Purity of Intention

"9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended. - 10. The intention by which someone detests evil and pursues good merely in order to obtain heavenly glory is not right or pleasing to God. - 11. Everything that is not from supernatural Christian faith, which works through love, is sin. - 13. Whoever also serves God with a view to eternal reward, if he should lack charity, is not free from fault whenever he acts, even with a view to beatitude. - 14. Fear of hell is not supernatural. - 15. Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of benevolence for God on account of Himself, is not a good and supernatural movement." Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"60. If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent this penance is, the more it leads to despair. - 61. Fear restrains only the hand; but the heart is devoted to sin as long as it is not led by the love of justice. - 62. He who abstains from evil only through fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is also guilty before God." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

Must we daily offer our actions to God for His glory?. The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10, 31: "Whether therefore you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God"; and Coloss. 3, 17: "All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, giving thanks to God the Father by Him," which St. Thomas holds as preceptive, while St. Bonaventure ¹ draws them down to mere counsel, in reality indicate nothing about the intention by which a good work must be performed.

They come back to this: act in such a way that you give occasion for glorifying God; act as Christians, conscious of your conjunction with Christ and of the benefits which through Christ you have received from God; and consequently, in a spirit of thanksgiving, do those things which are approved by Christ.

Therefore the precept is not demonstrated which, following Collet, St. Alphonsus enunciates in these words, De act. hum., n. XLIV: "It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least by the virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God." And the obligation, which we by no means deny, of offering works to the glory of God, requires only these things:

a) that our works glorify God; but all our good works glorify God, unless we reject that connatural relation;

b) that we fulfill the precept of formal love of God: concerning which precept we shall treat where we treat of charity. Cf. Lehmk., I, 375.

¹ In 1. 2, D. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

Connatural glorification of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Saints. By a connatural relation all good acts are also glorious to Christ. This is true not only of those who profess themselves Christians - which is too manifest - but also of others, since from the grace of Christ all good works are done ². Formal praise will be rendered to Christ from this by all who, whether in heaven or even on earth, have known this causality of Christ.

Since, as Benedict XV inculcated more than once, all graces are obtained through Mary, all good works also connaturally yield to the honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God and our Mother.

Not a few things also have a connatural relation to the Saints, for example to the founders of religious orders.

² Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 14, art. 6, c.

A good work which can be ordered to God, to the Blessed Virgin Mary, or to the Saints, or which is connaturally so ordered, can also from intention be done for honoring God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, or the Saints. And then, but only then, the act receives a species from that intention and becomes an act of religion.

But it is necessary that the act can truly express an order to God or to the Saints. Hence if someone wishes to refer an indifferent act, for example a walk, to the Blessed Virgin herself, he does not refer it except insofar as at the same time it is perceived to be licit, or, for example from the mode of temperance observed, is specially honest ¹, or unless by its external reason it honors Mary, as if it has become a pilgrimage.

¹ He merits specially from the object who seeks delight from the honest good, virtue, God; from the end, who seeks it on account of the honest good, that he may flee dangers, become more spirited for holy labor; from the mode, who seeks it temperately. St. Thomas uses this principle: "As the operation is, so is the delight following it." But voluntary delight contains approval of the object in which one delights. Therefore delight concerning a good object is good.

Concerning purity of intention. A twofold purity of intention must be very carefully distinguished: the purity by which every reason opposed to charity, such as vanity, sensuality, etc., is removed; and the purity by which a less sublime intention, although honest, is excluded.

The former account of purity cannot be sufficiently commended: by the mixture of a less ordered affection, the act is at least partly corrupted.

But the other purity must be proposed cautiously. For by the fact that we are helped toward an act by natural propensity, merit of itself is not diminished. Nor without great utility did provident God place propensities of this sort in human nature. Yet per accidens, insofar as it diminishes the psychological liberty of the act, it can make the act less meritorious. Besides, he who has need of such help demonstrates lesser charity and consequently lesser merit than he who is moved perfectly by a more sublime affection.

Wherefore in neglecting such a propensity this utility can be present: that the act be more voluntary; that from the unity of intention the more sublime affection itself become more intense.

Nevertheless, the powers which are at our disposal must be prudently reckoned, since it is better to do good with the aid of nature than, with that aid spurned, to omit the good: "Nature is not contrary to grace: hence the admixture of nature with grace does not cause remission in the effects of grace, which is caused by the intermingling of a contrary." Thus St. Thomas, in 3 S., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5, concerning the love of friends.

Moreover the intention of beatitude corrupts the good of virtue in no way, since beatitude is our perfection; since it is the end to which one must come by virtue. Cf. Sertillanges, La morale de S. Thomas, c. 17, n. 17.

The use of renewing intention, for example through daily oblations made to God of the whole of our action, contains these utilities: the oblation itself is in itself a laudable act of religion or charity; more easily, through it, while acting, frequent memory is fostered of the intention of religion, faith, and charity, by which the honesty of good works is increased; it confirms the will in good purposes: these, as we are men, lack perpetual efficacy and therefore must be renewed.

At the same time, however, it must be denied that through oblations of this sort acts become meritorious which are not elicited from the strictly so-called virtue of such intention.

Nor, even if the intention has been virtual, will it avail to remove the indifferent nature of the object. But, insofar as the act is apt for this, it can add the honesty of an extrinsic end, and render the honesty which the act contains of itself more certain to us.

Conversely, a universal oblation made to an idol is indeed in itself most evil; nevertheless it does not corrupt except those acts which have truly been commanded by such an intention.

It is one thing for merit to be acquired, another for a disposition to be made concerning the acquired fruit of an action.

The oblations of which we speak here indeed cannot render meritorious acts into which they pour no virtue; but they suffice for efficaciously disposing of the true fruits of actions, for example for the conversion of sinners, in favor of the souls of purgatory, just as, by a will actually past and merely habitual, Masses are applied to various intentions. For a future thing can be efficaciously ceded or given by a present act.

I. By moral imputation, in the forum of God and in the opinion of men, actions or effects are ascribed to a free author, unto praise and merit, or unto blame and demerit.

II. One's own action or omission is imputed according to all intended notes; indeed, according to all notes which are known to be present, if there is question of an evil thing toward which the will is affected as it truly is. For if the thing is loved abstractly, only the loved notes are to be considered.

III. An effect, or the further resultance of an action, can be intended, or merely permitted, either actively or passively. An intended effect is always imputed. A good effect is not imputed unless foreseen and intended; an evil effect, negatively permitted, is imputed insofar as there was a positive obligation of impeding it; but positively permitted, it is imputed insofar as one had to abstain from the action lest the effect follow. It will always be imputed if it could have been avoided without omitting the action.

IV. An evil effect which is permitted to follow an action is not imputed if the immediate efficiency is diverse, and the permission is excused by a proportionately grave reason. The reason is that the causality of one's own will is immune from the malice of the effect, and, on account of the proportionate cause, satisfaction has been made to the positive precept of taking care that the effect not follow.

That positive obligation varies according to the gravity and proximity of the evil effect, according to the nature of the precept, and according to the cause for acting. Guilt for a wrongly permitted effect is contracted when its cause is posited, and it is not changed whether the effect follows or not. But from the effect followed or not followed, damage or reservation can depend.

V. The action or omission of another can never be the strictly so-called effect of one's own action. Nevertheless it is imputed to us on account of cooperation, on account of the imitation of a good example or scandal, on account of fraternal correction made or omitted. Yet these, if there is question of another's evil action, can be excused by a similar and stronger reason than that by which permission of an evil effect is excused.

I. Merit is the retribution of a work before him to whom it expresses an order. The common conditions of merit are peace, or at least begun pacification, between the agent and the one making retribution; a work freely done; a relation either connatural or explicit to another's service; acceptance of the work by the one rewarding; and proportion between the work and the reward.

II. Merit is distinguished as human and theological, or before God. This latter is de condigno and de congruo. De condigno means the title of some justice; de congruo means only a partial title: it is hoped for from the persevering benefit of grace inviting and from the good effort of man. There is no merit except in the state of a wayfarer. Merit now is supernatural; natural merit would befit the works of a man not elevated.

III. The heavenly reward toward which we tend is essential and intrinsic to us; already now it is conferred inchoatively.

IV. Merit de condigno requires the state of grace, the moral goodness of the work, and a supernatural principle. It does not seem to require a special intention referring the work to God. Wherefore every act not evil and moral of a man having charity is meritorious.

Nor in the sinner - indeed nor in the unbeliever - do there seem to be supernaturally indifferent acts, or acts endowed with merely natural goodness.

V. We can merit de condigno only for ourselves; namely, an increase of sanctifying grace and heavenly glory. De congruo we merit for ourselves actual graces as sufficient; indeed graces which will be efficacious. And after we have become sinners we can merit aids for rising again. We cannot merit first grace, nor, while we are just, the restitution of justice after a future fall. Let the same be said of final perseverance.

For others we can merit the same aids, indeed first grace, de congruo.

For ourselves and for others we can merit de congruo and impetrate aids for persevering. Other things being equal, we merit more easily for ourselves than for others.

VI. The quantity of merit depends upon the dignity of the agent, and upon the value of the work, considered both in itself and in the intention from which it emanates; but the noblest intention is that of charity. Merit de condigno is not diminished by the fact that we direct an action toward impetrating various things for ourselves and for others.

VII. We cannot abdicate all the fruits of merit and impetration; nor would this be expedient. But we can laudably cede satisfactory fruits to others, especially to the souls of purgatory.

VIII. All our good acts glorify Christ and His Mother; many also glorify the saints.

There is no precept of a daily oblation of actions to be made to God.

A formal intention of honoring God or the Blessed Virgin through a congruent act adds a new species of goodness.

IX. Every impurity of intention must be purged; a more sublime intention must be prudently procured.

X. The use of renewing a good intention is very useful to the soul; nevertheless it does not remove the indifference of the object, but adds the honesty of an extrinsic end, and renders more certain the merit of intrinsic honesty. A most evil universal oblation made to an idol nevertheless corrupts only acts truly commanded by such an intention.

But by one oblation we can efficaciously dispose of the alienable fruits of our actions.

The fruit of our inquiry seems chiefly to be this: that we should make much of the moral liberty of acting well, without which psychological liberty lacks price and dignity, indeed almost use. The perpetual influx of the grace of God fills us with joyful hope of an almost continual increase of merits, while at the same time exhorting us that, by intending and extending the command of our will, we should endeavor unceasingly to multiply deliberate actions, in which almost our whole truly human life consists, with the vice of inconsiderateness routed and the yoke of the passions shaken off.

125. Principle 3. Man is bound to set before himself in all his actions an honorable end, which at least implicitly is referred to God; but it is not licit to act for pleasure alone.

The stated principle responds to the question: what intention is necessary in the agent so that his works may be good? But the proposed doctrine holds a middle place between two other extremes.

The first extreme doctrine requires that all human acts be referred actually or at least virtually to God. Baius, Jansenius, and their followers, thinking that human nature was thoroughly corrupted through original sin, taught that man must always actually refer his actions to God; otherwise he follows his vitiated nature and therefore sins. For according to these authors there is nothing intermediate between heavenly charity and vitiated cupidity. From this false doctrine it follows that all works of infidels and the impious, since they do not refer their actions to God, are sins. This indeed St. Pius V condemned: "All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."⁸³ St. Alphonsus seems to have taught that a virtual relation to God is necessary in our acts.⁸⁴ Nevertheless there are those who explain the mind of the holy Doctor otherwise.⁸⁵

The other extreme opinion teaches that for the honesty of an act it suffices that it be done according to the prescriptions of reason and be apprehended and sought as such. Therefore the act remains good, even if the will intends not an honorable good or a motive of virtue, but delectation (not evil in itself) or convenience, without thinking of a further end. Thus Noldin,⁸⁶ who for this opinion of his cites Ballerini, Genicot, Pesch, and others; indeed he calls this opinion today common among authors.

In practice this controversy does not seem to be of great moment, and therefore the faithful are not to be disturbed concerning the morality of their acts, provided that they follow the dictate of their own conscience; but theoretically speaking, the opinion requiring an actual relation of acts to the ultimate end is too rigid and today obsolete. Indeed even a virtual relation of our acts is not to be urged in this sense, as if it were a true sin if a man did not elicit an explicit resolve, for example, every morning, of doing all things for the glory of God. For such an obligation is not established. But the last opinion does not seem to be sufficiently safe unless it is explained in a sound sense.

It is proved. 1. From propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679: "It is licit to eat and drink to satiety without necessity for pleasure alone, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts" (prop. 8). - "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free of every fault and venial defect" (prop. 9).⁸⁷ Therefore, even in objectively licit acts, it is necessary to intend something other than pleasure; or the end of the will cannot be pleasure alone, although that pleasure does not directly conflict with reason. For it cannot be said that to eat for pleasure alone without detriment to health directly conflicts with natural reason, if one abstracts from the ordination of the Creator.

2. From Sacred Scripture. For the Lord says:⁸⁸ "But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment." But if an idle word is evil, a fortiori an idle work is evil; and therefore St. Jerome⁸⁹ exclaims: "If an account is rendered for idle words, how much more for works!" - But a word and work are called idle not because they have an evil end, for then they would no longer be idle, but evil, but because they are not ordered to their connatural end. Hence even boys are called idle, not because they do nothing or something evil, but because they do not do those things which they ought, for example, by playing uselessly. Moreover, an ultimate end has been appointed for man by the Creator, toward which he must tend by all his acts.⁹⁰ Therefore whatever man does, he must refer to that end; not indeed actually and explicitly, but implicitly, insofar as he perceives every act as fitting right reason and the eternal law. Certainly the Creator joined some special delectation to certain actions, for example, to actions of eating, drinking, generating, etc., with this intention, that men would perform more fervently and more perfectly these actions so necessary for individual and social life; but this delectation is not the end, but only a means to the end. Therefore he who seeks pleasure as the end and not as a means acts against the intention of the Creator and therefore sins. Hence it follows that man cannot positively intend and seek delectation in such a way that the proper motive and reason for willing the action is the convenience itself or the delectation itself, without it being necessary to think of a further honorable end.

3. By the authority of doctors. The proposed opinion is by far the more common among doctors, and indeed not only among Thomists, but also among other theologians. Thus, besides St. Thomas,⁹¹ Cajetan,⁹² Billuart,⁹³ Sylvius,⁹⁴ Haine,⁹⁵ Marc-Raus,⁹⁶ Aertnys-Damen,⁹⁷ Tanquerey,⁹⁸ and many others hold it. - John Sanchez⁹⁹ seems to have been the first who explicitly taught the contrary, writing: "If harm is absent, to eat and drink without necessity solely for seeking delectation, namely, because of the coolness of drink or the pleasantness of food, will by no means be against reason; but such eating or drinking is done freely so that the natural appetite may enjoy its acts. But to will that the appetite be delighted in its operations, which are not against reason, is in no way sin.... Therefore neither will it be right to condemn the sense of taste because it seeks food solely because of its delectation." It is deservedly doubted whether St. Bonaventure¹⁰⁰ and certain Scotists¹⁰¹ are rightly alleged as patrons of the opinion of John Sanchez.

4. From reason. St. Thomas¹⁰² rightly teaches: "Delectation is because of operation, and not conversely." For delectation is as it were a certain salt and condiment which serves for the appetibility and better digestion of food. But just as it is unfitting to eat solely because of salt or condiment, so also it is a disorder to act because of pleasure alone. Wherefore it is indeed licit to act with delectation or even to intend delectation as an intermediate end with subordination to some further end; but it is never licit to act because of pleasure alone. For this reason St. Augustine says briefly but most truly: "It is not licit to use things to be enjoyed or to enjoy things to be used."¹⁰³ Concerning delectation sought in foods St. Alphonsus notes:¹⁰⁴ "Although someone approaching the table does not think about the conservation of life, but only about the delectation of food, he does not therefore sin, because he wills such delectation, at least virtually, because of the conservation of life; and thus he does not seek it inordinately."

⁸³ Prop. 25 of Baius (Denz. n. 1025).

⁸⁴ Here are the words of the holy Doctor: "Man is bound to refer all his acts to God when he acts with deliberation and because of some end. For the apostle says in 1 Cor. 10:31: Whether ... you eat, or drink, or whatever else you do: do all things for the glory of God. Therefore, if he refers it to God at least through virtual intention, the act will be good; if he does not refer it, it will be evil: therefore no act is indifferent.... Hence for practice we gather: one must often in the day, at least in the morning, generally offer to God all his acts, so that thus the precept of the apostle may be fulfilled, at least by the virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God" (l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44).

⁸⁵ Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35, note; Vindiciae Alphonsianae P. 2, q. 1, t. 1, pp. 149-157, ed. 2.

⁸⁶ Princ. Theol. mor. n. 88 sqq.

⁸⁷ Denz. n. 1158 and 1159.

⁸⁸ Matt. 12:36.

⁸⁹ It is found among the apocryphal works of St. Jerome: Breviarium in Psalmos, Ps. 16 (Migne, Patr. lat. 26, 910).

⁹⁰ Cf. above n. 20.

⁹¹ Contra gent. 3, c. 26; Suppl. q. 49, a. 6.

⁹² Comm. in I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

⁹³ De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 6, and De ultimo fine diss. 1, a. 5.

⁹⁴ Comm. in I-II, q. 100, a. 10.

⁹⁵ Theol. mor. De act. hum. q. 59.

⁹⁶ Inst. mor. I, n. 307.

⁹⁷ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35.

⁹⁸ De act. hum. 8, n. 203.

⁹⁹ Select. disp. 2, n. 14; this work was placed on the Index on Dec. 6, 1642.

¹⁰⁰ Comm. in 2, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. I, n. 170.

¹⁰² Contra gent. 3, c. 26.

¹⁰³ What use and fruition are was said above, n. 34.

¹⁰⁴ Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44.

158. Principle II. In order that an act be not evil but good, it is required that it be done for a due honorable end.

It is proved: man acting deliberately, in his human acts, ought to act as man, that is, according to the requirement and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as an end; and indeed b) for the end proper to himself, that is, for the good fitting to his nature, or the honorable. Therefore in all human acts he ought positively to intend an end, and indeed an honorable end. Hence:

1. Idle acts are evil (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have an evil end, but because they do not have a due end: for an idle person is one who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could, or even ought to, do other useful things. Acts placed solely because it pleases (or does not please) to act in this way are idle, as are acts omitted because they are not commanded; for they lack a good end. They are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, for example, for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Acts which are done solely on account of a useful good, resting in it, are evil, because it is not an end, since it is not appetible on account of itself but only on account of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for its own sake.

3. Acts which are done principally on account of delectable good are evil. For God attached the chief delights as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, on account of those operations themselves, lest man abstain from operating, but rather so that he would be enticed to operating; and other secondary delights as a better means for the understanding of things, the relief of weariness of the mind, and refreshment and recreation in rational life. Hence delights are intrinsically ordered to the placing of a work. Therefore it is not licit to intend delight as the principal end, but as secondary and subordinated, namely, on account of the honorable good either of the operation or of recreation: not indeed as a mere means for obtaining it, but as its effect on account of the cause, or as a help for placing the work more securely, pleasantly, and easily. In other words, to seek an operation for the sake of delight is to invert the due order of things. Hence theologians after St. Augustine say: it is not licit to enjoy what is to be used or to use what is to be enjoyed.

1. Contra Gentiles III, c. 26, n. 7.

4. A fortiori, acts which are done solely on account of delight, resting in it, are evil, both because delectable good ought to be appetized on account of the honorable end, as was said under 3), and because animals act for delight alone, resting in it: but man in all things ought to follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek delight insofar as reason dictates that it is proportioned and fitting to his nature, and thus it already becomes an honorable good. Therefore to seek delight for its own sake is to pervert the order.

Whence propositions 8 and 9 were condemned by Innocent XI:

1. "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

2. "The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone altogether lacks every fault and venial defect."

Hence:

a) Acts which are done on account of any delight whatever are evil, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts which procure sensible delight are of themselves indifferent, and therefore are evil if they are not referred at least implicitly to honorable good; otherwise, namely, the lower powers, because from their nature they do not tend to honorable good but to delight alone, do not serve the higher powers, but on the contrary reason and will serve lower delight, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honorable end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus one who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour goes to the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori, acts which procure spiritual delight from an honorable good are good: for this by its nature is connected with honorable good, which therefore is implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, by which the due end is excluded only in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the disordered use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, someone also effectively wished to impede the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end or ultimate end in a certain respect is any honorable good whatever, because this is conformed to rational nature; but the due simply ultimate end is the supreme Good or God. Hence:

1. In order that an act be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2. But we ought not in every act tend expressly to God; it suffices implicitly, insofar as every participated honorable good from its nature is ordered and tends to the supreme good (cf. propositions 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3. Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or converting oneself) to God through charity; but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things which can be referred to him.

1. Cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 9 and 10; q. 21, a. 4; q. 100, a. 10, ad 2.

But if a sinner omits this, he sins by omission at the moment when the precept urges; yet other works which are done at this moment or afterward will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting those works themselves, but only merely accompanies them, unless nevertheless they were its occasion. Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed with a view to eternal reward or done from fear of hell would be evil, which has been condemned by the Church.

Prop. 16 of Hus; prop. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alexander VIII; prop. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistoia; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4.

4. There is no other precept of explicitly referring all works, or even each single work, to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel; or negatively, of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing which is not referable to God; in other words, of doing nothing except honorable works which are implicitly referred to God; or positively, of an act of charity which implicitly orders the whole following life to God as to the ultimate end.

Yet it should be noted that not all things can be referred to God even by one who has charity: namely, acts which are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, for example, walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of God's glory and of themselves conduce nothing to God's honor, and therefore, that they may be done on account of God, they must first be referred to an honorable end proportioned to them, for example, to health, to sustenance, etc.

We need not go beyond the words of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. vi. 22; vii. 17), for a proof of the important bearing of our intention | on the morality of our actions. In the sight of God the aim, the intention, with which we perform our actions, is of more importance than what we do. This is a commonplace of theology and of asceticism, and it is admitted by all who profess to guide their conduct by the maxims of the Gospel. But though it be admitted on all hands that the intention is the principal part of our deliberate actions, there is considerable difference of opinion among theologians on several points in the general doctrine of intention. Theologians do not usually discuss these points together, but it may be worth while to consider them together as forming a portion of one body of doctrine, every part of which throws light on every other part. I propose, then, to take St. Thomas principally for my guide, and bring together for the purposes of comparison and mutual illustration a few points in the doctrine of intention.

Intention is nothing more than an efficacious wish or desire of an object; it is a movement of the will towards an end, with reference to the means which must be taken in order to attain that end.

The ends of our intentions are manifold and various as are human nature and human actions, but there is one which is common to all men, and in regard to which we are not free. Man necessarily desires happiness, and if happiness be taken in the abstract, it forms the object of all our endeavors. The will is attracted only by what seems good; it is moved only by what seems likely to contribute to our well-being; in every action, then, we seek for happiness, and cannot do otherwise. If we found ourselves in presence of an object which was wholly good, we could not but love and desire it; and so when the blessed find themselves face to face with God, the infinite source of all goodness and beauty, they are necessarily ravished with love of Him; they cannot but love Him.

However, as no other object but God is wholly good, and as in this world we cannot see Him face to face, and the attainment of the possession of God is accompanied by labor and difficulty, so while we live on earth, though we necessarily seek happiness, yet we do not seek it necessarily in any one object; in other words, we are free to determine the end of our intentions according to our choice.

If we accept the teaching of St. Thomas, we are under a moral obligation to direct all our actions to the honor and glory of God.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Sum. I.-II., q. 100, a. 10 ad 2.

In this sense he interprets the words of St. Paul.² However, this must not be understood as imposing on us an obligation to form ‘an actual intention of doing our every action for God. This would be requiring more than man’s weakness can bear. It will be sufficient if we refer every action to God virtually. St. Thomas explains his mind very fully and clearly on this point in various places of his works. Thus in De Caritate, a. 11, ad 2, he says:

² I Cor. x. 31.

To the second it must be said that it is not possible in this life actually to refer all things to God, just as it is not possible always to think about God, for this belongs to the perfection of the heavenly homeland; but that all things be referred virtually to God belongs to the perfection of charity to which all are bound. To make this evident, it must be considered that, just as in efficient causes the power of the first cause remains in all subsequent causes, so also the intention of the principal end remains virtually in all secondary ends. Hence whoever actually intends some secondary end virtually intends the principal end; thus, while a physician actually gathers herbs, he intends to prepare a potion, perhaps thinking nothing about health; nevertheless he virtually intends the health for which he gives the potion. Thus, therefore, when someone orders himself to God as to his end, in all the things which he does for his own sake there remains virtually the intention of the last end, which is God; hence he can merit in all things, if he has charity. Therefore it is in this way that the Apostle commands all things to be referred to the glory of God.

In the next paragraph St. Thomas distinguishes a virtual from an habitual intention of pleasing God:

To the third it must be said that it is one thing habitually to refer to God and another virtually. For even one who does nothing and actually intends nothing, such as one sleeping, habitually refers to God; but virtually to refer something to God belongs to an agent acting for an end ordered to God. Hence habitually to refer to God does not fall under a precept; but virtually to refer all things to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing other than to have God as the last end.

It is then necessary and sufficient, according to St. Thomas, to refer all our actions to God virtually. What he means by virtually is clear enough from the passages just quoted, but he explains his meaning more fully and more clearly in other places, especially in his commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences, Dist. xl., q. 1, a. 5. There we read the following passages:

To the sixth it must be said that a wholly habitual ordering of an act to God does not suffice, because no one merits from what is in habit, but from what he actually does. Yet it is not necessary that the actual intention ordering to the last end always be joined to every action which is directed to some proximate end; rather, it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the last end, as happens when someone resolves to direct his whole self to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the last end, this is nothing other than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act; because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the whole man is ordered to the last end, and consequently all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him.

To the third it must be said that not only an act of charity is meritorious, but also acts of the other virtues insofar as they are informed by grace; although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are brought back to the end of charity. It is not necessary, however, that acts always be brought back to that end; rather, for the efficacy of meriting it suffices that they be actually brought back to the ends of the other virtues. For one who intends to preserve chastity, even if he thinks nothing about charity, certainly merits if he has grace. Now every act tending to some good, unless it tends to it inordinately, has as its end the good of some virtue, because the virtues sufficiently perfect a person concerning all things which can be human goods.

It is clear, then, that St. Thomas teaches that it is of obligation to refer all our actions to God, our last end. However, this obligation is sufficiently fulfilled by one who acts from any motive that is not bad; for in thus acting he intends something which he sees to be good, as every human act is either good or bad, according to St. Thomas. But in directing his intention to something that is good, he is necessarily, though only virtually, not actually, directing his intention to God, his last end; for the very notion of moral goodness implies conformity to man’s last end.

St. Thomas further teaches that in him who is in the grace of God, in him who fulfils all the obligations which bind him under pain of grave sin, every act that is ethically good is also meritorious of life eternal. For among our other obligations there is the positive precept of charity, by which we are bound at times to think of God, and elicit an act of love towards Him. By this act of charity we have referred ourselves and all our actions to God, and so unless it be recalled by one that is contrary to it, or by mortal sin, which destroys the bond of friendship between God and the soul, it continues to exert its influence on our subsequent actions, and informs them with the spirit of charity. It thus makes them supernatural and meritorious of a crown of glory in heaven.

The precept of charity obliges us to love God with all our heart, mind, and strength, but our condition here on earth does not permit us to be always engaged in actually thinking of God and forming acts of love towards Him. The limitations of our nature and the necessities of life, as a rule, only permit us to observe this greatest of all commandments by never doing anything directly contrary to it, and by fulfilling it virtually, that is, by virtually directing our every action towards God in the sense explained by St. Thomas. However we are bound at all events occasionally to think of God explicitly, and to give Him the service of our explicit love and affection. This St. Thomas teaches, as we have already seen, and it is certain doctrine, approved and enforced by the Church. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to say when and how often we are bound under pain of sin to form explicit acts of the love of God. St. Thomas³ teaches that at least when a man begins to have the use of reason he then begins to think about his last end, and that he is then bound under pain of mortal sin to refer his whole being and all his actions to God. If he do this, he thereby obtains the sanctifying grace of God if he was still in original sin; if he fail to do it he commits his first sin, so that one who is still in original sin cannot commit venial sin before he has committed mortal sin.

³ Sum. I.-II., q. 89, a. 6.

Although this opinion of St. Thomas has always had its supporters, especially among his followers, yet it does not seem ever to have won the common assent of theologians. The opinion seems not sufficiently grounded in revelation, reason, or experience. At some time, indeed, after coming to the use of reason, and after learning his obligations towards God, his Creator and Lord, every man is bound to give himself to the service of God by an act of love; but other theologians think that the particular time when this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of grave sin cannot be so exactly determined as St. Thomas lays down. All are agreed that we must frequently during our lives form explicit acts of the love of God, but it seems impossible to determine more accurately at what intervals this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of sin.