Chapter IV: On Moral Imperfection

— The abstract notion of imperfection. Imperfection of itself denies further perfection; and therefore, when the moral order is being treated, it denies that perfection in human operation itself, which is the object of moral science.

But it can be merely negative or positive. Negative imperfection signifies a mere defect, a mere lack; positive imperfection, some evil, and therefore some privation or absence of a thing which ought to have been present.

The concrete notion. Moreover, it can be considered from the side of deliberation, or from the side of moral goodness, or of intention or election.

From the side of deliberation, negative imperfection affects indeliberate acts which nevertheless tend objectively toward a good or non-evil thing. For the perfect action of man is a human action, or a deliberate one. Positive imperfection designates disordered movements, whether of the will but first-first, or of other faculties, which the will out of infirmity does not restrain, which it merely suffers: wanderings of the mind in prayer, movements of sensuality. Because the gift of integrity exempted from these, and they betray some tendency into evil, they are positive imperfections: in man, as God created him in justice, they ought not to exist, but they follow original fault.

— Furthermore, according to a sufficiently common opinion today, from the side of goodness, our free elections of an honorable thing, but not of the better thing, to which better thing we are not specially called, are negatively imperfect: for example, by which we do not observe a general counsel contained in Sacred Scripture, or even (according to some) neglect a more remiss inspiration. But positive imperfection is the omission of an act to which one is peculiarly invited, or even (as some will) an act which clearly, all things weighed, is known to be better.

And they are accustomed to add that these positive imperfections, not only from the motive on account of which they are freely admitted, easily become venial sins, but further, according to themselves, dispose one to sinning, and deprive man of greater habitual grace and glory destined for him; indeed that they are causes why God denies more abundant actual graces without which man easily sins, indeed becomes exposed to the danger of losing eternal salvation. They say this of him who, like the young man in the Gospel, specially called to a more perfect state, went away sad. Cf., for example, the things St. Alphonsus has, l. 2, n. 78, or Lehmkuhl I, 662, 663.

But the patrons of another opinion, which today has begun to prevail, remove these latter imperfections from the middle, since they contend that those are venial sins.

These things favor the former opinion: a) sin is not without a precept, and counsel is placed in the option of him to whom it is given ¹; b) in 1 Cor. c. 7, St. Paul, commending virginity, openly declares that he does not sin who chooses matrimony; and c) the Holy Fathers greatly inculcate this freedom of option (2); d) this is added: it pertains to the beauty of the present order, that man even in this matter can imitate God, so that just as divine liberty could create a good but not the best world, so human liberty can choose something honorable indeed, but not more honorable.

The latter opinion can use these arguments. Besides the condition of honesty required in the genus or in the object of an act, our action cannot be honorable unless at the same time it satisfies a certain more general law to which it is subordinated. Now a deliberate neglect of a special divine invitation, or of a good certainly better for the agent himself, cannot satisfy this more general law. For neglect of the benefit of a clear and special divine invitation contains a defect of reverence toward God, of confidence in God, and of ingratitude; and these surely are sinful. Furthermore, since man as a whole is for the end of eternal life, since that end is his proper and intrinsic perfection, how does he not derogate from charity toward himself who has deliberately chosen a lesser eternal glory? It is well understood that by the infinitely perfect Being, to whom no intrinsic good can accrue, so perfect a liberty is possessed that, just as he could abstain from every creation, so also he can choose a world good indeed but not the best; but he who deliberately neglects a certain occasion of greater perfection and beatitude, must he not be called harmful to himself? How could such an election be reasonable? The excuse of excessive difficulty, of an uncertain thing, is removed when there is had a special invitation of God, or when a thing manifestly better for me is present. But if the comparative election of the less good thing cannot be reasonable, it will necessarily be sinful, since God sanctions the whole use of reason. Cf. the laborious evasions of Fr. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 109.

Let this be another form of reasoning. In order that the free will without disorder be able to embrace what it clearly knows to be less perfect, it is necessary that a) it not choose in favor of a lesser intrinsic goodness; b) it not subjectively love the infinite perfection less. God satisfies each condition, for he acquires nothing, he loves all things by loving his own infinite goodness, nor does he love the good less whether he creates nothing, or creates a world good but not best. But in us, when we choose the less good, each condition is lacking. Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, there ought not to be measure in the intention of the end. Cf. 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3 c.

Finally, the patrons of the former opinion connect such consequences with positive imperfection, that it is far better and safer for eternal life to sin venially a hundred times than, for example, not to admit a religious vocation.

The latter opinion is followed by Cajetan, in 2, 2, q. 186, art. 2 ad 2; art. 9; Valencia, t. 3, d. 19, q. 2, p. 1 ad 3 arg.; Passerini, De hominum statibus, t. 2, in 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3, n. 43-45, 70-73; Toletus, Summa casuum conscientiae, l. 3, c. 2, n. 1; and recently Hugueny O.P., "Imperfection et peche veniel" (Rev. Clerge fr., t. 53, p. 641-661); Fonsegrive, "La loi morale et la loi sociale" (Quinzaine, December 1, 1905, p. 322).

¹ Summa, 1, 2, q. 108, art. 4. - (2) Cf. our little work concerning religious and sacerdotal vocation.

— Our conclusion. It is not in our mind to decide this controversy. Yet what is certain is that man ought not to make his elections positively under the aspect of the better good, but it is enough that he direct himself according to the norms of honesty. For a severer obligation, if it were common (for certain select persons prudently assume it by vow), would reduce men to straits which would be dangerous to honesty itself.

Furthermore, as it seems to us, if the former opinion seems truer, that is, if there is no individual obligation of following what is most clearly better or what God clearly inspires to be done, those withdrawals of actual graces, those dangers of eternal life by which the patrons of the former opinion strike minds, are chimerical. But then it must be said in a more general way what Cornelius a Lapide said concerning the election of a state of life (on 1 Cor. 7, 7): "Choose the state which you will, and God will give you the fitting and proper grace that in that state you may live decently and holily." For in what way someone would expose himself to such danger of eternal life without sin, even grave sin, we confess that we do not see.

— I. Imperfection, which denies further perfection, can be simple lack, if it is negative, or privation, if it is positive.

From the side of deliberation, indeliberate movements toward non-evil things are negative imperfection; toward evil things, they are positive imperfection, because they connote privation of integrity.

II. For not a few of the modern age, free elections of a thing honorable but not better are positive or negative imperfections, according as one was or was not specially invited to better things.

But for others, whose opinion today is prevailing, these so-called positive imperfections are venial sins, since deliberate neglect of a divine invitation cannot be altogether honorable.

Yet against this stands the fact that sin is not without a precept, and that freedom of option is greatly inculcated by the Fathers, when evangelical counsels are treated. This at least is established: man ought not to make his elections under the aspect of the better good. And, if no individual obligation of following what is clearly better is established, then the dangers of future life also must be denied which are so urged by some: for to expose oneself to these would be gravely culpable rashness.