Chapter I. The Nature of Sin

A SIN is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God. For a bad human act is a disturbance of right order either because in itself it is against right reason, as murder or suicide, or because it is against the command of a legitimate superior, which imposes a strict obligation, and which right reason bids us obey. But such a disturbance of right order is against the law of God.

Every voluntary act against right reason is an offence against God and a sin, for although the sinner in committing sin does not always think explicitly of God, yet he always apprehends that he is doing a wrong action, an action which his conscience condemns, and in the condemnation of conscience is implicitly contained the condemnation of God himself.

A sin must be distinguished from an imperfection, which is either negative or positive. A negative imperfection is merely the omission of a good action which is not of precept; and such an omission when grace moves one to perform the act, though not a sin, yet is a falling short of the perfection which was within one’s reach. A positive imperfection is a violation of God’s will made known to us, but which does not strictly oblige us. God wishes a religious to observe his rule, but frequently this does not bind under sin. A positive imperfection, then, is a falling short not only of the perfection which was offered to us and which we might have had, but also of that which God wished us to have, though he did not oblige us to have it.

Sin in the sense defined is called actual sin; habitual sin is the state which follows the commission of actual sin until this be forgiven.

A formal sin is committed knowingly and wilfully; a material sin is committed without knowledge or free consent.

Sin is said to be against God, our neighbour, or ourself, as it is against some virtue which immediately regards God, or our neighbour, or ourself. All sin is ultimately against God.

Sins of ignorance are committed through culpable ignorance; sins of infirmity through passion or bad habit; sins of malice with cool deliberation and forethought. The last, as is obvious, are the least excusable.

A sin of commission is an act against a negative precept; a sin of omission is the wilful neglect of a positive precept.

The meaning of the terms sins of thought, word, and deed, is obvious.

To commit sin there must be actual advertence to the malice of the action done, either when the action is performed, or when the cause is put. This follows from what was said above about human acts, which must be voluntary either in themselves or at any rate in their cause. But no act is voluntary without previous knowledge and advertence. It is not sufficient, then, for sin that a man could physically advert to the wrongfulness of his action, and should have done so; if there was no advertence, either at the time of the action or when its cause was put, there is no sin. However, advertence to what is likely to follow when the cause is put is sufficient to contract the malice of sin; and so wrong done through wilful negligence, or passion, or habit, or carelessness, is imputable to the agent.

Advertence to an evil thought or motion does not constitute sin without free consent of the will. The will consents when it voluntarily accepts an evil suggestion presented by the mind, and it is immaterial whether the evil originates in the will, or whether the will accedes to evil when suggested to it from without. For sin, then, there must be both advertence to the evil and free consent to it; a man who takes another’s money, thinking it to be his own, does not commit theft, nor does the kleptomaniac who is powerless to refrain.