Modesty of Conduct

I. Notion of Modesty of Conduct. Modesty of conduct is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the external movements of the body, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith.

II. Object of Modesty of Conduct. The remote material object is all external movements of the body; the proximate object is the passions which are occupied around these movements. From this it is clear that the true virtue of modesty of conduct does not consist only in external moderation, but requires that external moderation proceed from internal moderation of the passions (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 168, a. 1).

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of moderating the external movements of the body; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness which shines forth in moderation of the aforesaid movements and passions.¹

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 154 (t. 6, pp. 499-500).

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed affectation, by which someone attends too much to the external movements of the body, beyond the measure of right reason; by defect, rusticity, by which someone does not attend enough to the same movements, against the prescription of right reason.

Importance of the argument. We ought to be solicitous about exterior conversation and composition itself. For these are subject to our free will. But since through externals we communicate with others, the diligence of virtue can prepare many goods, while negligence and carelessness can lose many goods or even convert them into positively evil things.

But three virtues especially pertain to our matter: exterior Modesty, Affability, and Eutrapelia.

I. On exterior Modesty. A twofold character of it can be distinguished: composition of the body, and exterior furnishing and adornment.

By suitably composing the body, modesty effects that movements and gestures are such as agree with the agent, according to himself, and with the persons with whom he acts, with the affairs which he treats, and with the places in which he lives (2, 2, q. 168 art. 1).

Let exterior furnishing be simple, adapted to honorable custom, lest by excess it offend the souls of others, especially of the poor; let it be stained by no vain glory or evil end. Concerning the adornment of women, St. Thomas observes (2, 2, q. 169 art. 2): a) zeal for pleasing the husband is lawful for a wife; b) the intention of pleasing by the body cannot lawfully be had by women "who do not have husbands, nor wish to have them, or are in a state of not having them"; c) women who adorn themselves so that they provoke others to concupiscence sin gravely; d) "but if it is from a certain lightness, or even from a certain vanity on account of a certain boasting, it is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial."

II. On Affability. Affability is "the virtue by which man is suitably ordered to other men in common conversation, both in deeds and in words, namely, that he has himself toward each one according to what is fitting" (St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 114 art. 1, c.). From this it comes about that man "conducts himself in meetings neither too flatteringly nor too harshly" (Lessius, c. 47, n. 47), but is of pleasing intercourse.

Because it exhibits common signs of that friendship which joins all men among themselves, it is sometimes called friendship.

It does not beget an obligation strictly so called.

Two vices are opposed to it: a) adulation, by which someone too greatly strives in living together to please others. Yet more strictly he is called an adulator who, for the sake of his own utility, approves and praises all things.

b) Moroseness or contention, by which one sins by defect. The morose and harsh "are difficult everywhere, contradictors everywhere, nowhere do they accommodate themselves" (Lessius, ibid., n. 51).

III. On Eutrapelia. This effects that in jests our conversation is pleasing. More generally, it rules the appetite of rest of soul or relaxation after labor, for example through play, taking care lest one recede too much from gravity, and procuring that relaxation "be worthy of the time and the man" (2, 2, q. 168 art. 2). Against this virtue one can sin not only by excess, which nevertheless is more frequent, but also by defect, whether someone without cause deprives himself of the useful seasoning of delight, or especially shows himself burdensome to others and impedes the delights of others (cf. 2, 2, q. 168, art. 4).

I. There is a twofold character of exterior modesty. The one cares for composition of the body, so that movements and gestures are such as agree with the agent, according to himself, and with the persons with whom he acts, with the affairs which he treats, and with the places in which he lives (2, 2, q. 168 art. 1).

The other modesty regards exterior furnishing and adornment (2, 2, q. 169).

II. By affability, man in his common conversation has himself toward all as is fitting for him.

III. Finally, under modesty itself is counted eutrapelia, by which the appetite of rest of soul or relaxation after labor is ruled, for example through play, by taking care that delight not be sought from some evil thing or one harmful to another, that one not recede too much from gravity, and by procuring that relaxation "be worthy of the time and the man" (2, 2, q. 168 art. 2). Against this virtue one can sin by excess, but also by defect, whether someone without cause deprives himself of the useful seasoning of delight, or especially shows himself burdensome to others and impedes the delights of others (2, 2, q. 168 art. 4).

After, in treatise VI of the first volume, we proposed in a general view the aids by which our liberty is assisted, in the present volume we have treated more fully of the nature of the aids which are contained in the virtues.

Therefore we have spoken of the theological virtues, by which we immediately reach God; we have spoken of the moral virtues which are also infused into us so that they may be our good habits adapted to the theological virtues, and so that our new nature, which is sanctifying grace, may be furnished with powers by which our supernatural action can at the same time become connatural. It was permitted to suggest not a few things concerning several gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which we can most promptly yield to God inviting.

But to the moral virtues the divine rule is proposed as to be followed. How much it differs from the human rule, St. Thomas demonstrates by this example: "in the taking of foods, according to human reason, the mode is established so that it not harm the health of the body nor impede the act of reason; but according to the rule of divine law it is required that man chastise his body and reduce it into servitude through abstinence from food and drink, and other things of this kind" (1, 2, q. 63, art. 4).

Indeed, in Christian discipline, the virtues that are most human obtain a summit above the human, to be pursued more fully by some, to be esteemed in mind and followed by acts by all: thus continence is superimposed upon chastity, voluntary poverty upon liberality, mortification upon temperance, contempt of earthly sublimity upon humility.

But what shall we say concerning charity, which in its Christian embrace positively includes even enemies; which, forgetful of itself, considers what belongs to others (Phil. 2:4); by which man loves his neighbor as he himself is loved by Christ?

Those riches have been heaped up in us for working. But with divine powers what work do we have to perform except a divine one?

Therefore those Christians err who ponder an earthly building, in the construction of which they ought merely to attend to avoiding divine offenses.

Reborn in Christ, from water and the Holy Spirit, according to the spirit which we have from God, a building must be raised by us, which at the same time will be ours, Christ's, and others'. Ours, because it will prepare our eternal mansion in the glorious kingdom of God; Christ's, because it will be the work of His grace and will yield to His honor and praise; of other men, because it will be turned to the utility of private persons and of public society. For to those seeking first the kingdom of God and His justice, all these things will be added (cf. Matt. 6:33).

Nor is a division of life into two parts, one supernatural, the other earthly, to be admitted. Almost as fruit-bearing trees so elaborate the seed by which they provide for their own perpetuity that it is surrounded by a savory fruit which, without detriment to the seed, man can pluck and eat, so a structure approved by the divine Spirit cannot be raised by us without offering to others a manifold fruit of beneficence to be gathered.

But these things are unknown by too many, even Christians. Therefore they have to be learned, even from the moral theologian. He, while he furnishes these things, in no way goes beyond the limits of his province. Ought he not to propose and explain moral duties? Now by the law of tending toward sanctity absolutely all, no one excepted, are bound (Rerum omnium, Jan. 26, 1923, concerning St. Francis de Sales). Therefore for our part let us contribute so that very many, conscious of human and Christian dignity, may consider themselves and act as "fellow-citizens of the saints and domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the chief cornerstone, in whom the whole building, being constructed, grows into a holy temple in the Lord" (Eph. 2:19-21).

P. 23, last line: formalum, read formulam.

P. 142, 6th line from below: qua simeditatione, read quasi meditatione.

P. 188, last line: accusationem, read accusatione.

P. 191, line 2: perscrutantur, read perscrutantur.

P. 202, 3rd line from below: suadent, read suadet.

P. 221, 6th line from below: divinis, read divini.

P. 226, line 9: negare, read negari.

P. 437, line 7: jubebatur, read iubebat.

717. Modesty in external things is a moral virtue inclining a man to preserve decorum in external things according to right reason. These external things are: a) movements of the body; b) games; c) clothing and ornaments of the body.

a) Modesty in the external movements of the body is very necessary for pleasant social intercourse. Whence St. Augustine admonishes: "In all your movements let nothing be done which offends the sight of anyone."¹⁴¹⁸ And it is deservedly said in Ecclesiasticus: "A man is known by his appearance, and a sensible man is known by the meeting of his countenance; the clothing of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of a man declare concerning him."¹⁴¹⁹ Therefore writers, both sacred and profane, give many rules concerning the right ordering of the movements of the body. But especially to be avoided are affectation on the one hand and rusticity on the other.

b) Right modesty in games is equally necessary, lest someone be excessively addicted to games with scandal to others and damage to himself. The virtue moderating the right use of play is called eutrapely.¹⁴²⁰

c) Modesty in clothing and the adornment of the body avoids not only all indecency, but also every superfluity or deficiency. Against this modesty one sins:

1. By excess, when adornment, all the conditions of person, place, and time being considered, is either sought with excessive care or acquired at excessive expense. Not a few persons of each sex sin by such excess, who prodigally expend time, labor, and money in procuring excessive adornment. The quantity of sin in such excessive adornment must be weighed from many things: from the scandal arising, from the duties of state injured, and from the evil end intended. Let the confessor and preacher be cautious in admonishing the faithful concerning this matter, because he often exhorts altogether uselessly and causes laughter and indignation rather than a good effect. This indeed holds especially concerning the adornment of women. But if this adornment incites to lasciviousness, then assuredly it is to be sharply censured. Women can lawfully adorn themselves in order to increase their beauty, provided, however, that an honorable end is present and every scandal is absent. Ancient authors spoke more severely concerning cosmetics applied to the face. But apart from scandal and every evil end, there is no reason why cosmetics should be morally evil. A graver difficulty exists concerning the more or less extensive baring of the breast which women are accustomed to employ especially on certain occasions, for example, at great banquets and dances.¹⁴²¹

2. By defect, when someone does not employ due diligence in adornment and clothing.

Let these things said concerning the cardinal virtues suffice. He who desires to learn more should approach St. Thomas,¹⁴²² who, discoursing concerning their dignity, writes: "Among the other [moral] virtues prudence is the greatest, because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man bears himself well not only toward himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man on account of the good despises the dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man on account of the good despises the greatest bodily pleasures."¹⁴²³

¹⁴¹⁸ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1380).

¹⁴¹⁹ Ecclus. 19:26 ff.

¹⁴²⁰ Cf. above, n. 317, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 168, a. 2.

¹⁴²¹ Cf. what was said above, I, n. 613, concerning the adornment of women.

¹⁴²² S. theol. 2, 2, qq. 47-170.

¹⁴²³ Quaest. disp. unic. de virtut. card., a. 3.

S. Th. II-II, q. 168.

1057. Modesty of manners (zedigheid, bescheidenheid) is the virtue tempering the external motions of the body according to the prescriptions of reason, or the virtue preserving decorum in external motions and gestures.

The matter is bodily motion and exterior gesture, presented to the senses, as gait, standing, sitting, motion of the head, contraction and relaxation of the face, movement of the members, voice, laughter, gaze. In these two things especially are to be avoided: that there be anything effeminate or soft, and that there be anything harsh and rustic.¹

¹ Cicero, De Officiis I, 128.

And indeed: the exterior motions of man are free and orderable by reason: for at the command of reason the exterior members are moved; but that which is subjected to the ordering of reason can be ordered well or badly. Therefore it is manifest that concerning the ordering of these motions a moral virtue is to be constituted (a. 1): insofar namely as they can be corrected by the command of reason (ad 2), and are signs of interior disposition (ad 1), which they presuppose (ad 3).²

² Which St. Ambrose describes splendidly, De Officiis I, c. 18-19.

1058. Various modesty. - Modesty imposes the moderation of congruity according to right reason upon external motions and gestures. But the ordering of these motions is considered as to two things: 1. in one way according to the fittingness of the person according to himself (decentia or adornment; voornaamheid); 2. in another way according to fittingness toward other persons, affairs, times, and places (good ordering; geregeldheid). Hence the office is to moderate gait, voice, speech... in such a way that they fit the person both in himself and as placed in such a place, time, and affair, that is, both with respect to the person acting and with respect to exterior things.

And so modesty does not consider exterior motions insofar as they express a relation of debt to another, but insofar as they are to be moderated so that man is well disposed in himself according to the condition of the person acting and the affairs to be performed. Yet because through these motions we live outwardly with others (to whom they can be burdensome and unpleasant), and motions also are for them certain signs of interior disposition, therefore if moderation of exterior motions of this sort is furnished so that someone exteriorly displays himself as he is interiorly, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of truth (to which simulation and hypocrisy are opposed); if so that he offend no one but on the contrary displays himself agreeable and suitable in society, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of affability (to which flattery is opposed by excess, quarreling by defect); nevertheless from both sides it is elicited by the virtue of modesty. From this it is clear that this virtue is very useful for social life, for a good name, and for the edification of neighbor.

1059. Sins opposed to modesty. - To modesty of manners by excess is opposed affectation (gezochtheid), petulance (courtly mannerism) or insolence, which exceeds the prescription of reason in exterior motions and gestures, for example, if someone exceeds the common mode too much, or assumes a foreign mode which does not fit his own condition, as a religious assuming courtly manners. By defect is opposed: rusticity of manners (boersheid, onbeschaafdheid).

Per se these are venial; per accidens they can be mortal by reason of the end, scandal, offense, grave harm, etc.

1060. Modesty in games. - Modesty is not only concerned generally with serious exterior motions and gestures, but also specially with playful and jesting matters. In the first case it is the virtue described above, and is called eutaxy (welgevoeglijkheid): a good disposition of the body; in the other case it obtains the name of eutrapely: pleasantness or urbanity which befits the mode of virtuously and holily indulging recreation; by others it is called austerity (deftigheid), because games rather are to be moderated so that excess may be avoided. Eutrapely can be defined: the virtue moderating man in the use of games (by deeds) and jests (by words), or the virtue moderating play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect.

Game generally is whatever saying or deed ordered to delight of soul; if it is a saying, it is called jest; if a deed, it is called game. And although someone alone can play, nevertheless, because it is for the most part exercised among many, it is defined as a contest of two or more undertaken for delight of soul. To this contest, lest it grow slack, a pact can be added that the prize yield to the victor, and this is the contract of game, concerning which it was said in the treatise on justice, n. 600.

Game is licit, indeed necessary. For since the power both of soul and body is finite, it follows that by length or vehemence of labor it is wearied, and as bodily weariness is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal weariness is relieved through rest of the soul. But rest of the soul is delectation, and it does not so much consist in cessation from every work, because the soul of one awake never ceases from every work. Therefore a remedy against weariness of soul must be applied through some delectation, the intention by which one had previously insisted upon the study of reason being interrupted. But the sayings or deeds in which delectation is sought, and through delectation the repair of powers, are called jests and games. Therefore it is licit, indeed necessary, for man sometimes to use jests and games, so that there can be sin in defect of playing.

But for it to be licit three things are required:

1. First and principally, that the aforesaid delectation not be sought in any operations or words shameful, or injurious, or harmful to neighbor, as infamy, unjust detriment of fortune, etc.

2. That through play the gravity of the soul not be totally dissolved, as happens in those who are delighted beyond the limits of reason;

3. That the game fit the person, time, and place, and that all circumstances which are required for a virtuous act be observed.

Hence eutrapely is said to be "from good turning, because namely it turns certain sayings or deeds well into solace" (a. 2).

1061. Vices in games. - The virtue of eutrapely moderates play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect. He sins by excess or superfluity who does not observe the three aforesaid conditions. The sin of itself is venial, as being only excess of a good or indifferent thing; yet per accidens it can be mortal in some joined species.

For game is superfluous in two ways insofar as it exceeds the rule of reason: 1. in one way from the species of actions which are assumed, if they are shameful, or contain irreverence toward God and sacred things (for example, if someone abuses the words of Scripture for jests), or are injurious and harmful to neighbor (infamy, unjust detriment of fortune), and then it is a mortal sin from its genus; 2. in another way according to defect of due circumstances, when someone uses play at undue times or in undue places, or also apart from the fittingness of the affair or person. And this is venial, unless because of the vehemence of affection toward play, whose delectation one prefers to the love of God, so that he does not shrink from using such games against the precept of God or of the Church: for thus he places his ultimate end in the delectation of game, and is ready to transgress a grave precept of God or the Church rather than abstain from play. This sin by excess is reduced to buffoonery or inept mirth (a. 3, and ad 2).

He sins by defect who shows himself morose and burdensome to others, displaying nothing delightful and impeding or not receiving the delights of others.

"Everything which is against reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is against reason that someone display himself burdensome to others, for example, when he displays nothing delightful, and also impedes the delights of others.... But those who are deficient in play neither themselves say anything laughable, and they are troublesome to those saying such things, because namely they do not receive the moderate games of others. And therefore such persons are vicious, and are called hard and rustic. But because play is useful on account of rest and delectation; and delectation and rest are not sought for themselves in human life, but on account of operation,... therefore defect of play is less vicious than super-excess of play" (a. 4).

1062. Remarks. - 1. Excess in play, insofar as delectation is sought too much in it, is against modesty and temperance; but insofar as it is too much rest from labor, it is a certain softness which is opposed to perseverance and fortitude.

2. From these things it can be inferred: "the office of actors, which is ordered to displaying solace to men, is not according to itself illicit..." (cf. a. 3, ad 3).

3. Concerning spectacles and dances theologians remark that these, according to themselves, that is, with depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable, but morally indifferent, as pertaining to arts, games, and joyful recreations; nevertheless in practice they sometimes provide an occasion of sinning and become gravely dishonorable:

a) from a depraved, impious, or shameful end;

b) from grave danger of sinning mortally, for example, of perversion in faith or morals;

c) from grave scandal, whether direct, or even indirect, such as easily arises from depraved speech or words, gesture and touches, immodesty in clothing and other modes insufficiently honorable.

Concerning these they customarily treat more fully in pastoral theology.³

³ Thus in our little work: Questions on Various Categories of Penitents, c. III, q. 6: on Worldly Things.

TO Modesty this vice is opposed, and it consists in transgressing the due measure of those operations which require a mean beyond mediocrity in the senses, in food, dress, games, etc.

But as modesty shines forth especially in dress and outward ornament, in moderate studiousness, and in games not exceeding the bounds of Eutrapelia, so immodesty stands in the opposites, as St. Thomas teaches, quaest. cit.

FIRST, indeed, superfluity of ornament is a sin opposed to modesty in outward appearance by excess, namely when one uses unmeasured cultivation, whether in clothing or in other things, otherwise than is fitting: namely either by referring it to vainglory, or to illicit pleasure, or by giving it more careful attention than is proper; or when he directs his adornment to exciting to sin; or when fraud and falsehood are mixed into that cultivation, as St. Thomas discusses, art. 1. et 2. quaest. 169.

From these you have when they are mortal sins, namely when they are done with a mortal end, or cause grave sin.