Question One: On the Essence of Habit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 49; Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1.

559. Habit (hexis, hebbelijkheid) is said from the verb to have; whence it signifies the quality or mode by which a thing has itself in this or that way, in itself or toward another. But something can have itself in many ways; whence the signification of the word is restricted to indicating only the first species of quality, that is, the mode by which a thing has itself in order to its nature and consequently to its end, and therefore well or badly; and indeed a perfect and permanent mode, which firmly inheres in the thing and therefore is lost with difficulty: thus it is distinguished from a simple disposition, which is a mode easily lost, by which a thing has itself in order to its nature. Therefore habit is a quality difficult to move, according to which a subject has itself well or badly according to itself or toward another; - or a stable disposition determining the subject to having itself well or badly according to itself or toward operation, in being or in operating.

"Habit," says St. Thomas, C. G. IV, 77, "differs from power in this, that through power we are able to do something, but through habit we are not rendered able to do something, but apt or inapt for doing well or badly that which we can do. Therefore through habit there is not given to us, nor taken away from us, any being able, but through habit we acquire this, that we do something well or badly."

560. Habit is divided a) into good and bad habit, according as it is a mode suitable to nature or not suitable;

b) into substantive or entitative habit, and operative habit, according as it is the mode by which nature has itself well or badly according to itself, as to being, - or by which it has itself well or badly toward another, as to its operation, or by which it is disposed to acting suitably or not suitably to its end.

The first immediately inheres in substance and is ordered principally to being, and not to operating, except mediately insofar as being itself is ordered to operating: such are beauty, health, sickness, and sanctifying grace; - the other immediately inheres in an operative power and therefore is immediately ordered to operation: such are aptitude and inaptitude, science and art, virtue and vice. "Something is disposed well or badly in two ways: namely, according to itself or by relation to something. Thus healthy is that which is well disposed according to itself, but robust is that which is well disposed for doing something." St. Thomas, in V Metaph., lect. 20.

561. Necessity of habits. - That there are operative habits is known by experience: for operations which are very difficult afterward become very easy, as is clear from one who plays the lyre, or dances, or writes, or reads, or studies science, or exercises himself toward temperance or toward drunkenness. - They are necessary in those things which are indifferent: for habit is good or bad; whence nothing has habit except that which can be disposed in several and diverse ways in order either to its nature in itself or to operation. Therefore habits are in those things which 1. are in potency, 2. to many, diverse, and contrary things, and therefore 3. can and ought to be disposed well or badly in several or diverse ways to their nature or operation. These three conditions are required in order that something need a habit. Hence:

1. Habit is not given in God, because in no way is He in potency, but He is His being and His operation, and consequently He can be disposed to nothing beyond Himself.

2. Nor is habit given in powers wholly determined to one thing, because they are sufficiently determined to act and cannot be determined in several ways, nor be more or better or less well disposed; whence the powers of nature do not acquire a habit by their exercise, but always act as much as they can.

3. But habits are in powers which are not wholly determined to one thing, and therefore do not have the whole propensity which they can have toward operation, but can be proportioned to this in diverse ways. Through habit such a power acquires a greater inclination, and thus constancy, facility, and sweetness in performing its acts. This mode becomes as it were connatural to it, and therefore habit is called a second nature.

Whence operative habit can be defined: A quality difficult to move by which man is disposed to operating easily, promptly, and delectably;¹ - or a permanent quality superadded to an operative power, facilitating it and inclining it to operating either well or badly, that is, suitably or not suitably to the end.

¹ It should be noted that infused habits give elevation to the power, but not so great a facility: they confer only the power of acting in higher things and a certain inclination toward them. See below n. 619.

562. Observations. - 1. From the aforesaid definition it follows:

a) that operative habit is the first (proximate) act of a power, and operation is the second act (q. 49, a. 3, ad 1);

b) that habit is a mean between pure operative power (remote first act) and perfect act (operation, second act);

c) that habit does not give to the power that it can operate, but that it operates perfectly, that is, constantly and uniformly, - promptly, easily, and expeditiously, - and delectably (Q. D. de Virt. 1, a. 1; C. G. IV, 77);

d) that operative habit is found truly and properly in an active power which properly operates; but in a merely passive power through which the active power operates, it is not found except improperly and secondarily, insofar as there is there a rather passive quality by which this power easily serves the active power (q. 50, a. 1).

2. Operative habit, while it inheres in an indifferent power, nevertheless does not completely take away its indifference, nor consequently necessitate it to act; whence St. Thomas says that someone uses a habit when he wills (q. 49, a. 3 sed contra; q. 50, a. 3, ad 2; a. 5).