Chapter I. On The Nature And Divisions Of Human Acts

26. Definition. A human act can be defined: an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man; or: which proceeds from reason knowing and will moving; or: of which man is master.

The Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹ "Actions which are done by man are properly called human only when they are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts; whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will. Whence free choice is also said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." - Acts of man are commonly called those acts which indeed proceed from man as man, but without the intervention of reason or will, as the acts indicated below under nn. 2, 3, and 4.

From the given definition it is plain that the following acts are not properly human acts:

1. All natural acts and all acts of the vegetative power in man, for example, nutrition, digestion of foods, motion of the heart, bodily excitations coming from an influx of humors or from extrinsic causes not freely admitted by the will. But because of the intimate conjunction between soul and body, the will can exercise some influence upon those acts; for example, the will can vividly excite the imagination and, by means of the imagination so excited, is able to produce palpitations of the heart or motions of sensuality. In these cases acts of sensuality of this kind are certainly human and moral acts, but not if they arise without the intervention of the will.

2. All acts elicited by the perfectly insane, by those sleeping, by infants lacking the use of reason, by persons put to sleep by hypnotism, by the drunk (if, however, the hypnosis or drunkenness is perfect and the acts committed could not have been foreseen before the hypnosis or in the state of sobriety). The reason is that acts of this kind proceed without the use of reason and therefore are not produced by man as a rational animal.

3. All acts so-called "first-first,"² which are indeed produced by a man having the use of reason, but occur so suddenly that they precede every use of reason and will, for example, instantaneous and unforeseen motions of anger from an unexpected grave offense. Such acts are neither human nor moral, but amoral. But the motions so-called "second-first," which occur with half-full deliberation and advertence, are human acts, and therefore moral, although imperfect.

4. All coerced acts, that is, those which occur under the influence of force or violence. Hence violent rape is not for the virgin an act either human or moral, but merely physical. For the virgin is not mistress of this act, which is altogether against her will.

¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

² Concerning the controversy whether the first motions of sensuality are venial sin, see Billuart, De peccatis diss. IV, a. 2, § 1. The negative opinion seems to be far truer.

27. Scholion. On the love of felicity and beatific love. Authors dispute whether the love of felicity on this earth and beatific love in heaven is a human act or not. Suarez, Sylvius, Billuart, Haine, and others stand for the negative side. Wiggers³ and Vermeersch^3a are for the affirmative side. It seems to be a dispute about words. The love of felicity on this earth, just like beatific love, is psychologically necessary, but it is not an act, but a habit (either innate or infused). But the individual acts which from this habit are indeed elicited necessarily, but not coercively,^3b are altogether according to and in no way against the will; moreover they are proper to man insofar as he is man, and for this reason nothing prevents them from being called human acts.^3c Whence Wiggers⁴ deservedly says: "It seems very absurd to despoil the most perfect operations of man, and those for which he was chiefly created, of the name and dignity of human action." Therefore some theologians do not call the act of beatific love human, but superhuman. But there is no disputing about words.

³ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

^3a Theol. mor. I, n. 38.

^3b St. Thomas (De malo q. 6, a. unic.) says: To desire beatitude is necessary to man "as to the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite; but not as to the exercise of the act, because someone can then not wish to think about beatitude, since even the particular acts themselves of intellect and will are."

^3c If an act otherwise necessary could not be a human act, then Christ on this earth would not have elicited human acts in observing the divine precepts, because He could not transgress those precepts.

⁴ Commentary on I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

28. Note. St. Thomas⁵ says: "Moral acts and human acts are the same." Nevertheless the account of each is not the same; for an act is called human because it proceeds from reason and will, but it is called moral insofar as it is conformed to or deformed from right reason and divine law (cf. below, on the notion of morality, n. 99).

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3. This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is much truer than the opposite opinion defended by some, for example by Noldin, De princip. n. 63 at the end.

29. Divisions. Of human acts one is:

1. An elicited act and a commanded act. This division occurs very often in Moral Theology, but it is not explained by all in the same way. We call an act elicited which is produced immediately and formally by some power or habit; but a commanded act is one which is elicited by one power or by one habit, but from the command of another power or habit. Elicited acts of the will are, for example, to love, to hold in hatred, to consent, etc. An elicited act of the habit of faith is to believe; an elicited act of the virtue of justice is to render to each one what is his.⁶ A commanded act is a fast performed from the motive of penance; for it is elicited by the virtue of temperance, but commanded by the virtue of penance. Every act indeed is elicited, but not every act is commanded.

Even the highest powers of man not rarely act under the command of another. Thus the will itself can elicit commanded acts, as the Angelic Doctor expressly teaches: "An act of the will can be commanded."⁷ Only the first act of the will is to be excepted, namely, the simple volition of the end, which is not from the command of reason, but from the instinct of nature or of a higher cause.⁸ Experience testifying, inordinate passions in some men altogether command both the will and reason. - By the way, it is already permitted here to observe that, in a case in which one and the same act is elicited by one habit and commanded by another, that act derives its morality rather from the commanding habit than from the eliciting habit; for example, the virtue of mercy elicits an act of succoring the poor man, but this act of mercy is done from the motive or command of the love of God. In this case the act thus perfected pertains rather to the virtue of charity toward God. More broadly on this below, where there is discussion of the morality of acts from the end (n. 99 sqq.).

⁶ Many authors, such as the old Scholastics and Noldin, Tanquerey, Aertnys-Damen, take an elicited act as that which is immanent in the will, by which it is perfected and consummated, such as volition, choice, etc. But they call commanded acts those which are produced by other powers from the command of the will, for example, to think, to walk.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

⁸ Cf. ibid. ad 3.

30. 2. An internal act, an external act. Again, authors do not use this division in the same way. According to some, internal acts are only acts elicited by the will, such as to love; for they are and remain in the will. But external acts are all acts commanded by the will, since they are outside the will and are elicited by internal powers (an interior act, for example, to understand) or external powers (an exterior act, for example, to walk). According to others, in the more common and clearer sense, those acts are called internal which are manifested by no external sign, for example, acts of faith, meditations, morose delectations, of evil joy, of evil desire, etc.; but those acts are external which are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as to steal, to fornicate, to genuflect, to sing psalmody, etc.

Note. a) An act outwardly perceptible remains external, although accidentally it is perceived by no one; and this indeed must be well attended to in the matter of censures. For a censure is not incurred unless, besides the other requisites, an external act has been committed. Hence if someone has denied the faith interiorly, he is not excommunicated; but if he has committed his denial to writing or uttered it, although no one else knows this, he incurs the censure.

b) There are authors who, besides external and internal acts, also distinguish mixed acts, namely, those which are exercised by external and internal powers at the same time; but this distinction is superfluous, not to say erroneous, since every external human act must at the same time proceed from an internal act, otherwise it is no longer a human act. Yet we concede that several interior acts can be joined to some external act; for example, mental prayer, study, etc., can be joined to walking.

31. 3. A good act, an evil act, an indifferent act, according as it is either conformed to right reason as the norm of morality, or deformed from it, or indifferent to right reason. For example, a good act is prayer to God, an evil act is a lie, an indifferent act is walking (considered objectively). Below (n. 129 sqq.) we shall prove that indifferent acts are not given except when taken in the abstract, but that in the concrete every act is either good or evil because of the end or the adjoining circumstances. A good or indifferent act is called a licit act insofar as it is prohibited by no law; but an evil act is the same as an illicit act.

32. 4. A natural act and a supernatural act, according as it is elicited by natural powers alone (for example, to think, to speak) or is produced by the help of supernatural grace (for example, to elicit an act of contrition, of faith, etc.). An act is not supernatural from the fact that it turns upon a supernatural object, but from the fact that it is elicited by a supernatural principle. Hence if someone considers the mystery of the Trinity by the light of natural reason alone, he does not elicit a supernatural act; on the contrary, if someone by the help of grace resists a carnal temptation, he performs a supernatural act. - All supernatural acts elicited in this life are meritorious⁹ (either de condigno or at least de congruo, properly or broadly so called).

⁹ Cf. below, on merit, n. 139.

33. 5. A valid act and an invalid act, according as it either has or lacks the necessary conditions prescribed by positive law for producing some certain effect. This distinction often comes into use in sacraments and contracts. Thus, for example, the act of baptizing is valid if all things pertaining to the essence of baptism are observed; otherwise it is invalid. An invalid act is not to be confused with a rescindible act, since the latter is valid in itself, but can be annulled by competent authority.

34. Scholion. On the genesis of the human act. Here it is permitted briefly to add the series of acts both of the intellect and of the will which, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ must concur for any external moral work. They are twelve, namely, six on the part of the will, five on the part of the intellect, and one on the part of the executive powers. Therefore, first there are six acts elicited by the will, of which three turn upon the end and three upon the means to the end. Concerning the end: simple volition, intention, and fruition. Concerning the means to the end: consent, choice, and active use. To these six acts of the will correspond five acts on the part of the intellect, and on the part of the executive powers only one act. On the part of the intellect there are two concerning the end, namely, simple apprehension and judgment; three concerning the means, namely, counsel, discretive judgment, and command. That act which is elicited by the executive powers is called by the scholastics passive use. Now the order of all these acts is the following: The first act is on the part of the intellect, namely, cognition or simple apprehension of the end to be obtained, for example, health of body to be recovered. This act of the intellect is followed in the will by simple volition, which is the bare complacency or love of the good to be had. This act in itself is ineffective, for it is only a wish; yet it disposes the intellect to considering whether the loved good can be had. Therefore a third act approaches, and indeed on the part of the intellect, namely, judgment that the loved end can be obtained, for example, that lost health is truly recoverable. After this act of the intellect there follows in the will an efficacious intention of actually obtaining the proposed and possible end through means.¹¹ These four acts having been posited concerning the end itself, the intellect attentively inquires about suitable means to be employed for obtaining the end; this act indeed is called counsel or consultation about means. In the example brought forward this counsel would be the deliberation of the sick man or of the physician, by what means health is to be obtained. Such counsel having been had, there follows on the part of the will an act which is called consent, by which it approves and appetitively seeks the usefulness of the means. By force of this consent the intellect is applied to discerning in particular what means are to be employed; this discernment indeed is called discretive judgment. This having been had, the will truly chooses or appetitively seeks the means thus proposed in particular by the intellect; this act is called choice or the appetite of what has been pre-counseled.¹² For example, all things having been weighed, the sick man chooses a surgical operation for recovering health. Once the particular choice has been completed, the intellect commands the execution of the means chosen; this act is called command. To this command on the part of the will there corresponds the application of the executive powers to the work, which act is called active use. The executive powers obey this application of the will and truly execute the external work, which act is called passive use; for example, the sick man goes to the hospital and prepares all things for the surgical operation. Finally, all these acts having been premised, the intended end is obtained and the will rejoices and rests in it; this act indeed is called fruition in the possessed end; for example, the surgical operation having been happily performed, health is recovered, and the man, who previously was sick, now rejoices in perfect health. - All these things are explained more broadly by the Angelic Doctor in the cited place. We have made mention of them, not indeed because of immediate practical utility, since that twelvefold number of acts is wont to be performed so quickly that the agent does not become conscious of all of them, but to show how accurately and wisely the scholastics made an analysis of human acts.

¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 8-17.

¹¹ Intention is distinguished from simple volition in this, that simple volition has as its object the good as such; but intention has the good as attainable through the means necessarily to be employed (cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 1 ad 4). Whence, properly speaking, God indeed wills His goodness, but He does not intend it, since He does not need means for having it.

¹² S. theol. I-II, q. 14, a. 1. Concerning the relation between consent and choice, see ibid. q. 15, a. 3.