Liberty of worship

“15. Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he shall have thought true. — 16. Men can find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatever and can attain eternal salvation. — 17. At least good hope is to be entertained concerning the eternal salvation of all those who in no way dwell in the true Church of Christ. — 18. Protestantism is nothing other than a different form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is given to please God equally as in the Catholic Church. — 77. In this our age, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the sole religion of the State, with all other forms of worship excluded. — 78. Hence in certain regions bearing the Catholic name, it has laudably been provided by law that men immigrating there may have the public exercise of each one’s own worship. — 79. For it is false that civil liberty of every form of worship, and likewise the full power attributed to all of openly and publicly manifesting any opinions and thoughts whatsoever, conduces to corrupting more easily the morals and minds of peoples and to propagating the pest of indifferentism.” Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus.

[By liberty of worship there is understood today, on the part of private individuals, the faculty of embracing any form of worship whatever, among dissident and opposed ones, and even of rejecting them all alike; but on the part of the state, the right of publicly professing no religion, and of attributing the same value to all forms of worship, or at least to many, and of conceding them the same rights.

I say: Liberty of worship is altogether to be reprobated.

Proof. 1° from the unhappy and never sufficiently deplorable outcome of this system, namely that through the use of such liberty men are cast outside the way of salvation. For,

That the Catholic faith alone is true, alone salvific, alone imposed by divine law upon all and each man, together with the obligations and duties which flow from it, and that it shines marked with notes of credibility so splendid that its divinity cannot be doubted, no one using reason will sincerely deny. Moreover, liberty or equality of worship evidently sets itself against so excellent and necessary a good. Through it indeed, as Pius IX testifies in the Encyclical of 9 November 1846, there is thrust into Catholic kingdoms « that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, of indifference towards any religion whatsoever, which, every distinction between truth and error being taken away, holds that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion. » But this indifference casts man outside the way of salvation. Therefore.

Proof. 2° from the bond by which society is bound to God. This Leo XIII expounds most beautifully in the encyclical letter Immortale Dei: « Nature and reason, he says, which command every individual to worship God holily and religiously, because we are in his power and, having proceeded from him, must return to him, bind by the same law civil society. For men joined together in common society are no less under the power of God than individuals; nor does society owe less grace to God than individuals, by whose author it coalesced, by whose nod it is preserved, by whose benefit it has received the innumerable abundance of goods with which it abounds. Wherefore, just as no one is permitted to neglect his own duties towards God, and it is the greatest of duties to embrace religion in mind and morals, not that which each one may prefer, but that which God has commanded, and which by certain and by no means doubtful signs is established to be the one true religion among all: in the same way states cannot without crime conduct themselves as if God in no way existed, or cast aside the care of religion as something foreign and of no profit, or take up indifferently out of several kinds whichever they please; and they must altogether adopt in worshipping God that manner and mode by which God himself has shown that he wills to be worshipped. » But liberty of worship breaks this bond of society towards God. Therefore.

Proof. 3° from the ultimate end of civil society. If indeed its proximate end is to provide for the temporal goods and felicity of its members, its ultimate end is the same which was appointed by God for rational creatures, namely that individual men attain eternal salvation.

The same Pontiff proves this in the same place thus: « Holy must the name of God be held among princes, and it must be placed among their chiefest duties to embrace religion with favor, to guard it with benevolence, to shield it with authority and the sanction of laws, and to institute or decree nothing contrary to its welfare. This they owe also to the citizens over whom they preside. For we are born and received into being for a certain supreme and ultimate good, towards which all counsels are to be referred, placed in the heavens beyond this frailty and brevity of life. But since upon this depends the felicity of men, everywhere complete and perfect, therefore to attain the end mentioned is of such great concern to each one that nothing can be of greater concern. Civil society, therefore, born for the common utility, in safeguarding the prosperity of the republic must consult citizens in such a way that, by obtaining and acquiring that supreme and unchangeable good which they spontaneously desire, not only should no disadvantage ever accrue, but every opportunity possible should be brought forward. Of these the chiefest is that care be given to religion, to be preserved holy and inviolate, whose offices join man to God. » But liberty of worship subverts this end. Therefore.

Proof. 4° from the condemnation repeatedly inflicted upon this doctrine by the supreme Pontiffs.

1° Pius VI, in the epistle addressed to Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld and the other prelates of France, on 10 March 1791, exclaims: « What more insane thing could be devised than to establish such equality and liberty among all [forms of worship]? »

2° Leo XIII commemorates the doctrinal judgment delivered against liberty of worship by Gregory XVI, sanctioning it, in the above-praised Encyclical: « Thus Gregory XVI, by the encyclical letter beginning Mirari vos, of 15 August in the year 1832, struck down with great weight of judgment those things which were then being preached: that no choice need be employed in divine worship; that it belongs integrally to each one to judge of religion as he prefers; that each one's conscience alone is his judge. »

3° There was related above the judgment of Pius IX, by which he calls that system « horrible », and « repugnant in the highest degree even to the natural light of reason itself ».

4° The same Leo XIII, in the same place, equates the principle of the equality and liberty of worship with indifferentism and atheism: « To think concerning religion, he says, that there is no difference between dissimilar and contrary forms, this plainly has this outcome, to refuse to approve any by judgment, to refuse any by use. But this, if it differs from atheism by name, differs nothing in reality. For those who are persuaded that God exists, provided they wish to be consistent and not utterly absurd, necessarily understand that the customary forms in divine worship, so great is their difference, and their dissimilarity and conflict even about the greatest matters, cannot all equally be probable, equally good, equally acceptable to God. »

5° This system is condemned most expressly in the Syllabus of the principal errors of our age, whose value and authority the same Leo XIII expresses thus, in the same place: « Pius IX, as opportunity offered himself, marked several of the false opinions which had begun to prevail most widely, and afterwards ordered the same to be gathered into one collection, so that, namely, amid so great a flood of errors Catholic men might have what they might follow without offense. » Further, in the Syllabus, among the errors which are referred to the liberalism of today, the three following propositions are enumerated and noted as condemned: LXXVII: « In this age of ours it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion be held as the one religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship whatsoever. » Alloc. Nemo vestrum, 26 July 1853. — LXXVIII: « Hence it has been laudably provided by law in some regions bearing the Catholic name, that it shall be lawful for men immigrating thither to hold the public exercise of their own respective form of worship. » Alloc. Acerbissimum, 27 September 1852. — LXXIX: « Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power given to all of manifesting any opinions and thoughts openly and publicly, conduce to the corrupting of the morals and minds of peoples more easily, and to the spreading abroad of the pestilence of indifferentism. » Alloc. Nunquam fore, 15 December 1856. Which proposition is related by Leo XIII as condemned among the notes with which the Encyclical Immortale Dei is adorned.

Hence resolve:

1° A Catholic prince or legislator is bound to impede the free exercise of the worship of sects by all the means he can.

The truth of this conclusion is clear, both from the preceding arguments and authorities, and from this reason, namely that, if it is not permitted to the legislator to indulge lesser vices, much less can he favor those which universally pervert minds, corrupt morals, undermine the very foundations of the republic, and moreover, which is the gravest of evils, turn subjects away from their ultimate end, that is, from the attainment of eternal felicity.

2° But since in human affairs it is not permitted to pursue a good except insofar as the circumstances of things allow, if greater evils ought to arise from the violent suppression of an unhappily introduced liberty, it can be tolerated by the public authority, provided it be restrained within due limits, until it can be wholly removed without grave danger. Thus is to be understood what Pius VI wrote in the above-praised epistle: « Let us consider the difference which intervenes between men who have always been outside the bosom of the Church, such as infidels and Jews, and between those who subjected themselves to the Church herself through the sacrament of baptism received. For the former ought not to be constrained to the profession of Catholic obedience; but on the contrary the latter are to be compelled, » supposing indeed that good ought to prevail over evil. And the same Leo XIII says without limitation in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: « Nor does a just cause arise, he says, for anyone to accuse the Church, either of being confined more than is right in lenity and facility, or of being hostile to that liberty which is genuine and legitimate. In truth, if the Church judges that it is not licit for the various kinds of divine worship to exist by the same right as the true religion, she does not therefore condemn those moderators of commonwealths who, for the sake of attaining some great good or of prohibiting some evil, patiently suffer by custom and usage that those forms each have place in the state. And she is accustomed to guard this also most greatly, that no one be compelled unwillingly to embrace the Catholic faith, because, as Augustine wisely warns, Tract. XXVI in Ioann., n. 2, « Man cannot believe unless he wills. »

This the Angelic Doctor likewise teaches and excellently demonstrates, this q. 10, a. 11, c.: « Human government, he says, is derived from divine government, and ought to imitate it. God, however, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits certain evils to come to pass in the universe, which he could prevent, lest, those being removed, greater goods should be taken away, or even worse evils should follow. Thus therefore in human government those who preside rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be impeded, or even lest worse evils be incurred, as Augustine says in book II de Ordine, cap. 4, num 2: « Remove the prostitutes from human affairs, and you will confound everything » with lusts. Thus therefore, although infidels sin in their rites, they can be tolerated, either on account of some good which proceeds from them, or on account of some evil which is avoided. From the fact, however, that the Jews observe their rites, in which of old the truth of the faith which we hold was prefigured, this good proceeds, that we have testimony of our faith from enemies, and that there is represented to us as it were in figure that which we believe: and therefore they are tolerated in their rites. But the rites of other infidels, who bring no truth or utility, are not to be tolerated in any degree, except perhaps to avoid some evil, namely to avoid the scandal or discord which could proceed from this, or the impediment to the salvation of those who, thus tolerated, are gradually converted to the faith. For this reason the Church sometimes tolerated the rites of heretics and pagans, when the multitude of infidels was great. » That which is said here of the Jews is confirmed by example; for the Roman Pontiffs have always, on account of the reasons here set forth, tolerated them in the city of Rome and have even protected them with their protection.]

The certain rule is that these rites are not to be permitted by Christians to subject infidels without a most grave cause.

The most grave causes, however, are twofold: to avoid greater evils, or lest a greater good be impeded. So the Theologians commonly with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 10. art. 11. et St. Bonau. locis allegandis. So Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Card. Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 4.; Bassaeus v. Fides, 2. num. 9.

I assert first, that for the causes adduced, subject infidels can be tolerated by Christian Princes.

It is proved from the Saintly Doctor, opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7., from that word of Matth. 13., where the Father of the family, expostulated with about eradicating the Zizanias, answered: Non: ne forte eradicetis et triticum. Sinite utraque crescere, etc. — No: lest perhaps you root up the wheat also. Suffer both to grow, etc. For this is the general rule, observed at that time by Pontiffs and Kings, lest seditions and confusions boil up in the Church. For thus God also tolerates certain evils for these causes, as Tanner. notes after St. Bonau. in 1. dist. 47. quaest. 3., where he infers our conclusion, certainly for this reason, because our goods ought to have their exemplars in God.

I assert second, that for this cause also the Jews are tolerated, both because as it were shadows they confirm the truth of our faith, and they exhibit the sacred Books to us for convincing the Pagans. So it is had in can. Qui sincera, dist. 45. et St. August. l 8. de ciuit. cap. 46. The legitimate Books of the old testament are indeed to be received from them, but the truly Talmudic, Cabalistic, and similar ones, vomiting forth insults against Christ, are to be given to the flames, as was long ago decreed by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Julius III, Paul IV, and recently by Clement VIII.

I assert third, that outside these cases subject infidels are not to be tolerated. So it is defined in the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 15. Elibertino; cap. 44. et Clem. un. de Iudaeis, et Saracenis, et leg. Nemo, C. de Paganis.

It is proved from Suarez disp. 18 sect. 4.; Tannero disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Lugo disp. 19 sect. 2. §. 4.; by the argument of St. Bonau ad Psal. 118. cap. 2. vers. 11., expounding that word of Matthaei 20: Principes gentium dominantur eorum — The princes of the nations lord it over them; because they are bound to remove their subjects from the perdition of souls, from scandals, and to promote them to good. For this reason Constantine burned the Temples of the Pagans and forbade the sacrifices; and he is praised by the Saints, Ambr. epist. 30. August. epist. 48. 50. et 104., and Nicephorus lib. 8. cap. 33. et de Iouiniano lib. 10. cap. 39. et Theodosio lib. 12. c. 25. relates it; thus Josias, Ezechias, Iosaphat are praised, who took away the high places, 3. et 4. Reg., and others are blamed who did not take them away, as St. August. epist. 50. notes.

Here they ask: whether a Prince can grant a safe-conduct to infidels without a faculty of the Pontiff.

Hurtadus answers, disp. 79. sect. 5., that it can be granted to unbaptized infidels; not to heretics, who are subjects of the Church.

Therefore, notwithstanding any safe-conduct of the Kings, the Church can punish heretics, as the Council of Constance defines, sess. 19.; yet if she herself has given the safe-conduct, she is bound to keep it: as the Master Joannes Marq., the Augustinian, teaches, lib. 2. de gubernatore Christiano. cap. 24., who on pagina 301. says that faith is to be kept with them, especially when confirmed by oath.

IV. The Scientific or the Religious Ideal. Scientific and Religious Liberty : Their

Alleged Antagonism.

Summary : Is the scientific ideal opposed to the religious ? —Error of M. Bouché-Leclercq.—Exact notion of scientific theories : their object and their ambition.— The complete work of the scientist. — Though not disregarded by religion, scientific theories can neither confirm nor contradict it.—Impossibility of conflict between religion and natural sciences.—Objection founded on the alleged conflict with history and philosophy. — Incomplete answer. — Science is not the supreme good.—Sacrifices often asked of it.—Insignificance of those which religion asks of it accidentally.—Abundant compensation. — Parallel functions of science and religion. — The habit of faith not inconsistent with the scientific spirit.—Humanity needs both science and religion.—The problem of their reconciliation difficult, but important.

The copious literature of Tolerance has been recently enriched by a book written in France by a professor of the Sorbonne, entitled L’Intolérance Religieuse et la Politique. We have already quoted it. Its author, M. Bouché-Leclercq, is one of the survivors of rationalistic Liberalism. Though he repudiates religion, he does not approve of the open war between the Church and the State ; and he even proposes a modus vivendi, pressing rather heavily, it is true, on Catholics. However, he augurs very ill for the future of the faith and positive religions. No reconciliation between science and revelation appears to him possible, for he declares that there is “ an essential contradiction between the scientific ideal, which is the unremitting pursuit of truth through a succession of temporary or provisional theories, and the ideal of positive religions, which is the preservation of truth already acquired, and henceforth unassailable.”¹

¹ Op. cit., p. 354. 2 Quoted above, p. 232.

If the conflict between science and positive religions were as implacable as he declares, the modern world, which is entirely on the side of science, and the State which represents it, instead of begging concessions of tolerance from religion, would set to work to persecute it; or at most they would grant a temporary and, so to speak, compassionate tolerance to the Church and to Catholics, as to a set of old-fashioned persons, clinging to a transitory expression of religious sentiment: their good-nature would go no farther.

Happily this is not the case—the essentiality of the contradiction is imaginary ; so, indeed, is the contradiction itself, as we shall endeavour to prove. M. Bouché-Leclercq is mistaken, both as to religion and as to science.

What does he mean by his provisional theories ? Is he using unsuitable and inexact language ? Does he wish, in the interests of science, to associate himself with M. Payot2 in proclaiming the necessity of the relativist principle ? He cannot do it without falling into that absolutism of statement which he so unreasonably condemns. Relativism is no more a postulate of science than stagnation is a postulate of religion.

Does M. Bouché-Leclercq speak of the provisional theories of the natural sciences in the proper sense of the word ? The ideal of these sciences does not by any means consist in the pursuit of a truth which is continually escaping from our grasp ; and, on the other hand, the religious ideal is not the mere preservation of acquired truths. The acquired truth of religion is composed of a limited number of dogmas, derived from Divine revelation; but their clear understanding has sometimes taken centuries of work and preparation. Similarly, every science has its acquired truths¹ and its provisional theories. But these do not imply any attitude with regard to truth, different from the attitude of revealed religion, for the good and sufficient reason that, being entirely directed to the exact representation of external phenomena, they do not aim at the acquisition of absolute truth.

¹ Such are the results derived from experiments ; and such, also, is a part, very difficult to define, of physical theories, of which M. Duhem says : “ By a continuous tradition, every theory of physical science transmits to that which follows it that part of natural classification which it has been able to construct ” (La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure, p. 48. See also Physique de Croyant, p. 41).

Poincaré similarly says : “ At first sight it seems as if theories lasted only for a day ; but there is something in them which survives. If one of them has enabled us to discover a real relation between two things, that relation is finally acquired, and we shall find it again in a new form in the later theories which follow to take the place of the former ” (La Valeur de la Science; Paris, 1905).

Formerly, no doubt, and even fifty years ago, scientists put forward their theories as explanations, some certain and others conjectural, of the real truths concealed beneath the phenomena whose laws they recorded. Acoustics asserted and demonstrated the undulations which produce sound ; with reference to the propagation of light, various hypotheses were made, the most important of which were the emission or corpuscular theory and the undulatory theory. According to the latter, all bodies were supposed to be filled by an extremely subtle elastic medium called ether, through which waves of light were constantly throbbing ; but since then modern scientists, tired of fruitless strife and defeat, have ceased to look to their methods of observation for what those methods cannot teach them. Their theories are constructed, not to explain phenomena, but to represent and classify and generalize them, and to foresee the conditions of their recurrence, and thus to group them into rational systems, by which much mental labour is saved and the investigators are put on the track of new discoveries. They do not go deep enough to discover real causes, but in their places put symbols between which the same relations exist as would exist between the realities which are represented by those symbols in their statements and calculations.

For example, the theory of luminous vibrations does not assert any real motion, but it provides an excellent basis to express in figures the experimental laws of light. Its value consists in the precision with which it represents a great number of laws. It establishes between luminous phenomena a logical connection which gives it its beauty, and it exhibits its fecundity in the various deductions which are drawn from it. Though superior to other theories less simple, less complete, or less exact, it does not profess to exclude them as false, so long as they remain in sufficient correlation with the phenomena of which they are the signs and symbols ; for the vibratory theory, like the electro-magnetic theory, which tends to replace it, not pretending to tell us anything of the real causes of the luminous phenomena, does not present itself as objectively true or objectively false. “ The object of Fresnel was not to know whether there is such a medium as ether, whether it is formed of atoms or not, or whether these atoms move in this or that direction: it was to foresee the optical phenomena.”¹ This conception of scientific theories attracts scientific men of the sceptical school like H. Poincaré,² and of the Christian school like M. Duhem.³ The scientific ideal ceases, then, to be the pursuit of ontological truth, and becomes the reduction of all partial theories to unity ; and these succeed one another provisionally, because they are symbolical, and they must necessarily be continually modified and completed to fit in with new discoveries.

¹ H. Poincaré, La Science et l’Hypothèse, pp. 189, 190. Before this he had said : “ We are not concerned whether ether really exists ; that is the business of metaphysicians ” (Leçons sur les Théories Mathématiques de la Lumière, Preface ; Paris, 1889).

² See Sur la Valeur Objective des Théories Physiques (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1902, p. 263). “ The scientific fact,” says Poincaré, “ is nothing but the bare fact translated into appropriate language.” And again : “ Science is principally a classification, a way of connecting facts ... a system of relations ” (La Valeur de la Science, pp. 231, 265, 266).

³ See the work, La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure ; and the pamphlet, Physique de Croyant, written in answer to the article of M. Rey, quoted below, p. 288.

With these remarks, we may take leave of M. Bouché-Leclercq. His assertion holds good only as long as he⁴ clings to an antiquated scientific ideal, now almost abandoned. But modern conceptions furnish us with new material, which may be utilized to put an end to the old quarrel between science and religion.

⁴ In company with M. Le Dantec, who, with thorough Breton tenacity, seeks to know from biology what life is, and so puts forward his Biologie destructive in opposition to religion. See his Conference, Biologie Constructive et Biologie Destructive, given at the jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 308-318). “ When a scientific theory professes to tell us what heat is, or what electricity is, or what life is, it is condemned beforehand ” (Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science, p. 267).

Science is one thing, the scientist another. In practice the latter oversteps the limits of the former ; for who is there who does not yield to what M. Rey¹ calls the common temptation to do a little metaphysics ? And so we may say that the scientist proceeds by three stages, which we may compare to the three stories of a building. In the first we have the exact observation of facts and experimental laws—facts and laws which have their phenomenal reality, and communicate their objective value to the statements in which they are expressed ; in the second, we come to the rational classification of these facts and laws— the theoretical interpretation. Without expressing any opinion on the real facts, this interpretation supplies a logical, convenient, and suggestive representation by symbols. This is the work which properly belongs to science, and secures all its benefits. Lastly, these same theories, and sometimes also extra-scientific prejudices, lead scientists to set up a second series of hypotheses concerning the reality underlying the phenomena, so much the more clearly cherished because they seem as if arising spontaneously from the representative theories founded on experience. The scientist will thus become an atomist or a dynamist in cosmology ; a materialist or a determinist in natural history ; a transformist in biology. But we must remark that not one of these hypotheses is strictly contained in the physical theories or their manifold applications. They are formulated only by the aid of metaphysical principles or postulates, and the philosophic scepticism of many scientists leads them to neglect the prudent counsels of this other branch of human knowledge. They hope to deduce everything from experience, but unconsciously they overstep its teaching, and for want of philosophic discernment they proceed by guesswork to fill up the gap, which is sometimes very wide, between the theories and their hypothetical conclusions on man and the universe.

¹ La Philosophie Scientifique de M. Duhem (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1904, p. 699).

Take, for example, the naturalist, and watch him at his work. He will apply himself in the first place to the careful consideration of actual organisms and reproductions. Comparative studies of living beings will lead him to a theoretical systematization, in which all the species observed by him will occupy their logical place, in which compartments will be reserved even for intermediaries not yet discovered, but which the series of beings seems to demand, as the calculations of Leverrier postulated a new planet. That is strictly scientific work—the only work indispensable to progress in scientific discovery. The naturalist, however, following his natural inclination to announce as an established fact what is really only a hypothesis, will easily discover ontological relations between species which seem logically to be connected, and will proclaim that one is derived from the other. He will declare himself a transformist, but he will make this declaration, not as a scientist, but in the name of a parasitic philosophy which he has grafted on his science.¹

¹ It is much less as a scientist that M. Le Dantec declares that he “ abandons the language of humanity in the strictest sense ” and reduces man, soul included, to a mere piece of automatic machinery. He boasts of his destructive biology, which, as he says, does not teach him to live well, but only to live without the fear of death (Biologie destructive, Biologie constructive, Conference quoted above). There is neither science nor philosophy here. The two preceding speakers, Poincaré and M. Lanson, had used much more reserved and more scientific language.

These preliminary explanations suggest a very important question : At what stage are those contacts produced which are so incorrectly called the conflicts between science and religion ?

On the first story of our scientific building peace and good understanding prevail. Nothing appears possible beyond a little friction, a slight temporary and accidental irritation. In fact, no philosophical or religious doctrine could for long deny or contradict observations founded on palpable evidence. Poincaré wittily observes that Galileo and the Grand Inquisitor were not at issue on a question of fact;² but the same scientist is wrong in saying that a man, when he puts on his working clothes and enters his laboratory, must leave his faith behind him.³ It will be a delicate task to discover the points of intersection between observation and the scientific theory which accompanies it, for the proposition which formulates a scientific fact or law “ is generally a mixture of experimental discovery, possessing objective importance, and of theoretical explanation, simply symbolical, without any objective significance.”¹ M. Duhem adds that if a natural philosopher desires to speak of an optical phenomenon, he will speak of the vibrations of ether ; in other words, he will express the phenomenon in the language of his favourite theory.

² La Valeur de la Science, p. 231.

³ Le Libre Examen en Matière Scientifique, Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 285-295). The reference is specially to p. 288.

¹ Duhem, Physique de Croyant, p. 27. 2 Ibid., p. 19.

On the second story — that is, in the stage of theories—science and faith cannot come into conflict, because the scientific theory affirms nothing concerning objective reality. “ By its own nature and essence every principle of theoretical physics is useless in metaphysical or theological discussions.”2 And in this sense we may assent to the statement of M. Lanson : “ If there is not a German science, or a French science, or a Belgian science, but one science common to all nations, still less is there a science of a party, a monarchist or Republican science, a Catholic or Socialist science.”³

³ L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode de l’Histoire littéraire. Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 296-307 ; see p. 306).

Does this mean that the philosopher or the theologian can despise scientific theories ? Poincaré would perhaps condemn the pretensions of metaphysical research, for, according to him nothing can enable us to know the nature of things.⁴ As for ourselves, who give its due place to philo-sophy, we believe also in a harmonious correspondence of the classifying genius with the Spirit which has created that genius and all other things. We admit instinctively and, as it were, necessarily between the reality of things and their ideal classification certain analogies, closer and more probable according as the classification is more comprehensive and perfect. The plan which is formed as the result of scientific observations tends to reproduce the original plan on which all things were created. “ Every branch of learning appears to me a praiseworthy effort directed towards knowledge of the order which presides over a determinate category of phenomena.”¹ Thus the scientific theory creates a prejudice favourable or unfavourable to a philosophical or religious doctrine, but nothing more. We remember that in these scientific theories the scientist treads ground on which he is independent, in which he need not hope for or fear any clashing with religion.

⁴ La Valeur de la Science, p. 266.

¹ A. de Lapparent, La Recherche Scientifique, et la Foi. Letter to the Revue Pratique d’Apologétique, t. 2, p. 267.

The highest story only is the stage on which science and religion are brought into contact and relation, and sometimes into conflict.

This is enough to reassure mere unscientific mortals. This upper story, as we have seen, is not one of discoveries or inventions ; the scientist has not constructed it as a scientist. Even if the atmosphere there is troubled, and a wind of discord blows through, there is no reason to tremble for that earthly happiness or progress about which human nature shows such eagerness and anxiety. It is never with science properly so called that religion can find itself in conflict, but with something that we may call meta-science. The pretended conflicts of science and religion have never existed, except between religion and a certain philosophy that calls itself scientific.

This is enough to show that impiety has only misused the popularity of science in order to attack the faith or to make unlimited tolerance an essential condition of progress. Neither the act of faith nor submission to doctrinal authority need disturb the scientist in his truly scientific work.

There remains, it is true, his metaphysical work. For those branches of natural science which are devoted to the exploration of the material world with such valuable results, this is negligible, or of only secondary importance. It engages the attention principally of conceited inquirers, who hope to bring out of the facts of science either speculative answers on the nature and origin of life, ideas, and morals, or practical rules for the direction of our individual and social energy, the formulae of our duties, the key to our happiness.¹ Certainly, in all departments of knowledge strictly scientific inquiries and objective perceptions remain independent of metaphysical or religious doctrines. This remark applies also to psychology, and even to mysticism, in so far as they are experimental.² Nevertheless, hitherto the interest of observations of the psychical order has been identified with that of spiritualist or determinist teachings, and of supernatural or naturalistic explanations which inquirers rightly or wrongly professed to deduce from them. Few biologists or psychologists, and perhaps no sociologist, have confined themselves within the special limits of science.

¹ To this class belong those attempts to form a so-called “ scientific ” code of morality, which professes to do without the help even of philosophy. But these are no longer in fashion, and at present M. Durkheim is almost the only person to plead the cause of a moral code founded exclusively on science.

² “ The object of experimental psychology,” Father Maréchal forcibly remarks, “ is to deduce the laws of the relations of mental phenomena, but not to discover the ontological causes of the phenomena themselves ” (Le Sentiment de Présence, chez les Profanes et les Mystiques). Speaking of mystical phenomena, the Abbé Pacheu adds : “ The observation and description of facts, if men are well informed, cannot but be the same for all ” (L’Expérience Mystique et l’Activité Sub-consciente, p. 301). M. Delacroix, the secular writer who has the reputation of being the best informed on these sacred matters, writes to the author : “ As you say, it is not the part of psychology either to acknowledge or to deny the supernatural ” (ibid., p. 305).

There remain also history and historical criticism, in reference to which Renan says : “ Religions present themselves as facts, and must be discussed as facts.”¹ How can we gainsay this ? The speculative, moral, or social conclusions of certain writers who have a great reputation as philosophers or scientists, and also their historical conclusions, frequently come into contact with religious dogmas or assertions which necessarily depend on those dogmas, or at least with theories, beliefs, and opinions which are accredited and in favour in the Church, and these contacts are by no means always friendly.

¹ Discourse in answer to Pasteur’s discourse on admission to the French Academy. M. Bouché-Leclercq similarly says : “ However high they soar, revealed religions take their standing-ground on the earth, and they are bound to show the time and place at which the revelation they assert was made. And it is on this point that they have to justify themselves before historical criticism.”

Full liberty of expression and diffusion is claimed for every formal declaration put forth in the name of science, and the intolerance of the Church refuses it to science. Every scientist is called upon to give up preconceived ideas. The Catholic has his freedom of thought limited by his faith. Here is intolerance, here is slavery, which furnish the modern world with weapons against all authoritative religion.

Is it sufficient, in order to dispose of the first objection, to answer that a true dogma cannot contradict a truth of reason, and that therefore the religious barrier forbids nothing to scientists but error ? There is a double reply at once. Man can only make progress by groping his way. He fails before he succeeds ; he passes through error to arrive at the truth ; he must be allowed freedom to make unsuccessful attempts, or even wrongly to contradict articles of the Creeds. And, on the other hand, religious authority does not impose dogmas alone. It blocks the way by propositions not yet defined, but which it considers important to its cause ; it makes us subject not only to an infallible Pope, but also to Commissions and Congregations which are liable to error ; and in this connection men will triumphantly point to a small number of censures passed upon propositions which are nowadays universally accepted.

The page which bears the names of Catholic men of science is very glorious to the Church, and very useful for our argument ; but it is going a little too far to profess that it supplies a complete refutation of the objection. Certainly, we thoroughly appreciate the warning which Poincaré gave to an assembly of freethinkers : “ Do not imagine that I wish to deny science to men of faith, and especially to Catholics. God forbid ! I should not be such a fool as to deprive humanity of the services of a Pasteur.” And we are glad to hear him admit that “ believers have as much of the critical spirit as any other men.” “ I know many,” he added, “ and Pasteur is only the most illustrious among them.”¹

¹ Conference quoted, p. 288.

Again, it may be asked whether these Christians were not scientists in spite of their religion ; whether they have not had to overcome difficulties and obstacles in order to gain their reputation ; whether they do not owe their distinction to the emancipating influence of their environment. Perhaps, also, they are famous in those branches of science which have nothing to do—at least, at the present day—with religious questions, such as pure mathematics and astronomy. In such matters there would be no possibility of conflict with religion.

For this reason these answers appear to us incomplete, though we do not say that they are entirely devoid of truth. Some concession seems to be required, and our mind cannot be satisfied except by rising to a plane higher than that in which the difficulty lies.

It may be that in some departments of science in which the interests of religion are directly involved religion requires from scientists precautions which may entail sacrifices. It may call upon them to move slowly and carefully, and not to throw things into complete disorder ; and thus it to some extent hampers their investigations, and puts some restriction on their movements. Will it never go farther than is required ? Will the judgment of those who speak in the name of religion be so sound, so comprehensive, and at the same time so promptly given, as to place no unnecessary restriction on liberty ? Will their intention even be always so pure and honest as to take no counsel but from the light of reason ? We cannot expect such perfection of judgment and intention in every case without looking for a miracle which is nowhere promised, and forgetting the traditional symbol of the Church—a boat tossed on the waves of a stormy sea. The qualified representatives of the Church, and still more its self-constituted defenders, are but men. Their knowledge may be small, their prudence may be outwitted, even their virtue may fail. Their interference will sometimes be awkward, inopportune, or exaggerated. Excessive zeal, after all, should surprise us less and distress us less than the moral scandals from the pain of which God has not spared His Church.

This we grant freely and sincerely, but in making this admission we feel that we are the more justified in protesting against the absurd pretension implied in the complaint against religion and the Church. Science and all its branches and all its advances are represented as blessings so precious that they are worth purchasing at the price of any loss or sacrifice, while religion is a useless thing that is not deserving of the least attention. Unless they maintain some such proposition, our readers will admit that the famous objection as to the conflict between religion and science cannot be sustained, and that it leaves untouched our principles and our conclusions on the subject of tolerance and religion.

To explain. On a concrete question, let us reason without passion or prejudice—in other words, let us adopt what is called a scientific attitude.

If Science impersonate could appear before us, Religion and Science might well join hands, for what would religion have to fear ? Science, in the full light and in peaceful possession of truth, would not sin by impatience, or be in too great a hurry to reveal her secrets; but instead of a personification, we have only the disciples of Science, the best of whom call themselves eternal beginners, always labouring at the construction of a monument which is never completed, and in which every successive course of stones is only laid finally after many fresh beginnings.

If scientists themselves (all dogma set aside) had that interior liberty of which Poincaré makes a duty ; if they possessed those qualities which M. Lanson eloquently describes—“ disinterested desire for information, sincere probity, laborious patience, submission to facts ; if they were not too ready to believe either in themselves or in others ; and if they had a continual desire for criticism, control, and verification,”¹ we should be almost ready to vote with the famous philosopher for the suppression of all barriers. Not a single barrier is raised without cost, and all are irksome. Men of the character we have just described would give to religion and to society itself guarantees of perfect security. But, unfortunately, Poincaré dare not promise us or even expect complete freedom from prejudice among scientists. He recognizes the frauds which have given Haeckel such an unfortunate notoriety ;¹ while Madame Curie has shown us that scientists, in their pursuit of truth, do not necessarily forget all other desires; and the orator who followed Poincaré at Brussels condescended to go into details : “ Scientists and ourselves have in common all the same human weakness, the same short sight, the wavering attention, the blind passions, the same inability to put ourselves in another person’s place, the perpetual risk of deceiving ourselves and of being deceived.”2

¹ Lanson, Conference quoted, p. 299.

¹ Conference quoted, p. 290. 2 Ibid., p. 298.

There is no close corporation of scientists : the first comer is permitted to usurp the title ; and these are the men who claim entire freedom to write or say anything they please.

It must be admitted that entire freedom is no longer insisted upon with the same distinctness, and when to the question whether there are doctrines which are socially dangerous, and of which society can get rid as it gets rid of criminals, Poincaré replies, “ No lie can be ultimately advantageous,”³ he practically assumes without any justification that all doctrines are so many truths.

³ Ibid., p. 290.

We also think that no lie can be ultimately advantageous, and precisely for that reason we would not refuse to the civil power the right to protect itself against the propagation of falsehood and error.

Is not the remark which M. Lanson makes as a literary critic equally applicable in other matters ? He says : “ We have been too much inclined to believe that it was sufficient to have ideas, and have not fully realized that literature, like everything else, requires ideas that have been proved to be true.”¹

¹ L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode d’Histoire Littéraire, p. 304.

But if this is the fact, and if it is really impossible to identify scientists with science and ideas with truth, then all the liberty which Poincaré claims for science and all the good that he says of harmless truth unfortunately does not apply, even from the scientific point of view, to those who call themselves scientists or to what they call their ideas.

It is perfectly natural and intelligible that a Government anxious for the public welfare should be disturbed by the social repercussions of so many fanciful theories, that are labelled “ scientific ” just as easily as London merchants used to label their English goods “ made in Germany,” because German goods were in fashion. And how much more is the prudent and even protective action of the Church justified ! Charged with the spiritual interests of a multitude easily scandalized and easily led away, is she wrong in taking care that scientific novelties shall not be introduced without any control or examination ? Is she wrong in refusing to risk the higher life of souls for an advantage which is always less important, and sometimes problematical ? The personal dignity of every man forbids that dangerous experiments shall be made even on the vilest bodies in the interests of medicine or surgery. Is it not the part of a wise democracy to forbid the dangerous experiments in social or educational matters which modern sociologists or educators would like to try, as it were in anima vili, on the people or their children ?

This argument is not weakened by the optimistic view which prophesies a final victory for truth, for, while we are waiting for that victory to be won, error will have disturbed many souls, driven many more to utter ruin, and produced irreparable disasters.

But do not the restrictions of liberty tend to embarrass and retard the progress of science ? Granted ; but even then they are not necessarily condemned, unless we regard the least important scientific discovery as the supreme good of humanity.