Question One: On the Ultimate End in Common

1. Unless otherwise noted, the places indicated in the text are from St. Thomas's Summa, in I-II, in the questions which we submit to commentary.

15. Thesis I. In all deliberate and voluntary, or human, actions, man, in the mode proper to himself, acts for the sake of some end or good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: all actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the reason of its object. But the object of the will is good and end. Hence voluntary or human acts must be for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1).

b) From the notion of end: in causes subordinated per se, of which one does not move unless it is moved by another, there is no process to infinity; but when the first is removed, the others must necessarily be removed. But the end is first among causes, because nothing acts except from a determinate intention of an end: for if the agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more will or do this than that. Therefore all human acts depend upon and are derived from the intention of the end, and thus are done for the sake of the end (a. 2 and 4).

c) Billuart brings an argument from induction: all human acts are elicited or commanded by the will. Elicited acts are occupied either about the end, and then they are for the sake of the end, which by its goodness allures the will to love it; or about the means, and then they also are for the sake of the end, since the will does not will them except for the end. Likewise commanded acts, because the will commands them from love of the end, so that through them as through means it may attain the end. Therefore.

2. Billuart, diss. 1, art. 2.

1. The aforesaid doctrine is not opposed by the fact that the ultimate end itself consists in certain actions, and therefore that all human actions are not for the sake of an end. - Response: St. Thomas, a. 1, ad 2: "If a human action is the ultimate end, it must be voluntary, otherwise it would not be human... But some action is called voluntary in two ways: in one way because it is commanded by the will, as walking or speaking; in another way because it is elicited by the will, as willing itself. But it is impossible that the very act elicited by the will be the ultimate end; for the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color. Hence, just as it is impossible that the first visible thing be seeing, because every seeing is of some visible object, so it is impossible that the first appetible thing, which is the end, be willing itself. Hence it remains that if a human action is the ultimate end, it is itself commanded by the will; and thus some action of man, at least willing itself, is for the sake of an end. Whatever, therefore, man does, it is true to say that man acts for the sake of an end, even by doing the action which is the ultimate end."

16. Corollary.

From this it follows that all human acts receive their species (at least their physical species) from the end, whether a) they are considered actively, as an action proceeding from an agent, or as the motion by which man moves himself; and then they have their species from the formal principle. But the principle of an act of the will is its object, which is the good and the end (in intention); or b) they are considered passively, as a passion tending to something, and the motion by which man is moved by himself to a term; and then they are specified by the term. But that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end (in execution) (a. 3).

17. Thesis II. In all deliberate acts man, at least implicitly, acts for the sake of the ultimate end of the whole of life, at least conceived abstractly and in common, or for the sake of perfect good. - It is proved:

a) From the notion of good: everything that man seeks, he seeks under the aspect of good. But good is sought either as a perfect, satiating good and ultimate end, or as an inchoation and part of perfect good, and therefore as tending to perfect good and the ultimate end, because the inchoation of anything is always ordered to its consummation, as every part to the whole (a. 6).

b) From the notion of ultimate end: the ultimate end stands in moving the will as the first mover stands in motions, because it is first in intention. But among movers there is no process to infinity, because second movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary goods, or intermediate and subordinated ends, do not move the appetite except in order to the perfect good, which is the ultimate end (a. 6). And indeed, if there were a process to infinity in ends, and if all were intermediate and subordinated ends, there would be no end which the will would intend for its own sake and in which it would ultimately rest, none from which the will would first begin to be moved, and therefore it would never will anything, would never begin to do anything; just as neither would an action once begun ever be terminated. And thus there would be no human act; and even if there were some act, it would be altogether vain (a. 6 and 4).

18. Thesis III. Man cannot at the same time choose two ultimate ends, but only one.

This is to be understood not only of the ultimate end taken formally and in the abstract, or of beatitude in common and the very notion of the supreme good, which evidently is one; but also of the ultimate end taken materially in the concrete, that is, of the thing in which man places the supreme good. Not indeed if the end is considered partially, because several things collectively taken can concur toward it as parts, which together constitute one perfect and integral good; but if it is considered totally, because the notion of the supreme good cannot be attributed to several things dividedly and separately, so that man would tend into several disparate things as into ultimate total and adequate ends not subordinated to one another, as if each one alone without the others were the whole ultimate end. And therefore Christ says (Mt. VI, 24): No one can serve two masters, namely, not subordinated to one another.

It is proved: a) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the perfect: someone seeks as ultimate end that which he seeks as a perfect good, completing himself and fully satiating him (from the intention of the one seeking); otherwise he would not rest in it and it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore the ultimate end so fills and satiates the whole appetite of man that nothing outside it is left to be sought.

But it would not fill nor fully satiate if something outside it, namely another end, could be sought and were required for its perfection.

Hence it cannot be that the will tend into two in such a way as if each were its perfect good and ultimate end.

This is confirmed: if there were two ultimate ends, neither would be the supreme and full good of the one seeking, neither would perfectly satiate the appetite, since with one obtained the other would be appetible. Whence they would at once be fully satiating, because ultimate ends, and they would not be, because outside each there would remain something appetible which would not be subordinated to it, namely, the other end.

b) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first natural good: that which is naturally desired cannot be except one, because nature is determined to one and does not tend except to one; whence just as there is only one form and one species of one thing, so neither is there except one natural inclination.

But the ultimate end or supreme good is naturally desired.

Therefore the ultimate end is one.

The minor is clear from internal experience, and is also understood: just as in reason the principle is that which is known as naturally implanted, so in the will the principle is that which is desired by natural tendency; whence love of the end or of the supreme good is implanted in the will, because it is the principle in appetible things.

c) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first thing specifying: in every genus of causing and operating, there is one principle from which all things are derived; otherwise there would not be one genus.

But all human acts constitute one genus of operating and causing, because all appetible things of the will are of one genus, namely, a good befitting man; but the ultimate end is the first principle in this genus because appetible for its own sake.

Therefore the ultimate end is one. "Since voluntary actions receive their species from the end," says St. Thomas, "they must receive the notion of genus from the ultimate end, which is common" (a. 5).

19. Thesis IV. The ultimate end of man truly is happiness or beatitude. - It is proved:

The ultimate end is the highest and perfect good of man. But beatitude or happiness is nothing other than the possession of this highest good, sufficient and complete, which ultimately perfects and terminates every tendency and fully satiates and totally quiets the whole appetition of an intellectual nature, which consciously knows this full sufficiency of its own in the good and rejoices in it (I, q. 26, a. 1). Therefore the ultimate end of man is beatitude.

Hence beatitude can be defined, both objective: the perfect good totally quieting and satiating the appetite (q. 2, a. 8), or the most complete good which completes the whole appetition of a rational agent, so that nothing is left to be desired, or the perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire (q. 5, a. 3), the ultimate perfection of rational or intellectual nature (I, q. 62, a. 1); and formal: stable possession and rest in ultimate perfection, possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire, or a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods (Boethius).

That this beatitude truly exists and is possible for us is proved: man by an innate appetite and instinctive necessity tends to perfect beatitude, so that it is impossible not to think of it frequently and not to desire it, or sincerely to will the opposite. But an innate appetite cannot be vain, for otherwise our nature would be badly constituted; furthermore it is repugnant to the wisdom, truth, and goodness of God that He should have implanted in us an inclination and appetite for something which does not exist or which we are unable to attain. Therefore.

20. Corollaries.

1. The end is the cause, origin, and root of all affections. This "can be declared more fully not only by the example of light, which, because it is the first and highest visible thing, is the reason for seeing all differences of colors; or by the example of the motion of the heart, which, because it is the first motion of life, is the cause from which all vital motions flow; but still far more brilliantly by the comparison, most frequent in St. Thomas, of the intellect with the will. For the love of the ultimate end is related among appetible things as the knowledge of principles is among intelligible things; whence, just as first principles are the first things known, so beatitude or the ultimate end is the first thing willed. And just as we do not assent to particular conclusions except insofar as they cohere with first principles, so neither do we will particular goods except insofar as they are connected with the ultimate end, namely, beatitude. And finally, just as the knowledge of principles moves to all other cognitions, insofar as, enlightened by it, we understand the rest, and therefore it is the root of all cognitions, indeed the other cognitions are nothing but certain propagations and diffusions of that first light, so that first love of beatitude moves to other loves, insofar as, stirred up by it, we seek those things which lead to it, and it is the first root of all affections; indeed the other affections are nothing but certain branches, shoots, and diffusions of that first love; or lines born from this circumference and terminated in its center, namely, beatitude. Whence Boethius excellently says, On the Consolation, III, prose 2: Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold studies exercises, proceeds indeed by a diverse path, but nevertheless strives to arrive at one end of beatitude. And St. Augustine, On the Trinity, book XIII, chapter 5: All men will to be blessed, and they most ardently desire this, and for the sake of this they desire the rest." Thus Goudin, Philosophy, part 3, q. 1, a. 1, § 1, conclusion 2.

2. Beatitude can be considered:

a) In the abstract, and thus it is the universal and complete good which man necessarily wills and cannot not will, and therefore in this all agree.

b) In the concrete, for the thing whose possession ought to render us blessed and perfectly good; and thus man, who does not possess it, freely tends to it, because he does not necessarily see the necessary connection of this or that good with beatitude. Hence under this respect men do not agree in the ultimate end (q. 5, a. 8; q. 1, a. 7).