Synderesis

I. Notion. Conscience, moral and antecedent, is a dictate of the practical intellect by which someone judges that a particular action is commanded, prohibited, or free for him (St. Alphonsus, I, 2; cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De veritate, q. 17, a. 2). It is said:

1. A dictate, because conscience is an act, not a faculty or a habit.

2. Of the practical intellect, that is, of the intellect insofar as it directs to operation what it apprehends. This belongs to the practical intellect, which "knows truth as the speculative intellect does, but orders the known truth to work" (St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2).

3. A particular action; for conscience is not a judgment about the morality of an act considered in general and in the abstract, but about the morality of an act viewed in particular and in the concrete (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 2).

4. For him, namely, conscience judges about the morality of an act insofar as it belongs to the one judging himself, or insofar as it must be placed or omitted by the one judging himself, or can be placed or omitted at will.

5. Commanded, etc. That is, moral conscience does not judge about the utility or pleasantness of an act, but about its morality, that is, about the moral necessity or moral liberty of placing or omitting the act.

Corollary I. Conscience is the conclusion of a syllogism, at least a virtual one. The major proposition states some law. The minor proposition compares some act with the law; for example: Theft is illicit. But the taking of this thing would be theft. Therefore the taking of this thing is illicit for me.

Corollary II. Conscience differs from synderesis, from moral science, from casuistic science, from prudence, and from the last practical judgment.¹ Synderesis (Greek synteresis, that is, preservation) is the natural habit preserving the first and general practical principles, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled. Moral science is an acquired habit which concerns general conclusions deduced from first principles; for example: to each person his own must be left; but theft takes away from one's neighbor what is his; therefore theft must be rejected. Casuistic science is an acquired habit which applies the conclusions of moral science to particular cases considered in the abstract. But conscience applies general conclusions to particular cases, and to these as considered in the concrete, insofar as here and now they are to be brought into practice. Prudence is a habit which directs the intellect in deducing and applying conclusions. But conscience is the very act itself of applying conclusions to particular cases considered in the concrete. Finally, the last practical judgment dictates only that something is to be done or omitted; but it does not speak about the morality of the action or omission.

¹ Judgments formed in order to operation are distinguished into speculative, speculative-practical, and practical-practical. Speculative judgments regard the truth which founds the morality of a consequent act, for example the existence of some fact, as: Today is Sunday; or the value of an act, as: A sacrament administered in this way is invalid; etc. Speculative-practical judgments regard the morality of an act, but only in common, as: Mass is to be heard on Sunday. Practical-practical judgments concern the morality of an act in particular and constitute conscience properly so called, as: Today Mass is to be heard by me.

4. "And according to this mode it is clear how synderesis, natural law, and conscience differ: because natural law names the universal principles of law themselves; synderesis names the habit of them, or the power with the habit; but conscience names a certain application of natural law to something to be done, by way of a certain conclusion." St. Thomas, 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 24, a. 4. But from universal principles speculatively applied to particular matters, moral science is had, which deduces determinate conclusions, but in the abstract.

What is the intrinsic nature of moral conscience? - Law regulates human actions in order to their moral honorableness or shamefulness by means of conscience. For in order that it regulate them, it must be applied to the action to be effected here and now, so that it may be seen whether such an action is commanded, prohibited, permitted by law, or counseled; from which application a judgment is then formed concerning such or such an action, to be effected or omitted here and now, and this practical judgment is conscience. Therefore conscience is nothing other than the practical judgment by which we pronounce a thing to be done or omitted here and now as good or evil; and this after the manner of a precept, or counsel, or simple permission.

Therefore in order that we may form this conscience, we make a syllogism. In this syllogism the major proposition states the law generally. But the minor proposition of the same syllogism compares the action which we wish to do here and now with the law. Finally the consequent, from the conformity or deformity of such or such an action with the law affirmed in the premises, pronounces that such or such an action is to be effected here and now as good, or to be omitted as evil; and this judgment or dictate is called conscience. Dictate, for to dictate is to command, to ordain; and conscience is like an interior law which binds man. Judgment, since as dictate it concerns only those things which ought to be done or omitted, but as judgment it also concerns those things which can be done or omitted. Therefore conscience differs altogether from synderesis, which is the natural habit of the first principles of things to be done, which natural principles are of natural right. S. Th. 1. p. q. 79. a. 12. 13, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1, De Verit. q. 16. a. 1, q. 17. a. 1. 5, 2. D. 24. q. 1. a. 4, q. 2. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 1; L. 1. 1. n. 1. 2.

351. Moral conscience is therefore distinguished: (a) from synderesis, which is usually defined as the habit of the first moral principles, or a certain innate promptitude of reason for easily knowing the first moral principles, such as these: good is to be done, - what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, etc. (above, n. 221); (b) from science, which is knowledge of general conclusions deduced from first principles; (c) from prudence, which is the right estimation of all the circumstances regarding the morality of some action. - Yet it depends on these three: for it uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions, and also the prudent consideration of all circumstances, for judging whether this action in particular, all things considered, is licit or not.

Many say that the judgment of conscience is, as it were, the conclusion of some prosyllogism. Namely the major is some general principle, proposed by synderesis, for example, every evil is to be avoided; the first minor declares that such a genus of action is comprehended under the general law, for example, theft is evil; from this moral science infers that theft is to be avoided. Then prudence adds: but the action which is here and now proposed as to be done, all things considered, falls under the concept of theft; and the last conclusion is the practical judgment of conscience: therefore here and now one must abstain from that theft. - For the most part, however, conscience does not explicitly syllogize, but, with all adjuncts considered, by a simple judgment, without any reasoning, decrees that this or that action is to be done, or omitted.

302. Scholion. On the difference between conscience, synteresis, moral science, prudence, and natural law. In order that the definition of moral conscience may appear still more clearly, it is helpful to compare it with synteresis, moral science, prudence, and natural law.

Synteresis¹⁰ is the habit of the first moral principles, whose act is to dictate in general that good is to be done and evil omitted, or, as Blessed Albert the Great¹¹ says: "Its act is twofold, namely inclination to good and murmuring against evil." But it belongs to conscience to judge in a particular case what is to be done or omitted. Conscience can err, but synteresis never can.¹² Synteresis is beautifully named by St. Jerome and especially by the scholastics of the thirteenth century the "spark of conscience," the "little fire"; for synteresis is as it were a little fire kindled by the Creator Himself in our intellect; a little fire derived from the divine light itself according to that word of Psalm 4: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us"; a little fire shining and burning: shining and showing the general principles of morals; burning, that is, impelling to good and drawing back from evil. But this spark is never extinguished, neither on this earth, when man becomes foul in sins, nor in heaven, nor in Gehenna. Hence St. Thomas¹³ says: "The spark of reason cannot be extinguished while the light of the intellect remains; but the intellect is never taken away through sin." This synteresis remaining in the damned is the primary cause of the so-called "worm," which does not die; for it always murmurs against the evil perpetrated and impels to good, which nevertheless because of the obstinacy of the evil will is also always rejected.¹⁴

Moral science deduces from principles objective conclusions, which are its proper object; but conscience is something altogether subjective, which can agree or disagree with moral science. Therefore in some men there is moral science rather great with a depraved conscience; but in others there is an excellent conscience with rather small moral science.

Prudence is a virtue and therefore a habit; but conscience is an act, as has already been said. There are three acts of the virtue of prudence, namely to take counsel, to judge, to command.¹⁵ The act of prudence which is to judge coincides with right conscience, to which it also belongs to judge concerning an act to be done or already done; but the act of prudence which is to command is antecedent conscience.

Natural law is a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature and therefore includes the objective principles of morality; but conscience applies these principles in order to judge concerning an act to be done or omitted. - St. Thomas briefly gathers this whole doctrine, saying: "It is clear how synteresis, natural law, and conscience differ; because natural law names the universal principles themselves of right; but synteresis names the habit of them; and conscience names a certain application of natural law to something to be done by way of a certain conclusion."¹⁶

Note. Although conscience differs from the enumerated norms, nevertheless it depends on them, because each one of them concurs in forming it; this becomes clear in this way: Synteresis proposes a general principle, for example, every moral evil is to be avoided. Moral science and natural law teach that fornication is something morally evil and therefore to be avoided. Then prudence adds: the action which here and now is proposed to be done is truly fornication. Finally conscience dictates that this action is absolutely to be avoided. From these things it appears that nothing prevents the judgment of conscience from being called the conclusion of a certain syllogism, in which synteresis and the other things are after the manner of premises. Therefore St. Thomas says:¹⁷ "Conscience is completed as by a certain particular syllogism."

Conscience thus described is the subjective rule to which human actions are to be conformed; for it is as it were the herald or voice of God, intimating and applying the divine law to us. This indeed is beautifully expressed by St. Bonaventure:¹⁸ "Conscience is like God's herald and messenger; and what it says, it does not command from itself, but commands as from God, just as a herald when he publishes the edict of a king." Hence it also follows that we must always follow conscience clearly commanding. Therefore Innocent III¹⁹ says forcefully: "Whatever is done against conscience builds toward Gehenna"; and St. Thomas²⁰ teaches: "Every will discordant from reason, whether right or erring, is always evil, so that he who acts against conscience sins." But I said: that man is bound to follow conscience clearly commanding; for if conscience does not command, but only counsels, or if the command is not so clear, as is accustomed to happen in the scrupulous, then the dictate of conscience does not oblige in that way.

¹⁰ Authors do not agree whether synderesis or synteresis should be written. Likewise it is not established whence this name synteresis, which is first employed by St. Jerome (In Ezech. 1, 7 [Migne, Patr. lat. 25, 22]), was taken. Perhaps it is a copyist's error for syneidesis. "Synteresis is the capacity, inseparably joined with the use of reason, for the binding grasp of the fundamental moral laws" (cf. Renz, Die Synteresis nach dem hl. Thomas vi).

¹¹ S. theol. 2, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 2, a. 3. The same is taught by St. Thomas, De verit. q. 16, a. 2.

¹² Blessed Albert, De creat. 2, q. 71, c. 2; cf. also St. Thomas l. c.

¹³ 2, dist. 39, q. 3, a. 1. Cf. De verit. q. 16, a. 3.

¹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 85, a. 2 ad 3. Blessed Albert and Alexander of Hales teach similar things, even if they do not agree concerning the function of synteresis in the other life.

¹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 8.

¹⁶ 2, dist. 24, q. 2, a. 3.

¹⁷ Quaest. disput. de veritate q. 17, a. 2.

¹⁸ 2, dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3 ad 3. Already by Socrates conscience was beautifully called daimonion.

¹⁹ It is found in c. 13, X 2, 13.

²⁰ Quodl. 3, q. 27.

135. Thesis. The cognitive faculty of morality is nothing other than the intellect, which under this respect is called practical.

It is proved: A. indirectly, by the exclusion of other opinions. The cognitive faculty of morality is not experience, nor sense, nor instinct, nor subjective affection. Therefore (cf. nn. 136-137).

B. directly: 1) morality is conformity or agreement with the rule of reason and the ultimate end, or difformity or disagreement. But that pertains to the object of reason or intellect. Therefore morality is known by the intellect.

2. Judgment concerning moral things is a certain truth. But truth is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore judgment concerning moral things pertains to the intellect.

It is called practical because as its object it has the proportion of means to the end, and thus is ordered to directing the acts of the will toward the end. But the practical intellect is not diverse from the speculative intellect. A faculty is not diversified by an accidental difference of the object. But the object of the speculative intellect and the object of the practical intellect differ merely accidentally: for it happens to something apprehended by the intellect that it be ordered to work or not ordered to it. Therefore the practical intellect does not differ really from the speculative intellect (I, q. 79, a. 11).

136. Moral Empiricism is opposed to the aforesaid doctrine.

Moral empiricism repeats the cognition of morality solely from experimental observation of utility. All things are changeable; the absolute is a metaphysical illusion; and therefore morality is essentially changeable according to circumstances. Hence the system in fact is reduced to evolutionism, which rests upon impulses had and transmitted from repeated sensible experiences through all generations. In this, reason has only secondary parts: for it follows inclinations and experiences what is, but does not dictate what ought to be. And thus ethics is a descriptive and explanatory science, not a normative one.

Now organic ethics, as it is usually called:

A. As to the foundation, supposes materialism or positivism, and consequently acknowledges only the ethics of utilitarianism or sensualism.

B. As to method, 1) it is incomplete: for determining the rule of conduct, historical and psychological observation of facts and actions is certainly useful, but it does not suffice, because the question is not only what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what it is fitting or necessary to do. To determine this, experience does not suffice, but the exercise of reason itself is required, by which we know the cause and origin of this fittingness or moral obligation;

2. it is maimed: they assert indeed that there is no man who ultimately acts except on account of his own advantage. And yet experience also teaches that there are men who spend themselves and all that is theirs on account of God or neighbor; and that the notion of the honorable and just, at least among many, is distinct from the notion of happiness: for certain acts are held as good, indeed best or heroic, which so far from bringing pleasure cause sadness and detriment; but others are depraved although they procure advantage, as if someone, by using fraud in playing, wins victory for himself and much money.

C. As to the matter: 1) it is insufficient. The value of a necessary principle is not from experience, and instinctive impulses do not constitute the principle of morality. For we must ask whether impulses or organic dispositions are the true manifestation of good, or rather an hallucination. If the first, this will be only because they agree with reason, and thus we return to our criterion. If the second, the universality and persistence of those hallucinations would have to be explained;

2. it is illogical, as opposed to experience: for if moral ideas and inclinations come from heredity, how does ethics give us the faculty, and sometimes the duty, of acting against instincts?

3. it is erroneous: it falsely asserts that duty is a natural or intellectual instinctive necessity; but that obligation arises from an intrinsic sanction, for example harmful effects, and an extrinsic sanction, or fear of punishments, which is threefold: social, by which the stronger impose their will; civil, by which the prince necessary to social order is feared; religious, by which the souls of the dead, especially of the prince, are feared. Now:

a) that is not the notion which we have of duty or obligation;

b) many do not perceive these moral sanctions; but those who know them could say that they yield to force, not however that they acknowledge obligation;

c) such obligation does not have force and efficacy in conscience, but rather is the destruction than the explanation of moral obligation: for it would be nothing except an action extorted by fear alone.

4. Hence the system is not founded upon positive experience, but is constituted rather from a series of hypotheses.

137. Moral Intuitionism is also opposed.

By this general name are designated all who agree in this, that good and evil are immediately affirmed from a certain intuition of some faculty, as the Nativists and Innatists hold in psychology; or who assert that morality is known by instinct or by a special sense, by which man spontaneously affirms good and evil without the induction of experience and without the deduction of reason.

A. Some say that it is known by a physical or bodily sense, such as the Sensists and Phrenologists, who admit nothing except sensitive cognition. Against this:

1. The assertion rests upon a false foundation; it supposes materialism and a false system concerning the criterion of truth.

2. In the sensist system, no freedom remains, which supposes the indifference of judgment, which cannot be given without intelligence. Hence it destroys morality in its principle.

3. Universals, abstract and immutable things, such as the moral norm, are not known by sense, which essentially is changeable and varies according to circumstances and subjective dispositions. Therefore it destroys morality in its essence.

4. The moral rule orders human acts. To order pertains to the intellect. Therefore the cognition of morality pertains to the intellect.

5. Sense experiences nothing from objects except pleasure and pain; therefore logically sensism must lead to hedonism or sensualism.

1. Cf. Roselli, Ethica, q. 3, a. 2.

B. Others say it is known by a certain spiritual sense of intuition or by an instinctive sense, which differs from the intellect and corresponds to a blind instinct by which we immediately know first principles, both speculative and practical. This sense is of the affective order and consists in a certain internal affection or sympathy or taste. Thus the Scotist school, the Sentimentalists, and many more recent authors, who all in fact are altruists. This system:

1. For the most part is founded upon a false criteriological system.

2. Is inadequate. It denies the rational element and attributes the first parts to the affective element, which is only secondary. Reason, namely, according to them, only observes, it does not dictate; and social utility must be embraced not because it is conformable to reason, but because affection and instinct incline to it. On the contrary, affection is nothing except a prelude or resonance of the judgment of reason, which is the norm of morality.

3. It does not furnish a certain criterion, but a fallacious one. For we are not always affected with sympathy toward moral good, nor always with antipathy toward evil; but other non-moral causes also, such as talents, qualities, a happy outcome, fruition, joy, can excite the same affections.

4. It does not furnish a universal criterion: for the multitude and society toward which we are bound to be affected with sympathy is subject to change; but what if men toward whom we are sympathetically affected incline to diverse things?

5. It does not furnish an objective criterion, but a subjective one: sympathy and antipathy are changed according to circumstances and persons.

6. It does not furnish an ultimate criterion: for sympathies and antipathies themselves are good or evil. Why, unless because they are conformable or difform to reason?

7. Just as human reason reasons concerning speculative truth, so also concerning practical truth. But it is absolutely repugnant that the first principles of speculative reason be admitted by a blind instinct and without evidence. Therefore the same is repugnant also for the first principles of practical reason, in practical or moral matters.

8. There are other instincts and intuitions, namely egoistic ones. But why must we pursue sympathetic inclinations, not egoistic ones? Either because they are conformable to reason; or because they are a fact of evolution. In this last case it does not follow that they are legitimate and good. And moreover persons of an egoistic character can provoke antipathy.

The moral sense cannot be distinguished from other experiences unless there is first a certain notion of morality; that is, unless reason has investigated the idea and value of morality, and distinguished it from merely sensitive, aesthetic, or social impressions.

They object: the spontaneity and universality and persistence of moral conscience among all men and through all times, which cannot be explained except by instinct and a special sense; and this is the only argument which they bring forward. Resp.: this proves a constant and native disposition for knowing the first moral principles, namely synderesis or the habit of first practical principles, just as there is the habit of intellect for first speculative principles; but it does not prove a blind instinct or a special sense. It is useless, namely, to recur to a distinct special faculty, because practical reason informed by synderesis is able to explain this, and it itself is not a faculty distinct from speculative reason.

C. Others who profess transcendental objectivism, or the transcendental or absolute idealism arising from it, recur to a blind instinct of the intellect itself, by which abstract and universal truths are admitted in such a way that their value is not demonstrated, because it cannot be demonstrated that they correspond to reality. Thus Kant and after him those who, relying on his principles, fell into pantheism, such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Against this:

a) As to the foundation, this is a false criteriological system, or even pantheistic monism, in which case morality will be impersonal and supra-individual.

5. There is another element of mind, often confounded under one name with conscience, but distinct from it, as a habit from an act, and as principles from their application. This element the schoolmen called synderesis.¹⁰

Synderesis is an habitual hold upon primary moral judgments, as, that we must do good, avoid evil, requite benefactors, honour superiors, punish evil-doers. There is a hot controversy as to how these primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute are kindled by the assumption, that these moral judgments must needs have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The assumption is specious, but unfounded. It looks plausible because of this difference, that moral judgments have emotions to wait upon them, speculative judgments have not. Speculative judgments pass like the philosophers that write them down, unheeded in the quiet of their studies. But moral judgments are rulers of the commonwealth: they are risen to as they go by, with majesty preceding and cares coming after. Their presence awakens in us certain emotions, conflicts of passion, as we think of the good that we should do, but have not done, or of the evil that goes unremedied and unatoned for. Commonly a man cannot contemplate his duty, a difficult or an unfulfilled duty especially, without a certain emotion, very otherwise than as he views the axioms of mathematics. There is a great difference emotionally, but intellectually the two sets of principles, speculative and moral, are held alike as necessary truths, truths that not only are, but must be, and cannot be otherwise: truths in which the predicate of the proposition that states them is contained under the subject. Such are called self-evident propositions; and the truths that they express, necessary truths. The enquiry into the origin of our primary moral judgments is thus merged in the question, how we attain to necessary truth. ¹⁰ On the derivation of this word, whether from [Greek: synedaesis] or [Greek: syntaeresis], see Athenæum, 1877, vol. i., pp. 738, 798, vol. iii. pp. 16, 48.

3. It was furthermore observed above (l.c.), that the natural law was so called as being found expressed more or less perfectly in the minds of all men, and therefore being a proper element of human nature. It remains to see how much this universal natural expression amounts to. That is at once apparent from our previous explanation of synderesis. (s. i., nn. 5, seq., p. 139.) Not a complete and accurate knowledge of the natural law is found in all minds, far from it; but synderesis is found in all. This is apparent from Mr. Grote's own phrases, "aspirations of filial sentiment," "religious obligation," "honour as a patriot," Parents are to be honoured, we must do our duty to God and to our country: there Hannibal was at one with the most approved teachers of morality. Callatian and Greek agreed in the recognition of the commandment, Honour thy father and thy mother. That was the major premiss of them both, in the moral syllogism (s. i., n. 3, p. 135), which ruled their respective consciences. Their difference was upon the applying minor, as it is called; the Greek regarding the dissolution of the body into its elements by fire, and so saving it from corruption, as the best means of honouring the dead: the Callatians preferring to raise their parents as it were to life again, by making them the food of their living children. Hannibal, again, had before his mind the grand principle of retribution, that wrongdoing must be expiated by suffering. But he had not heard the words "Vengeance is Mine;" and mistakenly supposed it to rest with himself to appoint and carry out his own measure of revenge. Whether he was quite so invincibly ignorant on this point, as Grote represents, is open to doubt. At any rate he was correct in the primary moral judgment on which he proceeded.

Reading.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 94, art. 6.