Sorrow and Purpose Regarding Venial Sins

I. If someone confesses venial sins together with a mortal sin, he receives the sacrament validly and fruitfully, even if sorrow and purpose comprehend only the mortal sin.

II. If someone confesses only venial sins, sorrow and purpose must enjoy the same properties as sorrow and purpose concerning mortal sins, except the property of universality (St. Thomas, 3 p., question 87, article 1, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, VI, 449, 451). This is not required, because one venial sin can be remitted without another. Therefore sorrow and purpose suffice:

1. Concerning all the venial sins which someone confesses.

2. Concerning some or one of those which he confesses, as follows:

a) Concerning only those fully deliberate, because someone can detest the greater malice without detesting the lesser (St. Thomas, at the cited place; St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

b) Concerning only venial sins of a determined species, because we can detest one baseness without detesting another different from it (St. Thomas, at the cited place; St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

3. Concerning the multitude or frequency of venial sins. Some teach absolutely that this suffices, but they suppose that then one grieves concerning determined sins, namely at least concerning the later ones, which constitute the multitude. Finally, others admit this as regards semi-deliberate sins, but not as regards fully deliberate sins (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, at the cited place, and Praxis Confessarii, n. 71). St. Thomas declares that the purpose "of preparing oneself for diminishing venial sins" suffices (3 p., question 87, article 1, ad 1).

III. Sorrow - which I note for the sake of completeness - which according to what has just been explained does not extend itself to all venial sins, cannot be perfect contrition concerning some venial sin, because perfect contrition concerning one venial sin necessarily extends itself to all venial sins, as was explained in n. 284.

Corollary I. One who confesses only venial sins concerning which he does not grieve sins gravely, because the sacrament is rendered invalid. But one who, with the value of the sacrament preserved, confesses venial sins without sorrow sins only venially; for grave irreverence is not found in this (St. Alphonsus, VI, 449, doubt 1).

Corollary II. Penitents who are accustomed to commit only venial sins should be advised to add a mortal sin, if they have committed one before, or a more serious venial sin of their past life (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, nn. 71, 99, 188).

446. QUESTION 5. Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow?

Reply. Negative, more probably, provided that sorrow concerning other sins, or at least one, is not lacking, and that the penitent does not knowingly submit the other sins as matter of absolution ⁹. The reason is:

⁹ Distinguish with Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 6, no. 7) a twofold manner in which someone can confess a venial sin without true attrition or a purpose of amendment. 1. If he discloses to the confessor this very defect of sorrow and purpose; then neither ought the priest to absolve from such a sin, nor, if the penitent is prudent, ought he to tell it for this end, namely, as matter of the Sacrament, since it cannot truly be such. Nevertheless, it can licitly be told either for the sake of humility, counsel, or incitement to true penance; but this manner has nothing to do with the present matter. 2. If he discloses the venial sin over which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution. Then, says Suarez, many think it a mortal sin.... But although it cannot be denied that it is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such a fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose, of itself and by its nature, is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this Sacrament signified by the form ...; nor does it impede the remission of the other venial sins concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin. See also Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 48.

Moreover, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will more often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of that defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it may not be sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception.

1. for the validity of the Sacrament, it suffices that some certain matter be furnished, namely, that there be sorrow for some venial sin; for venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, and, moreover, since they do not deprive one of the grace and friendship of God, some can be remitted without the others; 2. because no injury is thereby inflicted upon the Sacrament if they are declared for a good end, all levity being excluded. Indeed, those venial sins for which one does not have at least certain sorrow are also very often usefully disclosed, namely, for a fuller manifestation and direction of conscience, for conceiving some confusion, etc. - See St. Lig., no. 449.

463. QUESTION 4. What purpose is required, or suffices, for venial sins?

Reply 1. For the validity of the Sacrament, it is required and suffices to have an efficacious purpose of avoiding at least one venial sin; because it suffices to grieve over even one for sufficient matter of the Sacrament ¹¹; therefore, a fortiori, an efficacious purpose of avoiding all the venial sins which are accused suffices.

¹¹ Compare Cardinal De Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 141), who teaches that the opinion of those who think that sufficient sorrow can be present concerning one venial sin, even if no virtual sorrow, or certainly less sufficient sorrow, is present concerning other venial sins of the same species, is truer.

2. It suffices to purpose amendment concerning some class of venial sins, for example, concerning lies, by saying: I do not wish to lie any more.

3. It suffices to wish to avoid all deliberate sins, because these can be avoided; and semi-deliberate sins insofar as it can be done. - St. Lig., bk. 6, no. 449, dub. 2.

4. It suffices to wish firmly and efficaciously to diminish the frequency and multitude of venial sins, because, as was said concerning contrition, the purpose falls upon at least some one of them ¹². In practice, it is safer to elicit a purpose concerning certain determinate sins, especially the graver ones and chiefly those which are committed from habit, and to join to them some sin of one's former life. - Reuter, no. 295.

¹² To this pertain those words of St. Thomas (III, q. 87, art. 1, ad 1): Penance for mortal sins requires that a man purpose to abstain from each and every mortal sin. But for penance for venial sins it is required that a man purpose to abstain from individual sins, but not from all, because the frailty of human nature does not permit this; nevertheless, he must have the purpose of preparing himself to diminish venial sins; otherwise, there would be a danger of his falling away, since he would abandon the desire of advancing, or of removing the impediments to spiritual progress, which are venial sins.

When the faithful, including those who are regarded as pious and confess frequently, are seen to make no or almost no progress after innumerable confessions, it is permissible to conjecture that they conceive purposes which are too general and confused, and therefore sluggish and languid. - Elbel, no. 112.

Not rarely, moreover, penitents are found, women especially, who devote a long time to the examination of conscience, seek out the smallest faults with the greatest anxiety, and prolong their confessions beyond measure, and nevertheless are not very solicitous about sorrow and an efficacious purpose. These are to be seriously exhorted that, omitting the anxious care of declaring all venial sins in species and number, they subject to the keys with serious sorrow and a purpose of amendment only those which weigh more heavily upon the conscience and which especially are to be rooted out. Indeed, it is expedient that from these venial sins they select one principal sin upon which, above the rest, they diligently concentrate in detesting and amending it. - Sporer, no. 339; Elbel, no. 113; etc.

237. 1° Principle: The purpose of avoiding venial sins must indeed be firm and efficacious, but not necessarily universal; for one venial sin can be remitted without another, and consequently with a habitual or even actual affection for other venial sins.

238. 2° Conclusions: (a) The purpose of avoiding one of the venial sins declared is required and suffices. It is indeed required, if other sins are not accused, at least sins of the past life; otherwise absolution would be invalid on account of the defect of purpose and consequently of contrition; and he who knowingly lacked a good purpose would commit sacrilege. - But it suffices, because as soon as one venial sin is held in hatred, it can be remitted without the others. Yet it is better that it be extended to all venial sins which have been accused; and this certainly will not be difficult if a motive of contrition embracing all venial sins is proposed.

239. (b) When the same venial sins are often accused, it suffices to conceive sorrow and purpose concerning their frequency, by firmly resolving to lessen this frequency. For since we cannot avoid all venial sins taken collectively, as was said in the Treatise on Grace (n. 63), it is enough to lessen their number. - Yet it is expedient to conceive sorrow and purpose concerning certain sins in species, especially concerning those which are more deliberate, since they more greatly hinder Christian perfection. Therefore pious penitents who are accustomed to accuse only venial sins are to be admonished to detest specially one or another and to try to amend it, by determining certain means for attaining this end.¹

¹ Cf. Pratique progressive de la Confession, 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, t. I, p. 62 sq.; t. II, p. 115-144.

240. (c) Absolution is more easily to be granted to those who frequently relapse into the same venial sins than into the same mortal sins.² For the occasions of committing venial sins are much more frequent and much more difficult to remove; whence relapse is not a very probable indication that true sorrow is lacking. Besides, if it is lacking with respect to these venial sins, it is easier to excite contrition with respect to the graver faults of the past life, which the pious are accustomed to accuse.

² Recidivists are treated below, n. 478, where the office of the confessor with respect to various kinds of sinners is treated.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4; q. 87, a. 1, ad 1; Suppl., q. 2, a. 4.

486. Principle I. The purpose required for contrition is the deliberate will not to sin for the future. - It is required for the sacrament, according to the Council of Trent, which, handing down the definition of contrition which is part of the sacrament, says that it is "sorrow... with purpose" (sess. 14, c. 4).

That it is necessarily required for the sacrament is clear:

1. From the Council of Trent itself, which places purpose in the definition of contrition; and that it is placed there as an essential part is clear from the parallelism with the place where there is discourse concerning attrition: for there it is said that attrition disposes with the sacrament to justification "if it excludes the will of sinning."

2. From intrinsic reasons: For the remission of sin there is required the true will of detesting, or of turning oneself altogether away from sin and converting oneself to God. But without the purpose of no longer sinning this cannot be done. - On the other hand, if someone truly sorrows over sin above all things, the formal reason of sorrow is that sin under some special aspect is against God. But sin being against God is verified in future sin just as in past sin, with only the accidental difference of time. Therefore.

487. Principle II. An implicit purpose can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily required. - An explicit and formal purpose is a special act of the will, distinct from sorrow, by which someone determines that he wills to amend his life or abstain from sin; an implicit or virtual purpose is that which is included in sincere contrition, and is really sorrow: for he who from a universal motive seriously sorrows that he has sinned truly implicitly purposes that he will sin no more.

This latter can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily and from the nature of the thing required, since it is not of the essence of contrition, which even from an implicit and virtual purpose alone suffices for the sacrament, since, as Trent requires, it excludes the will of sinning.¹ Whence 1) an implicit purpose suffices if someone does not think about sins to be avoided in the future; 2) but if he has thought about them, he ought also connaturally to elicit an explicit purpose, otherwise it would be a sign that contrition is not sincere and supreme. Therefore in practice a) before confession penitents are to be exhorted to an explicit purpose, for greater security and certainty concerning their own disposition; b) after confession has been made, if an explicit purpose was not present, they are not to be disturbed.

¹ Cf. Gury-Ballerini, Th. M., II, n. 462.

488. Principle III. Purpose requires four qualities: it must be absolute, firm, efficacious, and universal.

1° By reason of essence it must be absolute, i.e., there must exist here and now an absolute will not to sin again, but to guard against sin thereafter.

Therefore not any simple desire of not sinning suffices, nor a velleity, nor a conditioned will, e.g., I would will not to sin any more if I could, if temptation were not pressing, unless it were so difficult and troublesome to me, etc. Nor does a will not to sin for a time suffice, e.g., I will not sin for a month.

2° By reason of proportion the purpose must be firm, i.e., so rooted in the will that here and now there is present the will not to sin, notwithstanding the fear of any evil whatever or the love of any good whatever; wherefore absolution would have to be denied to one who is not here and now disposed so that generally he would rather suffer every evil and be without any good than again offend God.

It is said: a) Here and now, i.e., by actual will; nor is it required that it so remain in the future, for someone can change his will. Whence a firm purpose of the will does not exclude fear or doubt, nor even some intellectual foresight of future relapse from one's own known inconstancy or fragility, provided that it is not with the absence of all confidence or with despair, or therefore with complete certainty of relapse, but amendment is held as possible with the help of God and is intended.

For purpose does not require a positive judgment that one will sin no more. For purpose is an actual disposition of the will, which is detestative of sin and wills to preserve this detestation. But judgment pertains to the intellect, which, knowing the inconstancy of the will, can foresee that a fall is possible, indeed probable. Whence purpose does not exclude this judgment, but only the judgment of certain relapse and impossible avoidance: for hope is concerning a future possible good.

b) Generally, i.e., in genus or in a confused way, for according to the common opinion of Doctors the confessor must take care not to propose to the penitent in particular evils to be borne or goods to be relinquished. For it can happen, and in reality does happen, that someone generally wills to bear all evils rather than admit sin, who would no longer will this if they were distinctly and vividly proposed in the individual. It is indeed true that this general purpose is remiss and much less perfect than another purpose; nevertheless, according to the common and certain opinion of theologians, it is sufficient, and in reality one who purposes in this way truly wills to avoid sin above all things.²

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, on Penance, n. 458.

The firmness of the purpose does not make it so that the violation of the purpose constitutes a new guilt of itself, as from a violated vow or promise. For purpose is not a vow, because it is not made to God but with respect to oneself; nor is it a promise, because a promise is made to another; and although the purpose is made in some way in service of God, nevertheless it is not a promise made to God.

3° Purpose also, by reason of efficiency, must be efficacious, so that the sinner here and now wills to employ the means necessary for afterward avoiding sin, and especially wills to flee proximate occasions of sinning mortally, to remit offenses, to lay aside hatreds and enmities, and to restore for injuries. The reason is that the intention of the end, if it is true, must move one to seek the necessary means.

Efficacy is required affectively, not effectively. For a) it regards the present will and brings it about that, as long as the purpose remains in the soul, so long the sinner cannot sin again; b) but it is not the efficacy of a future event, insofar as from the fact that the purpose is here and now efficacious it would follow that sin is in fact never again committed thereafter; otherwise it would be enough once to elicit a good purpose so that someone would never sin again. Whence, from the fact that, after having had a purpose, someone has frequently relapsed into the same mortal sin, you will not necessarily infer that he did not have an efficacious purpose. Therefore purpose must be efficacious affectively, and from the fact that it was not effectively efficacious, it cannot be concluded that it was not affectively efficacious (cf. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4).

Hence to the question whether purpose must be constant in order to be called efficacious, the response is: per se, negatively, because the human will is mutable. Per se, for if the penitent should relapse at once and with almost no resistance, this will be a motive for suspecting that the penitent lacked a truly efficacious purpose. Generally, one who efficaciously purposes does not so easily forget his purpose, and is accustomed at least for some short time to employ effort and persevere.

4° Finally, purpose by reason of matter must be universal, i.e., it must extend itself to all mortal sins, not only those perpetrated, but whatever ones are to be avoided thereafter.

Nevertheless, 1) it is not required that a special purpose be formed concerning individual sins to be avoided, but a general one concerning all in genus from a universal motive suffices. Nor is it required 2) that it extend itself to venial sins. But if only venial sins are declared, for the validity of the sacrament there is required at least a) a purpose concerning one declared venial sin, namely, concerning avoiding a sin altogether similar in altogether the same circumstances, or concerning all sins, not indeed of the same species, but of altogether the same condition; or b) concerning avoiding a certain kind of venial sins; or c) concerning avoiding the graver ones; or d) concerning avoiding fully deliberate ones; or e) concerning diminishing the number of venial sins (S. Th. III, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1). Purpose can also be had concerning avoiding individual venial sins, or concerning all to be avoided distributively, but not concerning all to be avoided collectively, because we can avoid individual ones, but to avoid all at once is impossible for us.

Question 4. What purpose is required and suffices for the value of the sacrament, where only venial sins are accused? Resp. The same must be said concerning purpose as was said above concerning the sorrow required when only venial sins are accused; and consequently just as it is certain that purpose concerning all venial sins is not required, because these are compatible with the infusion of grace, so it is certain that purpose concerning only one of those things which are accused is required and suffices, whether it is some venial sin committed since the last confession, or whether it is some venial or mortal sin of the past life, and often already accused, even if that accusation is made only according to species, even the lowest species. Indeed not only does this suffice, but it is also expedient that from several venial sins which are accused, some one principal sin be selected, to the detesting and amending of which the soul is applied before the others. - Cf. Sporer, n. 339. - Elbel, nn. 113 and seq.

IV. In the confession of venial sins also this grief is necessary. It is not necessary that grief be conceived for all venial sins, since venial sins are not necessary but free matter: it is enough that grief be conceived for some graver venial sin, and that an express purpose be had of avoiding it, when no necessary matter is subjected to the keys.