Strengthening and Weakening of Habits

Strengthening and Weakening of Habits.—Habits are increased: (a) extensively when they are applied to more objects—thus the habit of science grows as it is applied to more truths; (b) intensively, when they are rooted more firmly in their subject and become easier to exercise. This last comes about when intense acts of a habit are frequently repeated. Thus, a habit of virtue or vice becomes a second nature, and it is exercised with ever greater delight and resisted with ever-increasing difficulty.

The infused habits cannot be diminished, but they can be destroyed (see 745). As to the acquired habits, they are weakened and destroyed chiefly in two ways: (a) by acts opposed to them, especially if these acts are earnest and frequent—thus, evil custom is overcome by good custom, and vice-versa; (b) by long discontinuance or disuse. Thus, a person who has learned a foreign language will forget it, if he fails to speak, read or hear it. The knowledge of first principles, speculative or moral, is not lost, however, through forgetfulness, as experience shows.

Accidentally, a habit may be corrupted through injury of an organ that is necessary for the exercise of the habit. Thus, right moral judgment may be lost if certain areas of the brain are affected.

600. 1. That virtues can be increased together with grace, Trent thus declares:³ "Thus therefore, having been justified, and having been made friends and members of the household of God, going from virtue to virtue, they are renewed, as the Apostle says, from day to day;⁴ that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and exhibiting them as arms of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in the justice itself received through the grace of Christ, faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are more justified... But the holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and charity."

³ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10, apud Denzing., n. 685.

⁴ 2 Cor. 4:16.

601. 2. Virtues of this kind are increased through the worthy reception of the sacraments, and through merit de condigno.

(A) For the sacraments confer sanctifying grace, and indeed ex opere operato,¹ upon all who place no obstacle, and therefore they increase it in all who have received first grace; but grace growing, by that very fact the infused virtues which are connected with it grow.

¹ Synops. Theol. Dogmat., De Sacramentis, n. 45.

(B) Likewise supernatural good works, with Trent as witness,² truly merit the increase of grace, and consequently the increase of virtues which flow from it.

² Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, apud Denzing., n. 724; cf. Synops. dogmat., De Gratia, n. 193.

602. 3. But theologians dispute concerning the mode by which infused virtues are increased. (A) All indeed hold that they grow intensively, and indeed through divine infusion; for since they are supernatural, and are produced in the soul by God, they cannot be increased by the proper efforts of the will, but only by divine action. Wherefore the repeated acts of these virtues do not concur directly toward their increase, but only as a meritorious cause, insofar as God, in view of these merits, increases grace and virtues.

But when the question concerns the intrinsic reason of this increase, theologians do not agree: (a) Thomists hold that the increase of habits happens not by the addition of a new form or reality, but by a greater rooting in the subject, which the habit more subjects to itself, by more easily reducing its potentiality into act.³ (b) But Scotists⁴ think that the increase happens through the addition of a new reality, or of a new degree, which accedes to the former and with it effects something one and more perfect. - A question of this kind is more philosophical than theological, and modern philosophers generally declare that nothing certain can be defined about this matter.

³ Thus John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XIII, art. 6.

⁴ Scotus, in Sentent., lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3; Suarez, Disput. metaphys., XLVI, sect. I, where he enumerates the various opinions and critically weighs them.

603. (B) But it is certain that by the exercise of infused virtues facility in exercising acts of the same virtues is gradually acquired. This indeed arises especially from a twofold head: (a) From the removal of impediments; for by the exercise of infused virtue the passions are moderated, prejudices are put away, difficulties are overcome: but, obstacles removed, by that very fact the acts of virtues become easier. (b) From custom itself: for just as, through the frequent repetition of natural acts, a greater facility is acquired for doing the same, so likewise, at least indirectly, through the repetition of supernatural acts, the facility of doing the same is increased: for thus the potency is better disposed and, as it were, inclined to act. Hence a sinner recently converted indeed with difficulty works acts of temperance, chastity, fortitude, etc.; but, provided that, helped by grace, he elicits acts of these virtues, gradually he will perform the same more easily and delectably.

604. 1. Infused theological virtues are lost through acts directly and gravely contrary to them; thus faith is destroyed through the grave sin of apostasy or heresy, - hope through the mortal sin of despair, - charity through any grave sin whatever, since it is opposed to divine charity.

(a) That faith is lost by infidelity (that is, by any grave sin against faith), but not by other grave sins, is clear from Trent:¹ "It must be asserted that not only by infidelity, through which faith itself also is lost, but also by any other mortal sin whatever, although faith is not lost, the received grace of justification is lost."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, apud Denzing., n. 691. Cf. Synopsis Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, n. 141-147.

(b) But that charity is destroyed by any mortal sin whatever is likewise gathered from Trent; for, on the one hand, in the text alleged, it is declared that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin whatever; and, on the other, it is defined that justification happens "while through the Holy Spirit the charity of God is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them";² from which it is deservedly inferred that charity does not inhere in sinners. - This is otherwise clear from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is asserted that sin is opposed to dilection, and that by charity the sons of God are distinguished from sinners,³ as was said above, n. 449. And in reality, from what was said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 139-140, such is the nexus between grace and charity that one cannot subsist without the other.

² Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

³ John 14:21; 1 John 2:3-11; 3:7-12.

(c) Concerning hope nothing is expressly defined; but the common and true opinion holds that it is not destroyed when sanctifying grace is lost, on account of the analogy with faith, but is lost through despair or through an act contrary to faith; for since, with the Apostle as witness,¹ faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, with faith hope necessarily perishes; for what can we hope, when the foundation of hope, namely faith in God the remunerator, has already failed?

¹ Heb. 11:1.

605. 2. It is commonly held that infused moral virtues are lost, together with habitual grace, through any mortal sin whatever.

(A) This St. Prosper, disciple of Augustine, had already taught, writing against the semi-Pelagian errors of Cassian: "Virtues cannot dwell with vices: for what participation," says the Apostle,² "has justice with iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? For virtue principally is God: to whom having virtue is not something other than being virtue. When we are participants of this, Christ dwells in us, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God;³ faith dwells, hope, charity, continence, understanding, counsel, fortitude, and the other virtues. But when we withdraw from this good, all things opposite arise to us from us."⁴

² 2 Cor. 6:14.

³ 1 Cor. 1:24.

⁴ St. Prosper, Contra Collatorem, c. 13, P. L., LI, 247.

606. (B) Theologians commonly hold the same, led by this reason: infused moral virtues are, as it were, properties and the most noble company of grace, and therefore are infused so that they may order our life toward the supernatural end. Now, sanctifying grace having been lost, its properties are logically taken away; and since, through mortal sin, man is turned away from the supernatural end, he is consequently deprived of the virtues which tend toward the supernatural end. - It is indeed true, from what was said above, that faith and hope are not taken away by any grave sin whatever; but this happens from the special benevolence of God, who does not permit the very foundation of the spiritual building to be utterly overturned through mortal sin, but wishes faith and hope to remain in the sinner so that more easily he, moved by true penance, may return to the good Shepherd of souls.

Moreover if there are any naturally acquired virtues, they do not necessarily perish when grace is lost; thus he who has obtained the virtue of temperance or justice by repeated acts does not lose it by the very fact that he falls into a grave sin of lust.

607. 3. Corollary: concerning the diminution of infused virtues.

(A) It is commonly taught that infused habits are not diminished by venial sins. For if infused virtues were diminished by any venial sin, through many venial sins infused virtues and habitual grace itself could be totally destroyed; but this is opposed to the doctrine of Trent: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."¹ - This is otherwise clear from what was said concerning venial sin, n. 483; for since infused virtues are the most noble company of grace, they are increased or lost with it; but they are not diminished, because grace itself is not diminished by venial sins, which in no way turn us away from God.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11, apud Denzing., n. 686.

608. (B) Nevertheless the fervor of charity and of the other virtues is diminished by venial sins. For (a) the facility of acting according to infused habits is diminished as soon as one sins against them even venially; (b) moreover he who frequently and deliberately commits venial sins, by that very fact is gradually disposed toward grave sin, as was shown above, n. 485, and thus a way is prepared for the very loss of charity: "Whence it follows," says St. Thomas,² "that charity can in no way be diminished, speaking directly; nevertheless the disposition toward its corruption can be called indirectly a diminution of charity, which happens either through venial sins, or even through cessation from the exercise of works of charity."

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 10.

For carefully avoiding such harm, nothing is of more profit than a constant effort toward making progress in Christian virtues. Concerning this progress it remains to be spoken in special moral theology.

609. After the consideration concerning human acts in general, insofar as, with law and conscience directing, they tend toward the ultimate end, - after the things said concerning sins and vices which turn us away from God, and also concerning virtues in common by which we are sweetly inclined toward God, it is necessary to discuss human acts in species: "For universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are in particulars."¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, Prologue.

But this part, which discusses acts in species, is called Special Theology. It is divided in diverse ways by diverse authors: (a) St. Thomas, whom many Scholastics have followed, distributes it into two parts, of which the former treats of those things which pertain to all states of men, but the latter of those things which pertain to determined states. But again he divides the former according to virtues; these are seven in number, namely three theological and four cardinal, concerning which he disputes separately and at length, describing them with all their parts, and with the gifts of the Holy Spirit which correspond to the same.

610. (b) Others, especially casuists,² who write for the use of confessors, omitting in their Institutions of Moral Theology all those things which are required for attaining Christian perfection, discuss only the precepts which are necessary for obtaining salvation: 1. concerning the precepts of the theological virtues; 2. concerning the precepts of the decalogue; 3. concerning the precepts of the Church; 4. concerning the penalties laid down by the Church against graver delicts; 5. concerning the sacraments insofar as they are means for preserving the precepts. - This order is useful indeed to the confessor questioning penitents, but is of less profit to the director, who ought not only to turn souls away from evil, but also to lead them in the way of Christian virtues. The confessor could indeed and even ought to read ascetical authors, but not a few omit this, thinking that moral theology suffices for all things. - Besides, the precepts of the Decalogue or of the Church do not exhibit a logical and scientific order, and often are only negative; therefore this division, although practical enough in catechetical instructions, seems less apt for a scientific exposition of Christian Ethics.

² Thus especially Busembaum, S.J. (1600-1668), Medulla Theologiae moralis, whom, among others, Lacroix and St. Alphonsus followed and expounded with commentaries.

(c) Others, adhering to the division of natural Ethics, discuss successively duties toward God, oneself, and neighbor:¹ duties toward God and oneself regard individual morals, duties toward the neighbor regard social morals. This division indeed, by reason of its simplicity and perspicuity, can be of much profit for a popular and compendious exposition of Morals; nevertheless it seems less apt for scientific investigation, because not a few virtues, such as charity, are referred to God, oneself, and neighbor, and things are better understood and connected when the various offices of one and the same virtue are declared in the same Treatise.

¹ Thus, for example, Michel, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Paris, 1901-1902.

611. Therefore we follow the order delineated by the Angelic Doctor, yet accommodating it to present-day morals. Therefore we will discuss:

I. Concerning the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, which immediately reach God, and rest upon one of the divine attributes as upon a motive.

II. Concerning the virtue of religion, which regards divine worship, whether internal or external, and therefore consists as though in the middle between theological and moral virtues; in this treatise are set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

III. Concerning the moral virtues, which sweetly incline us to composing our morals honorably and Christianly, especially concerning prudence, temperance, and fortitude, which are called cardinal; to these is added a supplement concerning Chastity, where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is set forth.

IV. Specifically concerning the virtue of justice, by which to each is rendered his own; this is indeed one of the cardinal virtues, but, on account of the multiple rights and offices which it includes, it demands a fuller exposition. There the four precepts of the Decalogue are declared, namely the fifth, seventh, eighth, and tenth.

V. Concerning the various obligations of states, or concerning the offices which are proper to the principal states of laymen and clerics; there, among other things, the fourth precept of the Decalogue is set forth, concerning the mutual offices of parents and children, masters and servants.

But concerning the sacraments, which include at the same time a dogmatic and moral part, we discuss partly in the Synopsis of Dogmatic Theology, after the Treatise on Grace, partly in the Synopsis of Moral Theology.¹

¹ Nevertheless, for the use of Seminaries where the moral doctrine concerning the Sacraments is usually handed down separately, we publish a special volume including practical questions concerning the sacraments in general and in species.

In treating of the cardinal virtues, we will not describe all their integral, subjective, and potential parts, but only those which are more useful for practice. - Moreover, so that confessors may more easily be able to question penitents, in the Supplement concerning the Precepts of God and of the Church we will show how precepts of this kind correspond to various virtues, and what sins are usually committed against the precepts.

612. A theological virtue is a virtue infused of itself, whose immediate object, at least primary, is God himself, and whose motive is one of the divine attributes.

That there are three theological virtues, and only three, can be gathered from the common sense of pastors and of the faithful. Paul commemorates these:¹ "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." From the context, the matter here is not acts, but virtues, which remain; faith and hope indeed will be made void by the beatific vision, but charity will never fall away. - Augustine treats of the same in a special treatise, whose title is Enchiridion, or Concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity, where among other things he has these words: "On account of which the apostle Paul approves and commends faith, which works through dilection,² which certainly cannot exist without hope. Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor both without faith."³ But elsewhere he explains how virtues of this kind contribute to the spiritual building of perfection: "(The house of God) is founded by believing, raised by hoping, perfected by loving."⁴

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Gal. 5:6.

³ St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 8, P. L., XL, 235.

⁴ Sermon 27, n. 1, P. L., XXXVIII, 178.

613. But why there are three theological virtues, and how they are connected among themselves, St. Thomas declares.⁵ (a) Since the supernatural beatitude to which men are ordered is above our powers, it is necessary that we be disposed to it through supernaturally infused habits; but that we may be sufficiently ordered to God, three such habits are required. That our intellect may know God supernaturally in this life, faith is required, by which we assent to divinely revealed truths. But the will intends the supernatural end through hope, by which we trustingly expect eternal salvation and the means for attaining it. Finally the will is spiritually joined to God through charity, through which in some way it is transformed into him. - Nor are more theological virtues than three required; for the intellect, through faith, is referred to God under the aspect of truth; the will, through hope, is borne toward God, as he is our good, by which namely we are able to be perfectly made blessed; but through charity, it is borne toward him insofar as he is the supreme good in himself; and thus by these three we are sufficiently ordered into God.

⁵ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62.

(b) A twofold order is distinguished in theological virtues. In the order of generation, faith, as to exercise,¹ precedes hope and charity, for the will cannot be borne into God through hope or dilection, unless he is first supernaturally known through faith; likewise we are not accustomed to love God as good in himself, unless we first apprehend him as our good, and thus hope precedes charity. - In the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are formed by charity, and acquire the perfection of virtue; and thus charity is the mother of all virtues.²

¹ I say as to exercise, for the habits themselves of faith, hope, and charity are infused at the same time, from the things said in the Treatise on Virtues, n. 597.

² The excellence of charity and its preeminence are excellently described in 1 Cor. 13.

We will describe the theological virtues according to the order of generation, namely:

I. faith, through which we assent with the whole mind to God revealing;

II. hope, by which we trustingly expect the possession of God and the means for attaining it;

III. charity, by which we love God from the whole heart, and the neighbor on account of God.

438. Notion. Habit (ἕξις)² in a general sense signifies a mode of being disposed; but in a more particular sense habit is called a quality according to which some thing is well or badly disposed either according to itself or toward another; or, more briefly, it is a stable quality by which some being is perfected.³ Qualities of this sort affect either the nature itself with respect to being, or the powers with respect to acting. If they directly affect the nature, they are called entitative habits, for example health of body, sanctifying grace; but if they are directly subjected in some power, they are named operative habits, for example science, moral virtue. Habit, insofar as it includes both entitative and operative habits, is defined by Aristotle⁴ as "a disposition according to which what is disposed is well or badly disposed, either according to itself or toward another." Or more briefly, as has already been said: Habit is a quality by which a subject is well or badly disposed toward itself or toward another. But an operative habit⁵ can be defined: A quality difficult to move, by which man is disposed to acting easily, promptly, and with delight; or according to St. Thomas:⁶ "Habits are certain qualities or forms inhering in a power, by which the power is inclined to determinate acts according to species." Therefore habit is a certain accident, namely a quality, and according to St. Thomas it differs from a simple disposition in this, that the latter is something imperfect, begun, and not yet stable, while on the contrary habit is a perfect and stable quality.⁷ Thus, for example, a young artisan who has been formed imperfectly has the disposition of art; but an artisan furnished with long experience and complete formation possesses the habit of art.

The definition given holds for natural habits, which cause an expeditious facility of acting. But supernatural habits, such as the infused virtues of faith, etc., do not give such facility and promptitude of eliciting supernatural acts, but rather power and a certain inclination. Hence a man existing in the state of sanctifying grace indeed has the infused supernatural habit of all the virtues, but in the exercise of such virtues he can feel many difficulties. But facility in exercising the supernatural virtues is acquired through strenuous and repeated acts, insofar as obstacles are thereby removed and the powers are rendered more prompt for performing those acts.

² Philosophers take habit either a) as the last predicament, or b) as a postpredicament, or c) as a species of quality. We speak of habit only in this last sense.

³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 1.

⁴ L. 4: Metaphys. c. 20 (ed. Didot 2, 520). In German: predisposition.

⁵ Skills, aptitudes.

⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 54, a. 1.

⁷ Cf. S. theol. q. 49, a. 2 ad 3.

439. Distinctions of habit are numerous.⁸ Let these be noted briefly:

1. By reason of the subject, habits are distinguished into entitative and operative habits.⁹ The former immediately perfect the nature with respect to accidental being, and only mediately perfect the powers, for example beauty of body, sanctifying grace, etc. But operative habits immediately perfect the powers for acting promptly, easily, and with delight, for example musical art, moral virtues, etc. Among entitative habits sanctifying grace holds the first place; it is received in the essence of our soul,¹⁰ which it renders a sharer of the divine nature.¹¹ Of itself and immediately sanctifying grace does not dispose one to acting, since it is an entitative habit, but it does so by means of the virtues which are infused together with it. The Angelic Doctor aptly notes:¹² "According to the account of habit, it belongs to every habit in some way to have an order to act." The reason is that every habit has an order to the nature of the thing. But every nature of a thing is ordered in some way to operation.

2. By reason of morality, habits are distinguished into good and evil habits, according as they are stable dispositions either toward good or toward evil. In the moral order good habits are virtues; but evil habits are vices.

3. By reason of origin, habits are distinguished into natural, acquired, and infused habits, according as they are caused either from human nature itself, as it were, or by repeated exercise, or by supernatural divine infusion. Sometimes, however, natural habits are taken in another sense, namely insofar as they are divided against supernatural or infused habits and insofar as they include habits arising both from nature and from exercise. Natural habits taken in the first sense are certain natural propensities either implanted in all men having the use of reason or specially granted to some particular man. Thus all men have a natural habit of first speculative and practical principles, namely they immediately understand general principles, for example that the whole is greater than its part; that good is to be done and evil is to be omitted.¹³ The former is called by the Scholastics the understanding of first principles, namely speculative principles; the latter is called synteresis. Likewise in certain men there are found certain natural propensities which are deservedly called inchoate habits, for example toward anger, toward alcoholism, toward patience, toward chastity, etc.¹⁴ For the most part such particular inchoate habits arise from bodily temperament or from the heredity of parents.

Acquired habits are caused by multiplied acts elicited by some power of man. Thus, for example, the habit of science is caused in the power of the intellect from multiplied acts of study; the habit of the virtue of temperance is produced from acts of fasting; the habit of drunkenness creeps in from much drinking of wine, etc.

Infused or supernatural habits are liberally granted by God to man, although human nature has no strict right to them. These infused habits are supernatural either a) as to substance or b) as to the mode alone. A habit is supernatural as to substance if proper human powers are in no way able to elicit the acts corresponding to such habits, for example acts of faith and contrition. But supernatural as to mode is an infused habit which could also be acquired by natural virtue, but is now granted miraculously. Thus knowledge of the Scriptures and of languages was miraculously granted to the apostles, though it could also have been acquired by natural study.¹⁵

⁸ See L. Schutz, Thomas-Lexicon, s. v. habitus.

⁹ In German: dispositions of being and of activity.

¹⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 110, a. 2.

¹¹ Cf. 2 Pet. 1, 4.

¹² S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 3.

¹³ Cf. ib. 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1, 2, q. 51, a. 1.

¹⁴ Cf. ib. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1.

¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 51, a. 4.

440. The subject of operative habit is all those human powers which are not determined to one thing, but are able to operate in diverse ways and exercise their operations more or less perfectly and promptly. But those powers which act necessarily, and always in the same way, cannot receive habits properly so called. The reason is that habit is superfluous if a power is wholly determined to one thing and of itself is sufficiently furnished for operating. Hence operative habits are in the intellect, for example science; in the will, for example the virtue of justice; and in the sensitive appetite, for example the virtue of temperance and the vice of intemperance.¹⁶ On the contrary, operative habits do not exist in the vegetative power, nor in the external senses,¹⁷ nor even, of themselves, are operative habits found in brute animals, but only insofar as they are directed by man. For brute animals always follow the instinct of their nature, unless they have been directed by man or previously instructed.¹⁸

But entitative habits can be in the body, as for example health, beauty, etc.,¹⁹ and in the soul insofar as it is furnished with the supernatural habit of sanctifying grace. But because the essence of the soul is a complete nature and cannot receive any new accidents, it therefore cannot be the subject of natural entitative habits.²⁰

¹⁶ Cf. ib. q. 50, a. 3, 4, and 5. For the sake of brevity we omit the controversy discussed among theologians, namely in what precise way habits and virtues are found in the sensitive appetite. See John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol. in 1, 2, disp. 18, a. 2.

¹⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 50, a. 3.

¹⁸ Ib. ad 2.

¹⁹ Cf. ib. a. 1.

²⁰ Ib.

441. Origin and increase of habits. By the origin of habits is understood their efficient cause, which is threefold, as has already been said: 1. God, who causes supernatural habits by infusing sanctifying grace.²¹ 2. Nature itself, which causes both a) certain dispositions or entitative habits, such as beauty and health, and b) certain propensities in the faculties of the soul. Indeed, those natural propensities transmitted by heredity are not perfect habits, but are, as it were, latent and inchoate.²² The pedagogical art must pay the greatest attention to watching over those natural propensities proper to each man, namely by fostering or repressing them. Good natural propensities are to be fostered; but evil ones are to be vigorously and at the same time continually uprooted. We have already said above, n. 439, that propensities of this sort either are common to all men, namely the habit of first speculative and practical principles, or are particular to certain men, for example a propensity toward anger. 3. Exercise. It is clear from daily experience that habits are generated and also increased by multiplied acts. The more intensely, longer, and more frequently acts are repeated, the greater the habit, that is, the greater the promptitude of performing such acts, is wont to arise, unless, however, man's powers are exhausted from acts repeated too much. Thus, for example, from intense study of letters the habit of science is acquired, unless such study is so exaggerated that the powers of the brain are weakened.

The increase of habits is twofold: one extensive, the other intensive. The first is had when a habit extends itself to greater or more numerous objects. In this way only intellectual habits can be increased;²³ thus, for example, the habit of science grows when the number of objects of science is increased. The other increase, namely intensive, is present when a habit is more deeply rooted in its subject, so that the subject more easily and promptly elicits acts. In such a way both intellectual and moral habits can be increased. Thus, for example, the habit of the acquired virtue of temperance is increased when a man is more easily and promptly and perseveringly able to elicit acts of temperance. A habit can become as it were a second nature, and the more it approaches this naturalness, the more easily and delightfully it operates. For things which are done naturally are done easily and delightfully. Thus also depraved habits, namely vices, can become as it were a second nature inducing man to acting almost with a certain natural necessity. Examples are the vices of drunkenness, lust, anger, etc. On the increase of infused habits, namely of supernatural virtues, there will be a return below at n. 475. - The Angelic Doctor notes²⁴ that acquired habits are not increased by any exercise of acts whatsoever, but only by intense exercise. For if the exercised act, although often repeated, is remiss and more imperfect than the act which could be produced by the habit possessed, the habit is not increased, but rather diminished. Hence experience establishes, for example, that a musician who plays often but not very artistically not only does not grow in musical art, but gradually loses it.

²¹ Cf. below on infused virtues, n. 468.

²² Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 51, a. 1.

²³ A moral habit or virtue cannot be increased extensively, that is, insofar as it extends itself to more objects, for virtue is not true virtue unless it extends itself to its whole object. Wherefore St. Thomas says: "It belongs to the account of virtue that in all things one should act virtuously; hence science can be increased either according to the number of objects, or according to its intensity in the subject; but virtue in one way only" (Quaest. disp. de virtut. a. 11, ad 10).

²⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 52, a. 3.

442. Corruption and diminution of habits. 1. The habits of first principles, both speculative and practical, cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception. The reason is that such habits are as it were begotten from human nature, and therefore last as long as the nature of man exists. This is also established by experience; for there is no one so vicious that he does not know that good is to be done and evil omitted; no one of sound mind is so stupid that he does not understand that the whole is greater than its part, the principle of contradiction, etc.

2. Supernatural or infused habits can indeed be corrupted, but not diminished, as will be explained below, n. 476 sq., concerning infused virtues.

3. Natural acquired habits can both be corrupted and diminished. First of all, such habits are diminished and corrupted:

a) Through contrary acts, especially intense and often repeated acts. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is overcome by contrary custom. Hence, for example, the acquired habit of temperance gradually decreases and at last is corrupted by repeated acts of drunkenness.²⁵

b) Through long cessation from the exercise of acts. Thus experience makes clear in both intellectual and moral habits. "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating the passions and proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise beyond the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other things which move externally. Hence virtue is corrupted or diminished through cessation from act. Similarly also it is on the part of intellectual habits, according to which a man is prompt to judge rightly about things imagined. Therefore, when a man ceases from the use of an intellectual habit, extraneous imaginations arise and sometimes lead to the contrary; so that ... a man is rendered less apt for judging rightly and sometimes is totally disposed to the contrary."²⁶ Thus, for example, the habit of speaking some language is gradually diminished and at last ceases through long non-use.

4. Per accidens, operative habits, even spiritual ones, are corrupted through corruption of the bodily organ which is necessary for the exercise of the act. Thus those who labor under certain diseases of the brain no longer have right judgment concerning the morality of acts.

²⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 53, a. 1-2.

²⁶ Ib. a. 3.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49; Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1.

559. Habit (hexis, hebbelijkheid) is said from the verb to have; whence it signifies the quality or mode by which a thing has itself in this or that way, in itself or toward another. But something can have itself in many ways; whence the signification of the word is restricted to indicating only the first species of quality, that is, the mode by which a thing has itself in order to its nature and consequently to its end, and therefore well or badly; and indeed a perfect and permanent mode, which firmly inheres in the thing and therefore is lost with difficulty: thus it is distinguished from a simple disposition, which is a mode easily lost, by which a thing has itself in order to its nature. Therefore habit is a quality difficult to move, according to which a subject has itself well or badly according to itself or toward another; - or a stable disposition determining the subject to having itself well or badly according to itself or toward operation, in being or in operating.

"Habit," says St. Thomas, C. G. IV, 77, "differs from power in this, that through power we are able to do something, but through habit we are not rendered able to do something, but apt or inapt for doing well or badly that which we can do. Therefore through habit there is not given to us, nor taken away from us, any being able, but through habit we acquire this, that we do something well or badly."

560. Habit is divided a) into good and bad habit, according as it is a mode suitable to nature or not suitable;

b) into substantive or entitative habit, and operative habit, according as it is the mode by which nature has itself well or badly according to itself, as to being, - or by which it has itself well or badly toward another, as to its operation, or by which it is disposed to acting suitably or not suitably to its end.

The first immediately inheres in substance and is ordered principally to being, and not to operating, except mediately insofar as being itself is ordered to operating: such are beauty, health, sickness, and sanctifying grace; - the other immediately inheres in an operative power and therefore is immediately ordered to operation: such are aptitude and inaptitude, science and art, virtue and vice. "Something is disposed well or badly in two ways: namely, according to itself or by relation to something. Thus healthy is that which is well disposed according to itself, but robust is that which is well disposed for doing something." St. Thomas, in V Metaph., lect. 20.

561. Necessity of habits. - That there are operative habits is known by experience: for operations which are very difficult afterward become very easy, as is clear from one who plays the lyre, or dances, or writes, or reads, or studies science, or exercises himself toward temperance or toward drunkenness. - They are necessary in those things which are indifferent: for habit is good or bad; whence nothing has habit except that which can be disposed in several and diverse ways in order either to its nature in itself or to operation. Therefore habits are in those things which 1. are in potency, 2. to many, diverse, and contrary things, and therefore 3. can and ought to be disposed well or badly in several or diverse ways to their nature or operation. These three conditions are required in order that something need a habit. Hence:

1. Habit is not given in God, because in no way is He in potency, but He is His being and His operation, and consequently He can be disposed to nothing beyond Himself.

2. Nor is habit given in powers wholly determined to one thing, because they are sufficiently determined to act and cannot be determined in several ways, nor be more or better or less well disposed; whence the powers of nature do not acquire a habit by their exercise, but always act as much as they can.

3. But habits are in powers which are not wholly determined to one thing, and therefore do not have the whole propensity which they can have toward operation, but can be proportioned to this in diverse ways. Through habit such a power acquires a greater inclination, and thus constancy, facility, and sweetness in performing its acts. This mode becomes as it were connatural to it, and therefore habit is called a second nature.

Whence operative habit can be defined: A quality difficult to move by which man is disposed to operating easily, promptly, and delectably;¹ - or a permanent quality superadded to an operative power, facilitating it and inclining it to operating either well or badly, that is, suitably or not suitably to the end.

¹ It should be noted that infused habits give elevation to the power, but not so great a facility: they confer only the power of acting in higher things and a certain inclination toward them. See below n. 619.

562. Observations. - 1. From the aforesaid definition it follows:

a) that operative habit is the first (proximate) act of a power, and operation is the second act (q. 49, a. 3, ad 1);

b) that habit is a mean between pure operative power (remote first act) and perfect act (operation, second act);

c) that habit does not give to the power that it can operate, but that it operates perfectly, that is, constantly and uniformly, - promptly, easily, and expeditiously, - and delectably (Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1; C. G. IV, 77);

d) that operative habit is found truly and properly in an active power which properly operates; but in a merely passive power through which the active power operates, it is not found except improperly and secondarily, insofar as there is there a rather passive quality by which this power easily serves the active power (q. 50, a. 1).

2. Operative habit, while it inheres in an indifferent power, nevertheless does not completely take away its indifference, nor consequently necessitate it to act; whence St. Thomas says that someone uses a habit when he wills (q. 49, a. 3 sed contra; q. 50, a. 3, ad 2; a. 5).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, 52, 53; q. 63, a. 1 and 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 8 and 9.

566. Principle I. One operative habit of the soul inheres in man from nature, not indeed totally (for then it would be innate), but partially and according to an inchoation, namely, the habit of first principles, insofar as, once the terms have been known through intelligible species (which do not inhere in us by nature), there immediately flows forth the facility of seeing that the terms agree with one another or do not.

567. Principle II. Other habits are caused in the soul from human acts proper to the agent, namely, from acts of the moving power in the moved power of the same agent;¹ thus, for example, the act of the appetitive power proceeds from apprehension representing the object, the intellective power as reasoning has as an active principle a proposition known through itself, and the possible intellect is moved by the agent intellect. For an agent in which there is at once the active and passive principle of its act, insofar as it is active can cause a habit, and insofar as it is passive can receive that habit and be perfected by it.

¹ Also the same power can be moving and moved under a diverse respect.

They are acquired habits.²

² Cf. I-II, q. 51, a. 3, and De Virt., q. 1, a. 9, ad 10 and 11.

Sometimes a habit is caused by one act, when the acting power by one act totally overcomes the passive power, as happens in the habit of science, because one act suffices for conviction;³ - ordinarily, however, it is caused from repeated acts of the same species, as happens in an opinative habit, in habits of the internal senses, and especially in moral virtues and vices, because reason by one act cannot bring it about that the appetite be good or bad ordinarily, generally, and in all circumstances, as is nevertheless required for virtue or vice.

³ Thus as to the intellect, for "as to the lower apprehensive powers, it is necessary that the same acts be reiterated several times, so that something be firmly impressed on the memory." q. 51, a. 3.

568. Principle III. Other habits are caused by God, namely, supernatural habits by which we are disposed to the supernatural end exceeding the faculty of human nature; likewise God can also cause habits which we can acquire by our acts, just as He gave to some knowledge of the Scriptures or of languages.

They are habits infused per se, or per accidens.

569. Principle IV. No habit is innate. - Supernatural habits in no way inhere in us from nature; - nor are acquired habits from nature according to essence, perfection, and consummation, but only according to a certain aptitude and inchoation, and indeed in two ways.

a) On the part of the soul, not according to the inchoation of the habit itself, but only according to aptitude or as to its principles, insofar as the intellect and will naturally state an order and inclination to knowledge of the true and love of the good, and thus the habit of first principles in the intellect and the natural inclination of the will to the good are principles or seeds from which intellectual and moral virtues are generated.⁴ But "because the inclination to proper objects, which seems to be an inchoation of habit, does not pertain to habit but rather to the very account of the powers" (q. 51, a. 1), therefore it is not an inchoation of the habit itself according to itself, but only according to its principles or according to its aptitude in its causes.

⁴ Cf. q. 51, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1.

b) On the part of the body and of the internal senses, also according to the inchoation of the habit itself, insofar as on account of their disposition man is helped or impeded toward good, and thus is disposed better or less well to certain habits: thus from the disposition of the organs and the complexion of the body, one man is more disposed to understanding than another, or has a propensity to certain virtues (chastity, fortitude, meekness) or vices (anger, lust). Thus he has a greater aptitude for receiving such and such a habit and acquires it more easily.⁵

⁵ Nevertheless they are not virtues or vices: for the soul can be unharmed, although the body is so disposed from natural complexion.

Moreover habits of the body can be caused by one act, if the producing cause was of great power, as health from one strong medicine, organic deformation from one passion, for example, from immense terror.

570. Principle V. Habits are increased, but not by the addition of a new grade: for addition supposes two or more things which are added, whence there would be several habits and thus several accidents of the same species in the same subject, which is repugnant (for example, two charities, two temperances, two arts); nor would the prior habit truly become greater and be increased, but rather it would be multiplied. But they are increased:

1. according to themselves: extensively, insofar as the same habit in number extends itself to new objects to which it was not previously ordered; as theological science is extended by the study of a new treatise;

2. on the part of the subject: intensively, insofar as the same habit is received more and inheres more firmly in the subject, and reduces it more into act; and consequently the power in which the habit resides participates more in the account of the habit, whence it tends to act more expeditiously and promptly; as the knowledge of the same treatise becomes clearer. And indeed:

a) Habits are increased intensively by the same cause by which they are produced: for similar acts cause habits similar not only in species but also in grade and intensity; whence an act more intense than, or equally intense as, the habit increases it or at least disposes it to increase; but when the will does not use the habit totally and produces a less intense act, that act disposes rather to diminution of the habit and does not increase it.

b) Habits are increased extensively through acts concerning another part of the object: one who already has knowledge of all the treatises of theology, except one, increases the habit by the study of that part.

571. Principle VI. Habits are corrupted per se or per accidens: per accidens, when the subject in which they inhere is corrupted; per se, that is, through their contrary. It should be noted that every habit which is acquired by one act is corrupted by one act; but that which is acquired by several acts is not corrupted except by several, though it is diminished by only one.

Habits which do not have a contrary, such as the habit of principles, are not corrupted per se. But those which have a contrary can be corrupted per se, as science and opinion through an opposite principle or through a sophistical deduction; and acquired moral virtue through contrary judgments of practical reason from ignorance, passion, or malice; likewise habits of the body.

Habits of the intellect and will are not corrupted per accidens, because these faculties are incorruptible; but habits of the sensitive powers and of the body are corrupted, as temperance before the resurrection.

572. Principle VII. Habits are diminished intensively and extensively from the same cause by which they are corrupted per se, that is, through a contrary, because diminution is the way to corruption.

Moreover, certain habits are also diminished and corrupted by cessation from act alone, not indeed directly per se, but indirectly per accidens, namely, through the removal of that which prevents, insofar as this cessation takes away the acts which would impede things contrary to the habit from corrupting or diminishing it per se.