Matter, form and minister

THE decree of Eugenius IV, for the instruction of the Armenians, lays down that all the sacraments consist essentially of three things: the matter, the form, and the minister who makes the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does. And, it adds, if any one of these elements be wanting the sacrament is not made. The sacraments, then, are not simple, but composite signs, which consist of two distinct elements. One of these in technical language is called the matter, because it is that portion of the sacramental sign which is the most indeterminate with respect to conveying the meaning which the sacrament signifies. This matter is called remote when considered by itself; it is called proximate when it is taken and applied by the minister to the making of the sacrament. The second element consists of words, and this part is called the form of the sacrament, because the words determine the matter to the more complete signification expressed by the whole sacramental sign. Thus in Baptism the water, considered by itself, is the remote matter of the sacrament and does not necessarily signify washing; water may be used to slake the thirst, and for many other purposes. The application of the water to the person to be baptized is the proximate matter, and when this is done with the form of words, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” the whole composite rite assumes a religious aspect, and signifies, according to the intention of the minister, the washing away of sin from the soul.

The minister of a sacrament must necessarily use the matter and form which were instituted by Christ, for he alone as God-Man has the power to cause grace to be conveyed to the soul by means of sacred rites.

There must be no change made in the matter and form of the sacraments; not even the Church’s authority suffices for that. If a substantial change be made either in the matter or in the form, the sacrament is destroyed. The matter will be substantially changed if in the estimation of ordinary men it is no longer the same, but something else. Thus, if the wine has become vinegar, it cannot be used as the matter of the Eucharist. The form will be substantially changed if the sense is no longer the same, but different. Thus, ‘“ I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ” is the divinely instituted form for Baptism, and if the minister baptize with the words, “I baptize thee in the name of the Trinity ” it is no sacrament, because of the substantial change. It is not lawful to make any change in the matter and form of the sacraments, but if an accidental and not a substantial change be made, so that the matter and the sense of the form remain the same, the sacrament will not be rendered invalid, as a general rule. However, a change which in itself is slight and accidental may be made substantial by the perverse intention of the minister. For the sense may then be quite different, and that different sense is expressed in the form. Thus Pope Zacharias wrote to St Boniface that Baptism administered with the form, Baptizo te in nomine Patria, et Filia, et Spiritus Sancta, is valid when the mistakes are made through ignorance of Latin, and not through heresy or a perverse intention. If, then, such changes were introduced to give expression to heresy, the sense would be substantially changed and the form would be invalidated. Similarly, if Baptism were given with the form “* T baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” the sacrament would be invalid if the minister intended to baptize in the name of the Blessed Virgin as of one of the Persons in the Godhead; if the addition was made through mistaken devotion to the Mother of God the sacrament would not be invalid. On the principles just stated Leo XIII decided that Anglican ordinations are invalid.

What and how many kinds is the matter of the sacraments? - The matter of a sacrament is some thing, or quasi-thing, or some action, determined from the institution of Christ for confecting the sacrament. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 60, a. 5. - This matter is distinguished into remote and proximate. Remote matter is the thing itself to be used in the sacrament, e.g., water in baptism, chrism in confirmation, etc. Proximate matter is the application and use of the thing in the sacramental action, e.g., washing in baptism, anointing in confirmation, bread and wine insofar as they are subjected to the words of consecration in the Eucharist. Therefore proximate matter is matter which, together with the form, constitutes the sensible efficacious sign of grace. A thing or action of this kind has the character of matter in a sacrament, because it is more indifferent and has less perfect signification, and therefore must be determined to signify by something else.

What is the form of the sacraments? - The form of the sacraments is certain words determined from the institution of Christ for perfecting the sacrament by perfecting the signification of the thing or matter. For what things demonstrate more obscurely, words signify more clearly. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 60, a. 6.

Can a sacrament be confected without matter or without form? - Matter and form are altogether necessary for the validity of a sacrament; therefore, if either is lacking, the sacraments cannot be confected. The reason is that a sacrament is and has its power from the institution of Christ. Therefore it cannot be confected except in that mode in which Christ instituted it. This is furthermore established from Florence, Decree for the Armenians, from tradition, and from the practice of the Church. C. Non ut 5 de Bapt.

196. • DEFINITIONS. Matter is the sensible thing to be determined to the nature of a sacrament by the form. Hence matter is that which in the Sacrament is more indifferent, and has a less perfect signification; and therefore it must be determined by another thing for signifying.

Matter is twofold: one remote, and the other proximate. The former is the sensible thing itself which is employed in the Sacrament, or the thing about which the sacramental action is exercised. The latter is the very application or use of the remote matter in the sacramental action.

But form is the part of the Sacrament which determines the matter for effecting the sacrament, and which ordinarily consists in words pronounced by the Minister.

197. Principles. - I. Matter and form are altogether necessary for the validity of a Sacrament; therefore, with either one lacking, Sacraments cannot be confected. The reason is that a Sacrament cannot be confected except in that mode in which Christ instituted it, who alone is the author of the Sacraments. It is of faith. This is clear besides from dogmatic definitions, especially from the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union, etc.

II. In confecting a Sacrament outside a case of necessity, matter and form ought morally to be employed, as far as they can be had ¹, certain. The reason is that, unless necessity urges, it is not permitted to use probability which does not remove the danger of invalidity.

¹ ** To this pertains the first of the propositions proscribed by Innocent XI: It is not illicit in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer opinion having been left aside, unless law, agreement, or danger of incurring grave harm forbids it. Hence an opinion merely probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, of priestly Order, or of episcopal Order.

But the Author aptly adds, as far as it can be had; for where there is question, for example, of the disposition necessary for the sacrament of penance, scarcely anything else can be had concerning it than a certain prudent and probable judgment.

III. Matter and form must be united or applied by the same Minister and toward the same subject. The reason is that if one were to place the matter, and another the form, the words of the form would not be verified; for the Minister who, for example, would say: I baptize thee, while another poured the water, would pronounce what is false, since he himself would not baptize.

IV. ² In order that a sacrament be valid, there must be between the matter and the form, for example between the pouring of water and the pronouncing of the words, so great a conjunction that according to the moral estimation of men, with the nature of each sacrament considered, one affects the other, that is, that the words are judged to fall upon such a thing and to constitute with it one total sign. St. Alphonsus (Lib. 6, n. 8) with Busembaum.

² ** Those things are supplied which Gury seems to promise in the title of the paragraph, but in reality omitted.

From this: 1º In Baptism, Confirmation, Unction, and Order, such a conjunction is required that while the minister pronounces the words, he is morally judged also to wash, etc. Busembaum, ibid. ³.

³ ** Lugo (De Sacram., Disp. 2, n. 99), when about to explain how in the ordination of a Priest moral conjunction is had between the form and the first imposition of hands, which is done while no form is pronounced, discusses this matter thus: The imposition of hands is not so distant from the utterance of the form which afterwards follows, that they are not judged to have sufficient moral nearness; for there ought not to be physical coexistence, as is clear in Deacons, to whom the form is said to all at once, and afterwards they successively touch the book; wherefore if one hundred Deacons were ordained together, without doubt there would be great physical distance between the utterance of the form and the contact of the book with respect to the last; but nevertheless there is sufficient moral presence, because the same action is morally continued without moral interruption. So also after hands are imposed upon Priests, up to those words Receive power, etc., the same moral action is continued, by anointing them and preparing them so that they may more fittingly receive the grace of the Holy Spirit. But afterwards the matter is more explicated and another part of the same matter is applied together with the form: wherefore that distance, whatever it may be, is not so much between matter and form as between part and part of the matter, which certainly need not physically coexist with one another... Wherefore when it is a question of creating a Priest, that whole action by which insignia, vestments, instruments, and other things are solemnly given to him is judged to be one and the same action, just as the coronation of a Pontiff or of a King is drawn out for a long time, and divided into several actions, and interrupted by various solemnities, yet is reckoned the same action.

2º In Penance absolution can be deferred for a sufficiently long time, as in trials a sentence follows after examination of the cause. Busembaum, ibid. ⁴.

⁴ ** St. Alphonsus adds in this place (Lib. 6, n. 9): In this Sacrament such distance ought not to be so great as happens in a forensic trial. If these words merely indicated that it is not necessary that absolution be deferred as long as the sentences of judges sometimes are wont to be deferred in a forensic cause, they would express the most common and certain doctrine. But then the holy Doctor subjoins: But Croix, Lib. 6, n. 8, says with Tamburini, that a penitent is validly absolved after an hour from confession. From these words you might almost gather that according to the mind of the holy Doctor the due conjunction between matter and form is not preserved if such a delay intervenes as sometimes occurs in a forensic trial. And since here the question concerns that conjunction between those two parts of the sacrament which pertains to validity, the matter is certainly of grave moment. - Therefore the words of the holy Doctor are to be understood discreetly. For otherwise the most common opinion of all Doctors is that which Reiffenstuel expresses thus (Tr. 4, Dist. 1, Q. 2, n. 29): In the Sacrament of Penance a much greater distance can be admitted between the accusation of the penitent and the absolution of the priest: since this sacrament is performed by way of judgment; but in judgment accusation is presupposed to absolution, nor is it required that the sentence of the judge be conjoined in time with the accusation of the accused himself. And although all the Doctors use this reason, namely that this sacrament is performed by way of judgment, nevertheless there is found no trace of that limitation which St. Alphonsus suggests. Indeed the Salmanticenses (Tr. 1, Cap. 4, nn. 20 and 28) concede, and even contend, that the conjunction or moral coexistence is fittingly preserved if one who confessed on one day is absolved on another day. But Coninck (ad Q. 60, art. 6, n. 41) writes: In Confession absolution could be deferred for a sufficiently long time; just as in a trial absolution or condemnation is often wont to follow the examination of the cause after a long time. And Henriquez (Lib. 1, Cap. 9, n. 11): In the Sacrament of Penance, because it is a judgment, the matter, which is a human act, is called sufficiently present, although the confession of sins precedes the form by many days. Wherefore Roncaglia refers the reader to those things which are commonly handed down by the Doctors about deferring absolution for penitents. For thus he says (Tr. 16, C. 3, Q. 2, Resp. 2): But because Penance was instituted by way of judgment, in which it is not necessary that the sentence be altogether simultaneous with the confession of the crime, hence it is that absolution can be deferred after the confession has been heard, as will be said in its place. And in reality, whatever delay of absolution you may finally imagine, the two parts of the Sacrament will always have to be judged sufficiently conjoined, as often as it is morally understood that this one judgment is being performed. Thus well Suarez (In 3 Part, Tom. 3, Disp. 2, Sect. 2): In that sacrament that simultaneity suffices which is morally enough that the same judgment be understood to be performed and confirmed by the sentence.

But that which Croix reports from Tamburini (Lib. 6, P. 1, n. 8) is nothing. For Tamburini (De Sacr., Lib. 4, C. 1, § 1, n. 6) merely wishes to indicate the difference which is had concerning the conjunction of matter and form, if there is question of the Sacrament of Penance and of Extreme Unction. Namely, with two cases proposed, he says that an interval of one hour in no way stands in the way in the Sacrament of Penance, but does stand in the way if there is question of Extreme Unction.

3º In matrimony the consent of one can follow the consent of the other so long as this latter consent is judged morally to remain, as in other contracts. Busembaum, ibid.

198. • A twofold change is given both in matter and in form, namely substantial and accidental.

A substantial change will be in the matter if, according to the use and estimation of men, this cannot be called the same as that which was determined by Christ; but in the form, if the sense of the words intended by Christ is changed into another. But an accidental change is called one which concerns only the qualities of the thing, or which does not change the sense of the words. - St. Ligorius, n. 11.

199. Principles. - I. Every substantial change in the matter and form of a Sacrament invalidates the Sacrament, because it is no longer the rite instituted by Christ; and if it is voluntary, it constitutes grave sin, because it inflicts a grave injury upon the author of the rite.

II. No accidental change in the matter and form invalidates a Sacrament; nevertheless it induces grave or light sin, according as it is, or is not, notable.

The form of the Sacraments can be changed in many ways, namely by subtraction of a syllable or of words, addition, variation of language or of words, transposition of words, corruption of the same, for example by changing letters, and interruption. These are shown in the following little verses:

Do not take anything from the form, do not add anything, do not vary anything; Beware of transmuting, corrupting the words, delaying.

But the change will much more easily be substantial at the beginning than at the end of the words, because the sense will more easily be changed for hearers, for example in the name of the mother instead of of the father. In practice beware especially of precipitation.

200. • A threefold rule is to be established:

I. The Sacraments can be repeated whenever there is a prudent doubt concerning their validity. The reason is that if perhaps the Sacrament were not valid, those who approach to receive it would be deprived of its fruit. But that the prudent fear of so great an inconvenience is a sufficient reason why the Sacrament be repeated is clear from the very well-known axiom: The Sacraments are for men.

II. Sacraments generally cannot be repeated without grave sin when there is not present a prudent doubt concerning their validity. The reason is that they would be repeated without cause, and therefore a grave injury would be inflicted upon them.

III. Sacraments ought to be repeated whenever, upon a prudent doubt having arisen concerning their validity, charity, justice, and religion require it, namely whenever the nullity of the Sacrament, if perhaps it were present, would turn to the harm of neighbor and sometimes to the contempt or irreverence of Religion. But then they are to be repeated only conditionally, so that reverence for the Sacrament may be provided for. - Voit, n. 29 and following. - See St. Ligorius, n. 27 and following.

201. You will resolve. - The Sacraments that are more necessary, and that are conferred only once, namely Baptism and Order, are more readily to be repeated, even if a much greater probability militates for the validity of the sacrament against reasons doubtful or slenderly probable in the opposite direction. - Thus commonly.

2º Absolution is to be repeated with a penitent guilty of mortal sin if there is prudent doubt concerning the due pronouncing of the form. But if the penitent is not in the state of mortal sin ⁵, it will not be necessary to repeat the form, since Communion can be permitted to him even without absolution.

⁵ ** Perhaps you would say better: If the penitent has not brought necessary matter; for it certainly can happen that someone is in the state of grace, and nevertheless has matter which must necessarily be subjected to the keys, for example a grave fault omitted in the preceding confession from forgetfulness, which indeed had then been remitted indirectly, but nevertheless still needs absolution.

3º A Minister who lightly doubts, and does not know why he fears, or merely does not reflexively remember that he pronounced the words of the form, sins mortally per se if he repeats the form, or even repeats one word three or four times. The reason is that he changes the form, and introduces a new rite concerning the gravest action of all. Moreover he presents Christ, whom he represents, as speaking ridiculously. In practice, however, scrupulous persons who repeat the form are for the most part excused from mortal sin, indeed often even from venial sin, because, being too agitated by scruples, from perplexity or without advertence, they act thus foolishly. - Thus Voit, n. 27. - Elbel, n. 14. - Gobat, tract. 3, n. 94, etc.

4º If in Mass after consecration a doubt arises for you concerning the due pronouncing of the form, or concerning total omission, you ought and can repeat nothing, since otherwise you are not accustomed to omit these things: for one must judge from what commonly happens, unless, however, you doubt very probably, as the Rubric speaks. - See St. Ligorius, n. 224.

St. Thomas III, q. 60, a. 4 and 6.

9. Notions. - A sign is that through which someone comes to the knowledge of another thing. For this three conditions are required: that it be manifestative, that it express an order to another distinct thing, and that it be known first.

A sign is divided into natural and conventional, according as it leads to the knowledge of another thing by its own nature, as smoke signifies fire and a footprint an animal, or because of a connection arising from positive institution, as an olive branch indicates peace. The conventional sign is twofold: a) arbitrary or at pleasure, which of its nature is wholly indifferent to signifying something: such signs are words, for what we call a house could be called a stone, and vice versa; b) symbolic, which of its nature, independently of positive institution, does not indeed signify another thing, yet of its own nature has an aptitude for signifying this rather than that, on account of some likeness, agreement, or analogy which it has of itself with the thing signified. Thus bodily washing or eating of its own nature has an aptitude for signifying the purification or refreshment of the soul.

10. Principle I. The sacraments, both of the Old and of the New Law, are not natural signs, nor merely arbitrary signs, but for them there are required things which signify symbolically.

It is proved: a) They are not natural signs, because between corporeal and spiritual things there is no natural connection; therefore they are conventional signs from positive institution.

b) They are not merely arbitrary signs but symbolic signs: It is connatural to man that through likenesses of sensible things he come to the knowledge of spiritual things; but the sacred things which are signified through the sacraments are certain spiritual goods by which man is sanctified; therefore it is connatural to man that sensible things be taken as sacraments. But the wisdom of God provides for each thing according to its nature. Therefore it is fitting that the wisdom of God take as sacraments sensible things which have a certain likeness with sacred things. Whence Augustine, ep. 98 to Boniface, n. 9: "If sacraments did not have some likeness to those things of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all."

11. Principle II. For the perfection of the New Law it is required that the sacraments consist of symbolic things and at the same time of words. - This is certain and belongs to Catholic doctrine.¹

¹ This manner of speaking is already employed by Peter Lombard, IV Sentences, d. 1, under D.

It is proved: a) From the Scriptures, for Baptism (Eph. V, 26; John III, 5 and Mt. XXVIII, 19), the Eucharist (Mt. XXVI, 26; Mk. XIV, 22; Lk. XXII, 19), and Extreme Unction (Jas. V, 14, 15); it is perhaps indicated for Order (Acts VI, 6; XIII, 3) and for Confirmation (Acts VIII, 15).

b) From Tradition, whose witnesses are both the Fathers, as for Baptism: Didache, c. 7; Justin, Apology I, 61; Tertullian, Against Praxeas 26; On Baptism 13; Origen, on Romans V, 8; for the Eucharist: Justin, Apology I, 66; Irenaeus, Against Heresies IV, 18, 5; V, 2, 3; Origen, on Matthew XI, 14; for these sacraments and certain others, such as for Confirmation and Order, commonly from the fourth and fifth century, for example Gregory of Nyssa, oration on the Baptism of Christ; especially Augustine, on John tr. 15, n. 4; tr. 80, n. 3; - and all liturgical texts and Rituals, which already exist from the fourth and fifth century and by which it is established that the individual sacraments are composed of things and words; - and Councils, such as the Florentine, decree for the Armenians.

c) By reason of most fitting congruity: The sacraments of the New Law can be considered in a threefold way: 1. on the part of the sanctifying cause, which is the Incarnate Word, to which the sacrament is conformed in a certain way in this, that a word is applied to a sensible thing, just as the Word of God is united to sensible flesh; 2. on the part of the sanctified man, who is composed of soul and body, to whom the sacramental medicine is proportioned, which through the visible thing touches the body and senses, and through the word is believed by the soul; 3. on the part of the sacramental signification itself: words, says Augustine, On Christian Doctrine II, 3, have obtained the primacy of signifying among men, because through words we can express more distinctly what we have conceived in the mind, and therefore for the perfection of sacramental signification it was fitting that the signification of sensible things be determined through some words. For water can signify both washing, because of its humidity, and refreshment, because of its coldness; but when it is said: I baptize thee, it is made manifest that we use water in Baptism for signifying spiritual cleansing.

The aforesaid difference of the sacraments corresponds to the difference of the economy itself of the Old and New Law:

1. The former was less expressed, the latter of clearer signification, according to the Apostle, Heb. X, 1, distinguishing the shadow of heavenly things in the Old Testament, the image of heavenly things in the New, and the heavenly things themselves in glory; whence in the sacraments of the Old Law things sufficed which signified heavenly things rather obscurely and as through a shadow; on the contrary in the New Law a clearer signification as through an image was required, and therefore the sacraments consist of things and words.

2. The signs of a present thing ought to be clearer than the signs of a future thing; but the sacraments of the Old Law were announcements beforehand of Christ as about to come, and therefore they did not so expressly signify Christ, but by things alone, as do the sacraments of the New Law, which proceed from Him and have in themselves a certain likeness of Him, as consisting not of things alone but also of words.² Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus, book 19, cc. 16 and 17.

² In the Old Law words were sometimes employed, but they were merely ceremonial, not sacramental.

12. Principle III. The sacraments of the New Law consist of things and words as of matter and form. - This manner of speaking belongs to the usage received by the Church from the thirteenth century onward,³ which it would not be lawful to disapprove.

³ They generally say that William of Auxerre (d. 1231) first spoke thus in the Summa aurea, composed between 1215 and 1220. Others assign Stephen Langton (d. 1228), as Gillmann, who in Taufe in nomen Jesu and Sakramentenlehre vindicates this against Schanz.

It is proved: The things and words of which the sacraments consist are rightly called matter and form by analogy. For just as corporeal things consist of two really distinct principles, of which 1) one, matter, is indeterminate and imperfect potency (prime matter, - marble), the other, form, is act determining matter to such or such an existence and perfecting it (soul, - the form of the statue); 2) matter is presupposed, form accedes; and thus 3) by the union of these one being is constituted (one living thing, - one statue): so the sacraments consist of two things: 1) of things which signify more confusedly, indeterminately and imperfectly, and of words which signify more distinctly, determinately, perfectly, and which therefore determine the things to some determinate signification, as was declared in the preceding number; 2) the things are presupposed to the words, according to that saying of Augustine, tr. 80 on John, n. 3: "Baptism is consecrated by the word: take away the word and what is water except water? The word accedes to the element and it becomes a sacrament"; 3) by the union of these there is constituted one sacramental sign having one signification.

But since by this formula the very composition of the sacramental sign is indicated at once so aptly and concisely, by the usage of the universal Church, both Greek and Latin, and by the Councils of Constance, art. 22 against Wycliffe and Hus, Florence, decree for the Armenians, and Trent, sess. 14 on penance, c. 2 and 3; on extreme unction, c. 1, it was consecrated.

13. Observations. - 1. Matter and form here are understood as real parts of the sacrament; besides them, metaphysical or logical parts can be assigned, namely: on the one side, the whole sensible thing, consisting of things and words, which is the sign; on the other side, its signification through which it is a sign, which is the metaphysical form of the sacrament, as humanity is in man.

2. From the fact that a sacrament is defined as a conventional sign, it would be badly concluded that it is a mere being of reason, which does not exist except while it is known. It is not indeed a physical being which has its own existence, but a moral and juridical being. Such are obligations, jurisdictions, titles, dignities, deputations, conventional signs: these do not exist except dependently on the ordination of some practical intellect; but that ordination, as long as it is not revoked, remains affixed to the subject. Hence in the things and words of a sacrament together with institution there is present a real foundation, so that it may be conceived as a sign. Therefore although the signification itself is some relation of reason, nevertheless the foundation of this is real, and therefore the sacrament also exists while it is not conceived. In the same way the relation of creator in God is of reason, but in Him and in creatures there is present the foundation that God be called creator, and this foundation is real, for God remains creator even if He is not conceived as such.

3. The things which are the matter of the sacrament are understood not only as exterior things, such as water, chrism, etc., but also sacred rites or sensible human actions, such as washing, anointing, imposition of the hand, confession, etc., because in these there is the same indeterminate ratio of signifying as in things; likewise the words of the form, although regularly they are voices, can be those things which are equivalent to them, as the signs by which a mute person enters marriage.

In particular, the matter and form are: in Baptism, the washing of a man by water, and: I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; in Confirmation, the chrismation of a man on the forehead, and the words: I sign thee with the sign of the cross and confirm thee with the chrism of salvation... or other equivalent words; in the Eucharist, the accidents of bread and wine, and: This is My body, this is My blood, etc.; in Penance, the acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, satisfaction, and the absolution of the priest: I absolve thee...; in Extreme Unction: the multiple anointing, and: May the Lord forgive thee whatever thou hast committed; in Order: imposition of hands or handing over of the instruments, with the appropriate words; in Matrimony, the handing over of bodies and acceptance expressed by words or signs.

4. From the matter out of which the sacramental sign is intrinsically constituted or composed, there must be distinguished, in three sacraments, the extrinsic matter about which the sacrament merely turns: the former is called proximate matter, the latter remote matter. Such is the substance of bread and wine in the Eucharist, sins in Penance, bodies in Matrimony: for although they are prerequired for the sacrament, nevertheless they do not enter into the sensible sign. - In the other sacraments, because they consist in the application or use of a sensible thing, the matter out of which is called remote, namely the thing itself which is applied, for example water, oil; the proximate matter is the application or use of it, for example washing, anointing.

5. From the Council of Florence, teaching in the decree for the Armenians that "the sacraments are perfected," that is, confected, "by things as matter, by words as form, and by the person of the minister with the intention of doing what the Church does," do not conclude that the sacraments are not composed of matter and form: for the Council uses the verb to perfect, because the intention of the minister, which is necessary for effecting the sacrament, does not enter into the composition of the sacramental sign. But if things and words did not compose, they would not stand to each other as matter and form; nor, as Trent says, sess. 14, c. 3, would they be parts of the sacrament, required for its integrity.