Scholion. On the Necessity of Acting for the Sake of an End

I. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some end. For always, when he acts deliberately, he intends some effect or some good. But that effect is truly an end: for an end is that for the sake of which something is done (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1).

II. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some final end. For man, whose rational appetite regards the good as its object and is satisfied only by a good apprehended as perfect, man, I say, whatever he deliberately desires, desires either as a perfect good or as tending toward a perfect good. But in either case he acts for the sake of the final end: in the former case, because the perfect good has the character of the final end; in the latter case, because one desiring something as tending toward the perfect good desires it in order to the perfect good or to the final end (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6).

III. The final ends for which man can in fact act are distinguished as three, namely God, the creature, and beatitude in common. Of these, God and the creature are final ends in the concrete, as regarding a concrete object, and are called material ends. Beatitude is the final end in the abstract, as regarding the indeterminate perfect good, or whatever that may be; and it is usually called the formal end. Now that God and the creature can be intended as the final end is plain and admitted by all. The same seems to be said of beatitude in common. For by the consent of all, there are acts that are venially evil. But acts of this kind are neither referred to God as to the final end, nor to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be mortal sins. It remains, therefore, that they are referred to beatitude in common. Moreover, there are good acts placed without charity. But acts of this kind do not seem to be referred to God as to the final end (n. 243); nor are they referred to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be gravely evil. Hence it seems necessary to admit that they are referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, teach otherwise, and judge that acts that are venially evil and good acts placed without charity are referred to God positively, to the creature negatively, or - as others say - to God efficaciously, to the creature inefficaciously.¹

¹ Cf. Billuart, De ultimo fine, dissertation I, articles 4 and 5.

IV. Man cannot act at the same time for several final ends. For someone desires as the final end that which he desires as the perfect good. Hence the final end so fills the appetite of man that nothing outside it remains to be desired by man. Given this, neither can he desire anything outside it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 5). Hence a deliberate act is referred either to God alone, or to the creature alone, or to beatitude in common alone, as to the final end. If to God, the act is good; if to the creature, it is gravely evil; if to beatitude in common, it is good or venially evil, according as it is or is not referable to God (n. 243). Others, however, think otherwise according to what was said under III.

V. A man acting for the sake of some final end refers his act at least virtually to that end, or at least virtually intends that end. Therefore first note that intention is distinguished into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative intention; and into explicit and implicit intention. Actual intention is had when someone actually intends or wills some end. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually willed some end and acts by force of the past willing, although he does not actually think about the end. Habitual intention is had when someone intends the end and has not revoked the intention, but nevertheless does not act by force of that intention. Interpretative intention is had when someone does not intend the end, but would intend it if he thought about it. Others, however, by the name of interpretative intention understand that which others call implicit. Explicit intention is had when some end is intended distinctly, or according to its proper concept. Implicit intention is had when some end is contained in another thing explicitly willed. With these things noted beforehand, the proposition is proved: no one truly acts for the sake of some end unless the intention of the end in some way exercises influence on the act on the part of the agent. But neither interpretative nor habitual intention suffices for that; virtual intention, however, does suffice, as is gathered from the notions handed down.