The Dissolution of Marriage Between a Baptized Party and a Non-Baptized Party

I. The petition to be directed to the Supreme Pontiff should be transmitted to the Holy Office, to which this cause is committed.

II. The conditions required so that a marriage between a baptized party and a non-baptized party may be dissolved are:

1. If the non-baptized party desires to be converted to the Catholic Church, he or she should first be baptized, so as to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Church. Besides, it is required that after receiving baptism he or she has not had copula with the spouse; otherwise there would be a marriage consummated after the baptism of both parties, which cannot be dissolved by the Church. In addition, juridical proof is demanded by which it is proved that baptism had in no way previously been conferred, or had been conferred invalidly.

2. If the baptized party wishes to be converted to the Church, he or she must first in fact be converted to it.

3. Finally, other things are to be inserted into the petition; these indeed will be investigated and inserted by the one to whom this matter is committed.

"... 1. I ask whether in order to the validity or nullity of a contracted marriage, the conferral or non-conferral of Baptism, while it is unknown, is to be determined from the principle of presumption? ... 2. Whether, while the conferral of Baptism is unknown, the principle of presumption is rightly applied in order to the value of a contracted marriage in the following articles:

1. If the non-Catholic party or parties have had parents belonging to a sect which rejects Baptism, Baptism is not to be presumed here.

2. The same must be resolved if they had parents belonging to a sect which does not admit infant Baptism, or in which it is not conferred except on adults, for example those who have already attained the thirtieth year of age, as the matter stands in the sect of the Baptists.

3. The same must likewise be resolved if they had parents who, while they were living, professed that they did not wish to belong to any sect, and that they honored the Supreme Being rather by honest morals, as they say, than by any special worship.

4. If they had parents belonging to a sect which holds the same Baptism as necessary, or in which at least it is ordinarily administered, and those same parents were zealous in their sect, Baptism is to be presumed. But what if the parents were sluggish in the sect, or belonged to a sect which indeed does not reject Baptism, but does not hold it as necessary and in which it is not ordinarily administered? In both or in either case is Baptism to be presumed or not?

5. If according to the sect of only one parent and a zealous disposition of soul as above, the presumption favors Baptism, and in the education of the offspring that parent in fact and indubitably had the first parts, Baptism is to be presumed.

Resolve the same if, inquiry having been made, it is unknown or is not sufficiently established whether that parent had the first parts; for Baptism in order to marriage is to be presumed, since a union once entered is to be judged valid so long as an obstacle does not reveal itself. But what if it is certainly established that the sect and disposition of soul of the parent who in fact and indubitably had the first parts in education do not favor Baptism, while the sect and disposition of soul of the other parent favor the same?

6. In the case in which no presumption militates for Baptism, the rule is to be applied: a fact is not presumed, but must be proved. The application of this rule in these United States, where among non-Catholics there are very many who care nothing or little about conferring Baptism on their infants, perhaps ought to have place with the stronger right than in many other regions.

The aforesaid questions are proposed chiefly for this reason, that from their solution there may be had a norm according to which one can proceed safely especially in these cases. 1st. When, of two non-Catholic parties separated from each other as above, one asks to be received into the bosom of the Church, and desires to fly to other nuptials. 2nd. When a Catholic party separated from a non-Catholic as above asks to be joined with another spouse, or, already joined with another, desires to be admitted to the sacraments.

Resp. To the 1st: Affirmatively, yet investigation having been carried out in individual cases.

To the 2nd, namely: Whether, while the conferral of Baptism is unknown, the principle of presumption in order to the value of a contracted marriage is rightly applied in the following articles? They responded: Affirmatively as to the first, second, and third article, and as to the first part of the fourth and the first part of the fifth number; but in this last article, after the words "had the parts," let there be added: "nor is the other spouse known to be positively contrary to the conferral of Baptism," Baptism is to be presumed. In the remaining cases, which are noted in the second part of the fifth number, recourse must be had to the Holy See, with all circumstances of things, places, and persons, and other things bearing on the matter, set forth.

To the 6th: Provided for in the preceding." S. I. C. 1 Aug. 1883, Bishop of Savannah.

“You sought to be instructed by an Apostolic writing whether pagans who take as wives women related to them in the second, third, or a more remote degree ought, thus joined, to remain together after their conversion or to be separated from one another. Concerning this We respond altogether that, since the Sacrament of Matrimony exists among the faithful and unbelievers, as the Apostle shows when he says, ‘If any brother has an unbelieving wife, and she consents to dwell with him, let him not dismiss her’; and since a Marriage in the aforesaid degrees was lawfully contracted by pagans so far as concerns them, who are not bound by canonical constitutions (‘For what is it to us,’ according to the same Apostle, ‘to judge those who are outside?’), especially in favor of the Christian religion and faith—from the reception of which men can easily be called back because they fear being abandoned by their wives—the faithful who were joined matrimonially in this manner can freely and lawfully remain united, since Marriages are not dissolved by the Sacrament of Baptism, but crimes are forgiven. But because pagans, with regard to several women at the same time divide conjugal affection, it is not undeservedly doubted whether after conversion they can retain all of them, or which one from among all. But this seems absurd and inimical to the Christian faith, since from the beginning one rib was changed into one woman; and divine Scripture testifies that for this reason a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh: it did not say three or more, but two; nor did it say that he shall cleave to wives, but to a wife. Nor was it ever lawful for anyone to have several wives at the same time, unless it was granted to him by divine revelation, which is sometimes reckoned as custom and at times even as divine right; by which, just as Jacob is excused from falsehood, the Israelites from theft, and Samson from homicide, so also the patriarchs and other just men, who are read to have had several wives at the same time, are excused from adultery. Certainly this truthful judgment is proved also by the testimony of the Truth, Who testifies in the Gospel: ‘Whoever dismisses his wife, except on account of fornication, and marries another commits adultery’ [the printed text omits “except”]. Therefore, if another cannot by law be married after the wife has been dismissed, much less while she is retained; from which it plainly appears that plurality in either sex is to be reproved, since they are not judged by unequal standards concerning Matrimony. But he who, according to his rite, repudiated his legitimate wife, since the Truth in the Gospel has reproved such repudiation, will never be able lawfully to have another while she lives, even after being converted to the faith of Christ, unless after his conversion she refuses to cohabit with him, or, even if she consents, does not consent without insult to the Creator or without drawing him into mortal sin. In this case, restitution would be denied to her if she sought it, although unjust dispossession were established, because, according to the Apostle, a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in circumstances of this kind. But if she follows him when he is converted to the faith and she too is converted, before he takes a legitimate wife for the aforesaid causes, he will be compelled to receive her. Moreover, although according to evangelical truth he who marries a dismissed woman commits adultery, nevertheless the one who dismissed her will not be able to object to the dismissed woman that she committed fornication because she married another after the repudiation, unless she had committed fornication otherwise.” Chapter Gaudemus, 8, On Divorces.

675. The following practical cases are easily resolved from the things said thus far.

1. The baptized party chooses to lead a celibate life; but the unbelieving party contracts a new matrimony. This matrimony is null, because the first matrimony has not yet been dissolved and the privilege was granted for the baptized party, not for the unbelieving party;³⁰⁹ for it is a favor of the faith.

2. After conversion, the baptized party lives maritally with the unbelieving party. After several years have elapsed, the unbelieving party takes other women as wives and does not will to dismiss them. The baptized party can depart and enter new nuptials, although perhaps unable to take along and educate the offspring begotten in the matrimony. The reason is that the Pauline privilege has not been extinguished.³¹⁰

3. An unbelieving husband casts his baptized wife out of the home, contracts a new matrimony, and generates offspring. After some time he also is converted to the faith and is baptized. He is bound to dismiss the second wife unless the first wife who was cast out has in the meantime contracted another valid matrimony. The reason is that not the unbelieving but the faithful party became free, and the second matrimony of the unbelieving party is invalid. Certainly in practice it must be seen whether the first matrimony was certainly valid.

4. Two unbelievers, after contracting a legitimate matrimony and then dissolving it, pass to other nuptials. Each is afterward converted to the faith. Neither can remain in the second matrimony, at least if they received baptism together at nearly the same time. The reason is that the first matrimony was valid and legitimate and could not be dissolved by their own will and authority, nor was it in reality dissolved by the second nuptials, since these were not legitimate.

5. The baptized party, after the prescribed interpellations have been made, enters a new matrimony. Now the unbelieving party also can enter a new matrimony. The reason is that, although the privilege was given in favor of the baptized party, nevertheless it indirectly also redounds to the favor of the unbelieving party; and because the first matrimony has been duly dissolved by the baptized party, the unbelieving party also becomes free. Thus holds the common opinion.

6. One unbelieving spouse commits adultery, and for this reason is cast out by the other party; after some years that spouse is baptized, and asks the other party whether he or she now wills to cohabit peaceably, but suffers a refusal. That spouse can enter new nuptials.³¹¹ The reason is that the adultery committed is washed away by baptism, and the unbelieving party unreasonably repudiates the baptized party.

7. One unbelieving spouse is baptized, cohabits peaceably for some time with the unbelieving party, but afterward commits adultery and for this reason is cast out by the unbelieving party. Nevertheless, the baptized party cannot enter new nuptials, at least by force of the Pauline privilege. The reason is that the unbelieving party justly cast out the baptized party as an adulterer, nor is this crime of adultery destroyed through a subsequent baptism, since it was perpetrated after conversion.³¹²

8. The unbelieving party indeed consents to cohabit without insult to the Creator, but does not permit the offspring born or to be born to be instructed in the Christian religion. The baptized party can pass to other nuptials with a Catholic person; for the refusal of the education of the offspring in the Catholic religion is equivalent to an insult to the Creator.³¹³

9. An unbelieving woman who successively has several husbands is baptized. Her first legitimate husband no longer wills to cohabit with her; but the last husband indeed consents to cohabit peaceably, yet does not will to be converted. The woman must separate herself from the last man; or, if this is very hard, she must seek a dispensation over the impediment of disparity of cult in order to contract a true matrimony.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, March 29, 1727 (Gasparri, loc. cit., n. 1086).

³¹⁰ Cf. Holy Office, August 5, 1759, and July 11, 1886, ad 4; Code of Canon Law, c. 1124.

³¹¹ Thus the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, January 30, 1807 (Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 690).

³¹² Thus the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, January 30, 1807 (ibid.). Cf. Holy Office, July 11, 1866 (ibid., n. 1295); Code of Canon Law, c. 1123.

³¹³ Thus the Holy Office, December 14, 1848 (ibid., n. 1036).

³¹⁴ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1048.

676. Scholion. On dispensation over the bond of a matrimony which was consummated in unbelief. Authors ask here whether the Pope can dispense in the bond of a consummated matrimony of unbelievers if either one or both spouses have been baptized. In this matter certain things are certain, and certain things are not placed beyond every doubt:

1. It is certain that the Supreme Pontiff possesses no authority over marriages of this kind if neither spouse has received baptism. For the Church does not have jurisdiction over the non-baptized.

2. It is certain that the Supreme Pontiff is unable to dissolve the bond of a legitimate matrimony which, through the baptism of both spouses, was made ratified and, through intercourse following after the baptism of both, was also made consummated. The reason is that such a matrimony has become a consummated matrimony of Christians. Now the Pope cannot dissolve the bond of a consummated matrimony of Christians, as was proved above.

3. It is certain that the Supreme Pontiff can dissolve the bond of such a legitimate matrimony if either spouse has been baptized and the matrimony was never consummated, that is, neither before nor after baptism. For the Pope can dissolve the bond of a ratified and non-consummated matrimony of Christians, as was proved above. Therefore it is more certain that he can dissolve the bond of some non-consummated matrimony in which only one party is Christian and which more probably is not a sacrament.

4. It is more probable that the Supreme Pontiff can dissolve the bond of a legitimate matrimony which was consummated after the baptism of either spouse. Thus holds the more common opinion among modern authors.³¹⁵ The reason for this opinion is twofold: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The intrinsic reason is that only the bond of a ratified and consummated Christian matrimony is indissoluble. But such a matrimony is not ratified and consummated (unless carnal intercourse took place after the baptism of both spouses). The extrinsic reason, however, is that the Supreme Pontiffs several times dissolved the bond of such marriages in which the conditions of the Pauline privilege were altogether lacking.

Thus, for example, St. Pius V³¹⁶ permitted, "by his own motion and from certain knowledge and the fullness of apostolic power," that unbelieving Indians having several wives, after receiving baptism, could live in matrimony with whichever of those wives was baptized with them. Now here no mention is made of the departure of the unbelieving party, which nevertheless is a condition without which the Pauline privilege cannot be applied.

Gregory XIII,³¹⁷ attending to the fact that "marriages contracted between unbelievers are indeed judged true, yet not so ratified that, when necessity urges, they cannot be dissolved," granted missionaries the faculty of dispensing so that any unbelieving spouse, after receiving baptism, "while the unbelieving spouse survives and without that spouse's consent being required or a response being awaited, may contract marriages with any faithful person, even of another rite, and solemnize them in the face of the Church, and, after they have subsequently been consummated by carnal intercourse, may lawfully remain in them as long as he lives, provided that it is established, even summarily and extrajudicially, that the absent spouse, as stated above, cannot lawfully be admonished, or, having been admonished, did not signify his will within the time fixed in the same admonition. And we decree that these marriages, even if it should afterward become known that the prior unbelieving spouses, being justly impeded, could not declare their will and had even been converted to the faith at the time the second matrimony was contracted, nevertheless ought never to be rescinded, but will be valid and firm, and the offspring to be received therefrom legitimate."

It seems clearer than light that Gregory XIII here proceeded beyond the limits of the Pauline privilege, since he dissolves marriages contracted in unbelief even if perhaps both spouses had already been baptized at the time of the new matrimony.

According to the current practice of the Roman Curia, missionaries are granted the faculty "of dispensing with pagans and unbelievers having several wives, so that after conversion and baptism they can retain whichever [wife] among them they prefer, if she also becomes faithful, unless the first should will to be converted."³¹⁸ This faculty cannot be explained from the Pauline privilege, because the departure of the unbelieving party, which St. Paul requires as prior before he permits a new matrimony to be contracted, is altogether lacking. The same seems to follow from several particular decisions of the Holy Office,³¹⁹ and now it has been established generally by the Code of Canon Law, c. 1125, for all regions, if the same circumstances are present.

³¹⁵ This opinion is held by Gasparri, De matrimonio, II, n. 1108; Billot, De eccl. sacr., II, thesis 44; Scherer, Kirchenr., II, n. 590; Fahrner, Gesch. der Ehescheidung im kan. Recht, 281; Vlaming, Prael. de iure matrim., 3rd ed., II, n. 604; Wernz-Vidal, Ius can., V, n. 636; and among the ancients, St. Antoninus, S. theol., P. 3, tit. 1, c. 6; Navarrus, Cons. et Resp., III, tit. 33, cons. 2; Thomas Sanchez, De matrim. sacr., l. 2, disp. 17; Laymann, Theol. mor., l. 5, tr. 10, part 2, c. 3; the Salamancans, Cursus Theol. mor., tr. 9, c. 4, p. 2, n. 34; Pirhing, in tit. 1, sect. 5; and others. Indeed Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., II, n. 929, confidently says: "Every reasonable doubt concerning that power seems to be removed, so that it can be said with certainty: The Roman Pontiff, by reason of his supreme power, can for a grave reason dissolve the bond of a matrimony which was indeed consummated in unbelief, but was not consummated after one or both spouses were baptized." Nevertheless, there are some who reject this opinion, for example, Benedict XIV, De syn. dioec., l. 6, c. 4, n. 3, and l. 13, c. 21, n. 4; De Angelis, Prael., l. 4, tit. 19; Feije, De imped. et dispens. matrim., n. 486; Leitner, Lehrb. des kirchl. Eherechtes, 610. The reason which Benedict XIV (Prosper Lambertini) brings forward for his opinion is this: a consummated matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, while a ratified matrimony indicates the union of Christ with a sanctified soul. But just as the union of Christ with the Church is indissoluble, while the union with the soul is dissoluble, so every consummated matrimony is indissoluble, while a ratified matrimony is dissoluble. It is easily understood that this argument is weak.

³¹⁶ Constitution Romani Pontifices, August 2, 1571.

³¹⁷ Constitution Populis ac nationibus, January 25, 1585.

³¹⁸ Thus in Formula I, n. 11.

³¹⁹ Cf. Gasparri, loc. cit., II, n. 1084 ff., and the case narrated by Benedict XIV (Quaest. can., Florentine cause, 1726), which was afterward decided by the Sacred Congregation against the opinion of Prosper Lambertini, then secretary of that Congregation. Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., II, n. 931.

821. Does not the power granted to the Church of dissolving the matrimonial bond extend itself to certain other cases? - For more easily bringing the Pauline privilege into practice, certain declarations and concessions were made by the Pontiffs for particular places, which now, by force of can. 1125, have already been extended to the universal Church. There are three constitutions, namely, given by Paul III, June 1, 1537, by Pius V, August 2, 1571, and by Gregory XIII, January 25, 1585.

a) Paul III grants to polygamists that they may choose any one of several wives whom they may marry, if they do not remember which one they first received.

b) Pius V declares that polygamists can retain any one of the wives who is baptized together with them, even if they should remember which one was first.

c) Gregory XIII granted the faculty of dispensing with converted unbelievers, so that, the unbelieving spouse having been left, they could enter a new marriage with any believer whatever, provided that at least summarily and extrajudicially it was established that the absent unbelieving spouse could not be warned, or, after having been warned, did not manifest his or her will within the time fixed beforehand.

On the occasion of these things it was asked whether, outside the Pauline privilege, the Church cannot dissolve a matrimony contracted in unbelief:

1° after one party is baptized, although before, but not after, Baptism the matrimony had been consummated;

2° indeed, if after Baptism, received by one party, it was again consummated;

3° consequently also, if, both parties having been baptized, the matrimony, although before, nevertheless was not again consummated.

To this many more recent authors respond affirmatively: a) because, in the concessions related above, the Supreme Pontiffs in fact went beyond the Pauline privilege, and in fact more than once dissolved the matrimonial bond in the first and second case; b) because only Christian matrimony ratified and consummated is altogether indissoluble. Indeed, since the bond of ratified matrimony between the faithful is stronger than legitimate matrimony, even consummated, among unbelievers, if the Pontiff can diriment the former, a fortiori he can diriment the latter. Namely, in the first and second case, consummated matrimony is not ratified, because it is not a sacrament (n. 786, 5°); in the third case the matrimony is consummated and ratified, but nevertheless not ratified and consummated.

Others, however, deny this, and answer that in the said concessions there is present only a dispensation, urged by grave reason, from making the interpellation in the case of the Pauline privilege. But ratified matrimony, according to them, does not have that greater firmness, because indissolubility is from natural law, not from the sacrament, but at most it can be said that it was more strongly confirmed from elevation to a sacrament. Moreover, in concessions made by positive will, the argument a fortiori does not always have force. Whence they judge that the ministerial power of the Supreme Pontiff does not extend itself to any consummated matrimony, which always, even among unbelievers, represents the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church.

As Noldin notes, Th. M. III, n. 525: "the Holy See itself deliberately abstains from deciding the question, and in its decisions now employs those modes of speaking which do not expressly signify the dissolution of a matrimony contracted in unbelief, but only dispensation from interpellation."

822. Corollaries. - 1. Although matrimony is constituted by mutual consent, nevertheless it cannot be dissolved by mutual consent, because the nature of the conjugal contract does not depend on the stipulation of the contracting parties, but is determined by nature itself and by God, and by reason of its end requires perpetuity.

2. And although indissolubility can exceptionally harm the end of matrimony, nevertheless because "matrimony is principally ordered to the common good..., therefore in the laws of matrimony attention is paid more to what is expedient for all, than to what could be suitable to one. Therefore, although the inseparability of matrimony impedes the good of offspring in some man, nevertheless it is suitable to the good of offspring simply" (q. 67, a. 1, ad 4). Namely, law regards that which happens commonly and of itself. But the inconveniences which sometimes accidentally follow from indissolubility can be guarded against by separation from bed and cohabitation.

3. The law of indissolubility imposes on spouses the obligation of carefully preserving concord of souls and Christian charity, and of guarding against whatever can pave the way for disagreements and especially for separation itself. Whence they sin against the good of the sacrament in all those things which disturb the undivided society of life, such as quarrels, disputes, dissensions, murmurings.

4. The law of indissolubility is not only prohibitive of divorce but also invalidating, which is necessary that it effectively attain its end.

5. How many goods flow from the indissolubility of matrimony, both for the spouses and for offspring and for society, Pius XI describes:

"A. And first indeed, the spouses a) in this firmness have a certain seal of perpetuity, which the generous handing over of one's own person and the intimate association of their souls by its own nature so greatly demands, since true charity knows no end. b) Besides, a firm bulwark is built up for faithful chastity against incitements to infidelity, if any are presented interiorly or exteriorly; every access is closed to anxious fear whether in time of adversity or old age the other spouse will depart, and in its place quiet certainty is established. c) Likewise provision is most fittingly made for preserving the dignity of each spouse and for mutual aid to be furnished, since through the indissoluble bond, perpetually persevering, the spouses are continually admonished that they entered the nuptial fellowship not for the sake of perishable things, nor that they might serve cupidity, but that they might mutually procure for themselves higher and perpetual goods, which fellowship cannot be dissolved except by death.

"B. Provision is also made very well for the protection and education of children, which must be extended through many years, since the grave and lasting burdens of this office are more easily borne by parents with united powers.

"C. Nor do lesser goods arise for the whole human fellowship. For by experience we know that the unshaken firmness of marriages is a most abundant source of honorable life and integrity of morals; and when this order is preserved, the happiness and welfare of the republic are placed in safety: for such as are the families and men from which it consists, such is the city, as the body from its members.

"Wherefore, both concerning the private good of the spouses and of offspring, and concerning the public good of human society, those who strenuously defend the inviolable firmness of matrimony deserve very well."

6. But as many goods as flow from indissolubility, so many evils, on the contrary, are apt to follow from divorce, which the Pontiff shows after Leo XIII: "Here, namely, with the bond unharmed, we behold marriages safe and secure; there, with departures of spouses proposed, or exposed to the very dangers of divorces, the nuptial covenants themselves become mutable or certainly liable to anxious suspicions. Here mutual benevolence and the association of goods are confirmed marvelously; there, by the very power of departure, they are most miserably weakened. Here most opportune safeguards are added for the chaste fidelity of the spouses; there pernicious incitements to infidelity are supplied. Here the reception, protection, and education of children are advanced efficaciously; there they are affected by ever graver detriments. Here a manifold access to discords between families and relatives is closed; there occasion of discords is offered more frequently... Here above all the dignity and office of women, whether in domestic or civil society, are happily restored and reestablished; there they are unworthily depressed, since wives are put in danger lest, after they have served the lust of men, they be held as abandoned."

We teach, moreover, that the marriage of unbelievers, even consummated, can be dissolved extrinsically, both when, one party having been converted to the faith, the other refuses to cohabit, or not without injury to the Creator or spiritual harm to the faithful one, and also that it can be dissolved extrinsically by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

I. These are the canons of the Church in this matter. "Never, while his wife is living, will one even converted to the faith be able lawfully to have another, unless after his own conversion she refuses to cohabit with him, or, even if she consents, nevertheless not without insult to the Creator or so that she may draw him into mortal sin." c. Gaudemus, De Divort. "If one of the unbelieving spouses is converted to the Catholic faith, while the other in no way, or not without blasphemy of the divine name, or so as to draw the other into mortal sin, is willing to cohabit with him, the one who is left, if he wishes, will pass to second vows." c. Quanto, ibid. Therefore the dissolubility of marriage, even consummated, contracted in infidelity, when one of the spouses is converted to the faith, is to be understood under these conditions. Wherefore we do not say that by the very reception of baptism the marriage is dissolved; for this is false, since by baptism marriages are not dissolved, but crimes are remitted, c. d. Gaudemus, and we shall prove this a little below. But when the above-mentioned conditions exist, by divine law the bond of marriage can be severed; but when and how it is severed, we shall say afterward. Moreover this doctrine is common to theologians and canonists (cf. St. Thomas, q. LIX, a. 5; Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74), handed down by the Fathers, as by Ambrose, on Luke, l. VIII, n. 2: "If every marriage is from God (not indeed in whatever way, but according to the integral form of divine institution), every marriage may not be dissolved. And how did the Apostle say: but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart? In this he both wondrously did not wish the cause of divorce to reside among Christians, and showed that not every marriage is from God." Namely, according to Ambrose, that marriage is said to be from God which is exacted according to the norm of divine institution and which is entered upon for the worship and honor of God; but the marriage of unbelievers is not of this sort. Likewise Chrysostom, hom. XIX on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians: "But what is this: if the unbeliever departs, let him depart? As if he commands you to sacrifice, or to be an associate of impiety on account of the marriage, or to withdraw, it is better that the marriage be broken, and not piety," διασπασθῆναι τὸν γάμον, καὶ μὴ τὴν εὐσέβειαν. The doctrine has been confirmed by the practice of the Church through very many centuries and solemnly sanctioned by the Roman See; for the decrees from canon law adduced above proceeded from Innocent III and were transferred by Gregory IX into the canon law by which the universal Church is governed. "It is certain," says Benedict XIV (De Synod., l. VI, c. 4), "that the marriage of unbelievers is dissolved from the privilege granted by Christ the Lord in favor of the faith and promulgated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. VII, when one of the spouses embraces the Christian faith, the other, hardened in his infidelity, refusing to cohabit with the convert, or etc."

II. Accordingly the origin of this doctrine is Apostolic Tradition, which Paul committed to writing in 1 Cor. VII, and Innocent III testifies to this in the said c. Quanto; for after the words recited he adds: "And in this case we understand what the Apostle says: if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such a case." But there is no small difficulty in gathering this doctrine artificially from the words of the Apostle. They are v. 12 and following: For to the rest I speak, not the Lord. If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And if any faithful woman has an unbelieving husband and he consents to dwell with her, let her not put him away. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified through the faithful woman, and the unbelieving woman is sanctified through the faithful husband ... But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such a case: but God has called us in peace. Observe first that brother and sister here are those who have been aggregated to the Church through baptism; for Paul addresses Christians of this sort, and the Church has not deemed those who were only catechumens, although faithful, worthy of the name brothers. Therefore the discourse is about the baptized.

Moreover, from the words of the Apostle this is certain: that marriage is not dissolved by baptism. For even after the baptism of one, the brother is said to have an unbelieving wife, and the woman to have an unbelieving husband. Besides, if by baptism the marriage were dissolved by the law itself, Paul would by no means exhort the faithful one not to put away the unbelieving one, whether by the name of putting away is understood the severing of the bond or separation as to habitation. For if the former is understood, that dismissal would already be impossible; if the latter, since they are no longer husband and wife, there is no reason why they should remain together; indeed there would be an excellent reason for separation on account of the most probable danger of fornication, which reason must prevail over the hope of sanctifying the unbelieving one.

III. The question therefore concerns the genuine sense of the words of the Apostle. Moreover, it is asked first whether the words, for to the rest τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς I speak, not the Lord, are referred to what follows or to what precedes. Not a few indeed refer them to what follows, and thus the rest are those who are joined in marriage with unbelievers: "he speaks to unequal marriages, that is, where both had not been Christians" (Augustine, De Adult. coniug., l. I, c. 13); and the things which immediately follow are taken as a counsel of Paul, not as a precept of the Lord. And thus, among others, the Fathers of the Synod of Lima, approved by Sixtus V, received them in the decree reported by Father Ballerini in Op. Th. Mor., v. VI, n. 688. From this, indeed, with several authors cited by him, Sanchez gathers (De Matrim., l. VII, d. 73) that the faithful spouse was never obliged to cohabit with the unbelieving one, even if the latter wished to dwell without injury to the Creator and without danger to the faithful one; for Paul suggests only a counsel, not a precept. With this posited, it is easily understood why a prohibition could at times be brought by the Church, that a converted faithful one should not dwell with an unbeliever unwilling to be converted, and why that faithful one by this very fact has the right of passing to other nuptials. Cf. Sanchez, ibid., and the following disputation. Yet it is then with difficulty understood why in canon law certain conditions are required in order that the faithful one may be able to enter other nuptials. But concerning this matter later.

Therefore, to return to the words of Paul, the very learned interpreter Estius, and after him Cornelius a Lapide, in this place, judge on the contrary that these words, to the rest I speak, not the Lord, are to be referred to what precedes. And indeed those words, as Cornelius observes, are separated from what follows by a period in the Roman edition, namely the Clementine of the year 1593, and in the Plantin and other very correct editions; therefore it is lawful to read in this way. Then the things which follow can simply present the doctrine and precept of the Lord, and there the discourse can be about a dismissal which is a severing of the bond. If the context is considered, the opinion of these interpreters seems to us very probable. For the words, to the rest I speak, not the Lord, are opposed to the preceding words in v. 10: But to those who are joined in marriage I command, not I, but the Lord; moreover, the rest besides the married are the unmarried. But addressing these above he had said in v. 8: But I say to the unmarried and widows: it is good for them if they remain as I also am. Therefore what he had said, he now warns in v. 12 (and the admonition is sufficiently opportune) is his counsel, not a precept of the Lord; just as afterward he says: concerning virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but I give counsel. Moreover, with this interpretation applied, the doctrine of the Church concerning the dissolubility of the marriage of unbelievers is established in this way.

IV. Namely, when Paul begins, if any brother, etc., he makes a transition to another question proposed to him by the Corinthians, and teaches that if the unbelieving one wishes to dwell with the faithful one, he should not be put away; but if he departs, let him depart, because the faithful one is not in this matter subject to servitude. It is asked what faculty is given to the faithful by God. It is certain that the words, but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, etc., are sufficiently apt for signifying that the faithful one left behind can enter other nuptials. For the sense is: if the unbelieving one separates himself and puts away the faithful one, or, as he says above, if he does not consent to dwell with the faithful one, let him be left, let him be permitted to go away. But of what sort this leaving is, is explained by the reason added: because in such a case, that is, in this matter (cf. Estius, ibid.), as regards the conjugal bond, the faithful one is not subject to servitude, namely toward the unbelieving one. Moreover this reason shows that the unbelieving one can be left in such a way that the bond also is dissolved; otherwise the faithful one would be especially liable to servitude toward the unbelieving one, for he would remain bound by the bond and would not be able to use marriage because of the malice of the unbelieving one himself. And indeed either the denial of servitude consists only in this, that the one left is not bound to follow and be reconciled to one departing without a just cause, of which sort this unbeliever is, or it consists in this, that the one left is no longer bound by the bond by which he had been bound. But the first holds equally in the departure of both unbelieving and believing spouses without just cause, so that one unjustly left is not bound to be reconciled, and it is also common to unbelievers among themselves. But the Apostle speaks specifically about the departure of an unbeliever and about some prerogative of the faithful. Therefore the second remains.

Now observe that, if with the opinion of others you hold that in the prior words of the Apostle (if any brother ... let him not put her away, etc.) there is contained a counsel of the Apostle, not a precept of God, by this very fact it is signified that this dismissal is not prohibited by God himself but permitted, although the Apostle dissuades it on account of certain causes, that is, the good of the unbelieving one and of the children. With this posited it follows that much more the things which follow (if he departs, let him depart, etc.) signify permission made by God of dissolving the nuptials, since that would not be forbidden by God even in the prior hypothesis, that the unbelieving one wishes to cohabit.

Accordingly, if the unbelieving one departs, if he does not consent to dwell with the faithful one, let him depart, let him go where he wishes. And thus it must certainly be understood that that is conceded which, with this condition not existing, the Apostle perhaps would not have approved, that is, that the faithful one may put away the departing unbeliever. Namely, the faithful one can exempt himself from the bond of the marriage contracted with him; he can contract another marriage. And this is the doctrine of the Church set forth in the canons cited above.

Observe that Paul only says, if the unbelieving one departs, or does not consent to dwell with the faithful one. But he also who is unwilling to dwell without injury to God, or without drawing the faithful one to sin, is rightly judged to depart; because, even if he does not withdraw in body, nevertheless he compels the faithful one to withdraw, because then the faithful one ought, or certainly has the right, to withdraw from the society of the unbelieving one. And thus this one, supplying to the other a cause of flight, puts him to flight (Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74).

V. But what must be said when the unbelieving one indeed refuses to be converted, yet wishes to dwell without insult to the Creator and without drawing the faithful one to sin? Is it then lawful for the convert to dissolve the marriage, other nuptials having been entered upon? Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74, proposes two opinions: the one denying, which he himself judges very probable, and which rests especially on the texts of canon law, which demand those conditions; the other affirming, which Sanchez considers the truer. But its demonstration supposes what he proved in the preceding disputation, namely, that "today it is illicit for the faithful one to dwell with an unbelieving spouse in obstinate infidelity, even if the latter wishes to dwell without insult to God and without drawing the other to sin." Cf. the cited disputation. "Practice bears," says the distinguished Ballerini in the notes to Gury, de Matrim., at n. 759; cf. also Opusc. Th. Mor., l. c., "that in places of unbelievers, for example among the Chinese, Indians, etc., it is permitted to converts both to cohabit with an unbeliever and again to be able to pass to other nuptials according to the doctrine of Paul, if the unbeliever either is unwilling to cohabit or does not consent to cohabit except with injury to the Creator; and to this pertains chapter Gaudemus of Innocent III and the declaration alleged by Benedict XIV (de Syn., l. XIII, c. 21, n. 1). But among Christian nations the practice has prevailed that cohabitation is not permitted with the party who obstinately adheres to an unbelieving sect, for example the Jewish, although this party protests that he wishes to cohabit peacefully." With this posited, Sanchez proves his opinion thus: because it is lawful for the convert to enter another marriage as often as the unbelieving one departs and leaves the faithful one. Now at that time the faithful one is said to be left and deserted by the unbelieving one withdrawing, as often as either the unbelieving one withdraws altogether, or chooses that cohabitation which is illicit for the faithful one. Since therefore today cohabitation with an unbelieving one is illicit for the faithful one, this one, unwilling to be converted, will be said truly to withdraw, and it will be lawful for the faithful one to contract another marriage. Indeed Paul "only explained the case in which the unbelieving one refuses to cohabit, and from this follow two other cases, namely when he does not wish to cohabit without insult to God or drawing the other to sin, because then the unbelieving one is truly said to withdraw, choosing that cohabitation alone which is forbidden to the faithful one. But in the present case today precisely the same reason holds, since the unbelieving one, unwilling to be converted, chooses cohabitation forbidden to the faithful one. Therefore this case will today be comprehended in that privilege of Christ explained by Paul." This is confirmed from the end of the privilege, for, with that law posited, the faithful one would be compelled to remain unmarried and would be especially subject to servitude.

Moreover you see that if the words of the Apostle, if any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not put her away; and if any faithful woman has an unbelieving husband and he consents to dwell with her, let her not put him away; if these words, I say, contain only a counsel of Paul, nothing is had from the same Paul which stands in the way of this law or practice now in force, by which cohabitation with an unbelieving spouse is forbidden to the faithful one; for counsels can be changed according to diverse circumstances of persons, times, and places. But if those words contain a law of the Lord, how could this new law or practice have been introduced, which simply forbids converts habitation with an unbelieving spouse? It can be answered that that law of the Lord does not exclude this new law of the Church. For the law of the Lord is not universally that the unbelieving one willing to cohabit should not be put away, but (as the Church has always understood it, and as is also gathered from the following words of the Apostle: for he is not subject to servitude, etc.) that the unbelieving one willing to cohabit without spiritual harm to the faithful one should not be put away. But when a harm of this sort exists and must be met by separation, God left this to be determined by the Church, with which, therefore, diverse practice could be in use. Since, accordingly, in the apostolic age and thereafter it was not judged expedient that every convert should be separated from an unbelieving spouse, nor had a law been passed concerning this matter or a practice introduced forbidding cohabitation, the law of the Lord promulgated by Paul could still be observed in certain cases, which Paul certainly supposes (cf. the commentary of Cyril of Alexandria on this place, v. 8). Nevertheless, nothing prevented that afterward, because of the very condition established by the Lord, if the unbelieving one wishes to cohabit, but nevertheless to be understood with this limitation, without spiritual harm to the faithful one, cohabitation itself with an unbeliever unwilling to be converted should be prohibited, when it had been established that greater harm to the faithful one was to be feared from this cohabitation than the good to be hoped for from the same, namely the conversion of the unbelieving one. Since therefore the end of the law is the sanctification of the unbelieving one, and the condition of the law is that cohabitation should not harm the faithful one, and these things can be determined in diverse ways according to diverse circumstances of affairs, it comes about that the law of the Lord could be fulfilled now in this way, now in that, and that once Christianity was already grown, it has sometimes been fulfilled, and is fulfilled, otherwise among unbelieving nations, otherwise among Christian ones.

VI. It is asked finally, when and how is the marriage which the convert to the faith contracted in infidelity dissolved? The power to dissolve it is had when one of the enumerated conditions exists; but it is dissolved when another marriage is contracted. This is manifest from c. Gaudemus; for Innocent says: "But if she should follow the one converted to the faith, and herself converted (who had before refused to cohabit, etc.), before he, on account of the aforesaid causes, takes a legitimate wife, he will be compelled to receive her." Therefore until another marriage is contracted, the prior bond remains; this therefore is dissolved as soon as the second marriage is made, just as the corruption of one and the generation of the other are simultaneous. Therefore the prior marriage is dissolved not intrinsically from the will of one spouse, but extrinsically from the law of God, with the second marriage intervening, which is ratified.

VII. This is the privilege granted by God in favor of the faith received by baptism, which Paul promulgated, teaching that when the unbelieving one departs, the brother, that is, the Christian, is not subject to servitude in this matter, namely in the bond of marriage contracted with an unbelieving one. The reason for this privilege sufficiently appears, namely, both on account of the dignity of the sacrament of faith, and at the same time on account of the necessity by which the faithful one is bound to avoid cohabitation with the unbelieving one in these cases. In peace, says the Apostle, God has called us: namely, God wills that agreement in the faith and peace obtain in the family and in Christian society. But since Christ did not wish anyone to be obliged to the celibate life without his own will, and the obligation of continence would be a most grave burden imposed on neophytes and could deter unbelievers themselves from conversion, it was granted to the baptized under these conditions to enter other nuptials (Sanchez, ibid.). Moreover both from the words of Paul and from the interpretation of the Church it is clear that any marriage whatever of unbelievers, and the same even consummated, can be dissolved in favor of the faith.

Yet note what Innocent teaches in c. Quanto: "But if one of the faithful spouses either lapses into heresy or passes into the error of gentility, we do not believe that in this case the one who is left can, while the other is living, fly to second nuptials, although in this case a greater insult to the Creator appears. For although true marriage exists between unbelievers, nevertheless it is not ratified; but between believers true and ratified marriage exists, because the sacrament of Faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost; but it makes the sacrament of marriage ratified, so that it endures in the spouses themselves while that sacrament lasts." And the Council of Trent defined this, de Matrim., can. 5. Namely, the dignity of the sacrament prevails over the liberty of the innocent one and prevents that privilege from being granted to the innocent spouse; and Paul accurately warned that the faithful one is not subject to servitude in such a case, that is, in this obligation with an unbelieving one, of which he speaks. Therefore it is not lawful to extend the privilege of Christ to others; its supreme reason, finally, is the will of God manifested by the Apostle.

VIII. Since by the privilege of Christ promulgated by the Apostle the marriage which a convert to the faith contracted in infidelity can be severed, provided, nevertheless, that certain conditions exist, it is necessary for this, that the convert (at least existing in an unbelieving nation, where the cohabitation of unbelievers is not prohibited) may be able lawfully to use that privilege, that he know that these conditions, or some one sufficient from these, are present. Wherefore it is necessary that the faithful one be made more certain that the unbelieving spouse is unwilling to cohabit, or, if he wishes to cohabit, that he is not going to cohabit without injury to the Creator, or without attempting to draw the faithful one to sin. But if for some cause knowledge of this sort cannot be obtained, either because the spouse is absent and it is unknown where in the world he or she may be, or because, since someone has had several wives, he does not know which is legitimate, there is no place for the use of this privilege. But this inconvenience can be met by another way. Namely, the Roman Pontiff has power in these circumstances of dissolving a marriage contracted in infidelity, even consummated, and thus of making the faculty for the convert to marry whomever he wishes in the Lord. For if the Roman Pontiff can dissolve a ratified marriage, which is a sacrament, he can also dissolve a consummated marriage of unbelievers, which has less firmness. Indeed, 1. that marriage is dissolved by the ratified marriage of one converted to the faith; therefore it is less firm than it. 2. Indissolubility belongs to marriage chiefly by reason of signification; but that signification is had by a stronger right in sacramental marriage, and especially in consummated sacramental marriage. Therefore marriage, even consummated marriage of unbelievers, since it is not properly a sacrament, is less firm than ratified marriage (q. LIX, a. 5, ad 1); therefore. The Roman Pontiffs have asserted this power for themselves and have used it, Pius V in the Apostolic letters Romani Pontificis and Gregory XIII in the Apostolic letters Quoniam saepe contingit, and others. Moreover Pius V has these things: Since, as we have received, several wives are permitted to Indians remaining in their infidelity, whom they themselves also repudiate for very slight causes, it has therefore happened that those receiving baptism have been permitted to remain with that wife who exists together with the baptized husband (you would certainly wrongly demonstrate that this was rightly done from the Pauline privilege). And because it often happens that she is not the first, whence both ministers and bishops are tormented by very grave scruples, thinking that that is not a true marriage; but because it would be very hard to separate them from the wives with whom those Indians themselves received baptism, especially because it would be very difficult to find the first spouse: therefore, wishing kindly to provide with paternal affection for the state of the said Indians, and to free the bishops and ministers themselves from scruples of this sort, by our own motion and from our certain knowledge and from the fullness of Apostolic power, we declare by Apostolic authority, by the tenor of these presents, that Indians baptized in this way, as is premised, and those to be baptized in the future, should have to remain with the wife who was baptized and will be baptized with them, as with a legitimate wife, the others having been dismissed, and that the marriage between them stands as legitimate (therefore he also approves for the future the practice commemorated from the beginning). Likewise Gregory XIII speaks thus: "We, attending to the fact that marriages of this sort contracted among unbelievers are indeed true, yet are not judged so ratified that, necessity urging, they cannot be dissolved, grant to each of the ordinaries and pastors of the said places ... the faculty of dispensing with any Christian faithful of either sex inhabiting the said regions ... that any one of them, even with the unbelieving spouse surviving and his or her consent by no means required, and without awaiting a response (therefore also in the hypothesis that the spouse does not depart), may be able lawfully to contract marriages with any faithful person, otherwise however duly, and afterward to remain in them, once consummated by carnal copula, as long as they live." From these things you have two points: 1. the reason indicated beneath why marriage of this sort can be dissolved, namely because it is not ratified as Christian marriage is, or it is less firm than ratified marriage, that is, it does not enjoy perfect firmness; 2. that these marriages are dissolved by the authority of the Roman Pontiff delegated to him by God. For he who dispenses and grants the faculty of dispensing produces the effect by authority inherent in himself, either proper or delegated; but the Roman Pontiff conducted himself in this way.

IX. You will object two things. 1. It is the opinion of Benedict XIV (De Syn., l. XIII, c. 21) that in these things the Roman Pontiffs acted only as interpreters of divine law, tempering the rigor of canonical laws in that which pertains to the judicial interpellation which would have to be made to the unbelieving spouse.

I answer, 1. that an authentic interpretation of divine law is itself also a certain act of authority; 2. that this private opinion of Benedict XIV cannot be received. For an interpretation of law does not change the law nor establish a new law; but the divine law promulgated by Paul is one thing, and this law which is contained in the letters of the Roman Pontiffs is another. For even if it is not established that the unbelieving one is unwilling to dwell without harm to the faithful one, even then, when the cohabitation of both is licit, there is made by the Roman Pontiff a power of dissolving the bond; but this would not yet be lawful if account were taken only of the Pauline privilege. And certainly it is strange that it is denied that the Pontiff dispenses by his own authority, when Gregory expressly affirms that he dispenses and grants the faculty of dispensing, and indeed because the consummated marriage of unbelievers is less firm than ratified marriage. To what purpose is this reason, if there were question of tempering the rigor of canonical laws as regards the use of the Pauline privilege? Cf. Ballerini, Op. Th. Mor., v. VI, n. 706 ff.

You object, 2. that consummated marriage of unbelievers is stronger than ratified marriage of Christians, because ratified marriage signifies that union of Christ the Lord by which he joins himself to just souls; but consummated marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh, as Innocent III teaches, c. Debitum, de Bigamis; and therefore consummated marriage is firmer. But consummated marriage of unbelievers also represents the union of Christ with the Church through the incarnation; for "the sacrament of marriage exists among believers and unbelievers, as the Apostle shows," says the same Innocent, c. Gaudemus, de divortiis.

I answer, 1. that these things do not cohere with the judgment of Gregory XIII reported above; 2. if the reason of the indissolubility of consummated marriage is only the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through the incarnation, and this is said to be had equally in consummated marriage of unbelievers and of believers, it must be said that consummated marriage of unbelievers is altogether, even extrinsically, indissoluble in every case. But this is false, for it is dissolved in favor of the one converted to the faith. 3. When ratified marriage is said to represent the union of God with the soul of the just man, this must not be taken exclusively, as we already warned in Thesis XXIV; for it too signifies the union of Christ with the Church through will and love, which will and love are perpetual (Master of the Sentences, in IV, d. 26, n. 6), and then it also signifies, although less perfectly, the perpetual union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh. For the mutual obligation, by which each hands over his body to the other, so that it may be the other's, sufficiently signifies the union of Christ with the Church through flesh. But because in ratified marriage the bond of souls is eminent, while in consummated marriage the commingling of flesh is eminent, hence the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through will, which union is a certain bond of souls and has place in the very union of Christ with the Church, is appropriated to ratified marriage; but the representation of the union through the assumption of flesh is appropriated to consummated marriage. And because finally the union of God with the Church through grace contains the union of God through grace with individual just persons, which is soluble, hence, since it was established from elsewhere that ratified marriage can sometimes be dissolved, in order to explain this it was said that ratified marriage represents the union of God with just souls (q. LXI, a. 2, ad 1), not excluding the representation of the other union of Christ with the Church, but excluding only the perfect representation of the union through the assumption of flesh. That this explanation of the signification of ratified marriage is to be taken in this way is evident from this, that when the solubility of ratified marriage had to be demonstrated, appeal was made to the proper argument, that is, to tradition (cf. the things adduced above); it is evident again from this, that although the union of Christ God through grace with a just man is dissolved by the will of man, nevertheless it was not thence inferred that ratified marriage could be dissolved by the will of the spouses, and they wished that this marriage, except in the case of a privilege granted by God, be firm, even if a spouse should receive sacred orders or pass over to infidelity; the reason for this last point is brought forward by Innocent III, because ratified marriage is a Sacrament.

Accordingly, 4. we answer that the efficient reason why consummated marriage of Christians is extrinsically also indissoluble is indeed the will of God, but that the reason of fittingness, by which, as it were, God is conceived as determined to willing this, is the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh, but that representation which is made by sacramental marriage. If this condition is lacking, marriage is less firm, not indeed intrinsically but extrinsically. And because this intrinsic condition precedes consummation, from which extrinsic insolubility arises, and when the former is removed the consequent is removed, hence it is not strange that marriages which are not ratified have less firmness than those simply ratified. Namely, the dignity of the Sacrament is that on which extrinsic indissolubility depends. "Indissolubility belongs to the bond of marriage especially insofar as it is a Sacrament," says Pius VII in the letters given to the Archbishop of Mainz, October 3, 1803.

Wherefore, 5. although we do not deny that even marriages of unbelievers which are made according to the primitive institution, and therefore endowed with unity and indissolubility, and the same marriages consummated, represent in some measure the union of Christ with the Church, which signification was established for marriage in the very institution, nevertheless there is not yet a firm reason of perfect indissolubility; because the character of the sacrament is lacking, through which the union of Christ with the Church is signified in a perfect mode, that is, according to the character of holiness.

X. Here again someone may seize the occasion of arguing against the indissolubility of marriage established above, or against the suasive argument drawn from reason, since now so many marriages, even consummated, are most easily dissolved, without reason complaining.

I answer that deservedly reason ceases from complaints. For the arguments which reason can bring forward in favor of marriage duly entered upon, than which none more excellent can be had, certainly lose their force if they are brought forward in favor of an imperfect marriage not exacted to that norm which the Savior of the human race restored by recalling the first institution and perfected by completing it, so that it could be said by Ambrose that the marriages of unbelievers are not from God. Indeed, the danger to the faith which would arise of itself is a greater evil than any other inconvenience of one remaining in infidelity.

Question 4. When at last does the baptized party have the right of contracting new nuptials?

Resp. If the interpellations were omitted by declaration of the Apostolic See, or if the unbeliever has responded negatively to the same expressly or tacitly, the baptized party has the right of contracting new nuptials with a Catholic person, unless that party after Baptism has given to the non-baptized party a just cause for departing (Can. 1123).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1131, n. 91.

Question 8. Immediately after the Baptism of one and the departure of the other party, is the Marriage dissolved?

Resp. Negatively. According to the same divine privilege, the spouse converted to the faith, at the very point of conversion, is not understood to be loosed from the bond of the marriage contracted with an unbeliever still surviving; but then, if the unbelieving spouse refuses, he acquires the right of passing to other nuptials, nevertheless with a faithful spouse. S. Off., 11 July 1866. - Cp. Si quis, 28, q. 2; and Cp. Gaudemus, 8, De Divortiis: Crimes are loosed in Baptism, not marriages.

Question 10. Can an unbelieving spouse validly enter a new Marriage, if after his departure the party converted to the faith has emitted religious profession, or received sacred Orders, or made a simple vow of chastity?

Resp. He can indeed in the case of religious profession, if the Marriage was not consummated after the reception of Baptism, because then it is dissolved by force of the other privilege declared by the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 6. - Not likewise in the case of reception of sacred Orders, or emission of a simple vow of chastity, because then the first matrimonial bond remains entire. But if the unbelieving spouse is converted, cohabitation is certainly not permitted to him if the co-party has received sacred Orders, and according to some also in the case of a simple vow of chastity, because the state assumed is incompossible with conjugal life. - Cf. Baller. note (c), p. 734.

V. When one of the unbelievers is converted to the faith, the matrimony is not dissolved by Baptism, but by the subsequent nuptials. Wherefore if the unbelieving party, obstinate before the matrimony of the other spouse, and the believing party celebrated contrary nuptials, these would be null; and if these spouses were converted to the faith, they would have to be separated. Since the privilege of dissolving the conjugal bond has been granted by Christ in favour of the faith only, not of unbelief, as is had in chapter Quanto on Divorces. Similarly if a believer after admonishing the unbelieving spouse obstinate in unbelief contract matrimony, and then this second be dissolved by the death of the spouse, then that believer would not be bound to return to the former unbelieving spouse, even if he were converted to the faith. Since, the former matrimony having been lawfully dissolved, the believer became altogether free; and so he is not bound to return to the former converted spouse in the case of the death of the second wife.