Morality of the Consequences of an Act

The Morality of the Consequences of an Act.—Man’s life receives its moral character, not only from his internal and external acts which are done in the present and from those which he knows will result from them in the future, but also from the influence his acts exercise now and afterwards upon his fellowman. It is this influence upon others that we now speak of as the consequences of an act. According to the case, the consequences sometimes add, sometimes do not add, to the morality of an act. The good men do lives after them, and also the evil. There are various kinds of consequences:

(a) foreseen consequences, which, if intended, add to the morality of an act, since it is clear that one who wishes the many good or evil results of his act is better or worse in intention than another who has no such wish. Thus, one who knows that many will be edified or scandalized by his conduct, and wills the result, is better or worse than if he had no such will about those consequences;

(b) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow naturally and usually from an act, make the act in itself better or Worse according to their character. Thus, the teaching of Christian doctrine is good as conveying a knowledge of truth, but it is made better on account of the spiritual benefit of others that naturally results from it. Similarly, the teaching of evil is made worse on account of the evil consequences it usually produces;

(c) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow only accidentally and rarely from an act, do not affect its morality, since an act must be judged by what belongs to its nature, not by what is merely occasioned by it. Thus, the fact that an alms is used by the recipient as a means to intemperance does not detract from the goodness of the almsgiving done for the sake of charity. Likewise, the fact that an injury is used by the sufferer as an occasion for spiritual profit does not lessen the wickedness of the injurious act.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8; q. 77, a. 7; II-II, q. 64, a. 7 and 8; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4; Quodlibet IX, 15.

In human acts the external effect merits an altogether special consideration, from which, according as it is good or evil, morality can depend, especially in an exterior act. For the doctrine concerning the morality of the effect is of very great moment in practice and is as it were the key by which several difficult cases must be solved, such as concerning cooperation, scandal, damage, etc. Now concerning this matter the following principles have force.

172. Principles concerning the morality of the external effect.

I. A good or evil effect directly and in itself voluntary is imputed to the agent either unto goodness or unto malice, whence it increases the goodness of an act otherwise good, and the malice of an act otherwise evil; but if a good effect is joined to an evil act, it does not remove the malice of the act, although it can diminish it.

II. A good effect willed only in the cause or indirectly is not imputed unto goodness, because good is not done rightly, as right reason dictates and as it deserves to be done, unless it is willed on account of itself; hence goodness is not contracted unless it is intended in itself (n. 146).

III. An evil effect willed in the cause or indirectly is imputed to the agent unto malice, if three conditions are verified:

1. if it was foreseen in some way, at least in confusion: nothing is willed unless foreknown;

2. if it could have been impeded, insofar as the cause could have been not placed, or once placed could have been removed: for the effect is not more voluntary than the cause;

3. if it also ought to have been impeded, that is, if there was present an obligation of avoiding the effect, or of not placing the cause, or of removing the cause lest the effect follow (nn. 60 and 63).

One can be bound to impede an evil effect either from office, for example, parents or a teacher to ward off wicked companions from children entrusted to them, lest they be depraved; or from justice, as a guardian or administrator concerning things or affairs entrusted to him; or from religion, that divine honor be provided for; or from every virtue, lest an effect directly contrary to it be produced; or from charity, which, for example, demands that you cry out lest another unknowingly fall into danger of life. On the contrary, if you do not take necessary care of your health, it will not therefore be imputed to you that on some day you cannot fast, just as neither that you experienced pollution because you ate meat on a forbidden day: for these things are not to be avoided precisely lest such an effect follow.

174. How great is the imputability of the evil effect. - For determining the gravity of the fault incurred by the one who places the cause of an evil effect, the axiom has force: an effect voluntary in the cause is not more culpable than the cause itself. This is not to be understood of the cause considered in itself and independently of the effect: for it can happen that an action in itself good, indifferent, or lightly evil contracts grave malice from the effect, for example, if the throwing of a stone or a slight lie is the cause of homicide; conversely, that an action in itself gravely evil has light malice by reason of the effect, for example, drunkenness which produces light anger, homicide bringing on some other small harm. But it is to be understood of the cause considered as cause, that is, insofar as it influences the effect; hence the nature and gravity both of the influence or causality and of the effect itself are to be considered. Hence:

1. a cause which per se, proximately, and gravely influences an evil effect, besides its proper malice which perhaps it has from itself, further acquires the grave or light malice of the effect; hence a cause per se gravely evil, which proximately influences a lightly evil effect, has a light malice superadded; on the contrary, a cause per se lightly evil, which proximately influences a gravely evil effect, has grave malice from this;

2. a cause which per se but lightly and remotely, or only per accidens, influences even a grave effect, by reason of the influence contracts only light malice, for example, if from the immoderate taking of food or from drunkenness or from morose delectation not prolonged pollution follows. For a small influence upon a grave thing is not of itself something notable. Yet such a cause has grave malice by reason of the effect, if that effect is strictly prohibited so that all things which even lightly concur toward it are to be avoided (as happens in a matter of justice, lest grave harm be brought upon one's neighbor), or if by reason of office or state there is a special obligation of avoiding the effect. Thus the influence of drunkenness upon pollution is lightly culpable, but upon homicide is gravely culpable.

1. Then the malice is grave, not by reason of the influence, but by reason of the special prohibition or obligation.

175. When is the morality of the effect contracted?

The whole goodness or malice of the effect is contracted inchoatively, interiorly and as to affection, when the cause is voluntarily placed, even if per accidens the effect does not follow: for then the effect is intended at least in confusion; consummatively, exteriorly and as to the effect, when the effect truly occurs, unless at this moment the past will, insofar as possible, has been retracted: for then the effect will be only materially good or evil.

176. Observation for understanding the doctrine of St. Thomas. - In q. 20, a. 5, briefly and with several other general principles presupposed, St. Thomas teaches several things concerning the morality of the effect, which can be understood from what has been said:

A. In the order of execution, the following willed event, whether it follows or does not follow, does not add formal goodness or malice to the external action, just as it "does not make an act evil which was good, nor good which was evil; for example, if someone gives alms to a poor man, which he abuses for sin, nothing is lost to him who gave the alms; and similarly, if someone patiently bears an injury done to him, he who did it is not on this account excused."

For morality depends upon the voluntary. That the intended effect follows or is impeded per accidens is involuntary. Therefore it does not change the morality of the act.

B. In the order of intention he teaches three things concerning the event:

1. The following event which was forethought, that is, distinctly foreseen and in some way willed, in the diverse mode which ought to be present for contracting goodness or malice, increases the formal goodness or malice of the exterior act.

1. Thus St. Thomas himself interpreted himself, q. 73, a. 8 and ad 1.

2. The following event not forethought, that is, not distinctly foreseen, if it follows per se and for the most part from such an action, adds directly to the goodness or malice of the act, which is better from its genus from which several good things are apt to follow, and worse from which several evil things are apt to follow. In this doctrine, however, the general principle is presupposed: that this goodness in fact be contracted, it must be intended; that malice be contracted, it must in some way be foreseen, at least in confusion, which nevertheless easily happens if the action of itself is apt to produce the evil effect.

3. The following event not forethought, if it follows per accidens and in fewer cases, does not directly add to goodness or malice, for example, the abuse of alms by a poor man.

These things are to be understood on the supposition that from the same act there does not follow, with equal immediacy, a twofold effect: one evil, and the other good but greater and compensating. For then what was said in n. 173 must be applied.