Sufficient and Efficacious Grace

Here we have a contest with Jansenius and the theologians commonly called Augustinians. These, although in this state they admit the necessity of grace per se efficacious, contend nevertheless, from Augustine, libr. de Corrept. et Grat., cap. 10, 11, 12, that Adam and the angels had no need of it in order to persevere, but only of an indifferent and versatile grace hanging upon the nod of free will, such as the Molinists admit in the present state. The Thomists, on the contrary, uphold the necessity of efficacious grace for both states, with this difference, that in the first state grace would be grace of health, in the second it is medicinal grace, or, as Augustine says, the former is the more joyful, the latter the more powerful. And because the whole contest is about the mind of this holy Doctor,

I say: According to St. Augustine, grace per se efficacious was necessary for Adam and the angels in order to persevere.

It is proved 1° from the most formal testimonies of St. Augustine. the others falling, they themselves stood. Such is the title of the chapter: « Whether the holy angels have him whom they have as creator by nature as the same author of good will, that is, of that volition whereby they persevered, through the Holy Spirit, his charity diffused in them? »

What do the adversaries answer, or what ought they to answer, to this question? That both angels, the good and the bad, had versatile grace; that the good made it efficacious by their consent, the bad made it inefficacious by their dissent, and for that reason the former stood in the justice they had accepted, the latter fell. But how far distant from Augustine: « If the angels, says the holy Doctor, responding to the question proposed, could not make themselves better than he had made them, than which no one makes anything better, certainly they could not have had that good will whereby they would be better, unless the aid of the Creator were operating. And when their will did that good thing, that they should be turned not to themselves, who were less, but to him who supremely is..., what else is shown than that any good will whatsoever was needy, and would have remained in mere desire, unless he who had made good nature out of nothing capable of himself made it better by filling it, first making it by exciting it to be more avid?... But those who, although created good, are nevertheless bad by their own evil will, which nature alone did not make, save when it spontaneously fell away from good — that the good be not the cause of evil, but the defect from good — either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same; or, if both were created equally good, these falling by evil will, those were helped MORE, and attained that fullness of beatitude whereby they became most certain that they would never fall: as also we treated in the book which this one follows. It must be confessed therefore, with the praise due to the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said also of the holy angels, that the charity of God has been diffused in them by the Holy Spirit who has been given to them. » Although it is most evident that this testimony is for our opinion, yet that its whole force may shine forth the more, I weigh each point.

1° According to Augustine, no creature, not even an angel, can make itself better than God made it. But if the good angels had from God only the aid without which not, or versatile grace whereby they could persevere, while the will and act of persevering were from themselves, no mightier aid received which should work in them that they might will, they would have made themselves better than God had made them: for better is he who does good, than he who can simply; better he who in fact perseveres in the justice once accepted, than he who can simply persevere. Therefore, according to Augustine, efficacious grace was necessary to the angels in order to persevere.

2° What I note above all in the aforesaid testimony is that, whereas Augustine had said compendiously that God made the good angels better « by exciting them to be more avid, » afterwards explaining this more carefully, he sets forth two modes by which the good angels could be made better by God: First, he says, because the angels who fell received in their creation a lesser grace, consequently the good ones a greater; this being supposed, it is manifest that the holy angels were made better by God, not by themselves. But, because it was uncertain to Augustine whether those who fell truly received a lesser grace in their creation, and indeed the opposite is the truer, he adds that, if all were created equally good, those who persevered « were further helped, » that is, received a greater actual aid, whereby they persevered and were made better than the others. Therefore, according to Augustine, the holy angels, over and above the sufficient aid conferred upon all, needed another mightier and more efficacious aid, whereby they might persevere and be made better.

3° And what I weigh last in the aforesaid testimony of Augustine is the very response which the holy Doctor makes to the question proposed. The question was, as the title of the chapter bears: « Whether the holy angels have him whom they have as creator of nature as the same author of their good will [that is, of the good volition whereby they persevered], through the Holy Spirit, charity being diffused in them? » Many things having been premised and touched upon, especially those we have related, concluding at length he thus answers the question: « It must be confessed therefore, with the praise due to the Creator, that it pertains not to holy men alone, but can be said also of the holy angels, that the charity of God has been diffused in them by the Holy Spirit who has been given to them. » You see that God, Augustine defining it, wrought good will in the angels through the effusion of some new actual charity, just as he works in the saints. — I subjoin. But the grace by which God works good will in holy men is not merely sufficient and versatile, but per se efficacious; it is not an aid without which, but whereby, as Jansenius and the Augustinians contend with all their nerves. Therefore.

This celebrated testimony of Augustine set in a good light, I subjoin the following. The holy Doctor, Enarrat. in Psal. xxxi, expounding that word of the Psalmist, 6: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the virtue of them by the spirit of his mouth, and applying these words allegorically to the angels, says: « By the word of the Lord the heavens [that is, the angels] are made firm. For they were not a firming for themselves, nor did the heavens themselves bestow their own firmness upon themselves... For they had nothing from themselves, and received as it were a supplement from the Lord; for by the spirit of his mouth, not a part, but all their virtue was. » But if they had had nothing but versatile grace suspended upon the nod of free will, they would have had the firming and the firmness from themselves, at least in part, by rendering namely the versatile and indifferent grace efficacious by their consent, and would have added the supplement from themselves, namely their free consent to indifferent grace, as the adversaries say; all which Augustine denies. Therefore.

It is proved 2° by overthrowing the foundation of the adversaries. If motion per se efficacious were not necessary in the state of innocence, this would be, as the adversaries will, because, according to Augustine, its whole necessity is drawn from the infirmity of the fallen nature for supernatural and meritorious acts. But that assumption of the adversaries is false. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Augustine draws the necessity of efficacious motion not only from the infirmity of the fallen nature, but also from the omnipotence of God, from the subordination and dependence of every creature upon God in acting. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° Above all the holy Doctor, lib. I de Trinit., cap. 4, n. 9, lays down as a constant and universal principle that « the divine will is the first and supreme cause of all corporeal and spiritual motions, » which words he utters from Augustine, St. Prosper, sent. 58.

2° Lib. V de Genes. ad litt., c. 20, n. 41: « God, he says, moves by a hidden power his whole creature, and by that motion they turn about, while the angels perform the commands, while the stars make their circuits, while the winds alternate..., while the ages unroll the latent greens and pastures, as it were folded up¹ he had implanted; yet they would not unroll into their courses, if he who created them were to cease to administer them by his provident motion. » And at the end of c. 23, n. 46: « He by whom he made all things together, governing and moving them with an administering act, works without cessation. » Here there is no mention or question of the infirmity of nature for supernatural and meritorious acts, but of the subordination and dependence alone of every created cause, even natural, in acting, upon almighty God as first cause and first mover.

3° Lib. de Corrept. et grat., which the adversaries oppose to us, cap. 14, n. 43, on the election of David as king: « The Lord almighty, he says, brought these men that they might constitute him king. And how did he bring them? Did he perhaps bind them with any bodily chains? He acted within, he held hearts, he moved hearts, and drew them by their wills, which he himself wrought in them. If therefore, when he wishes to establish kings upon earth, he has the wills of men more in his power

^{1 1} So the editions. But the Benedictines, from manuscripts of better note, have plicita, from the verb plicare.

than those very men their own wills, who else makes it that correction be wholesome, and correction take place in the heart of the corrected, that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom? » And lib. I contra duas Epist. Pelagianorum cap. 20, n. 38, speaking of the change of King Assuerus from indignation to mildness, which was also an act of the natural order: « God, he says, by a most hidden and most efficacious power [converts the heart of the king] and translated him from indignation to lenity, that is, from the will of harming to the will of favoring, according to that of the Apostle: God works in us even to will. » In all these there are plainly efficacious motions, whose necessity Augustine nevertheless does not draw from the infirmity of the fallen nature, but from the omnipotence of God and the dependence of creatures upon him, as is clear both from the terms, and because, as I said, those elections and actions were merely civil and of the natural order, to which the infirmity of the fallen nature in respect of supernatural and meritorious acts is irrelevant. Nay, from the necessity of efficacious motion for those civil acts Augustine infers, as from the less to the greater, the necessity of such motion for salutary acts, namely for the correction of heart and morals, as is clear from the words of the second text, and which he repeats more openly lib. de Praedest. sanctorum, cap. 20, n. 42, where, defending this inference of his against the Semi-Pelagians, he says: « Do they think that God inclines the wills of whom he will for making earthly kingdoms, but that God does not incline the wills of whom he will for obtaining the heavenly kingdom?... Consider moreover what it is to believe that for constituting earthly kingdoms God works the wills of men, and for laying hold of the kingdom of heaven men work their own wills. » Therefore Augustine draws the necessity of efficacious motion from the omnipotence of God and the dependence of the creature upon him, both in natural things and in supernatural things.

It is confirmed 1°. If the necessity of grace per se efficacious must be drawn from the sole infirmity of nature wounded by original sin, it follows that, where there is no infirmity from original sin, there is no efficacious grace, but only versatile grace. Thus teach the adversaries. But the consequent is false. Therefore also the antecedent. — Proof of the minor. In Christ the Lord there was no infirmity from original sin, which he did not contract. Likewise in the most blessed Virgin: either there was no original sin, according to the pious opinion¹, or at least, according to all, the fomes was bound in the womb of her mother and fully extinguished at the conception of Christ. Yet nevertheless both Christ and his most blessed mother were endowed not with versatile grace only, but with efficacious and most efficacious grace. Therefore. — The major is of faith, (at least as regards Christ: as regards the most blessed Virgin it would be temerarious to deny it) But the minor I judge cannot be denied by anyone: 1° because it is incredible, indeed it seems to imply a contradiction, that the author and the Mother of grace, who were led, governed and moved toward good more efficaciously and unfailingly than any other by the Holy Spirit, lacked efficacious grace, and that in Christ there was not the grace of Christ, which Augustine defended through so many years and in so many volumes. 2° Because it would follow that the good works of Christ and of his Mother were not foreseen by God in his decree, but in the very use of their free will, through middle knowledge, and that the predestination of Christ to hypostatic union, and of the most blessed Virgin to the dignity of the maternity of God, and of each to glory, was not gratuitous, against the express doctrine of Augustine, de Praedestinat. sanctorum, c. 15, n. 30 and 31.

It is confirmed 2°. If Adam, because he suffered no rebellion in his lower appetite, had no need of efficacious grace for pious works, for instance to love God above all things, but versatile grace sufficed him, it follows that man regenerated in Christ likewise has no need of efficacious grace at that time when he is not assailed by any temptation of the lower appetite, as happens not rarely², according to Augustine, lib. VI contra Julian., c. 19, and as experience proves. For concupiscence which neither stimulates nor tempts is no more an impediment to the act of virtue than if it were not there at all.

^{1 1} It has been proved in the tract. on Sins that this doctrine was defined as of faith by Pius IX, through the dogmatic bull Ineffabilis Deus.

^{2 2} Namely, that he is not assailed by actual temptation.

But the consequent is false, even according to the adversaries. Therefore also the antecedent.

The objections are solved.

The adversaries seek from Augustine the single foundation of their opinion from cap. 10, 11, 12 of the book de Corrept. et Grat. When the monks of Adrumetum asked why Adam should be blamed because he did not persevere, if indeed he had not the gift of perseverance, nor could it be said of him what Augustine had said of men in the state of fallen nature, that the gift of perseverance was denied him on account of original sin,

The holy Doctor answers that Adam was nevertheless inexcusable and to be rebuked; because, although he had not efficacious aid for persevering, such as is given now to the predestinate, he nevertheless had sufficient aid, which was permitted to his will and whereby he could persevere if he willed, just as the good angels persevered with him by free will. And he adds the reason why he would not need efficacious aid, such as is given now; because his nature was sound and whole, whereas ours is weak and wounded, and therefore to be helped by mightier aid. Hence he concludes, cap. 12, n. 34: « The assistances themselves must be distinguished. One is the assistance without which something does not come about, and another is the assistance whereby something comes about... Therefore to the first man... was given the assistance of perseverance, not whereby it came about that he persevere, but without which he could not persevere by free will. Now indeed to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God by the grace of God there is given not such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself be given to them. »

This is the sum of the doctrine of Augustine in these three famous chapters. From it Jansenius infers that the difference between the present state and the state of innocence lies in this, that the grace proper to the state of innocence is the aid without which not, or sufficient grace only and versatile subjected to free will, nor was any grace per se efficacious necessary in it; but the grace proper to this present state is the aid whereby, or grace per se efficacious, on account of the infirmity of nature, nor is any grace merely sufficient given in it. And this is, as I have already warned, the poisoned root and origin of that heresy. The theologians who are called Augustinians infer the same, except that they acknowledge sufficient graces also for the present state.

For the sound understanding of this doctrine of Augustine, our Thomists observe that not every efficacious aid is of the same condition and virtue: one is only moving and applying the power to act; another is not only moving and applying, but at the same time healing and strengthening. The first, they say, was necessary both to Adam and to the angels, by reason of dependence upon God in acting, not the second; because their nature, being sound and whole, had no need of medicinal and sanative aid, such as our nature, now weak and wounded, needs, and to which therefore an aid is necessary that is not only moving and applying, but also healing and strengthening: whereas Augustine, when he excludes from the state of innocent nature the aid whereby and efficacious, speaks of aid that heals and strengthens, not of aid that simply assists and applies. Which they gather plainly from his words, cap. 11, n. 29, where he says: « He [Adam] had no need of that assistance which these [the saints in this life] implore, when they say¹: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord... But he, tried and troubled by no such struggle of himself against himself, enjoyed his peace with himself in that place of beatitude. » This distinction being laid down, they easily explain the phrases of Augustine which seem alien to our opinion.

Still more easily, if you observe further that God influences secondary causes in two ways: 1° By ordinary providence moving them, according to the condition of their forces, to effects proportioned to them. 2° By assisting them in a manner somewhat above the accustomed course of things and the condition of their forces, and by a special aid, whereby it comes about that by the power of God

^{1 1} Rom., VII, 23-25.

they effect something exceeding their own strength, and which would never be done by them under the accustomed aid only: as when through a few weak soldiers he routs an immense and strong army; as when to the woman, whose faculty of childbearing is weak and impeded according to the accustomed order of things and the condition of her forces, and who would bear either no offspring or none but a very weak one, he confers by special gift that she bring forth a stronger offspring than any fruitful woman.

Things done by the prior influence, according to the common manner of speaking, are not referred to him, but to the created active powers. Thus, that a sound and fruitful woman bear offspring, that a brave soldier conquer a cowardly enemy, that a sound man walk, speak, till the fields, plant vineyards — although these do not come to pass without the general concurrence of God, we nevertheless do not refer them to him, nor say that they are done by the aid of God, but by the proper powers of nature. But things done by secondary causes through some special power conferred freely by God beyond the condition of their natural powers and moving them, are said properly to be done by the aid of God, and are properly attributed to him as author, and not to the secondary causes. As that Jonathan with his armor-bearer routed so many thousands of men is attributed not to Jonathan himself nor to his valor, but to God specially assisting above the common course of things and the condition of natural powers. Likewise that a barren and unfruitful woman bear vigorous offspring by special gift of God, as happened in Elisabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, is attributed not to her own power, but to God.

Hence plain is the doctrine of St. Augustine concerning the difference of the assistances of the state of innocent and fallen nature, even while saving the necessity of grace per se efficacious in both states. For innocent nature stood as a strong and sound nature, furnished with every faculty for doing good even supernatural: whence, according to the ordinary course of things and the condition of its forces, it could both do good and persevere in it; nay, it came about that the good angels performed this. When this is said, the motion and direction of general divine providence is not excluded, which takes place in every agent, as St. Thomas notes, Ia IIae, the whole q. 109 and elsewhere, and

[There are to be exposed first the various systems concerning sufficient and efficacious grace.

1° Jansenius feigned that the distinction between the state of innocence and the state of fallen nature consisted in this, that in the former there were only sufficient graces hanging upon the will of Adam, while in the latter there are only efficacious graces absolutely dominating the will of man. From which principle he acknowledges no other cause of the necessity of inherent grace in the present state than the infirmity of nature corrupted and wounded by sin. This grace is nothing else than spiritual delight, or the indeliberate motion by which heavenly delight impels us to good, as concupiscence is the indeliberate motion of earthly delight by which we are impelled to evil: whence, according as one or other delight is superior, it becomes victor, and necessarily carries us away either to good or to evil. Jansenius does not deny indeed that in the state of fallen nature small graces are given to man which move him somehow toward good; but since in his system the force of grace is relative to concupiscence, these graces, which man resists, neither are nor can be sufficient, because they confer no true and expeditious power for overcoming the contrary concupiscence. Consequently Jansenius acknowledges in the present state no sufficient grace besides the efficacious, by giving which to act he gives at once also the power; nay rather, he gives the power because he gives the act. See above, de Actib. hum., dissert. II, a. 1, what liberty seems to this author to be, according to his doctrine.

2° The Thomistic School, after its Doctor, professes the following things: 1° A twofold grace, namely sufficient and efficacious, is necessary in every state. The former is less perfect and less valid, which gives only power, rendering man apt for supernatural act; the latter is more powerful and more valid, because it confers action. For the power of acting and action are two distinct entities in order both supernatural and natural; but man is a second cause subordinated to the first, indifferent of himself in acting and undetermined to acting or not acting, and of himself incapable, especially with his powers weakened by sin, of effecting any supernatural and meritorious act of salvation.—2° Sufficient grace is given to all, that is salvation is offered to each; efficacious grace is conferred on some only, namely from the twofold will which is in God relative to the salvation of men, the antecedent namely and the consequent, of which there was ample treatment in the tract. de Deo, dissert. VII, de voluntate Dei, art. 3 and 4.-3° Each grace is absolutely gratuitous; for each will of God concerning the salvation of men is a mere effect of his infinite mercy, wholly independent of their merits.—4° Efficacious grace is such of itself and from within, that is, from the most omnipotent will of God, and does not become efficacious from the consent of free will, which is always the effect and never the cause of this efficacy; so that it is always true to say a priori, God makes man consent because the grace is efficacious, never truly therefore that the grace is efficacious because man consents; otherwise God would not be first and immediate cause of this consent, and consequently of salvation.—5° From this efficacy no prejudice is inferred to liberty. For since the omnipotence of God extends to all entities and all differences and modes of entity, the motion which flows from it confers not only the substance of action, but also the mode in which it must come forth conformably to the nature of the second cause; so that if the cause be necessary, it moves so that it act of necessity, if the cause be free, it moves so that it act freely; and removing only passive indifference, it leaves entire active indifference, that is a true and complete power, the circumstances standing the same, of not acting, of resisting it, of doing the opposite, no otherwise than if will alone determined itself. Require what has been said abundantly concerning this gravest matter in tract. de Deo, dissert. VIII.

3° Very much at variance with Thomistic doctrine is the system of the Congruists. Louis Molina, celebrated theologian of the Society of Jesus, from whom his followers are called Molinists, taught that no graces are given except sufficient of themselves, but that they become efficacious from the consent of human will, and that God often confers stronger and more abundant graces on those who resist than on those who actually convert; but that he predestined to the kingdom those whom through middle science he foresaw from innate liberty would consent to grace offered to all and would persevere in it. This middle science was exploded in tract. de Deo, dissert. VI, art. 6. Since the doctrine of Molina appeared new to many and displeasing, they attacked it, among others, distinguished theologians of the same Society, whose chief were Bellarmine, lib. I de Gratia et libero arbit., c. 12, Henriquez, in the twofold censure given in the years 1594 and 1597, and Mariana, de Regimine Societ., c. 4; and it lacked little that it were destroyed by the censorial judgment of the holy See, after having been solemnly weighed in the congregations de Auxiliis, as was narrated in the dissertation cited above, § 6. The Society therefore tempered the system of this author, and prescribed to its alumni that they hold the system of congruous grace handed down by P. Suarez.

Further, in the theory of the Congruists grace is twofold: The former is incongruous, so called because it is not sufficiently accommodated to the disposition, inclinations, place, time, and other conditions and circumstances in which stands him who receives it, so as to obtain his consent, and therefore is only sufficient. The latter is congruous, because it is thus accommodated to the conditions and circumstances in which is constituted him to whom it is given, so as to obtain his consent; whence it is always efficacious, otherwise it would not be congruous. It has this infallible efficacy not of itself, as Thomists will, but, according to some of its asserters, from its congruity, according to others from divine prescience itself (which reduces to middle science), or from both together. Grace of this kind, as to physical being, has nothing more, on the part of God, than incongruous grace; but it has something more as to moral being, insofar namely as God, from special benevolence, confers it upon someone in those circumstances in which he certainly foresaw him about to consent, when he could confer it otherwise. Whence Congruists affirm that such grace is a greater benefit than incongruous grace, and distinguished from it not only as to the second act and on the part of the consenting creature, but even as to the first act and on the part of God.

4° The theologians called Augustinians agree with pure Molinists as to the state of integral nature, but with Thomists as to the state of fallen nature, except that they seek the necessity of grace efficacious per se from the sole infirmity of nature, whereas Thomists seek it moreover from the dependence of the second cause on the first, and from its indifference.

5° All theologians who admit neither the system of Molina nor of the Congruists, or middle science, stand for the system of grace efficacious per se as to substance, but differ among themselves only as to the mode of explaining this efficacy. For some explain it through sympathy, some through moral motions, some through delight, some through indeliberate acts, some through the sole divine decree, some through multiplication of assists, some finally through physical premotion, which is admitted in our school.

6° There is another singular system formerly championed by Alphonse Le Moine, and afterwards revived by Honoré Tournely, concerning sufficient grace in the Molinist sense for easy works, especially prayer: as if Christian prayer, attended with all its conditions, such as it must be to become impetratory, were not a difficult and most excellent work of salvation, and could withdraw itself from the graciousness of grace.

Therefore this system must be reduced to Molinism, and is attacked by the same arguments.

These things premised,

I say: Besides efficacious grace, there is given in the state of fallen nature a sufficient grace. This is against Jansenius, nor does it seem possible to deny it saving faith.

It is proved. Sufficient grace is that which gives the power of doing salutary good, even in those who do not do it, or which gives the faculty of a holy work, but lacking effect through the fault of created will. But grace of this kind is given in the state of fallen nature. Therefore. — The major is the notion of sufficient grace, as we understand it. — Proof of minor 1° Of faith it is that the commandments of God are possible to the just, who nevertheless do not fulfill them, as defined by council Trid., session VI, chapter 11 and can. 18^1, and by supreme Pontiffs in the condemnation of the first proposition of Jansenius. Therefore there is given them the grace whereby they become possible; for they are not possible to them by forces of nature, especially since among them are supernatural things: and this grace is not efficacious, because, as I suppose, they do not fulfill it. Therefore sufficient.