The Order of Charity Between God and Creature

I. God is to be loved above all things with charity objectively supreme. For charity commands that we will to each one the good which he has. But God has infinite goodness. Then, a greater extrinsic good, that is, greater glory, is to be desired for God or the Creator than for any creature whatever (St. Alphonsus, II, 22).

II. God is to be loved above all things with charity appreciatively supreme. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment";¹ 2. from reason. And indeed infinite goodness, such as the goodness of God is, must be judged worthier of love than the lower and participated goodness of a creature, and therefore the former must be preferred to the latter (St. Alphonsus, II, 22; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 27, a. 3).

III. Although it is fitting to love God with charity intensively supreme, nevertheless there is no obligation; nor is a certain degree of intensity required. The reason is that intensity does not so much correspond to the dignity of the object as to the subjective disposition and the more vivid apprehension of the one loving (St. Alphonsus, II, 22; VI, 442).

¹ Matt. 22:37-38.

Hatred of Creatures.—All dislike of God is sinful, because there is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents (Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor (i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St. Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”

The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.

Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself? (a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b) If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in them and beneficial to himself: “Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy” (Prov., xxvii. 6).

Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v. 29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John, xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, if this is necessary to save his life.

One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one’s neighbor under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss, but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the desire of a neighbor’s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property one expects to inherit, for the neighbor’s life is more important than private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal., v. 12).

Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death. Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to others.

Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God, diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

S. Th. II-II, q. 26, aa. 1, 2, 3; De Virt., q. 2, a. 7.

903. Notions. - It must be noted beforehand that someone is loved more than another in a threefold way: a) objectively, we love more him to whom we will a greater good; b) appreciatively or estimatively, we love more him whom simply we prefer and esteem more highly than another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than that of another; c) intensively, we love more him whom we love with a more fervent affection, that is, with greater intensity and vehemence of act, for example, with greater striving of the will.¹

¹ Billuart notes that St. Thomas under the same word of intension speaks of intension and appreciation: both are on the part of the agent.

904. Principle. In the order of charity God is to be loved simply above all things. - It is of the essence of charity that we love God above all things, as is said in Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37:

1. Objectively, because we ought to will to God divine goods which are infinite, namely, the infinity of his perfections which can belong to no creature; and because we ought to refer all other things to God and desire greater glory for him than for ourselves or neighbor.

2. Also appreciatively, so that we would prefer to lose and suffer all things rather than desert him;² for a) the infinite demands to be loved more than a finite creature, and the common good of all more than one's own particular good; b) God is the principle and cause of beatitude, whence we ought to love God more than ourselves or neighbor, who are only participants in this beatitude; c) the reason for loving ourselves and neighbor is God, as was said in nn. 877-878; whence God is to be loved more. Hence d) it is said in Lk. XIV, 26: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother..., and also his own soul (life), he cannot be my disciple" (cf. Mt. X, 37).

² Appreciatively, that is, also by election of the will or by estimative affection, not only judicatively through an act of the intellect; for thus even the demons themselves know and judge that God on account of himself is most worthy to be preferred to all created goods, but they do not thus esteem him by will.

3. Nevertheless we are not bound to love God more intensively;³ for sensible and present or proximate goods are accustomed to move us more vehemently than remote, absent, and divine goods.

³ Appreciation is from election of the will; intensity is not always so. For the intensity of the will and sensation of love does not arise so much from the dignity of the object as from the subjective disposition of the one loving, namely, from the vivid perception of the object and its proximity. Those things which seem more proximate to us are accustomed to be perceived more vividly and thus to excite more and to be loved more intensely. Hence many created objects, as visible, are perceived by us as more proximate and are felt by us more vividly than God, and therefore they excite intense love more than the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God.

But a creature cannot be loved more intensively than God, if from charity it is loved by the same act, because thus the reason for loving the creature is God loved, who consequently is loved more.

I ASSERT first that the habit of Charity is borne principally and more toward God.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure first, because thus God commands, Matth. 22. This is the first and greatest commandment. You have the same in Matth. 10. Lucae 14.

SECONDLY. The cause is prior to its effect; but the love of God is the cause of the love of neighbor: for man loves his neighbor precisely because he loves God, whose image he is, and whom God commands to be loved.

THIRDLY, because friendship principally and first regards that which has the ratio of an end, in which is found that good upon whose communication it is founded, and which is the cause of that good: but God is such a good, toward which the neighbor also is ordered, and is that from which that communication is derived in the supernatural life of beatitude, in which the perfect friendship of charity consists: Therefore. St. Thomas uses the same reason, which St. Bonaventure rubs up again, more in the body. And Tannerus disp. 2 quest. 3 dub. 2 num. 21. and the rest.

FINALLY: Love inclines first to that toward which it inclines more ardently, because the affection follows the greater inclination; but the love of Charity inclines more ardently to the loving of God than of one's neighbor: Therefore.

I ASSERT secondly. Charity as to exercise is first borne toward the neighbor, as the more imperfect act, so that through the active life it may rise to the perfect love of God, and to the contemplative; for he who wishes to be a perfect lover of God ought first to exercise himself in the love of neighbor; as he who wishes to be a good contemplative ought first to be a good active, as St. Gregory teaches. And in sign of this thing, the Holy Spirit was given twice. First on earth, Ioan. 20. Second from heaven, Act. 2. Because the love of charity must first be exercised in those things which we see, that we may be carried up through the love of visible things to the love of invisible ones; and according to this way proceed the reasons to be brought forward below: This is St. Bonaventure's.

It is THEREFORE proved first. The destruction of one is destructive of the other, and its position is the position of the other: but the destruction of charity for one's neighbor is destructive of the charity of God, as Ioan. argues, prima, cap. 4. He who does not love his brother, whom he sees; how can he love God, whom he does not see? But that thing to which the position or destruction of the other consequently follows must be prior to it; and this is according to disposition, as St. Thomas also says ad primum.

SECONDLY. First that which is animal, then that which is spiritual follows, prima ad Corinthios 15. but the love of neighbor is more sensible: Therefore it precedes.

THIRDLY. The process is from the imperfect to the perfect, from the way to the terminus; but the love of God is more perfect, and the terminus toward which the love of neighbor tends: therefore.

FOURTHLY. Action is prior to contemplation; but the love of neighbor is occupied with the active life; the love of God with the contemplative: Therefore.

I ASSERT that he is so to be loved.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure first from Deuter. 6. Matth. 22. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment. But the whole affection is commanded to be bestowed on no other: Therefore. The Holy Doctor proves the same on 14 Lucae, in these words: If anyone comes to me, and does not hate father and mother, etc. and moreover his own soul also, he cannot be my disciple.

NEXT it is proved from Sts. Augustine and Ambrose, who admonish that God is to be loved before all things, as I said in question 28.

THIRDLY it is proved by the Holy Doctor. On account of which each thing is such, that is the more such; but on account of God we love ourselves and our neighbor; and he is rightly so to be loved, because he is the supreme good: Therefore we are bound more to love God himself. The major is Aristotle: Primo post, cap. 3. et 2 Metaph. t. 4.

IT IS PROVED fourthly. The end is to be loved more than those things which are toward the end; but God is the end of all: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's 2 Phys. text. 23.

IT IS PROVED fifthly in the body. Right reason dictates that the supreme good is to be loved more than the other goods; but God is the supreme Good: Therefore. Scotus uses this argument, as I shall say in the following question.

You will OBJECT first. Perfection does not invert the order of its perfectible; but grace is the perfection of nature, which without grace loves itself more than God: Therefore grace, added, perfects but does not invert this order.

The Holy Doctor RESPONDS that nature has two things, a primitive Esse, and the defect of corruption: therefore that which is primitive and of perfection is perfected; but that which has defect is corrected and amended. Therefore disordered self-love is of corrupted nature, and so is corrected by grace.

You will OBJECT secondly. Just as if you add equals to equals, they remain equal; so if you add unequals, they remain unequal; but the love of ourselves before the advent of grace outweighs the love of God: Therefore also after its advent: Therefore according to the order of Charity we ought to love ourselves more.

The Holy Doctor RESPONDS that the Major is true if what is added as equal respect both equally; but charity respects the love of God more than that which is for oneself; hence at the advent of Charity the love of self is diminished and the love of God increased.

You will OBJECT thirdly. The affection of love follows cognition; but we know ourselves more than God: Therefore we also love ourselves more.

The Holy Doctor RESPONDS that love follows cognition not only as to Charity, but also as to the greater perfection of goodness. Therefore, although we know ourselves more clearly than God; nevertheless we acknowledge that the goodness of God is greater and to be esteemed of more worth.

You will object fourthly. As much as anyone loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; and as much as he desires to enjoy God, so much does he desire his own beatitude; and as much as he desires his own beatitude, so much does he love himself: Therefore he loves himself as much as he loves God.

He responds, St. Doctor, that as to the affection of concupiscence one loves God as much as he desires to enjoy God; but as to the love of friendship he loves God more, because he orders his own goodness ultimately to God, as toward an end more lovable, namely the good by essence, toward which as toward a principle the good by participation is ordered: For indeed the love of concupiscence does not make a plurality with the love of ourselves; and therefore it does not follow that by that love we love God and ourselves equally: for to love ourselves out of charity is nothing other than to wish the supreme good for ourselves.

Next he responds that the Major can be denied; because one can desire to enjoy God for the sake of God himself, and therefore love God more than his own beatitude, and this is the order of Charity.

You will object fifthly. When two things are finite, one can be intensified and the other remitted, and reduced to equality; but charity toward God and ourselves is finite: Therefore it can come about that the charity of God is remitted while the love of ourselves is intensified by Charity: Therefore, etc.

He responds, St. Doctor, that these loves are finite; nevertheless by reason of the object the love of God is infinite, and for this reason it cannot be equalled. Nor indeed is it new that the finite should infinitely exceed another finite: for thus a line infinitely exceeds a point, and so a point can never arrive at being equal to a line; indeed many, and infinite points will never make any length of a line. Thus, therefore, are created goods with respect to the supreme good for the rational soul; and so infinitely many created goods will never be so lovable, because the Divine good, even as participable by me, will always be loved as the end; and thus it will never be equalled by the love of self, or of any creature whatsoever.

You will object sixthly. Love is a unitive force; but one cannot be united to anyone more than to oneself.

He responds, St. Doctor, first, that nothing is more united to us than ourselves according to nature; but not according to affection. Therefore God can be more adhering to us in love; and in this second way love is a unitive force by affection, not by nature.

He responds secondly, that God is more intimate to us, and we depend more on him than on intrinsic principles, because God indwells nature and makes it blessed.

The first opinion denies that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves. So Coninck, disp. 24, doubt 3, alleging in favor of it St. Bonaventure, Giles, of Auxerre, and other older authors.

The second opinion is that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves. This opinion is explicitly held by St. Bonav. here, as we saw in the preceding question, and it is clear in the body, the foundations, and the replies to the arguments, where nothing clearer could be read; for he asserts, and repeats, that nature, as nature is, inclines more toward God, even though by reason of depravity and corruption it be pressed more by self-love. St. Thomas follows him here, and with him all Thomists, Cajetan, Bannes, Aragon; Scotus 3 dist. 27, single question, § Istis igitur rationibus, whom all Scotists follow, per Mastrius in 3 disp. 6 quaest. 25; Casati, treatise on Charity, disp. 3 sect. 5; Valencia here p. 2; Vasquez in I-II, disp. 194; Tannerus disp. 2 quaest. 3 dub. 3, wrongly citing St. Bonaventure 3 dist. 25 to the contrary.

I assert, with this opinion, that we are naturally inclined to love God more than ourselves.

Many reasons are brought forward by many. And many refute them, so as to exalt their own.

The first reason is that of St. Thomas in the body, which St. Bonaventure intimates in 3 dist. 29 dub. 1 litt. and in the Diet, title 5 cap. 5, and serm. 2 on the One Holy Doctor. Every part naturally loves the common good and the good of the whole more than the good proper to the part; but the good of any created thing is compared to the Divine good as the good of a part to the good of the whole: Therefore. For God is the highest good, by whose participation other things are good, and without whom there is no good, and hence he is every good, and the good of the whole universe. The major is proved by the example of the serpent, which, so that it may save its head, in which is life, exposes its parts to blows; and the hand naturally exposes itself so that the head, and consequently the whole, may be saved; and water ascends lest there be admitted into the nature of the universe the absurdity of a vacuum.

Scotus attacks this reason in § Istae rationes: for the examples by which the assumption is supported only show that the whole loves itself, or its principal parts, more than the less principal ones; for water does not ascend by its own form naturally to fill the vacuum, but is violently snatched by nature, which cares for the order of the universe; nor does the hand expose itself, but man exposes it: similarly the serpent exposes its more principal parts so that the head may be saved. Hence therefore you have only that God loves the good of the Universe more than that of a part; or that the good of a principal part is loved more than that of a less principal one; but you do not conclude that any part of the Universe loves the good of the whole more than its own.

Scotus adds, even were this granted in the examples; nevertheless the case is disproportionate; for those parts, by saving the whole, save themselves, which are parts of it; but a creature is not any part of God, although it be his effect. So also Mastrius.

But these things are frivolous. First indeed, the nature of a part is ordered to the whole as to an end; and therefore it appetizes the good of the whole more. That it is violent for the form of water to ascend, if no necessity of the whole universe urges, amounts to nothing; but if a vacuum is at hand, it is moved by a natural motion, as being formally a part; for it is not moved miraculously by God, nor attracted by another: for does the vacuum have an active power? But suppose the nature of the universe naturally operates thus. Acting therefore is most innate to the part, and likewise to each of the parts,⁴, and thus it is natural to be acted upon; for the particular nature follows the common nature, which is its rule. Hence Aristotle says in 1 Phys. text. 78: Each thing is apt to be acted upon and moved as it naturally acts and moves. ⁴ Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'maximè innatum partiformiter etiam singulis partibus'; 'partiformiter' is not attested Latin and both witnesses agree on it, so it was rendered as 'and likewise to each of the parts' (likely for 'parti, formaliter').

Nor is it true that the cause for which a part in the world, or in a serpent, or in a man, exposes itself to danger is that, by preserving the whole, it preserves itself, which is a part of the whole, etc.; on the contrary it is the opposite: for it undergoes its own destruction and perishing, so that by its own destruction the whole may be saved. For what preservation of water is there in departing from its natural place against its inclination?^{3 3} Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'Quae enim conservatio aquae dicedere a loco naturali ad infensum?'; 'dicedere' is a corrupted form, rendered 'decedere' (to depart); 'ad infensum' left as printed (cf. 'against its inclination').

To the disproportion last alleged by Scotus, St. Bonaventure replies at ad 6. For although a creature is not a component part of God, nevertheless it depends on him more than a part on the whole, and more than on itself, such that upon the destruction of God there follows, by way of intrinsic connection of Creatures, annihilation. Moreover God is an intimate pervader, penetrating, containing, and hence more intimate to us than we ourselves are to ourselves.