How non-consummated sins are distinguished

51. Declarations. 1. In order that judgment can be made concerning the malice of external acts in particular, first the parts of the body must be distinguished with respect to honesty. Thus the honest parts are: face, hands, feet; the less honest, not base, are: breast, back, arms, legs; the indecent, base, obscene parts are: the genitals and the parts near them.

2. In external acts venereal pleasure itself is not found; those acts in themselves are not evil, but indifferent, and therefore can be performed both from a good end and from an evil end. But all by their nature are apt to excite base movements and the sense of delectation and therefore pollution; therefore they cast one into danger of sinning through consent to delectation and through pollution. Wherefore it is not licit to perform those acts without a sufficient cause, more or less grave according to the measure of the influence which they exercise in provoking delectation and pollution.

The true doctrine must be held, that base sights and touches are opposed to the sixth precept of the Decalogue not of themselves and by their nature, but only because they bring danger of venereal delectation, pollution, and danger of consent to it. Therefore if there were any, which indeed will rarely happen, who from these actions suffered no danger either of base movement or of consent to base delectations, those actions for them would contain only the sin of idle action, of sensuality, but in no way a sin against chastity. But insofar as non-consummated acts are performed either explicitly or implicitly from a libidinous end, they must be regarded as the beginning and commencements of the consummated venereal act. They are performed implicitly from a libidinous end if they have no other end of the one acting.

3. Acts of immodesty, both external and internal, differ in species from perfect or consummated acts, pollution and intercourse: for in the former either venereal delectation is not contained, or, if it is intended and perceived, in them there does not intervene the special malice of effused semen. Therefore it does not suffice to accuse impure touches if pollution was had.

But incomplete venereal delectation does not differ in species from complete delectation, n. 8; and just as pollutions considered in themselves are of the same species, so incomplete venereal delectations or carnal stirrings are all of the same species. Therefore one who provoked in himself or voluntarily admitted carnal movements and delectation need not confess in what way they arose: by thoughts, sights, touches, kisses, or impure speeches.

52. Their moral malice from the end of the agent. To determine the moral malice of acts of immodesty, attention must be paid to the end on account of which they are performed by the agent, and to the danger which they induce, of venereal stirring, pollution, and consent to delectation. As regards the first, outside marriage they can be performed for a fourfold end: a. from the intention of venereal delectation or from libidinous affection; b. from the intention of sensual delectation; c. from play, levity, and curiosity; d. from a just and reasonable cause.

a. If they are done from a depraved and libidinous affection, although of themselves they have little influence upon libido, as the sight of a woman, handling of the hand, etc., they are always a grave sin because of the gravely evil intention; therefore it makes no difference whether the acts themselves are more or less base.

b. If they are done from the sole intention of sensual delectation, they are a light sin, unless they induce proximate danger of carnal stirring and of consenting to venereal delectation, as can happen if they are performed with some affection and delay.

a. In these acts had from sensual delectation alone, a twofold malice is found: that they are disordered, i.e. that they are not referred and cannot be referred to a rational end, and that they induce danger of venereal delectation and of consent to it; but each is a light sin unless the danger is proximate. Now the greater the affection and delay in those acts, the greater is the danger of venereal delectation and consent; indeed a longer delay with which they are performed is frequently a sign not only of great affection, but also of a libidinous soul, although a just cause for performing them is present, e.g. for giving a kiss. Therefore touches, kisses, embraces, if without a reasonable cause they occur on account of sensual delectation alone, are of themselves light sins.

b. St. Alphonsus teaches, n. 416, that there is no smallness of matter in sensual delectation, e.g. in the touch of the hand of a woman, as there is in the touch of a smooth thing, e.g. of a rose or silk cloth, because it is impossible that sensual delectation be intended and venereal delectation not also be intended, or at least because it is mortal to expose oneself to the proximate danger of consenting to venereal delectation; and one who acts from the intention of sensual delectation exposes himself to this danger. Therefore he denies that touches and kisses among young persons of diverse sex, had on account of sensual delectation, are venial sins. But it seems that it must be admitted that actions of this kind can occur on account of sensual delectation without intention and proximate danger of libido or of venereal delectation or of consent to it. For sensual delectation indeed disposes toward venereal delectation, but does not include it; therefore it can happen that sensual delectation alone is intended, both if venereal delectation is explicitly excluded and if it is only not thought about.¹

c. If they are done from levity, play, or curiosity, and therefore briefly and cursorily, although of themselves they can excite very strongly toward libido, as base sights or touches, they are a light sin, both because curiosity is light and because the influence upon base movements in these is light and remote.

d. If they are done from a just cause, even if a sense of delectation or even pollution is excited beyond intention, they are no sin, provided consent is absent. A just cause of positing them is: decency, utility, necessity. But the more modesty is injured, the greater the cause is required which excuses the immodest action; hence only necessity excuses a gravely immodest action, as to look at or touch the indecent parts of a person of the other sex, as in physicians and surgeons.

¹ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum, III, tract. 10, n. 686 f.; Elbel-Bierbaum I, pr. 4, n. 183 ff.

53. Their moral species. External acts of immodesty are: sights, touches, kisses, embraces, speeches, songs, readings. Now if their moral species is treated, the question properly concerns sights and touches: for kisses and embraces are reduced to touches, but speeches, songs, and readings had from the intention of venereal delectation are of themselves the same sins as thoughts and desires which are fostered interiorly while the words are spoken.

Between sights and touches this difference must be noted, that sight is not so material and concrete, and therefore easily abstracts from the circumstances of the person as such and regards that person as a man or woman, not as married, sacred, or related by blood; but touch by its nature is more material and concrete, and therefore does not abstract from the circumstances of the person who is touched.

a. Sights and touches performed on account of venereal delectation are not sins of diverse species; therefore in confession it need not necessarily be asked whether venereal delectation occurred from touch or from sight or from a depraved thought, unless the touch was done on another, and this on account of cooperation.

Although sight and touch differ essentially by reason of the act, because they proceed from essentially diverse faculties and tend toward diverse objects, by reason of moral malice they do not differ specifically: for their proper malice consists in the venereal delectation sought through them, which does not obtain a specific difference from the fact that it is procured by this or that sense or mode, but is of the same species in all these acts.¹

b. Touches, kisses, embraces, which from a depraved intention are done on another, are sins of diverse species according to the diversity of circumstances in the persons who are touched indecently; for since touch attains the person materially and in the concrete, as happens in the very acts of lust, they are of diverse species, just as the perfect acts to which they are naturally ordered.

Therefore touch on a person of the same sex and touch on a person of diverse sex differ in species: for the latter by its nature is referred to fornication, the former to sodomy. Touch on an unmarried person and touch on a married person differ in species: for the latter naturally tends toward adultery, the former toward fornication. Hence in confession the object of the touch must be explained.

c. But base sights which from a depraved intention are done on another, unless desire is added, are not sins diverse in species according to the diversity of circumstances in the person who is seen. For sight attains the object less materially and concretely than touch, so that ordinarily it abstracts from the circumstances of the person, unless the libidinous affection is borne precisely toward such a person. Therefore in confession the quality of the person basely seen, whether she was related by blood, married, sacred, etc., need not be declared.

Nevertheless a base sight of a male and of a female differ in species, and therefore also venereal delectation sought from the base sight of a male or female: for sight can indeed abstract from the circumstances of the person, but not from the diversity of persons; wherefore sight of a male is referred to intercourse with a male, sight of a female to intercourse with a female.²

¹ Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 154, a. 4; Bucceroni I, n. 783.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 969 ff.

54. Their moral malice from danger. To determine the moral malice of acts of immodesty which are done without the direct intention of procuring venereal delectation for oneself, attention must be paid to the danger which they induce, more or less proximate, of venereal stirring and pollution, or to the influence which they exercise in exciting libido. Therefore those acts are grave sins which proximately and notably influence toward exciting libido; those acts are light sins which remotely and lightly influence toward exciting libido.

a. To determine this influence, three things especially must be considered: a. the nature of the acts; for some acts of themselves and by their nature stir gravely, others only lightly; b. their various circumstances: for acts which are done with lingering delay and are repeated more often excite much more than acts which are done in passing and only once; likewise acts which are done vehemently and with great ardor stir more than acts which are done lightly and calmly; c. the disposition of the agent: for acts which excite some vehemently stir others little because of subjective disposition. Therefore concerning each act of immodesty one must judge which ordinarily influence gravely and proximately, which lightly and remotely, upon venereal stirring and upon pollution, and therefore which ordinarily are grave and which are light sins.

b. Although corruption of morals for the most part arises from obscene conversations: evil conversations corrupt good morals,¹ nevertheless things heard influence the phantasy, and therefore the stirring of the flesh, less than things seen; but most of all and most efficaciously the flesh is solicited from touch.

¹ 1 Cor. 15, 33.

Non-consummated sins of impurity are specifically distinct from consummated sins, in the same way as attempted homicide is specifically distinct from homicide. Impure touches, however, and lascivious kisses and embraces contract the malice of the circumstances of the object, just as consummated sins do. For, just as fornication with one bound by a vow of chastity or with a relation is not simple fornication, but contracts the malice of sacrilege or incest according to the circumstances, so impure touches of the same persons would also be sacrilegious or incestuous. The reason is because sins receive their specific malice from the object, and sins of touch take their malice from the concrete object as it exists with its special circumstances.

Impure speech and looks, on the contrary, do not seem to contract the malice of the circumstances of the object, for such sins are affected by the general character of the object only, and not by its special circumstances. This, at least, is the opinion of many theologians.

It is a disputed point among divines whether impure touches, looks, talk, or reading, are specifically distinct from each other apart from any difference in the object. Would it, for example, be sufficient to say in confession, “I committed a sin [by indulging in venereal pleasure by myself,” without mentioning whether it was procured by touch, or look, or other means ? Although the common opinion is that such a general form of self-accusation would not be sufficient, and that the penitent must say whether the sin was one of touch, or look, etc., yet the contrary view seems probable, for such imperfect acts are wrong, not precisely in themselves, but on account of their tendency to excite venereal pleasure. The reason, then, and source of their malice is the same, and so they would seem not to be specifically distinct as sins, though they are physically distinct acts.

13. Proposition. Very obscene words, which by a continued conversation about these matters from their nature can proximately dispose hearers to venereal delectation, unless they are made from a just cause, per se speaking, are a mortal sin. But less obscene words, which from their nature dispose only remotely to venereal delectation, unless likewise they are made from a just cause, per se speaking, are only a venial sin. The reason is the same as in the preceding proposition, n. 7. But what is said here about conversations must also be said in the same proportion about immodest songs and readings. Although words per se move less to lust than sight, readings nevertheless move much more than words and colloquies, on account of the more prolonged and more intense delay of the imagination in those base matters. - L. 426, 427, 428.

14. Corollaries. 1. Those sin gravely who, before unmarried persons, especially of the other sex, mix among themselves conversations concerning insemination, carnal intercourse, and other things which, with attention paid to the circumstances of the persons, the thing said, and the manner of saying it, can proximately dispose those speaking or hearing to venereal delectation. Nor, per se speaking, are those excused from grave sin who, under pretext of joking, have conversations about these things in equivocal words, but ones sufficiently known; except unless something of this kind is said by mere jest and in passing. For that jest and equivocation, far from removing, rather increases the danger of venereal delectation because of curiosity excited. It is said, with the circumstances attended to, because "of itself it is not evil to utter or hear base words." L. 426. - Likewise to read altogether obscene books without a just cause is a mortal sin, even if this seems to be done from curiosity or for the sake of recreation, because per se this reading greatly provokes to lust. Except perhaps unless those reading, from mere curiosity, on account of advanced age and a cold complexion, or custom of treating venereal matters, do not incur grave danger of lust. L. 426. - But it is certain that those who compose, and also those who sell, notably base books can in no way be excused from grave sin, on account of the scandal of others, although not intended; nor can profit, however great, excuse. L. 428.

2. It is not per se mortal to utter things indeed base, but not gravely obscene, if it is done briefly, through jest or empty solace, unless the hearers are so weak in spirit that they suffer grave scandal. Hence commonly base jests which are uttered by harvesters, grape-harvesters, muleteers, are not grave, because ordinarily they are said and heard for mere jest, and those uttering and hearing them are moved little or not at all. L. 426; G. 420, 4. The same consequently must be said about little songs. - Nor indeed must tender conversations, otherwise honorable, with persons of the other sex always be held as mortal sins, although they are full of dangers, especially if they are prolonged, often repeated, or made in solitary places. L. 422, 426. What, therefore, must be judged concerning loves, as they call them, especially among the younger? Not all indiscriminately are to be condemned of mortal fault; although often a proximate occasion of sinning lethally will with difficulty be absent, at least in the course of things, and with certain circumstances added, as if the lovers meet altogether alone, especially for a rather long time, or by night, etc. L. Prax. Confess., n. 65; G., l. c., 5. - Likewise, to read amorous and lightly dishonorable books per se is not a mortal sin, although in practice it is very dangerous, especially for the younger. L. 426; G. 419. But the theologians deservedly note that these amorous books, which are not gravely obscene, often harm pious faithful more than books that are utterly obscene, which excite horror by the very baseness that they show, and thus deter from reading. But those who compose or sell lightly obscene books indeed sin, even lethally, if they do this to excite lust; but if only for acquiring profit, or on account of another motive not gravely depraved, the sin will be only venial, since books of this kind can be read without grave danger. Yet clerics and religious do not seem, per se speaking, able to compose or spread books of this kind without grave scandal. Cf. St. Alphonsus, App. de libr. prohib., c. 1, n. 8-11.

3. "To mix honorable and familiar conversations and colloquies with a person of the other sex is free from all fault, although in these things you are naturally delighted. Salm., tr. 26, c. 3, n. 22." D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 68, ed. 3. "It does not matter that someone feels a greater inclination to deal with women than with men, because an inclination of this kind is not moral, nor free, but rather natural, or founded in nature itself. Therefore it is not formally evil. Yet it must be confessed that this is troublesome to a chaste mind, and even dangerous to the incautious." G., Cas., t. 1, n. 24; Elbel, de Act. hum., n. 15. - To read obscene books for a just cause, for example, for forming and perfecting style, for learning the truth of history, for informing superiors, for correcting morals, etc., is no sin, provided assent is not given to base things.

15. Note. 1. Those who hear obscene things, if they have authority over those uttering them, ought to restrain them as much as they morally can; if they do not have authority, they are bound likewise to admonish them as much as they morally can, or at least they ought to be silent, especially women, lest they seem to assent to base things; for from this the lust of men is accustomed to be inflamed. "Yet it must not lightly be pronounced that all those who, hearing base speech which on the part of the speaker is mortal, laugh a little, sin mortally; for it can happen that they laugh at the manner of speaking rather than at the things themselves; moreover in that case they do not sin mortally unless they furnish grave scandal. But religious, clerics, and persons eminent in Christian virtues would easily furnish scandal if they laughed at obscene words." Bouvier, Diss. in 6 dec. praec., de turpiloq., 4.

2. Those who, because of boasting, narrate their own base sins frequently sin on account of the scandal of those hearing, and complacency concerning the sin narrated. L. 426; Prax. Confess. 40.

19. We find nothing special about this matter among the Theologians. Yet the matter is indubitable, as is clear from experience itself, that many are excited to venereal delectation by smells and tastes. Now indeed the same here the principle holds as also for looks and conversations. If the smells and tastes of the thing are very obscene, and they take place in such a way that they induce the proximate danger of venereal delectation, then, per se speaking, grave sin will be present. But if, with attention paid to the thing, which either is not very obscene or is in no way obscene, and with attention paid also to the manner in which those sensations take place, there is a sufficiently remote danger of venereal delectation, or none at all, then, per se speaking, either the sin will be only light, if those acts are placed from levity or some sensuality, or even none at all. It is said if from levity, etc.; for again there will be no sin if an act of this kind is placed for a sufficient and proportionate reason. - A. p. 115.

Do the aforesaid touches differ in species from the consummated act of pollution and intercourse, and from other incomplete acts? R. To the 1st: Affirmatively; and this response holds both for touches and for other incomplete acts, about which the discussion has hitherto been. The reason is that an inchoate act differs in nature from a consummated act. Therefore when similar acts precede the venereal act completed in the same passion, or accompany it, or immediately follow it, such as kisses, touches, etc., they constitute with the completed venereal act one sin in number, and they are not necessarily to be explained distinctly in sacramental Confession; but when they are exercised without a completed venereal act, they are a sin distinct from this, yet one or several in number, if they are exercised in the same movement of passion, or in several. Hence in such a case they are a certain incomplete lust, and are to be explained in sacramental Confession.

R. To the 2nd: The first and more common opinion affirms. The reason is that these acts, considered in themselves, proceed from distinct and diverse faculties, and are ordered to distinct and diverse objects. Hence it follows that "the desire of looking basely, touching, kissing, fornicating, are distinguished in species not only from morose pleasure concerning those objects, but also each from the other, because they tend to those objects as they would be placed on the part of reality; but if they were placed on the part of reality, they would be distinguished in species, as is clear. Hence he who once was delighted by thought about intercourse, and once desired intercourse, does not satisfy by saying, twice I had a base thought, but he must say, once I was delighted in intercourse, and once I desired it. Similarly, he who once desired to look, once to kiss, once to touch, once to fornicate, does not satisfy by saying, four times I desired to do something base, but he is bound to express those objects." La-Croix l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032. The second opinion denies. The reason is that although acts of this sort physically proceed from faculties really distinct and diverse, and tend to objects really distinct and diverse, nevertheless, morally considered, they do not contain grave intrinsic malice; but the grave malice which they contain they have from venereal pleasure, to which they proximately dispose, and which is the same in species for all these acts. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 154, a. 4. Hence it follows that, once in Confession the venereal pleasure which followed, to which someone consented, has been explained, it is not necessary to explain whether he procured it for himself by looking at or touching himself, or even by looking at or touching another person, abstraction nevertheless being made from the sin of cooperation and scandal, certainly to be explained if they were present. Likewise, once the interior pleasure of the will, or desire as regards venereal pleasure, has been explained, it is not to be explained whether that pleasure and desire of the will was immediately terminated to base looks or touches. Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 15, section III, Note and following, has these things: "Franc. Henno teaches that pleasures concerning look, touch, kiss, etc., differ in species among themselves, and ought thus distinctly to be accused... because, he says, looks, touches, kisses, are distinguished in species among themselves... but nevertheless he admits that the practice of confessors and penitents is contrary. Besides, I think that his foundation is false, namely that touches, kisses, looks are distinguished in species in the genus of lust. For since they are not evil per se, as has been said, but only by reason of commotion, or pollution, or intercourse, to which they excite and tend, they have the same species of malice among themselves, namely either of carnal commotion, or pollution, or intercourse, etc. Hence in my judgment the penitent would satisfy who would say, so many times I excited in myself or in another carnal commotion, or pollution, while saying nothing whether by touches, or looks, or kisses, provided that he explains the conditions of himself and the accomplice. A fortiori he would satisfy by saying, so many times I was carnally delighted concerning such or such a person, without explaining whether concerning touches, or kisses, or looks; but indeed if there was pleasure concerning intercourse or pollution, because these differ in species from immodesty and are to be distinctly accused, so too are the pleasures concerning them." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 154, a. 4 ad 3, speaking of kisses and touches, says: "That things of this sort are not sins according to their species." And ib. ad 2 he says: "From lust they have the nature of sin." And in c.: "Things of this sort, insofar as they are lustful, are mortal sins."

783bis. Note: An act exciting simple venereal pleasure differs in species from an act of pollution; and therefore in confession the nature of the act is, per se, to be explained distinctly. "Nevertheless, as Genicot notes here, ed. 4, vol. 1, n. 396, 3, that distinction often is not accused by the penitent; nor are questions about most shameful matters to be made by the confessor without true necessity. It is lawful to follow the rule set down by Bouvier, Diss. in 6 Dec. praec. p. 76: 'Once touches or lustful motions have been discreetly known, let the confessor abstain from immodest interrogations.' And Berardi writes, Prax. conf. n. 851: 'When the penitent says, I touched myself, if it is evident that he truly touched himself maliciously, it is to be presumed that he carried the act through to its natural end; hence, whether the matter concerns men or women, I would say that interrogations about that matter can be omitted. It is true that some interrupt the act, although they have maliciously begun it, but from this confessors cannot be obligated to add further interrogations to all and each who confess that they touched themselves, concerning this very interruption.'"

Do touches and other incomplete acts, when they are grave sin, contract malice diverse in species because of the various circumstances of persons? - As regards touches, kisses, and embraces, this is commonly affirmed. And the reason is that in moral estimation touches more than other acts regard the individual person, and approach most closely to intercourse.

Hence just as the specific circumstances of persons are to be explained in intercourse, so also in touches. L. 417, 453, 459. As regards looks, the Salmanticenses apud St. Alphonsus 421 likewise affirm; and both as regards looks and also as regards base words whether said or heard, Sanchez de Matrim. l. 9, d. 46, nn. 17, 18, 30, 45 also affirms in almost the same way as regards touches, because of an altogether universal reason, namely because all these acts are ordered to coition and participate in its moral malice. But St. Alphonsus, having reported the opinion of the Salmanticenses, adds these things as regards looks: "But La-Croix more truly contradicts this doctrine, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1030, where he says that he who looks venereally at a person without any desire is not bound to say what sort of person it was. For how would a woman, by looking basely at a priest... commit sacrilege, which consists in the violation of a sacred person, when no violation intervenes there? And how would someone, by looking basely at a relative, commit incest?" l. c. But these things also hold as regards base words said or heard, as is clear per se.

S. Th. 2. 2, q. 154, a. 4 ad 1, ad 2; L. 415, 416, 417; Gur. Cas. 146; Laym. l. 3, s. 4, n. 13. Hence he who by the sight of some person or by conversation is voluntarily excited to pollution commits one sin of pollution, since the aforesaid acts do not put on the species of intercourse with the person who is looked at, or with whom someone converses.

III. Impudicity in this mode differs in species from pollution and consummated lust as an imperfect species from a perfect one. This is to be understood if one stops in it; for if it is done from the intention of a perfect act and is joined with it, they are one sin in complete species and in number.

Mere impudicity, however, of itself is a sin of one and the same species; for every venereal motion of itself, and unless special circumstances accede, is of the same species, in whatever mode it has arisen, by look, reading, touch, and so forth, because the venereal pleasure which is found in all acts is of the same nature.² Hence in confession it suffices to say: I exercised imperfect lust, or I voluntarily had carnal motions and procured, experienced, admitted venereal pleasure, and so forth.

² Nor is it divided on the part of the external act into according to and against nature; for of itself it says nothing such, but abstracts from this, although from the end of the agent or on the part of affection it can be estimated in this way.

Nevertheless per accidens a malice diverse in species can be added because of certain circumstances, which therefore are to be declared in confession:

1. from the circumstance of the person acting, and thus the circumstance of vow is to be declared;

2. from the circumstance of internal intention or affection, various malices can be added according as the acts are done with fornicary, sodomitical, bestial, stupratory, adulterous, incestuous, or sacrilegious affection, in the same mode as was said concerning pollution;

3. from the circumstance of the special mode in which they are carried out, namely if they are done with another person; for then scandal and blameworthy complicity intervene. But if the external acts according to themselves are the preparation and beginning of a complete act with that person, they participate in the specific malice of this complete act. This last is valid concerning touches, embraces, and kisses, concerning which therefore the circumstance of the other person is to be declared even if this person was unwilling. It is not valid concerning looks, which, unless desire accedes, are not the beginning of a complete act exercised with the person, and therefore it suffices to declare the use of another person, with the circumstance of vow added, however, if that person is bound by vow and consented.