Thesis XXVI

We teach, moreover, that the marriage of unbelievers, even consummated, can be dissolved extrinsically, both when, one party having been converted to the faith, the other refuses to cohabit, or not without injury to the Creator or spiritual harm to the faithful one, and also that it can be dissolved extrinsically by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

I. These are the canons of the Church in this matter. "Never, while his wife is living, will one even converted to the faith be able lawfully to have another, unless after his own conversion she refuses to cohabit with him, or, even if she consents, nevertheless not without insult to the Creator or so that she may draw him into mortal sin." c. Gaudemus, De Divort. "If one of the unbelieving spouses is converted to the Catholic faith, while the other in no way, or not without blasphemy of the divine name, or so as to draw the other into mortal sin, is willing to cohabit with him, the one who is left, if he wishes, will pass to second vows." c. Quanto, ibid. Therefore the dissolubility of marriage, even consummated, contracted in infidelity, when one of the spouses is converted to the faith, is to be understood under these conditions. Wherefore we do not say that by the very reception of baptism the marriage is dissolved; for this is false, since by baptism marriages are not dissolved, but crimes are remitted, c. d. Gaudemus, and we shall prove this a little below. But when the above-mentioned conditions exist, by divine law the bond of marriage can be severed; but when and how it is severed, we shall say afterward. Moreover this doctrine is common to theologians and canonists (cf. St. Thomas, q. LIX, a. 5; Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74), handed down by the Fathers, as by Ambrose, on Luke, l. VIII, n. 2: "If every marriage is from God (not indeed in whatever way, but according to the integral form of divine institution), every marriage may not be dissolved. And how did the Apostle say: but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart? In this he both wondrously did not wish the cause of divorce to reside among Christians, and showed that not every marriage is from God." Namely, according to Ambrose, that marriage is said to be from God which is exacted according to the norm of divine institution and which is entered upon for the worship and honor of God; but the marriage of unbelievers is not of this sort. Likewise Chrysostom, hom. XIX on chapter 7 of 1 Corinthians: "But what is this: if the unbeliever departs, let him depart? As if he commands you to sacrifice, or to be an associate of impiety on account of the marriage, or to withdraw, it is better that the marriage be broken, and not piety," διασπασθῆναι τὸν γάμον, καὶ μὴ τὴν εὐσέβειαν. The doctrine has been confirmed by the practice of the Church through very many centuries and solemnly sanctioned by the Roman See; for the decrees from canon law adduced above proceeded from Innocent III and were transferred by Gregory IX into the canon law by which the universal Church is governed. "It is certain," says Benedict XIV (De Synod., l. VI, c. 4), "that the marriage of unbelievers is dissolved from the privilege granted by Christ the Lord in favor of the faith and promulgated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. VII, when one of the spouses embraces the Christian faith, the other, hardened in his infidelity, refusing to cohabit with the convert, or etc."

II. Accordingly the origin of this doctrine is Apostolic Tradition, which Paul committed to writing in 1 Cor. VII, and Innocent III testifies to this in the said c. Quanto; for after the words recited he adds: "And in this case we understand what the Apostle says: if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such a case." But there is no small difficulty in gathering this doctrine artificially from the words of the Apostle. They are v. 12 and following: For to the rest I speak, not the Lord. If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And if any faithful woman has an unbelieving husband and he consents to dwell with her, let her not put him away. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified through the faithful woman, and the unbelieving woman is sanctified through the faithful husband ... But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such a case: but God has called us in peace. Observe first that brother and sister here are those who have been aggregated to the Church through baptism; for Paul addresses Christians of this sort, and the Church has not deemed those who were only catechumens, although faithful, worthy of the name brothers. Therefore the discourse is about the baptized.

Moreover, from the words of the Apostle this is certain: that marriage is not dissolved by baptism. For even after the baptism of one, the brother is said to have an unbelieving wife, and the woman to have an unbelieving husband. Besides, if by baptism the marriage were dissolved by the law itself, Paul would by no means exhort the faithful one not to put away the unbelieving one, whether by the name of putting away is understood the severing of the bond or separation as to habitation. For if the former is understood, that dismissal would already be impossible; if the latter, since they are no longer husband and wife, there is no reason why they should remain together; indeed there would be an excellent reason for separation on account of the most probable danger of fornication, which reason must prevail over the hope of sanctifying the unbelieving one.

III. The question therefore concerns the genuine sense of the words of the Apostle. Moreover, it is asked first whether the words, for to the rest τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς I speak, not the Lord, are referred to what follows or to what precedes. Not a few indeed refer them to what follows, and thus the rest are those who are joined in marriage with unbelievers: "he speaks to unequal marriages, that is, where both had not been Christians" (Augustine, De Adult. coniug., l. I, c. 13); and the things which immediately follow are taken as a counsel of Paul, not as a precept of the Lord. And thus, among others, the Fathers of the Synod of Lima, approved by Sixtus V, received them in the decree reported by Father Ballerini in Op. Th. Mor., v. VI, n. 688. From this, indeed, with several authors cited by him, Sanchez gathers (De Matrim., l. VII, d. 73) that the faithful spouse was never obliged to cohabit with the unbelieving one, even if the latter wished to dwell without injury to the Creator and without danger to the faithful one; for Paul suggests only a counsel, not a precept. With this posited, it is easily understood why a prohibition could at times be brought by the Church, that a converted faithful one should not dwell with an unbeliever unwilling to be converted, and why that faithful one by this very fact has the right of passing to other nuptials. Cf. Sanchez, ibid., and the following disputation. Yet it is then with difficulty understood why in canon law certain conditions are required in order that the faithful one may be able to enter other nuptials. But concerning this matter later.

Therefore, to return to the words of Paul, the very learned interpreter Estius, and after him Cornelius a Lapide, in this place, judge on the contrary that these words, to the rest I speak, not the Lord, are to be referred to what precedes. And indeed those words, as Cornelius observes, are separated from what follows by a period in the Roman edition, namely the Clementine of the year 1593, and in the Plantin and other very correct editions; therefore it is lawful to read in this way. Then the things which follow can simply present the doctrine and precept of the Lord, and there the discourse can be about a dismissal which is a severing of the bond. If the context is considered, the opinion of these interpreters seems to us very probable. For the words, to the rest I speak, not the Lord, are opposed to the preceding words in v. 10: But to those who are joined in marriage I command, not I, but the Lord; moreover, the rest besides the married are the unmarried. But addressing these above he had said in v. 8: But I say to the unmarried and widows: it is good for them if they remain as I also am. Therefore what he had said, he now warns in v. 12 (and the admonition is sufficiently opportune) is his counsel, not a precept of the Lord; just as afterward he says: concerning virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but I give counsel. Moreover, with this interpretation applied, the doctrine of the Church concerning the dissolubility of the marriage of unbelievers is established in this way.

IV. Namely, when Paul begins, if any brother, etc., he makes a transition to another question proposed to him by the Corinthians, and teaches that if the unbelieving one wishes to dwell with the faithful one, he should not be put away; but if he departs, let him depart, because the faithful one is not in this matter subject to servitude. It is asked what faculty is given to the faithful by God. It is certain that the words, but if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, etc., are sufficiently apt for signifying that the faithful one left behind can enter other nuptials. For the sense is: if the unbelieving one separates himself and puts away the faithful one, or, as he says above, if he does not consent to dwell with the faithful one, let him be left, let him be permitted to go away. But of what sort this leaving is, is explained by the reason added: because in such a case, that is, in this matter (cf. Estius, ibid.), as regards the conjugal bond, the faithful one is not subject to servitude, namely toward the unbelieving one. Moreover this reason shows that the unbelieving one can be left in such a way that the bond also is dissolved; otherwise the faithful one would be especially liable to servitude toward the unbelieving one, for he would remain bound by the bond and would not be able to use marriage because of the malice of the unbelieving one himself. And indeed either the denial of servitude consists only in this, that the one left is not bound to follow and be reconciled to one departing without a just cause, of which sort this unbeliever is, or it consists in this, that the one left is no longer bound by the bond by which he had been bound. But the first holds equally in the departure of both unbelieving and believing spouses without just cause, so that one unjustly left is not bound to be reconciled, and it is also common to unbelievers among themselves. But the Apostle speaks specifically about the departure of an unbeliever and about some prerogative of the faithful. Therefore the second remains.

Now observe that, if with the opinion of others you hold that in the prior words of the Apostle (if any brother ... let him not put her away, etc.) there is contained a counsel of the Apostle, not a precept of God, by this very fact it is signified that this dismissal is not prohibited by God himself but permitted, although the Apostle dissuades it on account of certain causes, that is, the good of the unbelieving one and of the children. With this posited it follows that much more the things which follow (if he departs, let him depart, etc.) signify permission made by God of dissolving the nuptials, since that would not be forbidden by God even in the prior hypothesis, that the unbelieving one wishes to cohabit.

Accordingly, if the unbelieving one departs, if he does not consent to dwell with the faithful one, let him depart, let him go where he wishes. And thus it must certainly be understood that that is conceded which, with this condition not existing, the Apostle perhaps would not have approved, that is, that the faithful one may put away the departing unbeliever. Namely, the faithful one can exempt himself from the bond of the marriage contracted with him; he can contract another marriage. And this is the doctrine of the Church set forth in the canons cited above.

Observe that Paul only says, if the unbelieving one departs, or does not consent to dwell with the faithful one. But he also who is unwilling to dwell without injury to God, or without drawing the faithful one to sin, is rightly judged to depart; because, even if he does not withdraw in body, nevertheless he compels the faithful one to withdraw, because then the faithful one ought, or certainly has the right, to withdraw from the society of the unbelieving one. And thus this one, supplying to the other a cause of flight, puts him to flight (Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74).

V. But what must be said when the unbelieving one indeed refuses to be converted, yet wishes to dwell without insult to the Creator and without drawing the faithful one to sin? Is it then lawful for the convert to dissolve the marriage, other nuptials having been entered upon? Sanchez, l. VII, d. 74, proposes two opinions: the one denying, which he himself judges very probable, and which rests especially on the texts of canon law, which demand those conditions; the other affirming, which Sanchez considers the truer. But its demonstration supposes what he proved in the preceding disputation, namely, that "today it is illicit for the faithful one to dwell with an unbelieving spouse in obstinate infidelity, even if the latter wishes to dwell without insult to God and without drawing the other to sin." Cf. the cited disputation. "Practice bears," says the distinguished Ballerini in the notes to Gury, de Matrim., at n. 759; cf. also Opusc. Th. Mor., l. c., "that in places of unbelievers, for example among the Chinese, Indians, etc., it is permitted to converts both to cohabit with an unbeliever and again to be able to pass to other nuptials according to the doctrine of Paul, if the unbeliever either is unwilling to cohabit or does not consent to cohabit except with injury to the Creator; and to this pertains chapter Gaudemus of Innocent III and the declaration alleged by Benedict XIV (de Syn., l. XIII, c. 21, n. 1). But among Christian nations the practice has prevailed that cohabitation is not permitted with the party who obstinately adheres to an unbelieving sect, for example the Jewish, although this party protests that he wishes to cohabit peacefully." With this posited, Sanchez proves his opinion thus: because it is lawful for the convert to enter another marriage as often as the unbelieving one departs and leaves the faithful one. Now at that time the faithful one is said to be left and deserted by the unbelieving one withdrawing, as often as either the unbelieving one withdraws altogether, or chooses that cohabitation which is illicit for the faithful one. Since therefore today cohabitation with an unbelieving one is illicit for the faithful one, this one, unwilling to be converted, will be said truly to withdraw, and it will be lawful for the faithful one to contract another marriage. Indeed Paul "only explained the case in which the unbelieving one refuses to cohabit, and from this follow two other cases, namely when he does not wish to cohabit without insult to God or drawing the other to sin, because then the unbelieving one is truly said to withdraw, choosing that cohabitation alone which is forbidden to the faithful one. But in the present case today precisely the same reason holds, since the unbelieving one, unwilling to be converted, chooses cohabitation forbidden to the faithful one. Therefore this case will today be comprehended in that privilege of Christ explained by Paul." This is confirmed from the end of the privilege, for, with that law posited, the faithful one would be compelled to remain unmarried and would be especially subject to servitude.

Moreover you see that if the words of the Apostle, if any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to dwell with him, let him not put her away; and if any faithful woman has an unbelieving husband and he consents to dwell with her, let her not put him away; if these words, I say, contain only a counsel of Paul, nothing is had from the same Paul which stands in the way of this law or practice now in force, by which cohabitation with an unbelieving spouse is forbidden to the faithful one; for counsels can be changed according to diverse circumstances of persons, times, and places. But if those words contain a law of the Lord, how could this new law or practice have been introduced, which simply forbids converts habitation with an unbelieving spouse? It can be answered that that law of the Lord does not exclude this new law of the Church. For the law of the Lord is not universally that the unbelieving one willing to cohabit should not be put away, but (as the Church has always understood it, and as is also gathered from the following words of the Apostle: for he is not subject to servitude, etc.) that the unbelieving one willing to cohabit without spiritual harm to the faithful one should not be put away. But when a harm of this sort exists and must be met by separation, God left this to be determined by the Church, with which, therefore, diverse practice could be in use. Since, accordingly, in the apostolic age and thereafter it was not judged expedient that every convert should be separated from an unbelieving spouse, nor had a law been passed concerning this matter or a practice introduced forbidding cohabitation, the law of the Lord promulgated by Paul could still be observed in certain cases, which Paul certainly supposes (cf. the commentary of Cyril of Alexandria on this place, v. 8). Nevertheless, nothing prevented that afterward, because of the very condition established by the Lord, if the unbelieving one wishes to cohabit, but nevertheless to be understood with this limitation, without spiritual harm to the faithful one, cohabitation itself with an unbeliever unwilling to be converted should be prohibited, when it had been established that greater harm to the faithful one was to be feared from this cohabitation than the good to be hoped for from the same, namely the conversion of the unbelieving one. Since therefore the end of the law is the sanctification of the unbelieving one, and the condition of the law is that cohabitation should not harm the faithful one, and these things can be determined in diverse ways according to diverse circumstances of affairs, it comes about that the law of the Lord could be fulfilled now in this way, now in that, and that once Christianity was already grown, it has sometimes been fulfilled, and is fulfilled, otherwise among unbelieving nations, otherwise among Christian ones.

VI. It is asked finally, when and how is the marriage which the convert to the faith contracted in infidelity dissolved? The power to dissolve it is had when one of the enumerated conditions exists; but it is dissolved when another marriage is contracted. This is manifest from c. Gaudemus; for Innocent says: "But if she should follow the one converted to the faith, and herself converted (who had before refused to cohabit, etc.), before he, on account of the aforesaid causes, takes a legitimate wife, he will be compelled to receive her." Therefore until another marriage is contracted, the prior bond remains; this therefore is dissolved as soon as the second marriage is made, just as the corruption of one and the generation of the other are simultaneous. Therefore the prior marriage is dissolved not intrinsically from the will of one spouse, but extrinsically from the law of God, with the second marriage intervening, which is ratified.

VII. This is the privilege granted by God in favor of the faith received by baptism, which Paul promulgated, teaching that when the unbelieving one departs, the brother, that is, the Christian, is not subject to servitude in this matter, namely in the bond of marriage contracted with an unbelieving one. The reason for this privilege sufficiently appears, namely, both on account of the dignity of the sacrament of faith, and at the same time on account of the necessity by which the faithful one is bound to avoid cohabitation with the unbelieving one in these cases. In peace, says the Apostle, God has called us: namely, God wills that agreement in the faith and peace obtain in the family and in Christian society. But since Christ did not wish anyone to be obliged to the celibate life without his own will, and the obligation of continence would be a most grave burden imposed on neophytes and could deter unbelievers themselves from conversion, it was granted to the baptized under these conditions to enter other nuptials (Sanchez, ibid.). Moreover both from the words of Paul and from the interpretation of the Church it is clear that any marriage whatever of unbelievers, and the same even consummated, can be dissolved in favor of the faith.

Yet note what Innocent teaches in c. Quanto: "But if one of the faithful spouses either lapses into heresy or passes into the error of gentility, we do not believe that in this case the one who is left can, while the other is living, fly to second nuptials, although in this case a greater insult to the Creator appears. For although true marriage exists between unbelievers, nevertheless it is not ratified; but between believers true and ratified marriage exists, because the sacrament of Faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost; but it makes the sacrament of marriage ratified, so that it endures in the spouses themselves while that sacrament lasts." And the Council of Trent defined this, de Matrim., can. 5. Namely, the dignity of the sacrament prevails over the liberty of the innocent one and prevents that privilege from being granted to the innocent spouse; and Paul accurately warned that the faithful one is not subject to servitude in such a case, that is, in this obligation with an unbelieving one, of which he speaks. Therefore it is not lawful to extend the privilege of Christ to others; its supreme reason, finally, is the will of God manifested by the Apostle.

VIII. Since by the privilege of Christ promulgated by the Apostle the marriage which a convert to the faith contracted in infidelity can be severed, provided, nevertheless, that certain conditions exist, it is necessary for this, that the convert (at least existing in an unbelieving nation, where the cohabitation of unbelievers is not prohibited) may be able lawfully to use that privilege, that he know that these conditions, or some one sufficient from these, are present. Wherefore it is necessary that the faithful one be made more certain that the unbelieving spouse is unwilling to cohabit, or, if he wishes to cohabit, that he is not going to cohabit without injury to the Creator, or without attempting to draw the faithful one to sin. But if for some cause knowledge of this sort cannot be obtained, either because the spouse is absent and it is unknown where in the world he or she may be, or because, since someone has had several wives, he does not know which is legitimate, there is no place for the use of this privilege. But this inconvenience can be met by another way. Namely, the Roman Pontiff has power in these circumstances of dissolving a marriage contracted in infidelity, even consummated, and thus of making the faculty for the convert to marry whomever he wishes in the Lord. For if the Roman Pontiff can dissolve a ratified marriage, which is a sacrament, he can also dissolve a consummated marriage of unbelievers, which has less firmness. Indeed, 1. that marriage is dissolved by the ratified marriage of one converted to the faith; therefore it is less firm than it. 2. Indissolubility belongs to marriage chiefly by reason of signification; but that signification is had by a stronger right in sacramental marriage, and especially in consummated sacramental marriage. Therefore marriage, even consummated marriage of unbelievers, since it is not properly a sacrament, is less firm than ratified marriage (q. LIX, a. 5, ad 1); therefore. The Roman Pontiffs have asserted this power for themselves and have used it, Pius V in the Apostolic letters Romani Pontificis and Gregory XIII in the Apostolic letters Quoniam saepe contingit, and others. Moreover Pius V has these things: Since, as we have received, several wives are permitted to Indians remaining in their infidelity, whom they themselves also repudiate for very slight causes, it has therefore happened that those receiving baptism have been permitted to remain with that wife who exists together with the baptized husband (you would certainly wrongly demonstrate that this was rightly done from the Pauline privilege). And because it often happens that she is not the first, whence both ministers and bishops are tormented by very grave scruples, thinking that that is not a true marriage; but because it would be very hard to separate them from the wives with whom those Indians themselves received baptism, especially because it would be very difficult to find the first spouse: therefore, wishing kindly to provide with paternal affection for the state of the said Indians, and to free the bishops and ministers themselves from scruples of this sort, by our own motion and from our certain knowledge and from the fullness of Apostolic power, we declare by Apostolic authority, by the tenor of these presents, that Indians baptized in this way, as is premised, and those to be baptized in the future, should have to remain with the wife who was baptized and will be baptized with them, as with a legitimate wife, the others having been dismissed, and that the marriage between them stands as legitimate (therefore he also approves for the future the practice commemorated from the beginning). Likewise Gregory XIII speaks thus: "We, attending to the fact that marriages of this sort contracted among unbelievers are indeed true, yet are not judged so ratified that, necessity urging, they cannot be dissolved, grant to each of the ordinaries and pastors of the said places ... the faculty of dispensing with any Christian faithful of either sex inhabiting the said regions ... that any one of them, even with the unbelieving spouse surviving and his or her consent by no means required, and without awaiting a response (therefore also in the hypothesis that the spouse does not depart), may be able lawfully to contract marriages with any faithful person, otherwise however duly, and afterward to remain in them, once consummated by carnal copula, as long as they live." From these things you have two points: 1. the reason indicated beneath why marriage of this sort can be dissolved, namely because it is not ratified as Christian marriage is, or it is less firm than ratified marriage, that is, it does not enjoy perfect firmness; 2. that these marriages are dissolved by the authority of the Roman Pontiff delegated to him by God. For he who dispenses and grants the faculty of dispensing produces the effect by authority inherent in himself, either proper or delegated; but the Roman Pontiff conducted himself in this way.

IX. You will object two things. 1. It is the opinion of Benedict XIV (De Syn., l. XIII, c. 21) that in these things the Roman Pontiffs acted only as interpreters of divine law, tempering the rigor of canonical laws in that which pertains to the judicial interpellation which would have to be made to the unbelieving spouse.

I answer, 1. that an authentic interpretation of divine law is itself also a certain act of authority; 2. that this private opinion of Benedict XIV cannot be received. For an interpretation of law does not change the law nor establish a new law; but the divine law promulgated by Paul is one thing, and this law which is contained in the letters of the Roman Pontiffs is another. For even if it is not established that the unbelieving one is unwilling to dwell without harm to the faithful one, even then, when the cohabitation of both is licit, there is made by the Roman Pontiff a power of dissolving the bond; but this would not yet be lawful if account were taken only of the Pauline privilege. And certainly it is strange that it is denied that the Pontiff dispenses by his own authority, when Gregory expressly affirms that he dispenses and grants the faculty of dispensing, and indeed because the consummated marriage of unbelievers is less firm than ratified marriage. To what purpose is this reason, if there were question of tempering the rigor of canonical laws as regards the use of the Pauline privilege? Cf. Ballerini, Op. Th. Mor., v. VI, n. 706 ff.

You object, 2. that consummated marriage of unbelievers is stronger than ratified marriage of Christians, because ratified marriage signifies that union of Christ the Lord by which he joins himself to just souls; but consummated marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh, as Innocent III teaches, c. Debitum, de Bigamis; and therefore consummated marriage is firmer. But consummated marriage of unbelievers also represents the union of Christ with the Church through the incarnation; for "the sacrament of marriage exists among believers and unbelievers, as the Apostle shows," says the same Innocent, c. Gaudemus, de divortiis.

I answer, 1. that these things do not cohere with the judgment of Gregory XIII reported above; 2. if the reason of the indissolubility of consummated marriage is only the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through the incarnation, and this is said to be had equally in consummated marriage of unbelievers and of believers, it must be said that consummated marriage of unbelievers is altogether, even extrinsically, indissoluble in every case. But this is false, for it is dissolved in favor of the one converted to the faith. 3. When ratified marriage is said to represent the union of God with the soul of the just man, this must not be taken exclusively, as we already warned in Thesis XXIV; for it too signifies the union of Christ with the Church through will and love, which will and love are perpetual (Master of the Sentences, in IV, d. 26, n. 6), and then it also signifies, although less perfectly, the perpetual union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh. For the mutual obligation, by which each hands over his body to the other, so that it may be the other's, sufficiently signifies the union of Christ with the Church through flesh. But because in ratified marriage the bond of souls is eminent, while in consummated marriage the commingling of flesh is eminent, hence the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through will, which union is a certain bond of souls and has place in the very union of Christ with the Church, is appropriated to ratified marriage; but the representation of the union through the assumption of flesh is appropriated to consummated marriage. And because finally the union of God with the Church through grace contains the union of God through grace with individual just persons, which is soluble, hence, since it was established from elsewhere that ratified marriage can sometimes be dissolved, in order to explain this it was said that ratified marriage represents the union of God with just souls (q. LXI, a. 2, ad 1), not excluding the representation of the other union of Christ with the Church, but excluding only the perfect representation of the union through the assumption of flesh. That this explanation of the signification of ratified marriage is to be taken in this way is evident from this, that when the solubility of ratified marriage had to be demonstrated, appeal was made to the proper argument, that is, to tradition (cf. the things adduced above); it is evident again from this, that although the union of Christ God through grace with a just man is dissolved by the will of man, nevertheless it was not thence inferred that ratified marriage could be dissolved by the will of the spouses, and they wished that this marriage, except in the case of a privilege granted by God, be firm, even if a spouse should receive sacred orders or pass over to infidelity; the reason for this last point is brought forward by Innocent III, because ratified marriage is a Sacrament.

Accordingly, 4. we answer that the efficient reason why consummated marriage of Christians is extrinsically also indissoluble is indeed the will of God, but that the reason of fittingness, by which, as it were, God is conceived as determined to willing this, is the representation of the union of Christ with the Church through the assumption of flesh, but that representation which is made by sacramental marriage. If this condition is lacking, marriage is less firm, not indeed intrinsically but extrinsically. And because this intrinsic condition precedes consummation, from which extrinsic insolubility arises, and when the former is removed the consequent is removed, hence it is not strange that marriages which are not ratified have less firmness than those simply ratified. Namely, the dignity of the Sacrament is that on which extrinsic indissolubility depends. "Indissolubility belongs to the bond of marriage especially insofar as it is a Sacrament," says Pius VII in the letters given to the Archbishop of Mainz, October 3, 1803.

Wherefore, 5. although we do not deny that even marriages of unbelievers which are made according to the primitive institution, and therefore endowed with unity and indissolubility, and the same marriages consummated, represent in some measure the union of Christ with the Church, which signification was established for marriage in the very institution, nevertheless there is not yet a firm reason of perfect indissolubility; because the character of the sacrament is lacking, through which the union of Christ with the Church is signified in a perfect mode, that is, according to the character of holiness.

X. Here again someone may seize the occasion of arguing against the indissolubility of marriage established above, or against the suasive argument drawn from reason, since now so many marriages, even consummated, are most easily dissolved, without reason complaining.

I answer that deservedly reason ceases from complaints. For the arguments which reason can bring forward in favor of marriage duly entered upon, than which none more excellent can be had, certainly lose their force if they are brought forward in favor of an imperfect marriage not exacted to that norm which the Savior of the human race restored by recalling the first institution and perfected by completing it, so that it could be said by Ambrose that the marriages of unbelievers are not from God. Indeed, the danger to the faith which would arise of itself is a greater evil than any other inconvenience of one remaining in infidelity.