Preliminary Chapter. On Habits In General

438. Notion. Habit (ἕξις)² in a general sense signifies a mode of being disposed; but in a more particular sense habit is called a quality according to which some thing is well or badly disposed either according to itself or toward another; or, more briefly, it is a stable quality by which some being is perfected.³ Qualities of this sort affect either the nature itself with respect to being, or the powers with respect to acting. If they directly affect the nature, they are called entitative habits, for example health of body, sanctifying grace; but if they are directly subjected in some power, they are named operative habits, for example science, moral virtue. Habit, insofar as it includes both entitative and operative habits, is defined by Aristotle⁴ as "a disposition according to which what is disposed is well or badly disposed, either according to itself or toward another." Or more briefly, as has already been said: Habit is a quality by which a subject is well or badly disposed toward itself or toward another. But an operative habit⁵ can be defined: A quality difficult to move, by which man is disposed to acting easily, promptly, and with delight; or according to St. Thomas:⁶ "Habits are certain qualities or forms inhering in a power, by which the power is inclined to determinate acts according to species." Therefore habit is a certain accident, namely a quality, and according to St. Thomas it differs from a simple disposition in this, that the latter is something imperfect, begun, and not yet stable, while on the contrary habit is a perfect and stable quality.⁷ Thus, for example, a young artisan who has been formed imperfectly has the disposition of art; but an artisan furnished with long experience and complete formation possesses the habit of art.

The definition given holds for natural habits, which cause an expeditious facility of acting. But supernatural habits, such as the infused virtues of faith, etc., do not give such facility and promptitude of eliciting supernatural acts, but rather power and a certain inclination. Hence a man existing in the state of sanctifying grace indeed has the infused supernatural habit of all the virtues, but in the exercise of such virtues he can feel many difficulties. But facility in exercising the supernatural virtues is acquired through strenuous and repeated acts, insofar as obstacles are thereby removed and the powers are rendered more prompt for performing those acts.

² Philosophers take habit either a) as the last predicament, or b) as a postpredicament, or c) as a species of quality. We speak of habit only in this last sense.

³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 1.

⁴ L. 4: Metaphys. c. 20 (ed. Didot 2, 520). In German: predisposition.

⁵ Skills, aptitudes.

⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 54, a. 1.

⁷ Cf. S. theol. q. 49, a. 2 ad 3.

439. Distinctions of habit are numerous.⁸ Let these be noted briefly:

1. By reason of the subject, habits are distinguished into entitative and operative habits.⁹ The former immediately perfect the nature with respect to accidental being, and only mediately perfect the powers, for example beauty of body, sanctifying grace, etc. But operative habits immediately perfect the powers for acting promptly, easily, and with delight, for example musical art, moral virtues, etc. Among entitative habits sanctifying grace holds the first place; it is received in the essence of our soul,¹⁰ which it renders a sharer of the divine nature.¹¹ Of itself and immediately sanctifying grace does not dispose one to acting, since it is an entitative habit, but it does so by means of the virtues which are infused together with it. The Angelic Doctor aptly notes:¹² "According to the account of habit, it belongs to every habit in some way to have an order to act." The reason is that every habit has an order to the nature of the thing. But every nature of a thing is ordered in some way to operation.

2. By reason of morality, habits are distinguished into good and evil habits, according as they are stable dispositions either toward good or toward evil. In the moral order good habits are virtues; but evil habits are vices.

3. By reason of origin, habits are distinguished into natural, acquired, and infused habits, according as they are caused either from human nature itself, as it were, or by repeated exercise, or by supernatural divine infusion. Sometimes, however, natural habits are taken in another sense, namely insofar as they are divided against supernatural or infused habits and insofar as they include habits arising both from nature and from exercise. Natural habits taken in the first sense are certain natural propensities either implanted in all men having the use of reason or specially granted to some particular man. Thus all men have a natural habit of first speculative and practical principles, namely they immediately understand general principles, for example that the whole is greater than its part; that good is to be done and evil is to be omitted.¹³ The former is called by the Scholastics the understanding of first principles, namely speculative principles; the latter is called synteresis. Likewise in certain men there are found certain natural propensities which are deservedly called inchoate habits, for example toward anger, toward alcoholism, toward patience, toward chastity, etc.¹⁴ For the most part such particular inchoate habits arise from bodily temperament or from the heredity of parents.

Acquired habits are caused by multiplied acts elicited by some power of man. Thus, for example, the habit of science is caused in the power of the intellect from multiplied acts of study; the habit of the virtue of temperance is produced from acts of fasting; the habit of drunkenness creeps in from much drinking of wine, etc.

Infused or supernatural habits are liberally granted by God to man, although human nature has no strict right to them. These infused habits are supernatural either a) as to substance or b) as to the mode alone. A habit is supernatural as to substance if proper human powers are in no way able to elicit the acts corresponding to such habits, for example acts of faith and contrition. But supernatural as to mode is an infused habit which could also be acquired by natural virtue, but is now granted miraculously. Thus knowledge of the Scriptures and of languages was miraculously granted to the apostles, though it could also have been acquired by natural study.¹⁵

⁸ See L. Schutz, Thomas-Lexicon, s. v. habitus.

⁹ In German: dispositions of being and of activity.

¹⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 110, a. 2.

¹¹ Cf. 2 Pet. 1, 4.

¹² S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 3.

¹³ Cf. ib. 1, q. 79, a. 12; 1, 2, q. 51, a. 1.

¹⁴ Cf. ib. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1.

¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 51, a. 4.

440. The subject of operative habit is all those human powers which are not determined to one thing, but are able to operate in diverse ways and exercise their operations more or less perfectly and promptly. But those powers which act necessarily, and always in the same way, cannot receive habits properly so called. The reason is that habit is superfluous if a power is wholly determined to one thing and of itself is sufficiently furnished for operating. Hence operative habits are in the intellect, for example science; in the will, for example the virtue of justice; and in the sensitive appetite, for example the virtue of temperance and the vice of intemperance.¹⁶ On the contrary, operative habits do not exist in the vegetative power, nor in the external senses,¹⁷ nor even, of themselves, are operative habits found in brute animals, but only insofar as they are directed by man. For brute animals always follow the instinct of their nature, unless they have been directed by man or previously instructed.¹⁸

But entitative habits can be in the body, as for example health, beauty, etc.,¹⁹ and in the soul insofar as it is furnished with the supernatural habit of sanctifying grace. But because the essence of the soul is a complete nature and cannot receive any new accidents, it therefore cannot be the subject of natural entitative habits.²⁰

¹⁶ Cf. ib. q. 50, a. 3, 4, and 5. For the sake of brevity we omit the controversy discussed among theologians, namely in what precise way habits and virtues are found in the sensitive appetite. See John of St. Thomas, Curs. theol. in 1, 2, disp. 18, a. 2.

¹⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 50, a. 3.

¹⁸ Ib. ad 2.

¹⁹ Cf. ib. a. 1.

²⁰ Ib.

441. Origin and increase of habits. By the origin of habits is understood their efficient cause, which is threefold, as has already been said: 1. God, who causes supernatural habits by infusing sanctifying grace.²¹ 2. Nature itself, which causes both a) certain dispositions or entitative habits, such as beauty and health, and b) certain propensities in the faculties of the soul. Indeed, those natural propensities transmitted by heredity are not perfect habits, but are, as it were, latent and inchoate.²² The pedagogical art must pay the greatest attention to watching over those natural propensities proper to each man, namely by fostering or repressing them. Good natural propensities are to be fostered; but evil ones are to be vigorously and at the same time continually uprooted. We have already said above, n. 439, that propensities of this sort either are common to all men, namely the habit of first speculative and practical principles, or are particular to certain men, for example a propensity toward anger. 3. Exercise. It is clear from daily experience that habits are generated and also increased by multiplied acts. The more intensely, longer, and more frequently acts are repeated, the greater the habit, that is, the greater the promptitude of performing such acts, is wont to arise, unless, however, man's powers are exhausted from acts repeated too much. Thus, for example, from intense study of letters the habit of science is acquired, unless such study is so exaggerated that the powers of the brain are weakened.

The increase of habits is twofold: one extensive, the other intensive. The first is had when a habit extends itself to greater or more numerous objects. In this way only intellectual habits can be increased;²³ thus, for example, the habit of science grows when the number of objects of science is increased. The other increase, namely intensive, is present when a habit is more deeply rooted in its subject, so that the subject more easily and promptly elicits acts. In such a way both intellectual and moral habits can be increased. Thus, for example, the habit of the acquired virtue of temperance is increased when a man is more easily and promptly and perseveringly able to elicit acts of temperance. A habit can become as it were a second nature, and the more it approaches this naturalness, the more easily and delightfully it operates. For things which are done naturally are done easily and delightfully. Thus also depraved habits, namely vices, can become as it were a second nature inducing man to acting almost with a certain natural necessity. Examples are the vices of drunkenness, lust, anger, etc. On the increase of infused habits, namely of supernatural virtues, there will be a return below at n. 475. - The Angelic Doctor notes²⁴ that acquired habits are not increased by any exercise of acts whatsoever, but only by intense exercise. For if the exercised act, although often repeated, is remiss and more imperfect than the act which could be produced by the habit possessed, the habit is not increased, but rather diminished. Hence experience establishes, for example, that a musician who plays often but not very artistically not only does not grow in musical art, but gradually loses it.

²¹ Cf. below on infused virtues, n. 468.

²² Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 51, a. 1.

²³ A moral habit or virtue cannot be increased extensively, that is, insofar as it extends itself to more objects, for virtue is not true virtue unless it extends itself to its whole object. Wherefore St. Thomas says: "It belongs to the account of virtue that in all things one should act virtuously; hence science can be increased either according to the number of objects, or according to its intensity in the subject; but virtue in one way only" (Quaest. disp. de virtut. a. 11, ad 10).

²⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 52, a. 3.

442. Corruption and diminution of habits. 1. The habits of first principles, both speculative and practical, cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception. The reason is that such habits are as it were begotten from human nature, and therefore last as long as the nature of man exists. This is also established by experience; for there is no one so vicious that he does not know that good is to be done and evil omitted; no one of sound mind is so stupid that he does not understand that the whole is greater than its part, the principle of contradiction, etc.

2. Supernatural or infused habits can indeed be corrupted, but not diminished, as will be explained below, n. 476 sq., concerning infused virtues.

3. Natural acquired habits can both be corrupted and diminished. First of all, such habits are diminished and corrupted:

a) Through contrary acts, especially intense and often repeated acts. For contraries are destroyed by contraries, and custom is overcome by contrary custom. Hence, for example, the acquired habit of temperance gradually decreases and at last is corrupted by repeated acts of drunkenness.²⁵

b) Through long cessation from the exercise of acts. Thus experience makes clear in both intellectual and moral habits. "When someone does not use the habit of virtue for moderating the passions and proper operations, it is necessary that many passions and operations arise beyond the mode of virtue, from the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other things which move externally. Hence virtue is corrupted or diminished through cessation from act. Similarly also it is on the part of intellectual habits, according to which a man is prompt to judge rightly about things imagined. Therefore, when a man ceases from the use of an intellectual habit, extraneous imaginations arise and sometimes lead to the contrary; so that ... a man is rendered less apt for judging rightly and sometimes is totally disposed to the contrary."²⁶ Thus, for example, the habit of speaking some language is gradually diminished and at last ceases through long non-use.

4. Per accidens, operative habits, even spiritual ones, are corrupted through corruption of the bodily organ which is necessary for the exercise of the act. Thus those who labor under certain diseases of the brain no longer have right judgment concerning the morality of acts.

²⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 53, a. 1-2.

²⁶ Ib. a. 3.