Article II: On the Endowments of the Purpose

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4; q. 87, a. 1, ad 1; Suppl., q. 2, a. 4.

486. Principle I. The purpose required for contrition is the deliberate will not to sin for the future. - It is required for the sacrament, according to the Council of Trent, which, handing down the definition of contrition which is part of the sacrament, says that it is "sorrow... with purpose" (sess. 14, c. 4).

That it is necessarily required for the sacrament is clear:

1. From the Council of Trent itself, which places purpose in the definition of contrition; and that it is placed there as an essential part is clear from the parallelism with the place where there is discourse concerning attrition: for there it is said that attrition disposes with the sacrament to justification "if it excludes the will of sinning."

2. From intrinsic reasons: For the remission of sin there is required the true will of detesting, or of turning oneself altogether away from sin and converting oneself to God. But without the purpose of no longer sinning this cannot be done. - On the other hand, if someone truly sorrows over sin above all things, the formal reason of sorrow is that sin under some special aspect is against God. But sin being against God is verified in future sin just as in past sin, with only the accidental difference of time. Therefore.

487. Principle II. An implicit purpose can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily required. - An explicit and formal purpose is a special act of the will, distinct from sorrow, by which someone determines that he wills to amend his life or abstain from sin; an implicit or virtual purpose is that which is included in sincere contrition, and is really sorrow: for he who from a universal motive seriously sorrows that he has sinned truly implicitly purposes that he will sin no more.

This latter can suffice, nor is an explicit purpose necessarily and from the nature of the thing required, since it is not of the essence of contrition, which even from an implicit and virtual purpose alone suffices for the sacrament, since, as Trent requires, it excludes the will of sinning.¹ Whence 1) an implicit purpose suffices if someone does not think about sins to be avoided in the future; 2) but if he has thought about them, he ought also connaturally to elicit an explicit purpose, otherwise it would be a sign that contrition is not sincere and supreme. Therefore in practice a) before confession penitents are to be exhorted to an explicit purpose, for greater security and certainty concerning their own disposition; b) after confession has been made, if an explicit purpose was not present, they are not to be disturbed.

¹ Cf. Gury-Ballerini, Th. M., II, n. 462.

488. Principle III. Purpose requires four qualities: it must be absolute, firm, efficacious, and universal.

1° By reason of essence it must be absolute, i.e., there must exist here and now an absolute will not to sin again, but to guard against sin thereafter.

Therefore not any simple desire of not sinning suffices, nor a velleity, nor a conditioned will, e.g., I would will not to sin any more if I could, if temptation were not pressing, unless it were so difficult and troublesome to me, etc. Nor does a will not to sin for a time suffice, e.g., I will not sin for a month.

2° By reason of proportion the purpose must be firm, i.e., so rooted in the will that here and now there is present the will not to sin, notwithstanding the fear of any evil whatever or the love of any good whatever; wherefore absolution would have to be denied to one who is not here and now disposed so that generally he would rather suffer every evil and be without any good than again offend God.

It is said: a) Here and now, i.e., by actual will; nor is it required that it so remain in the future, for someone can change his will. Whence a firm purpose of the will does not exclude fear or doubt, nor even some intellectual foresight of future relapse from one's own known inconstancy or fragility, provided that it is not with the absence of all confidence or with despair, or therefore with complete certainty of relapse, but amendment is held as possible with the help of God and is intended.

For purpose does not require a positive judgment that one will sin no more. For purpose is an actual disposition of the will, which is detestative of sin and wills to preserve this detestation. But judgment pertains to the intellect, which, knowing the inconstancy of the will, can foresee that a fall is possible, indeed probable. Whence purpose does not exclude this judgment, but only the judgment of certain relapse and impossible avoidance: for hope is concerning a future possible good.

b) Generally, i.e., in genus or in a confused way, for according to the common opinion of Doctors the confessor must take care not to propose to the penitent in particular evils to be borne or goods to be relinquished. For it can happen, and in reality does happen, that someone generally wills to bear all evils rather than admit sin, who would no longer will this if they were distinctly and vividly proposed in the individual. It is indeed true that this general purpose is remiss and much less perfect than another purpose; nevertheless, according to the common and certain opinion of theologians, it is sufficient, and in reality one who purposes in this way truly wills to avoid sin above all things.²

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, on Penance, n. 458.

The firmness of the purpose does not make it so that the violation of the purpose constitutes a new guilt of itself, as from a violated vow or promise. For purpose is not a vow, because it is not made to God but with respect to oneself; nor is it a promise, because a promise is made to another; and although the purpose is made in some way in service of God, nevertheless it is not a promise made to God.

3° Purpose also, by reason of efficiency, must be efficacious, so that the sinner here and now wills to employ the means necessary for afterward avoiding sin, and especially wills to flee proximate occasions of sinning mortally, to remit offenses, to lay aside hatreds and enmities, and to restore for injuries. The reason is that the intention of the end, if it is true, must move one to seek the necessary means.

Efficacy is required affectively, not effectively. For a) it regards the present will and brings it about that, as long as the purpose remains in the soul, so long the sinner cannot sin again; b) but it is not the efficacy of a future event, insofar as from the fact that the purpose is here and now efficacious it would follow that sin is in fact never again committed thereafter; otherwise it would be enough once to elicit a good purpose so that someone would never sin again. Whence, from the fact that, after having had a purpose, someone has frequently relapsed into the same mortal sin, you will not necessarily infer that he did not have an efficacious purpose. Therefore purpose must be efficacious affectively, and from the fact that it was not effectively efficacious, it cannot be concluded that it was not affectively efficacious (cf. III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 4).

Hence to the question whether purpose must be constant in order to be called efficacious, the response is: per se, negatively, because the human will is mutable. Per se, for if the penitent should relapse at once and with almost no resistance, this will be a motive for suspecting that the penitent lacked a truly efficacious purpose. Generally, one who efficaciously purposes does not so easily forget his purpose, and is accustomed at least for some short time to employ effort and persevere.

4° Finally, purpose by reason of matter must be universal, i.e., it must extend itself to all mortal sins, not only those perpetrated, but whatever ones are to be avoided thereafter.

Nevertheless, 1) it is not required that a special purpose be formed concerning individual sins to be avoided, but a general one concerning all in genus from a universal motive suffices. Nor is it required 2) that it extend itself to venial sins. But if only venial sins are declared, for the validity of the sacrament there is required at least a) a purpose concerning one declared venial sin, namely, concerning avoiding a sin altogether similar in altogether the same circumstances, or concerning all sins, not indeed of the same species, but of altogether the same condition; or b) concerning avoiding a certain kind of venial sins; or c) concerning avoiding the graver ones; or d) concerning avoiding fully deliberate ones; or e) concerning diminishing the number of venial sins (S. Th. III, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1). Purpose can also be had concerning avoiding individual venial sins, or concerning all to be avoided distributively, but not concerning all to be avoided collectively, because we can avoid individual ones, but to avoid all at once is impossible for us.