§ 2. The Necessity, Purity, and Efficacy of Formal Intention

Must we daily offer our actions to God for His glory?. The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10, 31: "Whether therefore you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God"; and Coloss. 3, 17: "All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, giving thanks to God the Father by Him," which St. Thomas holds as preceptive, while St. Bonaventure ¹ draws them down to mere counsel, in reality indicate nothing about the intention by which a good work must be performed.

They come back to this: act in such a way that you give occasion for glorifying God; act as Christians, conscious of your conjunction with Christ and of the benefits which through Christ you have received from God; and consequently, in a spirit of thanksgiving, do those things which are approved by Christ.

Therefore the precept is not demonstrated which, following Collet, St. Alphonsus enunciates in these words, De act. hum., n. XLIV: "It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least by the virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God." And the obligation, which we by no means deny, of offering works to the glory of God, requires only these things:

a) that our works glorify God; but all our good works glorify God, unless we reject that connatural relation;

b) that we fulfill the precept of formal love of God: concerning which precept we shall treat where we treat of charity. Cf. Lehmk., I, 375.

¹ In 1. 2, D. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

Connatural glorification of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Saints. By a connatural relation all good acts are also glorious to Christ. This is true not only of those who profess themselves Christians - which is too manifest - but also of others, since from the grace of Christ all good works are done ². Formal praise will be rendered to Christ from this by all who, whether in heaven or even on earth, have known this causality of Christ.

Since, as Benedict XV inculcated more than once, all graces are obtained through Mary, all good works also connaturally yield to the honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God and our Mother.

Not a few things also have a connatural relation to the Saints, for example to the founders of religious orders.

² Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 14, art. 6, c.

A good work which can be ordered to God, to the Blessed Virgin Mary, or to the Saints, or which is connaturally so ordered, can also from intention be done for honoring God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, or the Saints. And then, but only then, the act receives a species from that intention and becomes an act of religion.

But it is necessary that the act can truly express an order to God or to the Saints. Hence if someone wishes to refer an indifferent act, for example a walk, to the Blessed Virgin herself, he does not refer it except insofar as at the same time it is perceived to be licit, or, for example from the mode of temperance observed, is specially honest ¹, or unless by its external reason it honors Mary, as if it has become a pilgrimage.

¹ He merits specially from the object who seeks delight from the honest good, virtue, God; from the end, who seeks it on account of the honest good, that he may flee dangers, become more spirited for holy labor; from the mode, who seeks it temperately. St. Thomas uses this principle: "As the operation is, so is the delight following it." But voluntary delight contains approval of the object in which one delights. Therefore delight concerning a good object is good.

Concerning purity of intention. A twofold purity of intention must be very carefully distinguished: the purity by which every reason opposed to charity, such as vanity, sensuality, etc., is removed; and the purity by which a less sublime intention, although honest, is excluded.

The former account of purity cannot be sufficiently commended: by the mixture of a less ordered affection, the act is at least partly corrupted.

But the other purity must be proposed cautiously. For by the fact that we are helped toward an act by natural propensity, merit of itself is not diminished. Nor without great utility did provident God place propensities of this sort in human nature. Yet per accidens, insofar as it diminishes the psychological liberty of the act, it can make the act less meritorious. Besides, he who has need of such help demonstrates lesser charity and consequently lesser merit than he who is moved perfectly by a more sublime affection.

Wherefore in neglecting such a propensity this utility can be present: that the act be more voluntary; that from the unity of intention the more sublime affection itself become more intense.

Nevertheless, the powers which are at our disposal must be prudently reckoned, since it is better to do good with the aid of nature than, with that aid spurned, to omit the good: "Nature is not contrary to grace: hence the admixture of nature with grace does not cause remission in the effects of grace, which is caused by the intermingling of a contrary." Thus St. Thomas, in 3 S., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5, concerning the love of friends.

Moreover the intention of beatitude corrupts the good of virtue in no way, since beatitude is our perfection; since it is the end to which one must come by virtue. Cf. Sertillanges, La morale de S. Thomas, c. 17, n. 17.

The use of renewing intention, for example through daily oblations made to God of the whole of our action, contains these utilities: the oblation itself is in itself a laudable act of religion or charity; more easily, through it, while acting, frequent memory is fostered of the intention of religion, faith, and charity, by which the honesty of good works is increased; it confirms the will in good purposes: these, as we are men, lack perpetual efficacy and therefore must be renewed.

At the same time, however, it must be denied that through oblations of this sort acts become meritorious which are not elicited from the strictly so-called virtue of such intention.

Nor, even if the intention has been virtual, will it avail to remove the indifferent nature of the object. But, insofar as the act is apt for this, it can add the honesty of an extrinsic end, and render the honesty which the act contains of itself more certain to us.

Conversely, a universal oblation made to an idol is indeed in itself most evil; nevertheless it does not corrupt except those acts which have truly been commanded by such an intention.

It is one thing for merit to be acquired, another for a disposition to be made concerning the acquired fruit of an action.

The oblations of which we speak here indeed cannot render meritorious acts into which they pour no virtue; but they suffice for efficaciously disposing of the true fruits of actions, for example for the conversion of sinners, in favor of the souls of purgatory, just as, by a will actually past and merely habitual, Masses are applied to various intentions. For a future thing can be efficaciously ceded or given by a present act.

I. By moral imputation, in the forum of God and in the opinion of men, actions or effects are ascribed to a free author, unto praise and merit, or unto blame and demerit.

II. One's own action or omission is imputed according to all intended notes; indeed, according to all notes which are known to be present, if there is question of an evil thing toward which the will is affected as it truly is. For if the thing is loved abstractly, only the loved notes are to be considered.

III. An effect, or the further resultance of an action, can be intended, or merely permitted, either actively or passively. An intended effect is always imputed. A good effect is not imputed unless foreseen and intended; an evil effect, negatively permitted, is imputed insofar as there was a positive obligation of impeding it; but positively permitted, it is imputed insofar as one had to abstain from the action lest the effect follow. It will always be imputed if it could have been avoided without omitting the action.

IV. An evil effect which is permitted to follow an action is not imputed if the immediate efficiency is diverse, and the permission is excused by a proportionately grave reason. The reason is that the causality of one's own will is immune from the malice of the effect, and, on account of the proportionate cause, satisfaction has been made to the positive precept of taking care that the effect not follow.

That positive obligation varies according to the gravity and proximity of the evil effect, according to the nature of the precept, and according to the cause for acting. Guilt for a wrongly permitted effect is contracted when its cause is posited, and it is not changed whether the effect follows or not. But from the effect followed or not followed, damage or reservation can depend.

V. The action or omission of another can never be the strictly so-called effect of one's own action. Nevertheless it is imputed to us on account of cooperation, on account of the imitation of a good example or scandal, on account of fraternal correction made or omitted. Yet these, if there is question of another's evil action, can be excused by a similar and stronger reason than that by which permission of an evil effect is excused.

I. Merit is the retribution of a work before him to whom it expresses an order. The common conditions of merit are peace, or at least begun pacification, between the agent and the one making retribution; a work freely done; a relation either connatural or explicit to another's service; acceptance of the work by the one rewarding; and proportion between the work and the reward.

II. Merit is distinguished as human and theological, or before God. This latter is de condigno and de congruo. De condigno means the title of some justice; de congruo means only a partial title: it is hoped for from the persevering benefit of grace inviting and from the good effort of man. There is no merit except in the state of a wayfarer. Merit now is supernatural; natural merit would befit the works of a man not elevated.

III. The heavenly reward toward which we tend is essential and intrinsic to us; already now it is conferred inchoatively.

IV. Merit de condigno requires the state of grace, the moral goodness of the work, and a supernatural principle. It does not seem to require a special intention referring the work to God. Wherefore every act not evil and moral of a man having charity is meritorious.

Nor in the sinner - indeed nor in the unbeliever - do there seem to be supernaturally indifferent acts, or acts endowed with merely natural goodness.

V. We can merit de condigno only for ourselves; namely, an increase of sanctifying grace and heavenly glory. De congruo we merit for ourselves actual graces as sufficient; indeed graces which will be efficacious. And after we have become sinners we can merit aids for rising again. We cannot merit first grace, nor, while we are just, the restitution of justice after a future fall. Let the same be said of final perseverance.

For others we can merit the same aids, indeed first grace, de congruo.

For ourselves and for others we can merit de congruo and impetrate aids for persevering. Other things being equal, we merit more easily for ourselves than for others.

VI. The quantity of merit depends upon the dignity of the agent, and upon the value of the work, considered both in itself and in the intention from which it emanates; but the noblest intention is that of charity. Merit de condigno is not diminished by the fact that we direct an action toward impetrating various things for ourselves and for others.

VII. We cannot abdicate all the fruits of merit and impetration; nor would this be expedient. But we can laudably cede satisfactory fruits to others, especially to the souls of purgatory.

VIII. All our good acts glorify Christ and His Mother; many also glorify the saints.

There is no precept of a daily oblation of actions to be made to God.

A formal intention of honoring God or the Blessed Virgin through a congruent act adds a new species of goodness.

IX. Every impurity of intention must be purged; a more sublime intention must be prudently procured.

X. The use of renewing a good intention is very useful to the soul; nevertheless it does not remove the indifference of the object, but adds the honesty of an extrinsic end, and renders more certain the merit of intrinsic honesty. A most evil universal oblation made to an idol nevertheless corrupts only acts truly commanded by such an intention.

But by one oblation we can efficaciously dispose of the alienable fruits of our actions.

The fruit of our inquiry seems chiefly to be this: that we should make much of the moral liberty of acting well, without which psychological liberty lacks price and dignity, indeed almost use. The perpetual influx of the grace of God fills us with joyful hope of an almost continual increase of merits, while at the same time exhorting us that, by intending and extending the command of our will, we should endeavor unceasingly to multiply deliberate actions, in which almost our whole truly human life consists, with the vice of inconsiderateness routed and the yoke of the passions shaken off.