The Necessity of Grace

Augustine teaches this in the passages related in the proofs. Hence innocent nature could act and persevere just as it could with the powers given to it, as a fruitful and healthy woman can beget vigorous offspring, as a strong and armed soldier can conquer a cowardly and unarmed enemy, and as a healthy man can walk and speak; although this being so, it comes about by no means without the motion of God, which our Thomists explain through physical premotion, necessary for all second agents in whatever state. But man in this state, even justified by grace, stands to good and to perseverance as a weak cause, entangled with innumerable impediments : whence it comes about that, if he were provided for only according to the usual course of things and after the manner of his own condition, no one would persevere; and therefore to all those who persevere there is granted, through God's most special help, not only motion and direction according to the usual mode, but also healing, strengthening, and directing in a most special way, and, so to speak, holding man by the hand, so that, though weak amid so many temptations, he may persevere through the power of God.

Therefore, according to these observations, the answer is easy to those things which the adversaries object from Augustine, as may be seen in my former Work.

I. Leaving aside the various acceptances of grace, here it is taken generally for whatever gift or benefit granted gratuitously, that is, out of mere benignity of God, not from justice or from our merits. Under this general acceptance of grace all natural gifts, namely nature itself and all its powers, can be called graces; for gratuitously God bestowed upon us to be, to live, to sense, to understand, to will, etc. These however, although in this wide sense they are called graces, cannot be called aids of grace, because aid supposes him who is helped and active powers which it helps.

II. Grace properly and in the common sense of Scripture and Church is taken for a gratuitous gift, whether habitual or actual, superadded to nature.

III. This grace, both habitual and actual, is of twofold order, natural namely and supernatural: natural, which moves toward good within the sphere of naturals, as if God infuse light of natural science, or move specially to cognition of natural things; supernatural, which helps by habit or motion unto those things which exceed the forces of nature, as while God infuses habit of faith or charity, or moves to the act of either. Between each this aid can still be further distinguished by another, as it were medium, which participates something of both, namely that it be natural as regards substance and supernatural as regards mode, e.g., while Christ illumined the man born blind: for the mode of working this effect was above the forces of nature, although the effect, consequently through grace, is substantially within the order of nature; for that sight was not of another kind than the sight of other men.

IV. Truly, because grace is divided against nature, grace resting precisely in natural good is less properly called grace: whence most properly is called grace either the supernatural habit infused, such as sanctifying grace and infused virtues, or the supernatural motion whereby God moves us as first mover in the order of grace to supernatural acts, or even that operation of God whereby he directs natural things to our salvation.

V. Grace taken for supernatural motion is twofold, moral and physical. Moral comes about by the showing forth of good, sometimes joined with infusion of light for perceiving it: it pertains to final cause. Physical comes about by an influx effectively and intrinsically reducing the faculty to act: it pertains to efficient cause. That God moves the will in both modes the Author teaches Iap., q. 105, a. 4, and elsewhere.

VI. Physical motion is sometimes a mere application of preexisting power and virtue, as when God moves the will of the just to act of charity. Sometimes, although it be application of power, it is nevertheless not application of virtue, because it does not preexist, but brings it with itself by way of passage, as while God moves the will of a sinner to act of attrition or contrition; since indeed that act is supernatural, and in that sinner no supernatural habit yet exists, it is necessary that that motion beginning conversion bring with it some supernatural virtue, not by way of permanent habit, but by way of transient passion.

VII. That physical motion which is a mere application of preexisting power and virtue is again twofold: one general, whereby God as first and universal mover applies faculties according to their exigency and mode to acts proportioned to them; another special, whereby God sometimes applies the mind of man to thinking or willing things which, although they do not exceed his forces, nevertheless, according to the accustomed course and disposition of the subject, man would neither think nor will them, and this both in naturals and in supernaturals.

VIII. General motion, whereby God as first and universal mover, both in order of nature and in order of grace, applies preexisting power and virtue, according to its exigency and the accustomed course of things, to acts proportioned to it, at first aspect seems not to pertain properly to special aid of grace, because it is given gratuitously, but from a certain connatural exigency: for as, collation of natural virtue supposed, there is owed to fire the motion or general concurrence premoving it to its proper act, to fire to burn, to sun to illuminate, so that without miracle it cannot be denied to it; so, although elevating virtue unto supernatural good has been given gratis to the just, that being supposed, there is owed in a certain way, according to common laws of Providence, the general motion applying it to acts proportioned to it.

Nevertheless, if we consider the matter more deeply, this general motion can and ought to be called in some true sense special aid of grace. For the understanding of this it must be observed that this general motion does not stand in the same mode in natural and voluntary agents. Natural agents have natural form whereby they are determined necessarily to one act suiting them, as fire to burn, sun to illuminate, and thus they demand general motion determining to the act proper to them. But voluntary agents have no natural form whereby they be determined necessarily to one act suiting them, but they are turnable to opposites and defectible from good connatural to them. Thus, although object of intellect be truth, of will in itself natural good, of will as instructed with infused virtues supernatural good; nevertheless intellect toward truth and will toward good whether natural or supernatural are borne flexibly and are defectible from it.

Whence, although general motion is owed to these powers whereby they sometimes attain their object, nevertheless not that they attain always and indefectibly. Therefore that this rather than that other be given to this one here and now, is from special grace.

Wherefore, if this general motion be considered respectively to nature in itself or as instructed with infused virtues, it must be called general motion, and not special gratuitous aid; because to general providence pertains moving each agent according to its mode, and since in man there is inclination, attenuated indeed and defectible, yet not wholly corrupted, toward good, there is owed to him motion whereby he be sometimes moved to good act suiting himself, and not always to evil. Whence that he be moved sometimes to good is not aid purely gratuitous, because in a certain way it is owed; nor special, because it is not from special benevolence and providence, but according to laws of common providence whereby he sometimes moves defectible natures to good of their nature, sometimes permits them to fail. Say the same of will informed by charity, in respect of supernatural good. But if this motion be considered respectively to the man to whom it is given before another, then in respect of this man it can and ought to be called special aid of grace; because, although nature, as was said, demands sometimes to be moved into good, nevertheless this man before another demands not that he be moved into good here and now rather than another. Whence that he be moved into good from which another fails and from which he himself could fail, is from special aid of grace, that is, freely conferred.

(This observation, which is open to anyone attending maturely, St. Thomas weighs and hands down, q. 24 de Veritate, a. 14, c, in these words: « Although man can do goods of this kind [namely proportionate to his nature] without grace gratum faciens, nevertheless he cannot do them without God, since nothing can issue into natural operation except by divine power; because secondary cause acts not except by power of first cause. And this is true both in natural agents and in voluntary ones. Yet this necessity stands in another mode in each. For God is cause of natural operation, inasmuch as he gives and conserves that which is principle of natural motion, as gravity in earth, which is principle of downward motion: » Although the Angelic Doctor mentions not general motion here, he nevertheless always supposes it and elsewhere expresses it.

That however this general motion does not suffice man that he act good connatural to himself, but that he needs special motion and direction, he explains thus pursuing: « But human will is not determined to any one operation, but stands indifferently toward many [that is, good and bad], and thus is after a manner in potency, unless moved through something active, either what is outwardly represented to it, as is good apprehended, or what is wrought interiorly in it, as is God himself, as Augustine says lib. de Gratia et libero Arbitrio, cap. 21, showing manifoldly God works in hearts of men. But all exterior motions [he says the same of interior ones] are moderated by divine providence according as he himself judges someone to be excited to good by these or those actions. Whence, if we wish to call grace of God not some habitual gift, but the very mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things unto salvation of man; thus neither can man do any good without grace of God. » Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man, on account of indifference of human arbitrium, in order that he act good rather than evil, needs divine providence, which moderates motions to good according as it judges fitting, and mercy of God, whereby he works interiorly the motion of mind and orders exterior things to good. But no one can say this aid is owed to this man before another. Therefore it is gratuitous, because it is not given from merit, but from mercy. It is also special, because it is given not to all, however much in respect to nature in itself it be owed and general.

This observation is altogether necessary for untying the difficulties, otherwise most intricate, of this dissertation. For it removes ambiguities and equivocations on account of which many stumble and are deluded, and reconciles the apparently contrary opinions of Thomists, as will appear from what must be said.

I suppose as a certain principle, by which all difficulties concerning the necessity of grace must be removed, what Pope Coelestine defines, or whatever other author of the chapters attributed to him, cap. 12, namely: « From the work and favor of grace nothing at all is to be subtracted. » This principle, founded in Scripture, councils, Fathers and common sense, the Thomists explain with their Doctor ^{1 1} I. 1° part., q. 103, a. 3, c; IIa 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, c.

thus, that God not only gave and preserves to man the virtues of acting well, but moves and applies them to act well; for in these two is contained whatsoever there is of being and good in an act.

As to the knowledge of truth, truths are of two kinds, according as they look to the order of nature or to the supernatural order.

Among natural truths some are, for the present state of union of soul with body, proportioned to our intellect, as those deduced from the senses or from principles known per se. Some surpass our capacity, either because they are impenetrable to the senses, or have no necessary connection with principles naturally known, as thoughts of hearts and future contingents, or because they are merely spiritual, as angelic substance. It is agreed that these latter cannot be known without special assistance of God, and of these there is no question, but only of the former.

Again, among natural truths some are merely speculative, which namely nowise look to practice, as: anything is or is not, the whole is greater than its part, there is no effect without cause. Some are practical, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored. Of natural truths of the first genus I say 1°: Man fallen can, without special grace superadded to nature, but with sole preceding general concourse — which nevertheless in some sense ought to be called special and gratuitous — know certain natural truths ¹ This is against certain ancients and Vasquez. ¹ Here ibi, q. 109, a. 1, c.

The first part is proved. Every form or virtue implanted by God in created things has efficacy with respect to some determinate act into which it can be borne according to its property. Ergo our intellect, even in the present state, having the form cognoscitive of truth, that is, intelligible light, though darkened by sin, yet not extinguished, can from itself know some truth. Add that otherwise the intellective potency, which is the most perfect of all potencies, would be the most imperfect.

The second part is proved. All motions, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover simply, which is God: and therefore, however perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless moved by God; which motion indeed is according to the reason of his providence, not according to the necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body.

The third part is proved, namely that this motion which we call general ought in some sense to be called special and gratuitous. For since our intellect is defectible and flexible toward assenting to true and false, there is due to it, according to the laws of common providence, that it sometimes be moved to truth and not always to falsehood; and in this sense the motion is general and in a manner owed, and therefore ought not to be called grace. But that he rather be moved to truth than another who falls short of him and by whom he himself could fall short, that is not due to him, but is from special providence and benevolence; and in this sense the motion can and ought to be called motion and special grace. — By this explanation the foundation of Vasquez, sought from the indifference of our intellect to assent to true and false, is overturned.

I say 2°: Fallen man cannot, without special grace superadded, with moral potency at least, know, whether collectively or divisively, all natural truths, both speculative and speculative-practical, much less practical-practical ones.

I said 1° « with moral potency at least. » A twofold potency is distinguished, namely physical, which has of itself due proportion with the object, abstracting from impediments to attaining it; moral, which besides due proportion with the object, is not entangled or retarded by impediments so as not to pass into act.

I said 2° « speculative-practical truths, » which although they look to practice do not move to act, as are the general principles of synderesis, or the habit of the principles of things to be done, and universal propositions which pertain to moral philosophy, as: good is to be done, God is to be worshiped. Practical-practical truths move in particular to act, as: parents are to be honored here and now by such an act. On account of the acts which proceed from them, these latter truths pertain to the following articles, in which will be treated the necessity of grace for operating any good whatsoever. Here therefore must be treated only of truths merely speculative and speculative-practical.

The first part is proved, namely concerning knowledge of all natural truths collectively.

1° A weak and wounded potency cannot produce an act most excellent for a sound and whole potency. Yet to know all natural truths collectively is an act most excellent of a sound and whole intellect; but human intellect is wounded and weakened by sin. Ergo. Whence St. Thomas, IV Contra gentes, cap. 52, speaking of the spiritual punishments of original sin, says: « Among the spiritual ones is the chief weakness of reason, from which it happens that man arrives with difficulty at knowledge of truth and easily slips into error, and cannot altogether overcome bestial appetites, but is often obscured by them. » And here a. 3, ad 3: « Human nature is more corrupted through sin with regard to appetite for good than with regard to knowledge of truth. » Ergo it is corrupted also with regard to knowledge of truth, though less.

2° The intellective faculty in fallen man is entangled by many impediments, lest he be able to attain every truth taken collectively without error. The first is brevity of life, at whose beginning man is little apt for intellectual operations, and the almost infinite multitude of natural truths. Second, weakness of body and imperfection of the senses, upon which cognition depends, which are first less prompt, then are weakened by long and intense study. Third, the duties of civil life, domestic care, necessities of nature, whereby the greatest part of life is spent and the mind is drawn away from study of truth. Fourth, disorder of passions, by which reason is obscured, love of truth grows torpid and delight in contemplation.

Yet these defects must needs be compensated by superior assistance, that man may be able to obtain even knowledge of natural truths collectively. Ergo.

The second part is proved, concerning knowledge of any natural truths whatsoever divisively, by nearly the same reasons.

1° A wounded will cannot do any good moral work without special grace, as will be proved below. Ergo similarly a wounded intellect cannot know any truth without special grace.

2° There are natural truths most difficult, which cannot be understood certainly and integrally without long and intense study, for which are required a constantly upright will, burning love of truth, delight in contemplation, quiet of passions, firmness and good disposition of the senses, and leisure free from cares. Yet all these are not had in the present state, as was said in the proof of the first part. Ergo.

As to supernatural truths,

I say 1°: Fallen man, external preaching or revelation supposed, can, with sole preceding general concourse, without special grace superadded, know and embrace supernatural truths with imperfect assent, from some human motive. This is common opinion.

The first part is proved. That external revelation must be supposed and is necessary the Apostle teaches, Rom., IX, 14, saying: How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And it is evident; because we can know nothing in the present state except what falls under the senses per se or through another. Yet supernatural truth, since it has no connection with the works of nature, does not fall under the senses per se nor through another. Ergo it must be learned from another teaching.

The second part is proved, which similarly is evident. Supernatural truth, inasmuch as it stands under a human or natural motive, although it be entitatively supernatural, nevertheless formally in the character of object is not supernatural; because the object is constituted formally in the character of object through the motive or formal reason under which it is attained. Ergo, external revelation supposed, he can believe from a human motive by his own powers. And this appears in heretics, who believe by human faith certain mysteries of faith, not from the supernatural motive of divine revelation — otherwise they would believe everything — but either from their own judgment, or because they esteem such faith honorable or useful to themselves.

I say 2°: Man cannot believe supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation without special internal grace, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will ¹ This is against Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians and certain theologians who say that fallen man can assent by his own powers with natural assent to supernatural truths from the motive of divine revelation. ¹ Here q. 109, a. 1, c.

The first part is proved, namely that supernatural grace is required on the part of the intellect, 1° from Scripture. Matth., XI, 27: No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him. Ibid. XVI, 17, to Peter professing his faith in Christ, Christ himself says: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven. Ephes., II, 8 and 9: For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: not of works, that no man may glory. Ergo.