The Necessity of Acting for the Sake of an End

I. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some end. For always, when he acts deliberately, he intends some effect or some good. But that effect is truly an end: for an end is that for the sake of which something is done (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1).

II. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some final end. For man, whose rational appetite regards the good as its object and is satisfied only by a good apprehended as perfect, man, I say, whatever he deliberately desires, desires either as a perfect good or as tending toward a perfect good. But in either case he acts for the sake of the final end: in the former case, because the perfect good has the character of the final end; in the latter case, because one desiring something as tending toward the perfect good desires it in order to the perfect good or to the final end (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6).

III. The final ends for which man can in fact act are distinguished as three, namely God, the creature, and beatitude in common. Of these, God and the creature are final ends in the concrete, as regarding a concrete object, and are called material ends. Beatitude is the final end in the abstract, as regarding the indeterminate perfect good, or whatever that may be; and it is usually called the formal end. Now that God and the creature can be intended as the final end is plain and admitted by all. The same seems to be said of beatitude in common. For by the consent of all, there are acts that are venially evil. But acts of this kind are neither referred to God as to the final end, nor to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be mortal sins. It remains, therefore, that they are referred to beatitude in common. Moreover, there are good acts placed without charity. But acts of this kind do not seem to be referred to God as to the final end (n. 243); nor are they referred to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be gravely evil. Hence it seems necessary to admit that they are referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, teach otherwise, and judge that acts that are venially evil and good acts placed without charity are referred to God positively, to the creature negatively, or - as others say - to God efficaciously, to the creature inefficaciously.¹

¹ Cf. Billuart, De ultimo fine, dissertation I, articles 4 and 5.

IV. Man cannot act at the same time for several final ends. For someone desires as the final end that which he desires as the perfect good. Hence the final end so fills the appetite of man that nothing outside it remains to be desired by man. Given this, neither can he desire anything outside it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 5). Hence a deliberate act is referred either to God alone, or to the creature alone, or to beatitude in common alone, as to the final end. If to God, the act is good; if to the creature, it is gravely evil; if to beatitude in common, it is good or venially evil, according as it is or is not referable to God (n. 243). Others, however, think otherwise according to what was said under III.

V. A man acting for the sake of some final end refers his act at least virtually to that end, or at least virtually intends that end. Therefore first note that intention is distinguished into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative intention; and into explicit and implicit intention. Actual intention is had when someone actually intends or wills some end. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually willed some end and acts by force of the past willing, although he does not actually think about the end. Habitual intention is had when someone intends the end and has not revoked the intention, but nevertheless does not act by force of that intention. Interpretative intention is had when someone does not intend the end, but would intend it if he thought about it. Others, however, by the name of interpretative intention understand that which others call implicit. Explicit intention is had when some end is intended distinctly, or according to its proper concept. Implicit intention is had when some end is contained in another thing explicitly willed. With these things noted beforehand, the proposition is proved: no one truly acts for the sake of some end unless the intention of the end in some way exercises influence on the act on the part of the agent. But neither interpretative nor habitual intention suffices for that; virtual intention, however, does suffice, as is gathered from the notions handed down.

Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: “That act is good whose causes are complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.”

(a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense unless all its elements—its object, purpose and circumstances—are good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its elements—the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery—are what they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall short of perfection.

(b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that contribute to essential goodness—the object of the act and any circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the character of object—are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy, unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.

The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be essentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad (see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could change an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even by the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for the service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight vanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom does not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good circumstances that diminish its badness (see 81).

1. Unless otherwise noted, the places indicated in the text are from St. Thomas's Summa, in I-II, in the questions which we submit to commentary.

15. Thesis I. In all deliberate and voluntary, or human, actions, man, in the mode proper to himself, acts for the sake of some end or good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: all actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the reason of its object. But the object of the will is good and end. Hence voluntary or human acts must be for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1).

b) From the notion of end: in causes subordinated per se, of which one does not move unless it is moved by another, there is no process to infinity; but when the first is removed, the others must necessarily be removed. But the end is first among causes, because nothing acts except from a determinate intention of an end: for if the agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more will or do this than that. Therefore all human acts depend upon and are derived from the intention of the end, and thus are done for the sake of the end (a. 2 and 4).

c) Billuart brings an argument from induction: all human acts are elicited or commanded by the will. Elicited acts are occupied either about the end, and then they are for the sake of the end, which by its goodness allures the will to love it; or about the means, and then they also are for the sake of the end, since the will does not will them except for the end. Likewise commanded acts, because the will commands them from love of the end, so that through them as through means it may attain the end. Therefore.

2. Billuart, diss. 1, art. 2.

1. The aforesaid doctrine is not opposed by the fact that the ultimate end itself consists in certain actions, and therefore that all human actions are not for the sake of an end. - Response: St. Thomas, a. 1, ad 2: "If a human action is the ultimate end, it must be voluntary, otherwise it would not be human... But some action is called voluntary in two ways: in one way because it is commanded by the will, as walking or speaking; in another way because it is elicited by the will, as willing itself. But it is impossible that the very act elicited by the will be the ultimate end; for the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color. Hence, just as it is impossible that the first visible thing be seeing, because every seeing is of some visible object, so it is impossible that the first appetible thing, which is the end, be willing itself. Hence it remains that if a human action is the ultimate end, it is itself commanded by the will; and thus some action of man, at least willing itself, is for the sake of an end. Whatever, therefore, man does, it is true to say that man acts for the sake of an end, even by doing the action which is the ultimate end."

16. Corollary.

From this it follows that all human acts receive their species (at least their physical species) from the end, whether a) they are considered actively, as an action proceeding from an agent, or as the motion by which man moves himself; and then they have their species from the formal principle. But the principle of an act of the will is its object, which is the good and the end (in intention); or b) they are considered passively, as a passion tending to something, and the motion by which man is moved by himself to a term; and then they are specified by the term. But that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end (in execution) (a. 3).

17. Thesis II. In all deliberate acts man, at least implicitly, acts for the sake of the ultimate end of the whole of life, at least conceived abstractly and in common, or for the sake of perfect good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: everything that man seeks, he seeks under the aspect of good. But good is sought either as a perfect, satiating good and ultimate end, or as an inchoation and part of perfect good, and therefore as tending to perfect good and the ultimate end, because the inchoation of anything is always ordered to its consummation, as every part to the whole (a. 6).

b) From the notion of ultimate end: the ultimate end stands in moving the will as the first mover stands in motions, because it is first in intention. But among movers there is no process to infinity, because second movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary goods, or intermediate and subordinated ends, do not move the appetite except in order to the perfect good, which is the ultimate end (a. 6). And indeed, if there were a process to infinity in ends, and if all were intermediate and subordinated ends, there would be no end which the will would intend for its own sake and in which it would ultimately rest, none from which the will would first begin to be moved, and therefore it would never will anything, would never begin to do anything; just as neither would an action once begun ever be terminated. And thus there would be no human act; and even if there were some act, it would be altogether vain (a. 6 and 4).

18. Thesis III. Man cannot at the same time choose two ultimate ends, but only one.

This is to be understood not only of the ultimate end taken formally and in the abstract, or of beatitude in common and the very notion of the supreme good, which evidently is one; but also of the ultimate end taken materially in the concrete, that is, of the thing in which man places the supreme good. Not indeed if the end is considered partially, because several things collectively taken can concur toward it as parts, which together constitute one perfect and integral good; but if it is considered totally, because the notion of the supreme good cannot be attributed to several things dividedly and separately, so that man would tend into several disparate things as into ultimate total and adequate ends not subordinated to one another, as if each one alone without the others were the whole ultimate end. And therefore Christ says (Mt. VI, 24): No one can serve two masters, namely, not subordinated to one another.

It is proved: a) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the perfect: someone seeks as ultimate end that which he seeks as a perfect good, completing himself and fully satiating him (from the intention of the one seeking); otherwise he would not rest in it and it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end so fills and satiates the whole appetite of man that nothing outside it is left to be sought.

But it would not fill nor fully satiate if something outside it, namely another end, could be sought and were required for its perfection.

Hence it cannot be that the will tend into two in such a way as if each were its perfect good and ultimate end.

This is confirmed: if there were two ultimate ends, neither would be the supreme and full good of the one seeking, neither would perfectly satiate the appetite, since with one obtained the other would be appetible. Whence they would at once be fully satiating, because ultimate ends, and they would not be, because outside each there would remain something appetible which would not be subordinated to it, namely, the other end.

b) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first natural good: that which is naturally desired cannot be except one, because nature is determined to one and does not tend except to one; whence just as there is only one form and one species of one thing, so neither is there except one natural inclination.

But the ultimate end or supreme good is naturally desired.

Therefore the ultimate end is one.

The minor is clear from internal experience, and is also understood: just as in reason the principle is that which is known as naturally implanted, so in the will the principle is that which is desired by natural tendency; whence love of the end or of the supreme good is implanted in the will, because it is the principle in appetible things.

c) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first thing specifying: in every genus of causing and operating, there is one principle from which all things are derived; otherwise there would not be one genus.

But all human acts constitute one genus of operating and causing, because all appetible things of the will are of one genus, namely, a good befitting man; but the ultimate end is the first principle in this genus because appetible for its own sake.

Therefore the ultimate end is one. "Since voluntary actions receive their species from the end," says St. Thomas, "they must receive the notion of genus from the ultimate end, which is common" (a. 5).

19. Thesis IV. The ultimate end of man truly is happiness or beatitude. - It is proved:

The ultimate end is the highest and perfect good of man. But beatitude or happiness is nothing other than the possession of this highest good, sufficient and complete, which ultimately perfects and terminates every tendency and fully satiates and totally quiets the whole appetition of an intellectual nature, which consciously knows this full sufficiency of its own in the good and rejoices in it (I, q. 26, a. 1). Therefore the ultimate end of man is beatitude.

Hence beatitude can be defined, both objective: the perfect good totally quieting and satiating the appetite (q. 2, a. 8), or the most complete good which completes the whole appetition of a rational agent, so that nothing is left to be desired, or the perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire (q. 5, a. 3), the ultimate perfection of rational or intellectual nature (I, q. 62, a. 1); and formal: stable possession and rest in ultimate perfection, possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire, or a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods (Boethius).

That this beatitude truly exists and is possible for us is proved: man by an innate appetite and instinctive necessity tends to perfect beatitude, so that it is impossible not to think of it frequently and not to desire it, or sincerely to will the opposite. But an innate appetite cannot be vain, for otherwise our nature would be badly constituted; furthermore it is repugnant to the wisdom, truth, and goodness of God that He should have implanted in us an inclination and appetite for something which does not exist or which we are unable to attain. Therefore.

20. Corollaries.

1. The end is the cause, origin, and root of all affections. This "can be declared more fully not only by the example of light, which, because it is the first and highest visible thing, is the reason for seeing all differences of colors; or by the example of the motion of the heart, which, because it is the first motion of life, is the cause from which all vital motions flow; but still far more brilliantly by the comparison, most frequent in St. Thomas, of the intellect with the will. For the love of the ultimate end is related among appetible things as the knowledge of principles is among intelligible things; whence, just as first principles are the first things known, so beatitude or the ultimate end is the first thing willed. And just as we do not assent to particular conclusions except insofar as they cohere with first principles, so neither do we will particular goods except insofar as they are connected with the ultimate end, namely, beatitude. And finally, just as the knowledge of principles moves to all other cognitions, insofar as, enlightened by it, we understand the rest, and therefore it is the root of all cognitions, indeed the other cognitions are nothing but certain propagations and diffusions of that first light, so that first love of beatitude moves to other loves, insofar as, stirred up by it, we seek those things which lead to it, and it is the first root of all affections; indeed the other affections are nothing but certain branches, shoots, and diffusions of that first love; or lines born from this circumference and terminated in its center, namely, beatitude. Whence Boethius excellently says, On the Consolation, III, prose 2: Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold studies exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, but nevertheless strives to arrive at one end of beatitude. And St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book XIII, chapter 5: All men will to be blessed, and they most ardently desire this, and for the sake of this they desire the rest." Thus Goudin, Philosophy, part 3, q. 1, a. 1, § 1, conclusion 2.

2. Beatitude can be considered:

a) In the abstract, and thus it is the universal and complete good which man necessarily wills and cannot not will, and therefore in this all agree.

b) In the concrete, for the thing whose possession ought to render us blessed and perfectly good; and thus man, who does not possess it, freely tends to it, because he does not necessarily see the necessary connection of this or that good with beatitude. Hence under this respect men do not agree in the ultimate end (q. 5, a. 8; q. 1, a. 7).