Question Five: On Modesty of Manners

S. Th. II-II, q. 168.

1057. Modesty of manners (zedigheid, bescheidenheid) is the virtue tempering the external motions of the body according to the prescriptions of reason, or the virtue preserving decorum in external motions and gestures.

The matter is bodily motion and exterior gesture, presented to the senses, as gait, standing, sitting, motion of the head, contraction and relaxation of the face, movement of the members, voice, laughter, gaze. In these two things especially are to be avoided: that there be anything effeminate or soft, and that there be anything harsh and rustic.¹

¹ Cicero, De Officiis I, 128.

And indeed: the exterior motions of man are free and orderable by reason: for at the command of reason the exterior members are moved; but that which is subjected to the ordering of reason can be ordered well or badly. Therefore it is manifest that concerning the ordering of these motions a moral virtue is to be constituted (a. 1): insofar namely as they can be corrected by the command of reason (ad 2), and are signs of interior disposition (ad 1), which they presuppose (ad 3).²

² Which St. Ambrose describes splendidly, De Officiis I, c. 18-19.

1058. Various modesty. - Modesty imposes the moderation of congruity according to right reason upon external motions and gestures. But the ordering of these motions is considered as to two things: 1. in one way according to the fittingness of the person according to himself (decentia or adornment; voornaamheid); 2. in another way according to fittingness toward other persons, affairs, times, and places (good ordering; geregeldheid). Hence the office is to moderate gait, voice, speech... in such a way that they fit the person both in himself and as placed in such a place, time, and affair, that is, both with respect to the person acting and with respect to exterior things.

And so modesty does not consider exterior motions insofar as they express a relation of debt to another, but insofar as they are to be moderated so that man is well disposed in himself according to the condition of the person acting and the affairs to be performed. Yet because through these motions we live outwardly with others (to whom they can be burdensome and unpleasant), and motions also are for them certain signs of interior disposition, therefore if moderation of exterior motions of this sort is furnished so that someone exteriorly displays himself as he is interiorly, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of truth (to which simulation and hypocrisy are opposed); if so that he offend no one but on the contrary displays himself agreeable and suitable in society, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of affability (to which flattery is opposed by excess, quarreling by defect); nevertheless from both sides it is elicited by the virtue of modesty. From this it is clear that this virtue is very useful for social life, for a good name, and for the edification of neighbor.

1059. Sins opposed to modesty. - To modesty of manners by excess is opposed affectation (gezochtheid), petulance (courtly mannerism) or insolence, which exceeds the prescription of reason in exterior motions and gestures, for example, if someone exceeds the common mode too much, or assumes a foreign mode which does not fit his own condition, as a religious assuming courtly manners. By defect is opposed: rusticity of manners (boersheid, onbeschaafdheid).

Per se these are venial; per accidens they can be mortal by reason of the end, scandal, offense, grave harm, etc.

1060. Modesty in games. - Modesty is not only concerned generally with serious exterior motions and gestures, but also specially with playful and jesting matters. In the first case it is the virtue described above, and is called eutaxy (welgevoeglijkheid): a good disposition of the body; in the other case it obtains the name of eutrapely: pleasantness or urbanity which befits the mode of virtuously and holily indulging recreation; by others it is called austerity (deftigheid), because games rather are to be moderated so that excess may be avoided. Eutrapely can be defined: the virtue moderating man in the use of games (by deeds) and jests (by words), or the virtue moderating play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect.

Game generally is whatever saying or deed ordered to delight of soul; if it is a saying, it is called jest; if a deed, it is called game. And although someone alone can play, nevertheless, because it is for the most part exercised among many, it is defined as a contest of two or more undertaken for delight of soul. To this contest, lest it grow slack, a pact can be added that the prize yield to the victor, and this is the contract of game, concerning which it was said in the treatise on justice, n. 600.

Game is licit, indeed necessary. For since the power both of soul and body is finite, it follows that by length or vehemence of labor it is wearied, and as bodily weariness is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal weariness is relieved through rest of the soul. But rest of the soul is delectation, and it does not so much consist in cessation from every work, because the soul of one awake never ceases from every work. Therefore a remedy against weariness of soul must be applied through some delectation, the intention by which one had previously insisted upon the study of reason being interrupted. But the sayings or deeds in which delectation is sought, and through delectation the repair of powers, are called jests and games. Therefore it is licit, indeed necessary, for man sometimes to use jests and games, so that there can be sin in defect of playing.

But for it to be licit three things are required:

1. First and principally, that the aforesaid delectation not be sought in any operations or words shameful, or injurious, or harmful to neighbor, as infamy, unjust detriment of fortune, etc.

2. That through play the gravity of the soul not be totally dissolved, as happens in those who are delighted beyond the limits of reason;

3. That the game fit the person, time, and place, and that all circumstances which are required for a virtuous act be observed.

Hence eutrapely is said to be "from good turning, because namely it turns certain sayings or deeds well into solace" (a. 2).

1061. Vices in games. - The virtue of eutrapely moderates play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect. He sins by excess or superfluity who does not observe the three aforesaid conditions. The sin of itself is venial, as being only excess of a good or indifferent thing; yet per accidens it can be mortal in some joined species.

For game is superfluous in two ways insofar as it exceeds the rule of reason: 1. in one way from the species of actions which are assumed, if they are shameful, or contain irreverence toward God and sacred things (for example, if someone abuses the words of Scripture for jests), or are injurious and harmful to neighbor (infamy, unjust detriment of fortune), and then it is a mortal sin from its genus; 2. in another way according to defect of due circumstances, when someone uses play at undue times or in undue places, or also apart from the fittingness of the affair or person. And this is venial, unless because of the vehemence of affection toward play, whose delectation one prefers to the love of God, so that he does not shrink from using such games against the precept of God or of the Church: for thus he places his ultimate end in the delectation of game, and is ready to transgress a grave precept of God or the Church rather than abstain from play. This sin by excess is reduced to buffoonery or inept mirth (a. 3, and ad 2).

He sins by defect who shows himself morose and burdensome to others, displaying nothing delightful and impeding or not receiving the delights of others.

"Everything which is against reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is against reason that someone display himself burdensome to others, for example, when he displays nothing delightful, and also impedes the delights of others.... But those who are deficient in play neither themselves say anything laughable, and they are troublesome to those saying such things, because namely they do not receive the moderate games of others. And therefore such persons are vicious, and are called hard and rustic. But because play is useful on account of rest and delectation; and delectation and rest are not sought for themselves in human life, but on account of operation,... therefore defect of play is less vicious than super-excess of play" (a. 4).

1062. Remarks. - 1. Excess in play, insofar as delectation is sought too much in it, is against modesty and temperance; but insofar as it is too much rest from labor, it is a certain softness which is opposed to perseverance and fortitude.

2. From these things it can be inferred: "the office of actors, which is ordered to displaying solace to men, is not according to itself illicit..." (cf. a. 3, ad 3).

3. Concerning spectacles and dances theologians remark that these, according to themselves, that is, with depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable, but morally indifferent, as pertaining to arts, games, and joyful recreations; nevertheless in practice they sometimes provide an occasion of sinning and become gravely dishonorable:

a) from a depraved, impious, or shameful end;

b) from grave danger of sinning mortally, for example, of perversion in faith or morals;

c) from grave scandal, whether direct, or even indirect, such as easily arises from depraved speech or words, gesture and touches, immodesty in clothing and other modes insufficiently honorable.

Concerning these they customarily treat more fully in pastoral theology.³

³ Thus in our little work: Questions on Various Categories of Penitents, c. III, q. 6: on Worldly Things.