray with involuntary distractions.

Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects.-An imperfection becomes a sin: (a) if the motive for omitting what is of counsel only is sinful (e.g., to neglect a Mass that is not of obligation out of contempt); (b) if a slight indeliberate transgression has a cause that was voluntary (e.g., involuntary distractions caused by previous neglect).

— The abstract notion of imperfection. Imperfection of itself denies further perfection; and therefore, when the moral order is being treated, it denies that perfection in human operation itself, which is the object of moral science.

But it can be merely negative or positive. Negative imperfection signifies a mere defect, a mere lack; positive imperfection, some evil, and therefore some privation or absence of a thing which ought to have been present.

The concrete notion. Moreover, it can be considered from the side of deliberation, or from the side of moral goodness, or of intention or election.

From the side of deliberation, negative imperfection affects indeliberate acts which nevertheless tend objectively toward a good or non-evil thing. For the perfect action of man is a human action, or a deliberate one. Positive imperfection designates disordered movements, whether of the will but first-first, or of other faculties, which the will out of infirmity does not restrain, which it merely suffers: wanderings of the mind in prayer, movements of sensuality. Because the gift of integrity exempted from these, and they betray some tendency into evil, they are positive imperfections: in man, as God created him in justice, they ought not to exist, but they follow original fault.

— Furthermore, according to a sufficiently common opinion today, from the side of goodness, our free elections of an honorable thing, but not of the better thing, to which better thing we are not specially called, are negatively imperfect: for example, by which we do not observe a general counsel contained in Sacred Scripture, or even (according to some) neglect a more remiss inspiration. But positive imperfection is the omission of an act to which one is peculiarly invited, or even (as some will) an act which clearly, all things weighed, is known to be better.

And they are accustomed to add that these positive imperfections, not only from the motive on account of which they are freely admitted, easily become venial sins, but further, according to themselves, dispose one to sinning, and deprive man of greater habitual grace and glory destined for him; indeed that they are causes why God denies more abundant actual graces without which man easily sins, indeed becomes exposed to the danger of losing eternal salvation. They say this of him who, like the young man in the Gospel, specially called to a more perfect state, went away sad. Cf., for example, the things St. Alphonsus has, l. 2, n. 78, or Lehmkuhl I, 662, 663.

But the patrons of another opinion, which today has begun to prevail, remove these latter imperfections from the middle, since they contend that those are venial sins.

These things favor the former opinion: a) sin is not without a precept, and counsel is placed in the option of him to whom it is given ¹; b) in 1 Cor. c. 7, St. Paul, commending virginity, openly declares that he does not sin who chooses matrimony; and c) the Holy Fathers greatly inculcate this freedom of option (2); d) this is added: it pertains to the beauty of the present order, that man even in this matter can imitate God, so that just as divine liberty could create a good but not the best world, so human liberty can choose something honorable indeed, but not more honorable.

The latter opinion can use these arguments. Besides the condition of honesty required in the genus or in the object of an act, our action cannot be honorable unless at the same time it satisfies a certain more general law to which it is subordinated. Now a deliberate neglect of a special divine invitation, or of a good certainly better for the agent himself, cannot satisfy this more general law. For neglect of the benefit of a clear and special divine invitation contains a defect of reverence toward God, of confidence in God, and of ingratitude; and these surely are sinful. Furthermore, since man as a whole is for the end of eternal life, since that end is his proper and intrinsic perfection, how does he not derogate from charity toward himself who has deliberately chosen a lesser eternal glory? It is well understood that by the infinitely perfect Being, to whom no intrinsic good can accrue, so perfect a liberty is possessed that, just as he could abstain from every creation, so also he can choose a world good indeed but not the best; but he who deliberately neglects a certain occasion of greater perfection and beatitude, must he not be called harmful to himself? How could such an election be reasonable? The excuse of excessive difficulty, of an uncertain thing, is removed when there is had a special invitation of God, or when a thing manifestly better for me is present. But if the comparative election of the less good thing cannot be reasonable, it will necessarily be sinful, since God sanctions the whole use of reason. Cf. the laborious evasions of Fr. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 109.

Let this be another form of reasoning. In order that the free will without disorder be able to embrace what it clearly knows to be less perfect, it is necessary that a) it not choose in favor of a lesser intrinsic goodness; b) it not subjectively love the infinite perfection less. God satisfies each condition, for he acquires nothing, he loves all things by loving his own infinite goodness, nor does he love the good less whether he creates nothing, or creates a world good but not best. But in us, when we choose the less good, each condition is lacking. Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, there ought not to be measure in the intention of the end. Cf. 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3 c.

Finally, the patrons of the former opinion connect such consequences with positive imperfection, that it is far better and safer for eternal life to sin venially a hundred times than, for example, not to admit a religious vocation.

The latter opinion is followed by Cajetan, in 2, 2, q. 186, art. 2 ad 2; art. 9; Valencia, t. 3, d. 19, q. 2, p. 1 ad 3 arg.; Passerini, De hominum statibus, t. 2, in 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3, n. 43-45, 70-73; Toletus, Summa casuum conscientiae, l. 3, c. 2, n. 1; and recently Hugueny O.P., "Imperfection et peche veniel" (Rev. Clerge fr., t. 53, p. 641-661); Fonsegrive, "La loi morale et la loi sociale" (Quinzaine, December 1, 1905, p. 322).

¹ Summa, 1, 2, q. 108, art. 4. - (2) Cf. our little work concerning religious and sacerdotal vocation.

— Our conclusion. It is not in our mind to decide this controversy. Yet what is certain is that man ought not to make his elections positively under the aspect of the better good, but it is enough that he direct himself according to the norms of honesty. For a severer obligation, if it were common (for certain select persons prudently assume it by vow), would reduce men to straits which would be dangerous to honesty itself.

Furthermore, as it seems to us, if the former opinion seems truer, that is, if there is no individual obligation of following what is most clearly better or what God clearly inspires to be done, those withdrawals of actual graces, those dangers of eternal life by which the patrons of the former opinion strike minds, are chimerical. But then it must be said in a more general way what Cornelius a Lapide said concerning the election of a state of life (on 1 Cor. 7, 7): "Choose the state which you will, and God will give you the fitting and proper grace that in that state you may live decently and holily." For in what way someone would expose himself to such danger of eternal life without sin, even grave sin, we confess that we do not see.

— I. Imperfection, which denies further perfection, can be simple lack, if it is negative, or privation, if it is positive.

From the side of deliberation, indeliberate movements toward non-evil things are negative imperfection; toward evil things, they are positive imperfection, because they connote privation of integrity.

II. For not a few of the modern age, free elections of a thing honorable but not better are positive or negative imperfections, according as one was or was not specially invited to better things.

But for others, whose opinion today is prevailing, these so-called positive imperfections are venial sins, since deliberate neglect of a divine invitation cannot be altogether honorable.

Yet against this stands the fact that sin is not without a precept, and that freedom of option is greatly inculcated by the Fathers, when evangelical counsels are treated. This at least is established: man ought not to make his elections under the aspect of the better good. And, if no individual obligation of following what is clearly better is established, then the dangers of future life also must be denied which are so urged by some: for to expose oneself to these would be gravely culpable rashness.

1842. IT IS ASKED. How ought the confessor conduct himself with penitents who bring only IMPERFECTIONS or VENIAL sins?⁷

Resp. 1. "If they confess imperfections which do not reach faults certainly venial, Bonacina says that they can be absolved under condition; but I judge that this is not to be admitted except very rarely, and when they themselves could not assign certain matter from past life, or not without great trouble. For the rest I say that if the penitent does not present certain matter, the confessor must not inquire into it in order to absolve him; and in the case in which he had inquired and had not found it, he is not bound to impart conditional absolution to him" (cf. n. 1658 and 1663, qu. 5, Reg. 24).

2. "If the penitent confesses certain venial sins, but usual or daily ones, for example concerning impatiences, intemperances, distractions in the Office, in prayer, and similar things, so that absolution can be given to him, it must be considered whether he has at any time imposed force upon himself, as much as he could, in order to overcome the passion; because then it can be judged that his faults proceeded rather from human frailty than from defect of sorrow or purpose. - Conversely, if he has relapsed frequently, and without resistance, into faults of this kind, then he must be dealt with as with a recidivist," according to what was said at n. 1829; and therefore it must be obtained either that he truly grieve over at least some one of those sins, or that he present for matter some graver sin of past life.⁸ - Recall what was said at n. 340 and following.⁹

Case.—Anna has a great desire for Christian perfection. Accordingly she goes to confession every week, and receives Holy Communion daily, whenever possible, hoping thus to attain by sacramental graces a steadily increasing purity of heart. The results, however, do not meet her expectations, she is conscious of still possessing many faults, hence she loses courage and weakens in her efforts.

Question.—How should a confessor treat his penitent in order to encourage her faithful adherence to the practice of daily Communion?

Solution.—In the well-known decree of December 20, 1905, hope is expressed that Communicants who receive daily, with the right dispositions and in the state of grace, may also gradually avoid venial sins. Anna desires to be freed of her faults, hence her zeal in receiving the Sacraments. She had hoped to draw this fruit quickly from daily Communion, but she is disappointed in her expectations. The confessor, as a wise physician of the soul, must, before all things, inquire into the causes of this disappointment. Possibly it is brought about by the fact that her expectations were exaggerated, or even presumptuous. Anna believed that she would be freed not only from all sins, but even from all imperfections. As imperfections, the moralists designate either acts or omissions contrary, not to a positive commandment, but to a counsel; another definition classes them as violations of the moral law which are quite involuntary, such as distraction in prayer, involuntary emotions of anger, envy, etc., and, in general, all faults that proceed from guiltless ignorance or inattention. This latter definition, where there is discussion of the difference between imperfections and venial sins, is to be preferred to the former, since imperfections in the first sense are not always free from real sin, while, as defined in the other sense, they never include guilt. To free one’s self by degrees from such imperfections, in as far as this is possible to human beings, should be the endeavor of every Christian, but he should not forget that he can never achieve this perfectly in this life. Perfect purity is exclusively the privilege of the spirits dwelling in Heaven; on earth even the just have always occasion to accuse themselves of moral shortcomings, and to lament with the Apostle: “Who will deliver me from the body of this death?”

It would be presumptuous to insist on the gift of angelic purity, and it would surely lead to various errors. To a penitent with such aspirations St. Francis of Sales gave the admonition, “Often we take pains to become good angels, and in our zeal we neglect to be good men and good women.” He pointed out the importance of being patient with oneself: “Patience is that virtue which most assures us perfection. We must practice it in dealing with others, but it is equally necessary to exercise it with ourselves. Those who aspire to a perfect charity, must have more patience with themselves than with others. We must endure our imperfections in order to gain perfection.”

With venial sins it is different. These are more or less voluntary violations of the moral law, for this reason they offend God, and in this aspect they are to be abhorred as a positive evil. While in this life it is not possible to avoid always even the least of venial sins, yet it is possible to lessen their number, or to keep oneself entirely free from a certain species of them. That the penitent may never become lax in this endeavor, should be the special solicitude of the confessor. He will, in order to avoid the rock of extreme severity, and in order to discourage neither himself nor his penitent, clearly distinguish between sins of frailty and sins that result from a perversity of the will, or from bad habits. Even the saints were not wholly free from sins of frailty; they, too, had to confess with St. James: “In many things we all offend.” Such faults enter only too easily into our minds, actions and omissions; they can, however, be just as easily wiped out again, especially through prayer, as St. Augustine teaches: “For the daily, brief, and light sins without which this life is not led, the daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction... this prayer completely wipes away slight and daily sins,” Ench. 71. As a matter of fact these very faults of weakness work for the good of those who truly love God; for as they are thus continually reminded of their frailty, they are more firmly imbued with an humble self-knowledge. P. Scupoli tell us how advantageous is this knowledge of our faults: “O happy knowledge (of our frailty) which sanctifies us in this world, and uplifts us to the glory of Heaven! O splendid light, proceeding from the darkness and flooding the soul with celestial clarity! O hidden pearl, shining forth from our obscurity! O nothingness that uplifts us to the possession of all things!” If the saints received extraordinary graces from God, not a little of this was due to the fact that they chose to give themselves up to the contemplation of their own nothingness, and fostered within themselves the spirit of humility and contrition.

Upon this important point Anna must be enlightened so that what should really inspire confidence and courage may not become a cause for discouragement.

When, however, there is question of faults arising from perversity of will, and deliberately committed, then the case assumes another aspect. A spiritual condition of this kind requires careful treatment on the part of the confessor.

How harmful such faults are to our striving for virtue is aptly told by P. Lancicius. He writes, in the introduction to an exhaustive treatise upon venial sins: “During the forty-seven years of my priesthood, I have been at different times the spiritual director of lay persons and of Religious. In this work I was made aware that many persons received great graces from the Lord, but with the greater number I saw that they received lesser graces than the Divine bounty would have poured out upon them if they had been more diligent in avoiding numerous venial sins, especially those committed with deliberation.”

Should the confessor perceive that Anna is enmeshed in faults of this kind, that she commits certain faults from habit, then he will, first of all, prescribe the remedies needed against her shortcomings, and impress upon her the conscientious use of the same. Some pious, but little instructed, persons fall into the error that sacramental grace will do all and that it will suffice to receive Communion frequently in order to attain the heights of Christian perfection. If Anna sincerely desires to be cured of moral ills she will assuredly show her good will by a diligent use of the prescribed remedies, and thus gradually attain the desired goal. Should Anna, however, manifest a lack of good intention, by neglecting to cooperate with sacramental grace by her own suitable effort, then the prudent confessor will regard her case as critical, and, if necessary, treat her with warranted severity. Such souls are frequently in grave danger of straying afar from the path of virtue. In the case of such persons the question arises: Have they, indeed, the pious disposition, which is before all things requisite for daily Communion? Are they, indeed, in the state of grace? Admittedly they will not commit any sin which they regard as a grievous sin. Yet, what security is there, in their deplorable condition, that their supposedly venial sins are not really mortal sins, or at least will not soon lead to such? In judging sinful acts, which Moralists hold to be grievous sins ex genere suo, which, however, may be slight on account of parvitas materiae, it is often very difficult to define the borderline that divides venial sins and grievous ones, and, since even the most skilled Casuists often admit their inability to distinguish in this matter, how can a person, less well-informed, without conscious self-deception claim that this borderline has not been overstepped, when she has over and over again sinned deliberately against charity, justice, etc.? Moreover the neglected grace is gradually withdrawn from the tepid soul, and the Divine warning is being fulfilled which was pronounced upon the Bishop of Ephesus: “Because thou art tepid I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth.” There is, finally a particular point to be taken into consideration regarding such persons. Not infrequently the habitual faults of those avowing the aspiration to a devout life are yielding scandal. Their lack of charity, of fidelity to duty, of humility, meekness, etc., casts not seldom a dark shadow upon piety itself and brings it into discredit. The scandal which the world takes at the devout is surely often a pharisaical scandal-taking, their malice gleefully making small faults the occasion for vilification of all religion. Unfortunately, however, there is sometimes real scandal of this sort which the confessor must combat with energy. Should all his endeavors fail, then he must not hesitate to keep such persons, who evidently misuse the sacraments, from approaching them until they are induced to make a better use of the same.