Article III: On the Voluntary in Itself and in Cause

S. Th. I-II, q. 77, a. 7; q. 20, a. 5; II-II, q. 43, a. 3; q. 46, a. 2, ad 2; q. 64, a. 7 and 8; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4.

62. Notions. - By reason of the mode in which the will is borne toward it, the positive and direct voluntary is either:

1. Voluntary in itself, when the will is directly borne toward it, that is, immediately wills something in itself and at the same time causes it by acting, whether as an end (on account of itself), for example when someone wills to kill an enemy, or as a means to an end (on account of another), for example when a thief wills to kill a traveler in order to take money; or

2. Voluntary in cause only, when the will is immediately borne toward the cause and not toward the effect, that is, it does not will the effect in itself as end or means, but nevertheless that effect proceeds from the will insofar as the will wills and does something else with which it is joined as with a cause, for example when someone wills to become drunk, foreseeing that in drunkenness he will commit blasphemies, impurities, homicide. The cause can be physical or moral, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote, a cause per se which is apt to produce the effect although by accident the effect can fail (thus excessive drinking produces drunkenness), or a cause per accidens which not from its nature but by the intervention of another can sometimes produce it (thus drunkenness, when a quarrel intervenes, produces homicide).

1. Hence it exists only in rational creatures, because it supposes it to be known how one thing follows from another.

The more commonly received prefer to say direct and indirect voluntary; but they would speak better if they said immediate and mediate: for that which proceeds from the will through a positive cause nevertheless proceeds directly from it.

2. Therefore the voluntary in cause, which many more recent authors call indirect, is called direct by St. Thomas, because it is from the will as acting. I-II, q. 77, a. 7.

63. Principles. In order that an effect be voluntary in cause, it is required:

1. That the effect was foreseen in some way, at least confusedly, as was said in no. 60, II: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2. That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the cause was freely placed or could have not been placed: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3. That there be a nexus of causality between this freely placed cause and this effect. This:

a) is always verified of a cause per se if the two prior conditions are present: for he who wills the cause is judged to will the effect which naturally and necessarily follows from it;

b) is also verified of a cause per accidens, provided that, besides, there is a third condition: that the effect ought to have been avoided, or that there was an obligation not to place the cause, and indeed not to place it lest the effect follow. For since the effect is not sufficiently contained in such a cause (except by means of another cause), and therefore there is no physical nexus with the effect, if the said obligation is lacking, every nexus of causality, even moral, between cause and effect is lacking, and therefore the effect will not be willed nor voluntary in cause, but only permitted. On the contrary, if someone is bound not to place the cause lest the effect follow, and nevertheless places it, he is morally judged, and imputably is, the cause of this effect.

But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the axiom is verified: An evil effect foreseen in the cause communicates its malice to the cause, namely, if it itself can and ought to be avoided. For an effect voluntary only in the cause is not imputed for praise, because it is not intended; but for it to be imputed for fault, it is required that there be an obligation of avoiding the cause lest the effect follow; otherwise no precept regarding the effect would be violated.

64. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid things it follows:

1. That an effect voluntary in the cause can be in itself non-voluntary, if it is not intended, indeed involuntary in itself, if it displeases, as if someone places the cause of killing (for example, to shoot an arrow with some foresight of killing) and the killing is not intended or displeases him, for example, if he does not will to kill but wills to shoot the arrow without employing sufficient diligence lest he kill a man.

2. On the contrary, that an effect can be willed in itself, if it pleases, is desired, or even intended, and not voluntary, if it follows from a cause per accidens and the obligation of avoiding it is lacking because, for example, a greater good effect which follows from the cause is also intended. For then the evil effect willed in itself is not voluntary, but only permitted in the cause (cf. n. 173).

Thus if someone digs a pit on his own land, remote from the road, foreseeing and desiring that his enemy could fall into it; if this happens, the fall is not voluntary to him, because he was only its cause per accidens.

3. That an effect, for example the sin of a neighbor, of which we in no way place the cause per se but only a mere occasion or condition or cause per accidens, is not voluntary in the cause nor imputable, even if it is willed and intended in itself, unless nevertheless there is an obligation of avoiding the effect: for our intention does not change an occasion into a cause, nor a cause per accidens into a cause per se.

Thus if someone takes from a miser a thing of slight value, foreseeing or even intending that from grief he may become ill or die, and this happens, the illness and death are not voluntary, because he was their mere occasion or cause per accidens, in no way their cause per se.