Solicitude

Solicitude.—Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude, that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.

(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: “Be not solicitous therefore saying: ‘What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?’ ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof” (Matt, vi. 31, 34).

(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in Divine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume over the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).

Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.—(a) Solicitude is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.

(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much time and thought to business, politics, society or science that religion is more and more set aside in his life: “The cares of this world choked up the word” (Matt., xiii. 22).

(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life. Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.

Cases of Lawful Solicitude.—(a) When the end is a genuine temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: “Work must be attended to, but worry must be banished” (St. Jerome).

(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28), Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.

Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.—(a) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes temporal things one’s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future, as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.

(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.

(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time, when one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented (e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.

Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.—(a) When the end is a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good, for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654). Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen., xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance that they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55.

41. False prudence is a sin opposed to prudence by excess. There are various species of it: for there can be 1. abuse of prudence itself a) concerning a false end, through prudence of the flesh, b) concerning false means, through cunning, or the devising and knowledge of false means, c) concerning the execution of false means, through deceit in words and fraud in deeds; 2. abuse of solicitude, through excessive solicitude.

42. Prudence of the flesh is concerned with the end (voorzichtigheid des vleesches of der wereld, wereldswijsheid, Lk. XVI, 8) and is the excess or abuse of prudence itself strictly so called; it devises and dictates suitable means to an evil end, namely for accomplishing the works of the flesh or fulfilling the instinct of corrupt nature (Rom. VIII, 5-7; Gal. V, 16). Whence it is skill in finding and employing ways for doing evil. Since it is found in every sin, just as true prudence is found in every virtue, hence it is not a sin distinct from the evil work itself, unless it is directly and in itself voluntary, precisely insofar as it is opposed to prudence.

It is a mortal sin if someone sets up an evil end for himself as the ultimate end or the end of the whole life: for by that very fact he is turned away from the true ultimate end, God; as if it proceeds from a mortally evil affection, or someone on that account is prepared to sin mortally, for example if he preferred a temporal good to the eternal good of the soul. But if someone proposes a particular evil end for himself without being turned away from the ultimate end, it is a venial sin, for example if he were to employ effort for pleasure alone.

1. Hence false prudence does not necessarily judge erroneously by speculative error, because the means can be truly suitable to the end, and it does not necessarily judge that they are absolutely good, but that they are suitable for us to the end proposed. But it is practically false, because it is the cause of evil election: for it is not conformed to right appetite, but conformed to dishonorable affection.

2. The works of the flesh in the present place are understood not in the strict theological sense, but in the more general sense of the Apostle concerning all works of corrupt nature; these are of three kinds according to the threefold perverse concupiscence. Whence prudence of the flesh can be distinguished as threefold: earthly, animal or strictly carnal, and diabolical, according as it tends to temporal goods, to pleasure, or to pride (hebzuchtige, vleeschelijke of dierlijke, eerzuchtige v.).

43. There are various species concerning the means:

a) cunning (listigheid, arglistigheid, sluwheid, doorslepenheid), which is excess or abuse in counsel (and judgment); this devises for an end, whether good or evil, means not true but false, simulated, or apparent. Namely, it is skill in devising ways not true but simulated, for attaining an end, whether good or evil. It is sin because even to a good end one must not arrive by false ways but by true ones; mortal if it proceeds from a mortally evil affection, or inflicts grave harm (II Cor. IV, 2);

b) deceit, and c) fraud (bedriegerij, bedrog in woord en daad), which are nothing but the external act and execution of cunning: deceit principally through false words, which hold the principal place among signs; fraud through false deeds.

44. Excessive or immoderate solicitude (overdreven bezorgdheid) can be: either of temporal things, namely an excessive occupation of the mind in acquiring or conserving temporal things; or of future things, namely an excessive occupation of the mind concerning future things, especially things necessary for life, with anxiety and little confidence in divine providence. In three ways it can be illicit: a) if we seek temporal things as the ultimate end, by preferring them to spiritual things, which is mortal; b) if superfluous effort is employed for acquiring or conserving temporal things, so that we are withdrawn from due spiritual things: this is mortal if it withdraws from spiritual things prescribed under grave obligation; otherwise it is venial; c) if there is only superfluous fear, namely lest, by doing what must be done, necessary things fail us: this is venial, unless per accidens it were the effect or cause of mortal sin.

1. For a work of virtue, among other circumstances, due time also is required, and this also has place in interior solicitude. Thus if in the time of summer someone were already solicitous about the grape harvest, he would be superfluously solicitous (St. Thomas, q. 55, a. 7).

45. The cause of false prudence. - The species of false prudence arise especially from avarice, which is most of all opposed to the virtue of justice, in which the use of right reason chiefly shines forth. Thus, for example, excessive solicitude arises from the inordinate love of having or fear of losing.

This is immoderate study about temporal goods, either because in them the ultimate end is placed, or because it has joined to it a superfluous fear of lacking them. This solicitude Christ forbids, Matth. 6. Be not solicitous. So St. Bonaventure, Opusc. Explicatio terminorum Theologiae, and in the first part of the Centiloquium, sectione 8. It is defined by Cicero here, sectione 22. It is immoderate Love of possessing.

It has especially three species: The first is great anxiety for acquiring temporal things, whether the effect follows or not; and this is found both in those who possess much and those who possess little: The second is great tenacity in retaining, which allows nothing to be spent on pious causes or the relief of the poor: The third, finally, is a burning thirst for amassing worldly riches from every quarter, whether by fair means or foul. So St. Bonaventure, de profectu Relig. lib. 1. cap. 34. and most excellently in the Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 6. he compares the man solicitous of temporal things to the Mole; for the wickedness of this solicitude is dark and its imprudence blind; as many possessions as it has, so many tombs it has, which it digs for itself, burying itself in continual solicitude. Then the Saintly Doctor reproves this care for riches with various other similitudes set forth there, which see.

Toward the end of the Chapter he records several effects of this solicitude, the chief of which is servitude of Idols Ephes. 5. For to this Avatus refers all his works.

The second is folly opposed to prudence; for as the fool does not guard against danger, however near,¹ so the man solicitous about the world, though near to death, does not guard against his peril, as is said, Lucae 12. Fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee, other effects see in the same place. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'sicut stultas non praecavet periculum'; 'stultas' is not grammatical here and is rendered 'stultus' (the fool), the sense required by the parallel clause.

Immoderate solicitude for the future is reproved, Matth. 6. Be not solicitous for the morrow. Of this the Saintly Doctor treats in the exposition of cap. 2. of the rule, at those words: And let them not be solicitous.

In Religious, though small, this withdraws from perfection; in a Father of a family, when moderate, it is laudable; in anyone, however, when immoderate, it is culpable; and it destroys that prudence and confidence by which we ought to cast all our solicitude upon God; who feeds the fowls of the air, to die on the morrow; and clothes the lilies of the field, though soon to be cast into the oven.

Of this solicitude St. Bernard says excellently, de verb. Psalm. 23. There are other thoughts, more violent, which pertain to the necessities of nature; For often the Carnal thought about drink, about food, or about clothing so affects us, that it can scarcely be eradicated from our hearts. He gives the reason, because solicitude of this kind, viscous and muddy, will find muddy ground too, to which it may adhere; for man, formed not of other earth than muddy earth, conscious of his need, distrusts the providence of things to come, and directs every thought toward it, that he may follow upon it. But since our providence is uncertain, according to true prudence all our solicitude must be cast upon God; for to trust to oneself in those things whose outcome is uncertain is to distrust, as St. Bernard has it, serm. 5. de vigil. Nativit. Domini.