The Origin of Ownership in External Things

368. Principles. Concerning the origin of ownership, from those things which natural right teaches expressly, only those principles are to be taken which are required for rightly understanding these questions.¹

1. God granted the ownership of temporal goods for the preservation of life at the beginning to the human race in such a way that the goods were common to all and proper to one no more than to another.

a. Temporal goods were made by the author of nature for this end, that man may provide for himself from them concerning the things necessary for the preservation of life. Therefore man has a right of acquiring for himself from temporal goods the things which are necessary for the sustenance of life; but this right is true ownership in temporal goods.

b. Twice God granted dominion of earthly things to man: first indeed soon after creation: "Have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the heaven and all living things that move upon the earth";² then again after the fall and the flood: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth, and let your terror and dread be upon all the animals of the earth," etc.³ By these words God granted created things to the human race as a common good.

2. The division of things initially common, and private ownership of them, both movable and immovable, is not only licit, but in the present state of fallen nature also necessary.

Socialists affirm that temporal goods are to be held and preserved as a good common to all, so that the division of goods and private ownership of them is illicit and altogether unjust. But by a manifold argument it is shown that private ownership in the present order of things is altogether necessary, and therefore must be derived from the will of God.⁴ From these things it is clear that the distinction between rich and poor will never cease in human society at any time: "The poor you have always with you."⁵

3. From the law of nature itself, and indeed by occupation, the division among men of things initially common and private ownership were introduced.

By what right the first division of things was made, and in what way private ownership was first introduced, is not established among the learned. Some think that it was made by paternal authority; others by a pact of men, whether explicit or implicit; others by human law; others finally by force and violence by which the stronger oppressed the weak. In general it cannot be denied that this was done by the law of nature. With the natural faculty of acquiring ownership of things there must be joined a free fact which is the reason and title of ownership in some determinate thing; but this fact is the occupation of a negatively common thing. Hence the principle: a thing belonging to no one becomes the thing of the first occupier.

4. Ownership obtained by legitimate occupation is not absolute, but restricted by its own limits. Namely, man cannot have his goods as his own in such a way that in no respect are they any longer common, or that he can always and under every condition exclude all others from their use; for private ownership, which is a secondary right, cannot take away a primary right. Now the primary end on account of which corporeal goods were created is this: that there be at hand for men means for preserving those goods which nature itself wills to be common to all. Therefore, even after the division of goods has been made, man retains the right implanted by nature itself to those things which are required for protecting and preserving these goods.⁶

a. This right of acquiring those things which are necessary for preserving life is diverse according to the diverse condition of men. alpha. He who can labor has a (strict) right to labor, that is, of acquiring for himself the necessaries of life by labor (n. 69). beta. He who is unfit for labor has a (moral or legal) right of receiving the necessaries of life from the superfluous goods of the rich. gamma. He who is in extreme necessity has a (strict) right of taking those things which are necessary for preserving life. For each right, as far as can be done, ought to be preserved uninjured; but if private ownership impedes the preservation of life, the secondary right ceases and the primary right prevails. This right is not to be understood in such a way that the rich man is bound to confer upon the one in extreme need those things which he needs, but in such a way that he is bound not to impede him who, in extreme danger, provides for himself concerning the necessaries. To these rights on the other side correspond just so many duties, which are connected with ownership of temporal things.

b. Goods which nature wills to be common to all must be distinguished from goods which nature itself does not intend for all, but which individuals acquire for themselves according to their condition. Goods of the former kind are life, health, liberty, reputation; goods of the latter kind are a noble state, riches, great dignity, office, and things of this sort.⁷

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2. Encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, 16 May 1891. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas u. s. w. (Freiburg: Herder, 1895). F. Cathrein, Sozialismus^7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1903). F. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie^4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1902), II, p. 247 ff. H. Pesch, Liberalismus, Socialismus u. chr. Gesellschaftsordnung (Freiburg: Herder, 1901), p. 196 ff. Schaub, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1898). Th. Mayer, Institutiones iuris naturalis (Friburgi: Herder, 1900), II, n. 162 ss. A. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de iustitia^2 (Brugis: Beyaert, 1904), n. 194-245. Pottier, De iure et iustitia (Leodii: Ancion, 1900), p. 18-47. Diederlack, Die soziale Frage^6 (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1904), p. 131 ff.

² Gen. 1:28.

³ Gen. 9:1-2.

⁴ Diederlack briefly gathers the arguments, Die soziale Frage^6, n. 91 ff.; Cathrein, Das Privateigentum (Freiburg: Herder).

⁵ Matt. 26:11.

⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2; H. Pesch, l. c., Pflichten und Schranken des Eigentums, p. 390 ff.

⁷ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 153 ss.

1. Ioannes Iacobus, without any scruple, carries off the goods of another, saying that God alone is the Lord of all things, and that God created other things on account of man, namely on account of all men. Wherefore there is no property, but all things are common.

Q. What as to the case?

R. 1. Exterior things can be considered in two ways: in one way as to their nature, which is not subject to human power, but only to divine power, to which all things obey at a nod. In another way as to the use of the thing itself; and thus man has natural dominion of exterior things, because through reason and will he can use exterior things for his own utility, as if made on account of himself. For the more imperfect are always on account of the more perfect. And thus it is plain that, although God is the Lord of all things, nevertheless this does not exclude dominion and property of things in man. For thence it follows only that God alone has dominion over exterior things as to their natures, that God alone has principal dominion of all things. But God himself ordered, according to his providence, certain things to the bodily sustenance of man; and on account of this man has natural dominion of things as to the power of using them. For this is dominion, and nothing else: The right or faculty of using one's own thing for any use permitted by law, and this for one's own advantage. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 1; I. M. 838, 866, 867.

2. But although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that man also does not have dominion of things; indeed, the contrary follows. For if they are on account of man, these goods are man's, although they are not principally his, as is gathered from what has just been said. Moreover, although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that all things are to be possessed in common, and that nothing is to be possessed as proper; but from this it follows only that the distinction of possessions was not made naturally, but was naturally superadded to natural law, rational nature itself inclining and impelling toward that division and individual appropriation. First indeed, because each one is naturally more solicitous in procuring something which pertains to himself alone, than that which is common to all or to many, because each one, fleeing labor, leaves to others that which pertains to others. Secondly, because human affairs are treated in a more ordered way, if each has his own care of procuring some thing incumbent on him. But there would be confusion if anyone indiscriminately procured anything. Thirdly, because by this the state of men is preserved more peacefully, while each one is content with his own thing. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 2.

3. Ioannes Iacobus, therefore, a communist, is a true thief, and is held to restitution of all the things which he carried off. For to restore what has been unjustly taken away is of necessity of salvation, since to preserve justice is of necessity of salvation, and to restore what has been unjustly taken away is an act of commutative justice. S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 1, 2.

44. Since the right of private property is today attacked by many, namely by communists, socialists, and collectivists, we shall: 1. briefly outline the history of these errors; 2. propose the Catholic thesis; 3. solve the principal arguments of adversaries; 4. suggest certain means for preventing socialism.

1. From the duty of labor flows the right of property or ownership, i. e., the right to acquire, hold, and dispose freely of the material fruits of labor, that is to say, the goods which are the result of man's individual and personal endeavor.

The right to acquire and possess property is by no means, as the Communists and Socialists maintain, a fictitious claim based on robbery and injustice,¹ but corresponds to the natural duty of labor from which it arises, and therefore is a natural right.

¹ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Socialism: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application, tr. and adapted to conditions in the United States by V. Gettelmann, S.J., New York 1904.

Under certain conditions the acquisition of a limited amount of earthly goods even becomes a duty.² The supreme, though not the sole, title of ownership is labor.

² Gen. III, 19; Eccles. V, 17; 2 Thess. III, 10. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “With respect to an external thing, two powers belong to man, one of which is the power of procuring and administering it; and with respect to this it is lawful for man to possess things as his own. It is also necessary for human life for three reasons: first, because each person is more solicitous in procuring something that belongs to him alone than something common to all or to many, since each person, fleeing labor, leaves to another what pertains to the common good, as happens in a multitude of servants; secondly, because human affairs are handled in a more orderly way if the proper care of procuring some particular thing falls upon individuals, whereas there would be confusion if everyone indiscriminately procured everything; thirdly, because by this means a more peaceful condition of men is preserved, while each is content with his own thing. Hence we see that quarrels arise more frequently among those who possess something in common and undivided.” —Father J. Kelleher, in what is probably the best modern treatise on the subject (Private Ownership, Dublin 1911) points out (p. 149) that the classical theologians almost unanimously taught that the division of private property does not depend directly upon the natural law, but is derived from the ius gentium. (Cfr. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 278 sqq.)

Private ownership is a wonderful institution, to which humanity owes the development of trade, commerce, and industry, nay whatever determines the differences between civilized man and the savage. Without it labor would languish because the laborer would no longer be sure of the product of his industry. The surer he feels that he is toiling for himself and his own, rather than for strangers, the greater the persistency and diligence which he will bestow upon his work. Private ownership safeguards the future, as far as this is humanly possible, and without it diligence and thrift would never increase the movable capital that lends so powerful an impetus to production, nor would the constantly renewed and always laborious work of cultivating the soil insure to the earth that increase of fertility without which society would be condemned to endless misery.³

³ Chas. Perm, Les Lois de la Societe Chretienne, 2 vols., Paris 1876, especially Vol. I; F. Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, Bonn 1863, pp. 145 sqq.

Barely touching the traditional arguments as developed, e. g., by St. Thomas, Pope Leo XIII, in his famous Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," bases private ownership on the rational nature of man.

"Every man," he says, "has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self-direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep its powers on the alert, impel it to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine it to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self-preservation, the other, the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for beasts are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind or reason which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a man human, and distinguishes him essentially and generically from the brute. And on this very account —that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason —it must be within his right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced to use, continue for further use in after time. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; although satisfied to-day, they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow."⁴

⁴ English tr. from The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 181 sq. A better tr. in Bolshevism — The Remedy, New Haven, Conn., 1919, pp. 5 sq.

The Pontiff goes on to show that private ownership was established through individual efforts before the existence of the State, and that it is recognized by history, by civil law, and by divine law.⁵

⁵ Cfr. A. C. Breig, Papal Program of Social Reform, Milwaukee 1913, pp. 14 sqq.

It is frequently asserted that the first Christians, especially those at Jerusalem, practiced Communism.⁶ Learned scholars who have investigated the question with great care deny that there was Communism in the primitive Church. The early Christians were allowed to keep their property, and if some of them sold it, they did so voluntarily, for the purpose of assisting the poor.⁷ The most that can be said is that in some sections of the great congregation of Jerusalem there existed a sort of religious community of goods.⁸

⁶ Cfr. Acts II, 44 sq.; IV, 32-37; V, 1-4.

⁷ Cfr. E. Baumgartner, "Der Kommunismus im Urchristentum," in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1909, pp. 625 sqq.

⁸ O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in der altkirchlichen Literatur, Freiburg 1908, pp. 16 sq.

Those Church Fathers who are represented as having preached Communism, did not oppose private ownership, but merely its abuse. The passages quoted from their writings by Socialist authors are largely spurious, and those which are genuine prove nothing more than that God did not distribute temporal goods directly among individual men, but gave the earth with its resources to the race at large for the common use of all, so that no one may claim anything as his own as if he had the right to exclude all others absolutely and for ever from its use.⁹ The Fathers simply wished to express the same truth which St. Thomas in the thirteenth century set forth as follows: "Man may not have exterior things for his own, but as the common property of all, namely in such a way that one readily shares them with others in case of need."¹⁰ There are many Patristic texts which unmistakably assert the right of private ownership.¹¹ Lactantius defends it with great scientific acumen. St. Ambrose, who frequently censures the wealthy, teaches that the condemnation pronounced by Christ does not affect all who have wealth, but only those who abuse it, and adds that every man is allowed perfect freedom in giving alms.¹²

⁹ Cfr. J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., p. 134, n. 1.

¹⁰ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 2: “A man ought not to hold external things as his own, but as common, so that, namely, he may readily share them in the necessity of others.”

¹¹ See G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 82 sqq.; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 266 sqq.: V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphiloso- phie, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 313 sqq.; J. Seipel, Die wirtschafts-ethischen Lehren der Kirchenvater, Vienna 1907, pp. 49 sqq., 120 sqq., 190 sqq.; J. A. Ryan Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913.

¹² St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel, sec. Luc., 1. V, n. 69: “Although in abundant wealth there are many enticements to sins, nevertheless there are also very many incentives to virtues. Although virtue does not require assistance, and the contribution of a poor man is more praiseworthy than the liberality of a rich man, nevertheless the heavenly sentence condemns by its authority not those who possess riches, but those who do not know how to use them.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1654).—IDEM, De Nabuthe Iezrael, c. 13, n. 55: “He who has been able to be proved faithful amid riches is truly perfect and worthy of glory.” (P. L., XIV, 748).—IDEM, De Officiis, l. I, c. 30, n. 14: “It is in your power to bestow what you wish.” (P. L., XVI, 66). —On the teaching of St. Ambrose consult O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (see note 8, supra) pp. 134 sqq., and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, St. Louis 1913, pp. 52-66. "What St. Ambrose teaches is not communism in any correct sense of the word," says Dr. Ryan (op. cit., p. 57 sq.). "It is rather a first principle of the natural law, namely that the earth belongs to all the children of men, and not to a few only. He tells the rich to restore their excessive wealth to the poor, while a communist would order them to turn it over to the community. It is true that he calls these donations of the rich by the name of restitution, but this is because the rich have accumulated so much that the poor have been deprived of their birth-right. Hence, he commands them to give back their unjust gains. Any one who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the fourth century, will know that St. Ambrose was right when he told the rich that they had robbed the poor, and were consequently bound to make reparation. The most zealous defender of individual ownership could speak the same way in the same circumstances. What St. Ambrose demands, therefore, is not a return to common property, but a recognition of common rights."

The phrase, "Omnis dives aut iniquus aut iniqui heres,"¹³ which occurs repeatedly in the writings of St. Jerome, has led to his being classed as a Socialist. But the fact that St. Jerome makes this sentiment his own and quotes it with approval, does not prove that he looked upon every property holder as a thief. "Iniquus—from in + aequus—refers literally to a want of equality or want of proportion. Taken figuratively, it has about the same meaning as iniustus, for which it was often used as a synonym by the best authors. Now St. Jerome's style, as well as his own confession, assures us that he was well acquainted with classical Latin. We may safely infer then that he uses this word in the specific sense of iniustus, and not in the more general sense of peccator. This inference is confirmed by his manner of speaking in a sentence where he distinguishes between an impius on the one hand, and an iniquus and a peccator on the other. Even if he meant merely 'wrong doer' when he wrote iniquus, the specific wrong doing referred to must have been an act of injustice, since it was committed in acquiring riches. When a man gets possession by wrong-doing, the greater part of the wrong will fall under the head of injustice, violation of personal rights. St. Jerome, therefore, subscribed to the opinion that every dives was an unjust man, and by dives he meant, not a man of some property, but a man of much property. All the synonyms of dives and its use by the best authors show that it refers to an abundance of goods, and not to mere ownership, as some would have us believe."¹⁴

¹³ This remarkable saying, which seems to have been of pagan origin, was evidently current in St. Jerome's day, for he quotes it in three distinct passages of his writings. For an analysis of these passages see J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 67 sqq.

¹⁴ Ryan, op. cit., pp. 70 sq. Further on in his booklet (p. 74) Dr. Ryan shows that Herbert Spencer spoke in much the same way of the present titles to landed property as St. Jerome did of those of his time. "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate... Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning, these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." The passage occurs in Spencer's Social Statics and was omitted in later editions, but, as Dr. Ryan correctly says, "the question is one of fact, not of opinion." W. S. Lilly declares: "I say, without shadow of doubt, that to much property the saying of Proudhon [namely, that property is theft] is strictly ap- plicable." Charles S. Devas says: "As a matter of fact, much of the wealth of the rich classes in modern Europe has been gathered together, and is still kept up, by dreadful deeds of cruelty, injustice, and fraud." —"Mr. Lilly," comments Dr. Ryan, "is neither a Socialist nor a radical, but above all a pleader for law, while Mr. Devas was an unimaginative student of economics. If men of this character can write thus of titles to property in modern times, is it any wonder that St. Jerome used similar language in his day?" (Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 74 sq.)

The proposition, "No Christian should be engaged in commercial pursuits, and those who persist in them, should be expelled from the Church,"¹⁵ which is frequently ascribed to St. Chrysostom, does not occur in his genuine writings, but in the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum of an Arian writer falsely attributed to the Saint.¹⁶ Certain communistic ideas that occur in the genuine works of St. Chrysostom must be interpreted as the product of a sort of ideal Communism, resembling that of Plato, which marked a reaction against the dominating power of wealth, the materialism and egotism of certain rich people, and the exaggerated esteem in which worldly possessions were generally held at that time and which manifested itself in an insane pursuit of wealth similar to that which we behold all around us to-day. In attacking these flagrant and serious abuses St. Chrysostom occasionally employed expressions which, when read through modern glasses, seem to stamp him as an opponent of the principle of private ownership.¹⁷

¹⁵ “No Christian ought to be a merchant; or, if he wishes to be one, let him be cast out of the Church of God.”

¹⁶ Cfr. F. X. Funk's paper, "Ueber Reichtum und Handel im christlichen Altertum," in his Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, Paderborn 1917, Vol. III, pp. 150 sqq.

¹⁷ On the teaching of St. Chrysostom, see O. Schilling, Reichtum und Armut, (note 8, supra), p. 123 and J. A. Ryan, Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, pp. 1-7; on the teaching of St. Basil, ibid., pp. 7 sqq., 17 sqq.; of St. Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 10 sq.; of Clement of Alexandria, p. 11; of St. Augustine, pp. 12 sq.; of St. Gregory the Great, pp. 15 sq.

2. In all that regards wealth and earthly possessions (bona fortunae) Catholics must be guided by the following principles.

a) Broadly speaking, every man is in duty bound to acquire the means which are necessary to support himself and his dependents and to fulfil the obligations that rest upon him as a member of society. He may, moreover, acquire a superfluity of earthly possessions, but if he does so, he incurs the additional obligation of making good use of his surplus; in other words, he must not acquire or cherish wealth for its own sake, but in order to share it with the needy.¹⁸

¹⁸ Eph. IV, 28; I Tim. VI, 18. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 187, art. 3.

b) The possession of wealth is no sin in itself, but involves great danger because a rich man is constantly tempted to seek his happiness in this world and to neglect his soul.¹⁹ It is in this sense that Christ speaks of "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches,”²⁰ and warns His disciples that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven."²¹

¹⁹ Cfr. I Tim. VI, 9 sq., 17. — Seneca says (Epist., XVII, 3): “Riches have hindered many from philosophizing; poverty is unencumbered and secure.” And in another place (Ep., XVII, 5): “If you wish to be at leisure for the soul, you must either be poor or like a poor man.” —Cfr. G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 43 sqq.

²⁰ Matth. XIII, 22.

²¹ Matth. XIX, 23 sq.; cfr. Mark X, 23 sqq.; Luke XII, 16 sqq.; Jas. V, 1 sqq.

Neither is poverty in itself a virtue, or a source of virtue, though apt to become such. That it is no disgrace to be poor, appears from the example of Christ and His disciples, who were all poor laboring-men. "Jesus saith to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.”²² “Being rich," says St. Paul, "He [Jesus] became poor for your sakes, that through his poverty you might be rich."²³

²² Matth. VIII, 20; X, 9 sq.

²³ 2 Cor. VIII, 9; IX, 1 sqq.

When poverty is the result of sloth and shiftlessness, it easily leads to immorality and is in itself a sin if it makes a man discontented and covetous of the possessions of others. We read in Sacred Scripture: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life, lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of God."²⁴ Poverty becomes a virtue if borne humbly and with resignation to the will of God. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."²⁵ St. Ambrose explains this text as follows: "Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is merely a means: both good men and bad may be poor, unless perhaps that poor man is to be considered blessed of whom the prophet says, 'Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity than a rich man that is perverse.’²⁶... Blessed the poor man who cried to the Lord and was heard: poor in crime, poor in vice, a poor man in whom the prince of this world finds nothing, who imitates Him who, being rich, was made poor for our sake.²⁷ St. Matthew unfolded the full truth when he said: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'²⁸ for he who is poor in spirit does not become puffed up and proud in his conceit."²⁹

²⁴ Prov. XXX, 8-9.—St. Leo the Great says (Serm., 49 [al. 48], c. 1): “There are snares in the abundance of riches and snares in the straits of poverty. The former raise one up to pride; the latter incite one to complaint.” (Migne, P. L., LIV, 302).

²⁵ Matth. V, 3; cfr. Jas. II, 5.

²⁶ Prov. XIX, 1.

²⁷ 2 Cor. VIII, 9.

²⁸ Matth. V, 3.

²⁹ St. Ambrose, Expos. Evangel. in Lucam, l. V, n. 53: “Not all the poor are blessed, for poverty is an intermediate thing: both good and evil men can be poor. Unless perhaps that blessed poor man is to be understood whom the prophet described, saying: ‘A just poor man is better than a lying rich man.’ Blessed is the poor man who cried out and the Lord heard him: poor in crime, poor in vices, a poor man in whom the prince of this world found nothing, an imitator of that Poor Man who, though He was rich, was made poor for us. Hence Matthew disclosed the matter fully, saying: ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit’; for the poor man in spirit is not puffed up and is not exalted in the mind of his flesh.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1650). —Cfr. A. Winterstein, Die christl. Lehre vom Erdengut, pp. 173 sqq.

"Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing," says Epicurus,³⁰ and Seneca, who quotes this sentiment with approval, adds: "Not he is poor who has little, but he who attempts to gain more by dishonest means."³¹ In another place the great Roman philosopher says: "Great is the man who remains poor [i. e., in spirit] amid riches, but safer is he who does without them."³²

³⁰ “Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing”; quoted by Seneca, Ep., II, 5.

³¹ Ep., II, 6: “Not he who has little, but he who desires more, is poor.”

³² Ep., XX, 10: “Great is he who is poor amid riches, but safer is he who lacks riches.”

c) Those who devote themselves entirely to intellectual or mental labor, have a just claim to such material goods as they require, not merely to satisfy their necessities, but to enable them to live according to their rank or station. St. Paul's dictum that "they who serve at the altar share with the altar,"³³ applies in a wider sense to all who devote themselves to spiritual and intellec- tual labor for the benefit of their fellowmen, and includes pre-eminently the members of contemplative orders. d) As the individual, so also each social group (the family, the Church, the State, etc.) has the right and the duty to acquire property. But the group no less than the individual is exposed to the dangers that arise from wealth. History furnishes abundant examples of the truth of the Apostle's saying: "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men into destruction and perdition."³⁴

³³ 1 Cor. IX, 13.

³⁴ 1 Tim. VI, 9; cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 11; Luke XII, 15-21.

Man is not the absolute owner, but rather the steward of his possessions, and as such must give a strict account to God. Material wealth should never be the ultimate aim either of the individual or of society, but should be regarded and employed merely as the basis and foundation of a higher life. "Charge the rich of this world," says St. Paul, "not to be proud, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God, who giveth us abundantly all things to enjoy, to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others, to lay up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on the true life."³⁵

³⁵ 1 Tim. VI, 17-19; cfr. Matth. VI, 19-21.

The concentration of great fortunes in the hands of a few is becoming a serious danger, not only to the individual, since, as St. James says, the rich oppress the poor by might,³⁶ but also to society, because so many rich men now-a-days employ their wealth to establish monopolies, obtain excessive profits, defraud their fellowmen, purchase political power, etc. The fact that it is possible under present conditions, for the exceptionally able, the exceptionally cunning, and the exceptionally lucky, to accumulate enormous riches through the clever and unscrupulous utilization of special advantages, natural and otherwise, has given rise to a just demand for the legal limitation of fortunes. Various methods are suggested. The law might directly limit the amount of property to be held by any individual. One of our leading Catholic authorities on social and political science, Dr. John A. Ryan, thinks that if the limit were placed fairly high, say at one hundred thousand dollars, such a law "could scarcely be regarded as an infringement on the right of property. In the case of a family numbering ten members, this would mean one million dollars. All the essential objects of private ownership could be abundantly met out of a sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each person. Moreover, a restriction of this sort need not prevent a man from bestowing unlimited amounts upon charitable, religious, educational, or other benevolent causes."³⁷

³⁶ Jas. II, 6; cfr. Henry H. Klein, Dynastic America and Those Who Own It, New York, 1921; Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, New York 1900.

³⁷ J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916, pp. 292 sq.; cfr. Hy. H. Klein, Dynastic America, N. Y., 1921, pp. 164 sqq.

On the other hand, "the dangers and obstacles confronting any legal restriction of fortunes are so real as to render the proposal socially inexpedient. It would easily lend itself to grave abuse. Once the community had habituated itself to a direct limitation of any sort, the temptation to lower it in the interest of better distribution and simpler living would become exceedingly powerful. Eventually the right of property might take such an attenuated and uncertain form in the public mind as to discourage labor and initiative, and thus seriously to endanger human welfare. In the second place, the manifold evasions to which the measure would lend itself would make it of very doubtful efficacy."³⁸

³⁸ Ibid., p. 293.

Another suggestion is that the amount of property capable of being received by heirs of any person be limited, say, to one million dollars.³⁹ This would be a restriction of the rights of bequest and succession, which are integral elements of the right of ownership. Is such restriction admissible? The answer to this question, according to the same authority, "depends upon the effects of the measure on human welfare.... A person needs private property not only to provide for his personal wants and those of his family during his life-time, but also to safeguard the welfare of his dependents and to assist other worthy purposes, after he has passed away.... All the necessary and rational ends of bequest and succession could be attained in a society in which no man's heirs could inherit more than one million dollars. Under such an arrangement very few of the children of millionaires would be prevented from getting at least one hundred thousand dollars. That much would be amply sufficient for the essential and reasonable needs of any human being. Indeed, we may go further, and lay down the proposition that the overwhelming majority of persons can lead a more virtuous and reasonable life on the basis of a fortune of one hundred thousand dollars than when burdened with any larger amount. The persons who have the desire and the ability to use a greater sum than this in a rational way are so few that a limitation law need not take them into account. Corporate persons, such as hospitals, churches, schools, and other helpful institutions, should not, as a rule, be restricted as to the amount that they might inherit; for many of them could make a good use of more than the amount that suffices for a natural person."⁴⁰

³⁹ Final Report of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, p. 32; H. E. Read, The Abolition of Inheritance, N. Y., 1919; A. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, N. Y., 1901, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴⁰ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 294.

The limitation of inheritance would, of course, also be liable to abuse, and while its bad effects would probably not be as great as those following a similar abuse with regard to possessions, they are, in Dr. Ryan's opinion, "sufficiently grave and sufficiently probable to suggest that the legal restriction of bequest and succession should not be considered except as a last resort, and when the transmission of great fortunes had become a great and certain public peril."⁴¹

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 295.

An indirect way of limiting large fortunes would be through a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances. This is a more feasible method, though the maximum limit that justice would set to the rate of taxation is not easy to determine. Some years ago Andrew Carnegie⁴² recommended an inheritance tax of fifty per cent on estates amounting to more than one million dollars. While no country has yet reached this high level, the proposal cannot be stigmatized as unjust either to the testator or his heirs, nor can it be proved that it is in any other manner injurious to human welfare. In a general way, all that can be said with confidence concerning the just rates of inheritance taxation is that "the increments of the tax should correspond as closely as possible to the diminishing intensity of the wants which the tax deprives of satisfaction; in the case of each heir a certain fairly high minimum of property should be entirely exempt; on all the highest estates the rate should be uniform, and it should fall a long way short of confis- cation; and the tax should at no point be such as to discourage socially useful activity and enterprise."⁴³

⁴² The Gospel of Wealth, pp. 11 sqq.

⁴³ Ryan, Distributive Justice, p. 300.

It would be still better, perhaps, instead of clipping off wealth from the top, by limiting possession and transmission, to prevent these things by going to the root, i. e., by abolishing the wage system and admitting workingmen to a share in the possession of the means of production. This, too, could best be brought about, not by legal enactment, but by molding public opinion.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ See Social Reconstruction, brochure issued by the four bishops constituting the Administrative Committee of the American Catholic War Council, Washington, D. C., 1919; Cardinal Bourne's Lenten Pastoral for 1918, "The Nation's a Crisis," London, Catholic Social Guild, 1918.

e) We will close this chapter with a few remarks on the duty of distributing superfluous wealth. Here, also, we shall follow Professor Ryan.

It is the fundamental teaching of Christianity that ownership is stewardship and that he who possesses superfluous goods must regard himself as a trustee for the needy. St. Thomas clearly and concisely formulates this principle as follows: "As regards the power of acquiring and dispensing material goods, man may lawfully possess them as his own; as regards their use, however, a man ought not to look upon them as his own, but as common, so that he may readily minister to the needs of others."⁴⁵ This teach- ing is in perfect conformity with reason. Since the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the common benefit of all mankind, the possessor of a surplus is reasonably required to use it in such a way that this original purpose of all created goods will be fulfilled. To refuse to do so is to treat one's less fortunate neighbor as something different from and less than oneself, as a creature whose claim upon the common bounty of nature is something less than one's own.

⁴⁵ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3.

Is this obligation one of charity or of justice? In the case of wealth unjustly acquired it is clearly one of justice. But how about wealth honestly acquired? St. Thomas says: "The goods which a man has in superfluity are due by the natural law to the sustenance of the poor."⁴⁶ This is the official teaching of the Church, for Pope Leo XIII says: "When one has provided sufficiently for one's necessities and the demands of one's state of life, there is a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains. It is a duty not of strict justice, save in case of extreme necessity, but of Christian charity."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Ibid., art. 7.

⁴⁷ Encyclical "On the Condition of Labor," 15 May, 1891; The Pope and the People, p. 192.

There seems to be a contradiction between this teaching and that of certain Fathers, but the contradiction is apparent rather than real. "The truly important fact of the whole situation," says Dr. Ryan, "is that both the Fathers and the later authorities of the Church regard the task of distributing superfluous goods as one of strict moral obligation, which in serious cases is binding under pain of grievous sin. Whether it falls under the head of justice or under that of charity, is of no great practical importance."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Distributive Justice, pp. 303 sq., 307 sq.

What portion of his superfluous wealth is a man obliged to distribute among the needy? Dr. Ryan, proceeding from the unanimous teaching of moral theologians that the entire mass of superfluous wealth is morally subject to the call of grave need, and from the principle of the moral law that the goods of the earth should be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the earth in proportion to their essential needs, attempts to answer this question from the standpoint of common welfare. He thinks that, in view of available statistics, the conclusion is inevitable "that the greater part of the superfluous income of the well-to-do and rich would be required to abolish all grave and ordinary need." He adds: "The proposition that men are under moral obligation to give away the greater portion of their superfluous goods or income is, indeed, a 'hard saying’.... No Catholic, however, who knows the traditional teaching of the Church on the right use of wealth, and who considers patiently and seriously the magnitude and the meaning of human distress, will be able to refute the proposition by reasoned arguments. Indeed, no man can logically deny it who admits that men are intrinsically sacred, and essentially equal by nature and in their claims to a reasonable livelihood from the common heritage of the earth. The wants that a man supplies out of his superfluous goods are not necessary for rational existence. For the most part they bring him merely irrational enjoyment, greater social prestige, or increased domination over his fellows. Judged by any reasonable standard, these are surely less important than those needs of the neighbor which are connected with humane living. If any considerable part of the community rejects these propositions, the explanation will be found not in a reasoned theory, but in the conventional assumption that a man may do what he likes with his own. This assumption is adopted without examination, without criticism, without any serious advertence to the great moral facts that ownership is stewardship, and that the Creator intended the earth for the reasonable support of all the children of men."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 314.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 1 sq. —Theodore Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. II, pp. 126 sqq., Freiburg 1900. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, Vol. II, pp. 285 sqq. —IDEM, Das Privateigentum und seine Gegner, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 240 sqq.—Ch. Perin, De la Richesse dans les Societes Chretiennes, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Paris 1881. —F. Walter, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Socialismus, pp. 266 sqq., Freiburg 1895. —H. Pesch, S.J., Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, Vol. I, Freiburg 1905, pp. 179 sqq.—Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 113 sqq.—R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, New York 1899, pp. 203 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 278 sqq. —J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth, New York 1916, pp. 3 sqq., 291 sqq., 303 sqq. —J. Husslein, S.J., The World Problem: Capital, Labor, and the Church, New York 1918, pp. 232 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck 1914, pp. 387 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 344 sqq., 350 sqq., New York 1919. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, pp. 499 sqq. —J. Kelleher, Private Ownership, Dublin 1911. —J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 271 sqq., New York 1919.—H. Belloc, The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property, London 1920. —J. A. Ryan, The Christian Doctrine of Property, New York 1923.

1. The right of ownership (dominium) is defined as “the permanent and exclusive right of retaining, controlling, and disposing of an object in one’s own interest and according to one’s own wishes.”¹ It is derived from nature itself and protected by the natural law.²

¹ Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 113.—J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 533: “Ownership is the legitimate faculty of disposing of some thing as one’s own. Ownership is chiefly divided into perfect and imperfect, according as there is a right to dispose both of the thing itself and of its utility, or only of one of the two. Imperfect ownership, however, is subdivided into direct and indirect, that is, useful, according as it regards solely the ownership of the thing or solely its utility. They also commonly distinguish high and low ownership. The former is ownership improperly so called and is termed the right which the supreme authority has, for the gravest cause and for the good of the community, sometimes to dispose of the goods of private persons with due compensation, insofar as this can be done. The latter is the ownership of private persons, to which the definition properly applies.” Cfr. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 248 sqq.

² Leo XIII, Encycl. “Quod apostolici,” Dec. 28, 1878: “The right of property and ownership, proceeding from nature itself, is sanctioned by natural law.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Rerum novarum,” May 15, 1891: “The right to possess things privately as one’s own has been given to man by nature. . . . The right of ownership which we have shown to have been bestowed by nature upon individuals must be transferred to man insofar as he is the head of a family. . . . Therefore, when relief for the people is sought, this must be held above all as a fundamental principle: private possessions must be preserved inviolate.”—IDEM, Encycl. “Graves de communi,” Jan. 18, 1901: “Therefore let nothing be more sacred to it [Christian democracy] than justice; let it command that the right of acquiring and possessing be kept intact.”

All ownership is based on some ground, usually called title. A title is a factor or an event by which a particular owner comes to have a right to his property. There is a variety of such titles, partly original or primary, partly derivative or secondary. An original title of ownership is one by which objects that belong to no one are appropriated, or by which existing private property is increased or improved. A secondary title is one based upon donation or legitimate purchase from a previous owner.

2. The chief original titles of ownership are: occupancy, accretion, and labor.

a) Occupancy (occupatio), the first and most primitive title of private ownership, is defined as the actual appropriation of ownerless objects with the intention to keep them as one’s own. This title of ownership (ius primi occupantis) presupposes that the object in question is by nature fit to become private property (res capax dominii privati). Hence it must not belong either to State or Church, nor be of such a nature that it cannot be occupied, e. g., the sea or air. Secondly, it must be actually ownerless, that is to say, it must never have belonged to anybody (res nullius), or, if it did, have been relinquished by the former owner (res relicta); third, the occupant must have the intention of acquiring the object as his own and of exercising the right of ownership in future. Fourth, the act of occupancy must be such as to convey to others some intimation that proprietary possession has been taken.³ This is usually done by some external act, e. g., in the case of a movable object, keeping it and turning it into something else; in the case of soil or real estate, by the act of cultivating it, fencing it in, setting out plants on it, and so forth.

³ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 139 sq.—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 558: “Occupancy is the actual taking possession of things which belong to no one. It is a legitimate mode of acquiring ownership, provided that the required conditions are present, namely: 1. That the thing be capable of private ownership and belong to no one; 2. That the occupant wish to make it his own and take possession of it; 3. That no law stand in the way of occupancy. The more frequent practical cases concerning this matter relate to the occupancy of animals.”

The principle that ownerless land in uncivilized countries may be occupied and thereby become private property is recognized by the law of nations.

The most common kinds of occupancy are: hunting (venatio), fishing (piscatio), and discovery (inventio). In civilized countries the right of hunting and fishing is regulated by positive laws and hence may not be exercised ad libitum, or if it is so exercised, entails the duty of making restitution for damage done. Hence the right of occupancy may be exercised:

α) In regard to ownerless objects (res nullius), e. g., wild animals (animalia fera) which have not yet become private property by the laws regulating the chase, or by being enclosed in parks or ponds; in regard to tamed animals (animalia mansuefacta) that have freed themselves from control; in regard to bees and pigeons which have lost their home, but not in regard to domestic animals (animalia domestica). The latter never become ownerless, even when they escape from their masters, except if they go astray, in which case they are to be treated as lost objects.

β) Abandoned objects (res derelictae) are objects which once had an owner, but were given up by him because he no longer cared for them. This category does not include property that has been abandoned because of impending danger, or from which the owner has been separated against his will, e. g., on the occasion of a conflagration or a flood; nor does it include tame animals that have gone astray. Occupation based upon the so-called right of salvage, therefore, is morally inadmissible.

Occupancy is “not of much practical account in modern civilized States, since all the land of the earth is now practically ‘occupied.’ And even such unoccupied territories as still remain, like Central Africa, have been divided in such a way that the right of extension allowed to each competing government is fixed by special treaties or understandings. The only cases in which occupancy is still to be regarded as an operative title are those of finder, fisherman, and hunter. Their rights are . . . decided by special civil enactments in each country.”⁴

⁴ Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 142 sq.—Cfr. Gury, l. c., n. 559–563.—Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, Vol. I, pp. 283 sqq.

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 1 and 2.

391. State of the question. - Man naturally is lord of external things, not indeed as regards their nature, which is not subject to human power but to divine power, to which they obey at will: for man cannot annihilate the nature of things nor immediately change it as he wills, but only use their powers and thus mediately bring about a certain transformation of things; - but as regards the use of things, possession is natural to man, because through reason and will he can use them for his own utility, since imperfect things are for the sake of more perfect things. And thus man not only has the power of using, or useful dominion, but also direct dominion or possession, but in order to the power of using.

We have already proved this where we treated the object of dominion. But from this it is not yet demonstrated that that right of dominion is to be exercised by a private man rather than by all together or by the community, so that it is licit for someone to possess things as his own. Socialists deny this. But Catholic doctrine holds that in the present order, after original sin in the state of fallen nature, to possess things privately is legitimate and morally necessary.¹

¹ Among other special works there can usefully be compared: E. de Laveleye, Le Socialisme contemporain; Thonissen, Le Socialisme dans le passe; Schaeffle, Quintessenz des Sozialismus (French trans.); Capart, La Propriete individuelle et le Collectivisme; Castelein, Le Socialisme et le Droit de Propriete; Bourdeau, L'Evolution du Socialisme; Winterer, Le Socialisme contemporain; Schrijvers, Manuel d'Economie politique; Antoine, Cours d'Economie sociale; Schwalm, Lecons de Philosophie sociale; Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia; Nicotra, Le Socialisme; Drijvers, Eigendomsrecht; Garriguet, Introduction a l'etude de la sociologie; La propriete privee; Deploige, La theorie thomiste de la propriete; Van Overbergh, Les caracteres generaux du socialisme scientifique, in R. Neo-scolastique, 1898; Pottier, De Iure et Iustitia; Cathrein, Der Sozialismus; Biederlack, Die soziale Frage (Dutch trans.); Sertillanges, Socialisme et Christianisme; Bourguin, Les systemes socialistes et l'evolution economique; Rutten, Manuel d'Etudes et d'Action sociales; La Doctrine sociale de l'Eglise; Horvath, Eigentumsrecht.

396. Thesis. The private, permanent, and exclusive right of dominion over external goods and over the land itself, circumscribed by just limits, flows from natural law, and therefore is legitimate, and in the present state morally necessary. - It is said:

1. the private right of dominion, i.e., dominion not only useful but full, belonging to individual men independently of the State, not to society itself: for although society can possess certain goods as its own, nevertheless the right of dominion belongs also to private persons, indeed primarily to them;

2. permanent and exclusive, in such a way that it is exercised not only transiently but in a stable manner and can be transferred to others, or also to natural heirs; and that it is so proper that the owner is able to exclude all others from his possession;

3. over external goods, whether movable or immovable, whether ordered to the new production of things, or to use or consumption;

4. circumscribed by just limits: that right is not absolute, but, like other rights, is limited by its immediate end. That end is that for which earthly things have been created, namely, that all may be able to live from them. But it is limited in three ways:

a) in a case of extreme necessity, each one can occupy that which is necessary for the support of himself and his own;
b) by reason of the common good, social authority can decree fitting laws, so that no prejudice be brought to the end of things, which is that all may be able to live from them; and at times it can restrict private dominion, or partially take it away if this is necessary for the good of the whole republic, though this last cannot be done without a grave cause, nor regularly without due compensation;
c) charity toward one's neighbor demands that the rich give to the poor out of their superfluities.

This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, which Leo XIII made his own: "Concerning an external thing two things belong to man: one of which is the power of procuring and dispensing (dominion), and as to this it is lawful that man possess things as his own...; but the other... concerning external things is the use of them, and as to this man ought not to have external things as his own, but as common, namely, so that one may easily communicate them in the necessity of others."⁹ II-II, q. 66, a. 2.

⁹ Yet this necessity of the poor man is not a right, otherwise there would be an obligation of justice; but it is a title for obtaining that they be assisted from superfluities, because superfluities by natural ordination are destined for them, in such a way that the rich have a strict obligation of giving them generously from charity.

These obligations of owners can also proceed from legal debt, inasmuch as it pertains to the common good not only that in extreme necessity all be assisted and no one be deprived of necessary things, but also that there be a good use of superfluities in society and that from superfluities there be given to the needy.¹⁰ - Whence human law, on account of the common good, can compel to this: for no one has superfluous goods except for their good use and good dispensation; and therefore society could take away the dispensation from one who does not use well, as from one unworthy. "Wherefore," says Pius XI, in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931, "what, with the reality of the common good considered, is lawful for those who possess, what is unlawful in the use of their goods, public authority, with natural and divine law always shining before it, can investigate more accurately."

¹⁰ Thus conformably to St. Thomas, q. 118, a. 4, ad 2, and to the commentaries of Cajetan. This also P. Vermeersch conceded, his confreres dissenting, while the controversy stood which arose on occasion of the book of P. Horvath, O.P., Eigentumsrecht, and of certain writings by others, concerning which see Theol.-Prakt. Quartalschrift, Linz, 1929.

5. flows from natural law, and therefore is legitimate. For it is not a primary natural right, which belongs to nature considered in itself and absolutely; but it follows by way of conclusion from the consideration of human nature, and for this reason is legitimate.¹¹

¹¹ The law of nature comprises those things which are required by the nature of things. If the nature of the things to be possessed is considered in itself and absolutely, the division of possessions is not required: there is not in them a requirement that they be possessed by one or by another, in common or in particular. Private dominion is neither required nor excluded; whence it is not against nature. Only this is required by the nature of things considered in itself, that the things to be possessed not be turned aside from their immediate and intrinsic end, which is that they serve the necessities of all men: the land does not cease, says Leo XIII, to serve the common utility of all, and there is no one who is not nourished from those things which it produces. Whence in a case of extreme necessity, private dominion ceases and all things are common: the division of possessions cannot prejudice such necessity, and from the human application of the law of nature the primary end cannot be impeded... But private dominion is of natural law according to something which follows from nature and is concluded by reasoning. Thus Pottier, o. c.

To this it is no obstacle that, according to St. Thomas and many scholastics, the right of private dominion arises from the law of nations. According to the ancients, natural law designates only that which is required by the nature of things considered according to itself and absolutely; the law of nations designates that which, not according to itself, but in order to a certain end, or in a certain supposition, is derived from the nature of things by reason, according to a certain utility, fittingness, and consequent moral necessity, as a necessary conclusion, not very remote, so that the nations easily agree in it (I-II, q. 95, a. 4). According to more recent authors, both are called natural law, namely, primary and secondary; and rightly, for according to St. Thomas, the law of nations has something of its force from the natural law (I-II, q. 95, a. 2), and "natural reason instituted it" (II-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3). Whence Ethics V, lect. 2: "Whatever follows from the naturally just as a conclusion, is naturally just."

6. in the present state morally necessary. A state of things is possible in which common possession in a certain place or in a certain society would sufficiently provide for the necessities and happiness of men: thus in the state of innocence or original justice, among pastoral tribes, when men are not many. But in the present condition of things, in which men with their defects commonly seek only themselves, and have little care for their neighbor and for society, and given the state of present-day civilization, in which men cannot lead a pastoral life but, being greatly multiplied, need great labor to procure necessities for themselves, private dominion is now morally necessary for the happiness and perfection of citizens and for the peace of society, as will be clear from the demonstration of the thesis.

Therefore the division of goods has arisen not from civil law, as Hobbes, Bentham, Montesquieu said; - nor from a social pact, as Grotius, Puffendorf, Heineccius held; - nor from a merely human institution, or from theft as Proudhon proclaimed, but from natural necessity. Whence Leo XIII: "to possess things privately as one's own is a right given to man by nature"; and to divide the land and to possess it privately, "the universality of the human race... has found in the very law of nature the foundation of the partition of goods, and has consecrated private possessions by the usage of all ages, as things which most of all accord with man's nature and with peaceful and tranquil living together."

If, however, the nature of things is considered not in itself but in order to the necessities of men, and they are considered together with the very nature of man, which must be regarded not in a certain ideal state but in the concrete and actual condition and according to its proper psychology, then there arises a requirement for the partition of goods which positive law must determine from natural law.

Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ad 1: "Community of things is attributed to natural law, not because natural law dictates that all things are to be possessed in common and nothing is to be possessed as one's own; but because according to natural law there is no distinction of possessions, but rather according to human agreement, which belongs to positive law... Whence the property of possessions is not against natural law, but is added to natural law by the devising of human reason."

It is concluded: "The division of goods and the appropriation of things... has proceeded not according to natural law, but rather from human agreement, which pertains to positive law. Whence the property of possessions is not against natural law; but it is added to natural law by the devising of human reason" (II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ad 1), i.e., from a requirement of human nature, dependently on natural law.

397. The thesis is proved. Demonstrations are taken from the Scriptures, from Tradition, and from reason: the Scriptures and Tradition show the legitimacy of private dominion, reason also its necessity.

A. The Scriptures suppose and acknowledge the right of private dominion to be legitimate. God, in creating men, indeed handed earthly things over to them undividedly (Gen. I, 28-30), but so that they would be possessed in the manner more apt for procuring for themselves the necessary and useful things of life; but that the manner of possessing by private dominions is legitimate is shown:

1° In the Old Testament: a) the first division of goods already appears among the sons of Adam, since Abel is presented as a shepherd of sheep, offering to the Lord from the firstborn of his flock, Cain as a farmer, offering from the fruits of the earth, and afterward building a city which was his own and which he called by the name of his own son Henoch (Gen. IV, 2, 4, 17).

b) At the time of Abraham the right of private dominion already existed widely: Abraham was rich in possession of gold and silver; - Lot had flocks of sheep, and herds, and tents (Gen. XIII, 1-2, 5); fields and caves were under private dominion, since Abraham bought the field of Ephron and the double cave in it, that he might bury Sarah there when she had died (XXIII, 1-20), with a stable and permanent right indeed, so that Abraham, Isaac, Leah, and Jacob were buried there; just as Joseph was buried in the part of the field which Jacob had bought from the sons of Hemor (Jos. XXIV, 32). But pastures were common; yet when, because of the multitude of flocks, a quarrel arose between the shepherds of Abraham and of Lot, they were separated, one from his kinsman (Gen. XIII, 7-11).

c) The right of private dominion was confirmed as legitimate by the divine law itself, which not only prohibits theft but also the very covetousness of another's good (Ex. XX, 17), wherefore it strictly forbids that the boundaries by which fields are circumscribed be transferred (Deut. XIX, 14); but the earthly possessions of each family, which had been sold, could be redeemed, and when the year of the great jubilee recurred they returned to the former possessor (Lev. XXV, 23-28).

2° In the New Testament: a) Christ confirmed the law, by condemning theft; and he gave only the counsel of selling all things and giving the price to the poor (Mt. V, 3); but to those possessing he commanded the good use of goods, by generous almsgivings (XXV, 41-43).

b) The Apostles, applying the counsel of the Lord, instituted common possession of goods in the first communities (Acts IV, 34-35); nevertheless Peter himself proclaimed that the renunciation of possessions is of counsel only, not of precept, when addressing Ananias: "While it remained, did it not remain to thee, and when sold was it not in thy power?" (V, 4). Whence, when the disciples had been multiplied, community of goods did not endure, and provision was made for the necessities of the poor by collections of alms (XI, 28-30). Hence Paul admonishes that it must not be prescribed to the rich to leave their goods, but that they "not be high-minded, nor trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God..., to be rich in good works, to give readily, to communicate, to treasure up for themselves a good foundation unto the future" (I Tim. VI, 17-19).

From these it is established that, according to the Scriptures, a) the right of private property such as existed is legitimate; b) nevertheless it is in some measure limited by the precept of almsgiving.

B. The Tradition of the Church acknowledges and vindicates the right of private dominion:

1° The Church has always condemned the adversaries of private dominion: in the third century the Apostolics, who, with Augustine as witness (book On Heresies, 40), "most arrogantly called themselves by this name, because they would not receive into their communion those using marriages and possessing their own things... But these men are therefore heretics, because, separating themselves from the Church, they think that those who use these things have no hope"; - in the thirteenth century, the Waldenses, against whom Innocent III prescribed this profession of faith: "we confess and believe that those remaining in the world and possessing their own things, giving alms and other benefactions from their own things, and keeping the precepts of the Lord, are saved"; - in the fifteenth century, Wicleff and Hus, who denied the legitimacy of possessions in ecclesiastical men (Council of Constance, sess. 8, a. 10; interrog., a. 34-36); - in the nineteenth century, the Socialists, who were reproved by Pius IX (Qui pluribus, November 9, 1856), by Leo XIII proclaiming, in the encyclical Rerum novarum (May 15, 1891), that their doctrine concerning expropriation is unjust, inept, and subversive of order, and by Pius XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno.

2° The Fathers explain that riches are not evil nor prohibited, but are unequally given by God, so that they might be for the richer an occasion of kindness and charity, but for the poor an occasion of patience and of greater merit.

But if the celebrated preachers of the fourth¹² and fifth centuries, such as Basil, Chrysostom, Nyssen, Ambrose, etc., most eloquently proclaim that goods are common, that what is due from them is to be rendered to the poor, that all riches descend from iniquity, that those who deny alms are thieves and guilty of injury; - this is rather to be attributed to the oratorical manner of speaking.

¹² Thus, for example, Basil: "Is God unjust, who has distributed to us unequally the necessities of life? Why, when you are rich, is that man poor? Is it not certainly so that you may receive the reward of kindness and faithful dispensation, and he may be endowed with great rewards of patience?" on that passage of Luke: "I will destroy," n. 7. - And Chrysostom: St. Paul "besides knew that riches are not forbidden, if one has used them as he ought. For as I have said: wine is not an evil thing, but drunkenness is evil; so riches are not an evil thing, but avarice is evil, cupidity is evil." Whence to sell all things is a counsel, not a precept (hom. 2 to the people of Antioch, n. 5). Hence the pastors of churches do not excommunicate the rich, but urge them to assist the needy. Cf. on this argument Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, n. 210.

For, when occasion is given, the same Fathers expressly assert the right of private dominion; - they wish goods to be common by destination and use, so that they yield to the utility of others, not so that they be possessed by all; - they hold alms as a debt of charity; - whence those who deny them are guilty of injury in the wider sense, insofar as they wound justice understood in the general or metaphorical sense, or even legal justice, the more so because in those times of plague, drought, and great calamity many were poor even in urgent necessity; - but they rightly maintain that riches are from iniquity because from original sin and the corruption of morals the division of goods became necessary, and in fact they have often had their origin from injustice and usury. Besides, the orators of the seventeenth century in France said similar things, and nevertheless most certainly admit the legitimacy of private possessions.

C. Reason demonstrates the legitimacy and at the same time the necessity of private dominion. To this end one can argue thus:

The form of dominion or government of external goods to which nature strongly inclines man, and which the common good demands, is legitimate, indeed necessary, by natural law. But such is the regime or form of private dominion in the present condition of things. Therefore.

The minor is proved as to the first part: Nature inclines man to the possession of external things, both that he may govern himself and provide for himself even for the future, and that he may provide for his children even after his death, and that he may vindicate for himself the fruit of his labor (as we demonstrated when speaking of the object of dominion, n. 168).

But nature impels the individual and private man to this, not civil society; for

a) The individual man and the family are prior in nature and in time to the State itself: "for man is older than the republic," says Leo XIII; "wherefore he must have had by nature his right to protect life and body before any city came together."

b) Society has not been constituted in order to deprive individual men and families of rights, or to restrict their activity and substitute itself for them, but to protect their rights, foster activity, and promote its exercise.

Therefore according to nature the right of dominion belongs primarily to individuals, not to the State, and therefore private dominion is legitimate.

The second part of the minor is proved: Nature demands and requires the regime which is necessary for the common good, or which appears as the one apt means by which the end may be obtained. But the regime of private dominion is morally necessary and the only apt means both for stirring up man's labor, and for procuring the progress of labor, and for preserving social peace.

Therefore the regime of private dominion is morally necessary by natural law.

I. God alone is truly and absolutely Lord of all things. The reason is that, since he alone is the supreme creator and conserver of all things, all things have absolute dependence upon him alone. - Hence it follows 1st. that no created being can possess with respect to God, that is, use some thing as absolutely his own; and 2nd. that the right of property cannot be in a created being unless God wills it.

II. A man can be proprietor with respect to another man. The reason is that this is repugnant under no aspect: not on the part of men, because, since these are equal by nature, they do not depend in this matter one upon another; not on the part of the things themselves, because these rather have an aptitude to be possessed and brought into use, although not by diverse persons at the same time on account of their finitude; nor finally on the part of God, because God wills that we use created goods as means for conserving life, as is clear from the nature of those goods and from the exigency of man.

III. If any man has legitimately made certain goods his own, he has acquired in them a right inviolable of itself. The reason is that, this condition having been posited, God, who gave both aptitude and exigencies to man for the use of things, immediately communicates a right in them; but that right cannot be violated by another man without disorder. - Hence it follows 1st. that there is a natural precept promulgated and sanctioned by God himself, forbidding that the right of another be injured, and prescribing that if at any time it has been injured, it be restored whole; 2nd. that he who unjustly usurps another's thing becomes guilty both toward neighbor and toward God: toward neighbor indeed, because he injures his natural independence; toward God, by violating the divine right communicated to the neighbor, and at the same time the natural precept commanding that the aforesaid right be observed.

IV. Commutative justice obliges under grave sin and with the burden of restitution. The reason of the first is taken both from the fact that in the Scriptures eternal punishment is decreed not only once against those who violate commutative justice, and because the violation of another's right, since it is essentially harmful, by its own nature introduces great disorder into the mutual fellowship of men, and is repugnant to charity, which moves one to will another's good. But the reason of the second is that commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, which can be brought about only through full restitution, once it has been violated.

V. The other species of justice of themselves also oblige under grave sin, but not with the burden of restitution. The first is clear from this, that, their definitions being inspected, grave harm to the whole society would follow if they could be violated either with impunity or under light sin only. But the other is gathered from this, that there cannot be the burden of restitution where either equality or relation to another is lacking, namely where restitution itself is not possible. - Nevertheless, commutative justice is often joined to the others, and thus the burden of restitution is introduced. Wherefore a magistrate or judge is held to restore if, on account of grave negligence in punishing, he is the cause why private persons or the community suffer grave damage, not by virtue of legal justice having been neglected, but of a violated contract by which, in assuming the office, he implicitly obligated himself to prevent the damages of subjects.

Note, then, that Right in a thing, as I showed in disp. 23. quaest. 1. de Iustitia, is twofold: of Jurisdiction, and of Property. The dominion of jurisdiction is a certain power of superiority, or the force of governing subjects. The dominion of property is a certain right of disposing of some thing as one's own and for one's own advantage.

The Dominion of Jurisdiction is one thing Divine, or Uncreated; another human, or created. Created dominion is one thing Ecclesiastical proper, namely of the Prelates of the Church, for the spiritual good; another is Political, or temporal, for the public peace. Such is the power of Kings and of the Emperor.

Temporal dominion is either pure or mixed. Pure is the power, or right of the sword, for punishing malefactors. Mixed imperium is a simple power of jurisdiction joined with a slight right of coercion, joined by law, as is seen in Bullonius, and in Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2.

Nor is far from this division that partition of dominion into High and Low. The High is divided, according to the variety of regimes, into Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy.

Dominion of property, on the side of the object, is one thing perfect, or full, which embraces the thing and all its advantages; another imperfect, which is content either with the mere ownership of the thing without its advantages, or with the mere use, or advantages, of the thing. This is called the Useful dominion; that one, indeed, the Direct dominion.

Some have asserted the dominion of things to be so lawful that they would altogether condemn Religious Expropriation; yet these the Seraphic Doctor refutes most elegantly and most forcefully in the Apology for Poverty.

The dominion granted to all men in more universal fashion appears from Gen. 1: Have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures. And Deut. 15: You shall be lord over many nations, and no one shall be lord over you, as the Holy Doctor shows in p. 1 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy through three chapters.

Thus he subjects women to the dominion of men, Gen. 3: You shall be under the power of the husband, and he shall have dominion over you. Thus also he subjected the nations to Kings, etc. See D. Bonav. loc. cit., where he treats of the dominion and subjection of men, which is nevertheless not proper dominion, according to the definition handed down, because subjects cannot use, sell, kill, etc. everything at their pleasure.

Now, whether it is lawful for men, especially those professing the law of Christ, to hold peculiar dominion over external things, I shall weigh.

There were indeed divisions of goods from the time they were made by the law of nations, approved by all up to Christ; only Plato and Socrates stood against them, wanting all things to be common, even wives, against whom Aristotle argues in 2 Polit. from ch. 2.

But in the time of grace there were certain heretics saying that all things ought to be common, even wives, as S. August. reports of heresy 40, and Epiph. of heresy 32, attributing it to Carpocrates.

Soon, however, some of the Pelagians condemned the abundance of goods among Christians. S. August. reports them in lib. 2 de gratia Christi, cap. 15, and epist. 160. Moreover this error was condemned in the Palestinian Council, at which S. Augustine was present.

Afterwards other heretics called Vadiani, and Anthropomorphitae, by the testimony of August. heresy 50, denied that it was lawful, at least for Ecclesiastics, to have anything of their own. The Wicleffites and Anabaptists followed these; which error was condemned in the Council of Constance, session 8.

I assert, therefore, that dominion and the division of things is lawful for all, even Ecclesiastics and Religious, according to the institute of each order.

This assertion is infallible to all Catholics, and the Holy Doctor rather supposes it than proves it in the Apologies for Poverty, and he strove only to prove that even the religious renunciation of things is licit, which presupposes their dominion.

The assertion is proved, therefore, by the Holy Doctor from Jos. 10, where the Priests and Levites of the old Law had possessions and lands by God's constitution. S. Bonav. pursues this at length in cap. 3 of the third response in the Apology for the Poor. There, however, he strenuously shows that some have drawn badly, together with the heretic Vigilantius, from the old testament even the summity of Evangelical perfection requiring possessions and dominions; and consequently that expropriated religious orders are superstitious, inasmuch as they were not figured in the old testament, for those Levites were most distant shadows; for they had even wives and children, although in the Gospel Castity and Poverty are urged by Christ in Matthew 19. The former while it is said: There are Eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He who can take it, let him take it. Poverty, however: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell all that you have, and give to the poor. Weighing which passage, D. Bonavent. in cap. 3 of the first response admonishes that there is a threefold state of perfection, which arises in charity.

The FIRST is of necessity, and consists in the observance of the precepts. The second is of counsel, and stands in fulfilling the evangelical counsels. Therefore Christ, when he had first opened that state: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. Soon he urges the higher perfection: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell all that you have; and give to the poor, so that the expropriation of things is not a precept, although it is a proposal. The third state of perfection, the Holy Doctor says, is in the fatherland, of which Prov. 4: The path of the just, as a shining light, goes forward and grows even to the perfect day. Of this D. August. in the first Soliloquy cap. 6: Truly perfect virtue is reason arriving at that end which blessed life attains; and then charity is consummated.

It is PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor in cap. 1 of the first response; for even the Apostolic college had purses, in order to show condescension toward the imperfect, as Hugh says in Psalm. 91. cap. 64. The same Holy Doctor explains this also at that place Ioan. 12., and on the poverty of Christ, against Guillelmus, art. 1., from the Gloss on that Ps. 103: He bringeth forth hay for the cattle; and from D. Jerome at that place, where he says they had purses for other poor men.

The same S. Bonav. proves in cap. 1 of the second response of the Apol. of the poor, from the immense riches given by God to Solomon, that he might enrich the Temple and the Priests.

The SAME he proves in cap. 3 of the third response, from Genes. 12., where the Lord indeed commanded Abraham to go out of his land, but obeying God: Abraham went out, as the Lord commanded him: He took Sara his wife, and Lot the son of his brother, and all the substance which they possessed in Haran. Behold, the dominion of Abraham's goods is left to him by God, even in the state of the old perfection.

The Holy Doctor proves THE SAME THING by examples of the friends of God, Jacob, Joseph, David, Job, who possessed the most ample riches. Whence he observes that the goods of Job were restored multiplied.

He ADDS, however, with D. Bernard, in the sermon on that: Behold we have left all things, that those rich men of old were not at the summit of perfection while they were most wealthy.

It is PROVED secondly in the same Apologies from the Holy Fathers, asserting that it is perfection, not precept, to relinquish the dominion of things.

S. AUGUST. de bono coniug. cap. 8: They did good who ministered necessaries to Christ and his disciples from their substance; but better those who left all their substance, that they might follow the same Lord more unimpeded.

GREGORY, homil. 26. in Ezech.: When one vows to God something of his own, and does not vow something, it is a sacrifice; but when he has vowed all to God, it is a holocaust.

The same is held by Ioan. Chrysostom in the book Quod nemo laeditur, nisi a seipso. And D. Bernard. epist. 42.

D. PROSPER de vita contemplativa lib. 2. cap. 9. praises Paulinus and Hilarian, because of their own accord they bestowed on the poor, although by reason of the Episcopal office they afterwards dispensed the goods of the Church, as is had in dist. 12. quaest. 1. Expedit: It is fitting that the faculties of the Church be possessed, and one's own goods be contemned for love of perfection. The Holy Doctor reports the same also ad cap. sextum Regulae.

The GLOSS on that 1 Timot. 6: Habentes alimenta, etc. Although we have brought nothing into this world, nevertheless these temporal things are not to be cast away. It adds, however, that it would be better that they be cast away for Christ's sake.

Likewise the Gloss on those words, 2 Cor. 8: Let your abundance supply their want, reports many other authorities of the Saints, in the first response cap. 3, and of the third response cap. 1 and 2.

It is PROVED thirdly by D. Bonav. from arguments taken from 2 Polit. cap. 3., indeed from the Scriptures; for first violent poverty induces to sins; as is said Ecclus. 27: Through poverty many have sinned.

SALOMON indeed said Prouerb. 30: Give me neither riches nor poverty; but grant only the necessaries to my sustenance, lest compelled by need I be mad, and swear by the name of my God. These things, to be sure, were said in the time of the old law, as Chrysost. notes homil. 18. in epist. ad Hebraeos. Therefore it is said in Ecclus. 17: Wisdom is more useful with riches.

INDEED, if we look at the ordinary natural and civil life, we shall surely find that individuals need the particular helps of the family goods, that each one may not be anxious over many things, and may live peacefully.

They OBJECT first from Luke 14: Unless one renounce all that he possesses, he cannot be my disciple. Now the disciple of Christ and the Christian are the same: Therefore a rich man cannot be a Christian.

The Holy Doctor answers in opusc. de paupertate Christi, cap. 1. from the Gloss, that Christ wished his disciples to renounce, that is, in affection, so that they should so use the worldly things they possess, that nevertheless in mind they tend toward God; and this befits all the disciples of Christ, that is, Christians; but to leave all things befits only the perfect, Matth. 19. Therefore to the Apostles, who had chosen the perfect state of the counsels, he urged: Matth. 10. Do not possess gold. And that they carry nothing, Matth. 6. Thus also Valentia puncto secundo.

They OBJECT also many holy Fathers who reprehend the ownership of things. Clemens I. epist. 5. and it is reported 12. quaest. 1. C. dilectissimis. Basilius serm. ad diuites avaros, around that passage of Luke 12: I will gather together all things that are born to me. Ambrosius serm. 81. and it is reported cap. sicut II, dist. 47. Hence Aristotle says 2. Polit. cap. 3: All things ought to be common among friends.

The Holy Doctor answers, loc. citat. de paupertate Christi, art. 1. from the Fathers Ambrosius l. 2. offic., Chrysostomo loc. cit. and others, that the sense is that riches afford no aid toward the blessed life, which Christ openly testifies saying, Matth. 5. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; for they are occasions of sins; on which account they are called: Mammona of iniquity, because, as is said Ecclus. 11: If you be rich, you will not be free from sin, as S. Bonav. pursues at length at that place Lucae 16.

TO the same point about friends, I say with Valentia that all things ought to be common in necessity, except those things which induce turpitude, as wives, which were never common, as Tertullianus proves in the Apologeticum contra gentes, cap. 39.

But WHEN this division of things was made, it is easily dispatched that it was made from the nations united by the law of nations. But if it had been made by the law of nature, the communion of things would be against nature, which plainly appears false from the usage of the primitive Church, and of the diverse Religious orders now, among whom ownership is renounced. But now the division of all things, or jurisdiction, if it is made anew, is made by the civil, or positive law, as D. Thom. says art. 2. ad 1., and it is plain in ff. de legibus, et Constit. Principum, l. 1. Whence rightly D. August. tract. 6. in Ioan., and it is reported in dist. 8. cap. Quo iure: Take away (he says) the laws of the Emperors, and no one will dare to say: this villa is mine.

Now all jurisdictions are so appropriated and divided that no private person is not the subject of someone, dist. 99. C. Nullus, and 25. quaest. 2. C. de Ecclesiasticis.

Now here, concerning the dominion of jurisdictions, it is to be noted by the certain and common opinion of all that Princes, whether Ecclesiastical or secular, are by no means lords of things, nor even of persons, but only of a certain power over subjects, which is called jurisdiction, as Valentia notes disp. 5. quaest. 10. punct. 2. ad finem, and it is called the High dominion, which however he can use only for the pressing public good.

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.

That right of property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must also belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, such a person must possess this right so much the more clearly in proportion as his position multiplies his duties. For it is a most sacred law of nature that a father must provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, nature dictates that a man’s children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the Family has, at least, equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

We say, at least, equal rights; for since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature. If the citizens of a State—that is to say, the Families—on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after.

The idea, then, that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household, is a great and pernicious mistake. True, if a family finds itself in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the walls of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here. Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State, nor absorbed; for it has the same source as human life itself. “The child belongs to the father,” and is, as it were, the continuation of the father’s personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten. And it is for the very reason that “the child belongs to the father,” that, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, “ before it attains the use of free will, it is in the power and care of its parents.”^* The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and introducing the providence of the State, act against natural justice, and threaten the very existence of family life.

^* St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2æ Q. x. Art. 12.

And such interference is not only unjust, but is quite certain to harass and disturb all classes of citizens, and to subject them to odious and intolerable slavery. It would open the door to envy, to evil-speaking, and to quarrelling ; the sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality of which so much is said would, in reality, be the levelling down of all to the same condition of misery and dishonor.

Thus it is clear that the main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected; for it would injure those whom it is intended to benefit, it would be contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and it would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth. Our first and most fundamental principle, therefore, when we undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This laid down, We go on to show where we must find the remedy that we seek.

We approach the subject with confidence, and in the exercise of the rights which belong to Us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of Religion and of the Church. It is We who are the chief guardian of Religion, and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and We must not by silence neglect the duty which lies upon Us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides Ourselves—of the rulers of States, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves for whom We plead. But We affirm without hesitation, that all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church. It is the Church that proclaims from the Gospel those teachings by which the conflict can be put an end to, or at the least made far less bitter; the Church uses its efforts not only to enlighten the mind, but to direct by its precepts the life and conduct of men; the Church improves and ameliorates the condition of the working man by numerous useful organizations; does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes; and acts on the decided view that for these purposes recourse should be had, in due measure and degree, to the help of the law and of State authority.

Let it be laid down, in the first place, that humanity must remain as it is. It is impossible to reduce human society to a level. The Socialists may do their utmost, but all striving against nature is vain. There naturally exist among mankind innumerable differences of the most important kind; people differ in capability, in diligence, in health, and in strength; an unequal fortune is a necessary result of inequality in condition. Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case. As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from the state of innocence, he would not have been wholly unoccupied ; but that which would then have been his free choice and his delight, became afterwards compulsory, and the painful expiation of his sin. Cursed be the earth in thy work; in thy labor thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.^* In like manner, the other pains and hardships of life will have no end or cessation on this earth; for the consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hardpressed people freedom from pain and trouble, undisturbed repose, and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles.

^* Genesis iii. 17.

The great mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration, is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class; that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another. So irrational and so false is this view, that the exact contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in making it impossible, the efficacy of Christianity is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is nothing more powerful than Religion (of which the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing rich and poor together, by reminding each class of its duties to the other, and especially of the duties of justice. Thus Religion teaches the laboring man and the workman to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made; never to injure capital, or to outrage the person of an employer; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, or to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their slaves; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to right reason, and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Thus, again, Religion teaches that, as among the workman’s concerns are Religion herself and things spiritual and mental, the employer is bound to see that he has time for the duties of piety; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just. Doubtless before we can decide whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but rich men and masters should remember this—that to exercise pressure for the sake of gain, upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold the hire of the laborers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.^* Finally, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workman’s earnings, either by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing ; and with the more reason because the poor man is weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should be sacred in proportion to their scantiness.

^* St. James v. 4.

Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed, would not strife die out and cease ?

But the Church, with Jesus Christ for its Master and Guide, aims higher still. It lays down precepts yet more perfect, and tries to bind class to class in friendliness and good understanding. The things of this earth cannot be understood or valued rightly without taking into consideration the life to come, the life that will last forever. Exclude the idea of futurity, and the very notion of what is good and right would perish; nay, the whole system of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its base—that when we have done with this present life, then we shall really begin to live. God has not created us for the perishable and transitory things of earth, but for things heavenly and everlasting; He has given us this world as a place of exile, and not as our true country. Money, and the other things which men call good and desirable—we may have them in abundance, or we may want them altogether ; as far as eternal happiness is concerned, it is no matter; the only thing that is important is to use them aright. Jesus Christ, when He redeemed us with plentiful redemption, took not away the pains and sorrows which in such large proportion make up the texture of our mortal life; He transformed them into motives of virtue and occasions of merit: and no man can hope for eternal reward unless he follow in the blood-stained footprints of his Saviour. If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign with Him.^* His labors and His sufferings, accepted by His own free will, have marvellously sweetened all suffering and all labor. And not only by His example, but by His grace and by the hope of everlasting recompense, He has made pain and grief more easy to endure ; for that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.^†

^* II. Timothy ii. 12.

^† II. Corinthians iv. 17.

Therefore those whom fortune favors are warned that freedom from sorrow, and abundance of earthly riches, are no guarantee of the beatitude that shall never end, but rather the contrary ;^* that the rich should tremble at the threatenings of Jesus Christ—threatenings so strange in the mouth of Our Lord ;^† and that a most strict account must be given to the Supreme Judge for all that we possess. The chiefest and most excellent rule for the right use of money is one which the heathen philosophers indicated, but which the Church has traced out clearly, and has not only made known to men’s minds but has impressed upon their lives. It rests on the principle that it is one thing to have a right to the possession of money, and another to have a right to use money as one pleases. Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right, especially as members of society, is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary. It is lawful, says St. Thomas of Aquin, for a man to hold private property ; and it is also necessary for the carrying on of human life.^‡ But if the question be asked, How must one’s possessions be used? the Church replies without hesitation in the words of the same holy Doctor: Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need. Whence the Apostle saith, Command the rich of this world... to give with ease, to communicate.§ True, no one is commanded to distribute to others that which is required for his own necessities and those of his household; nor even to give away what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life; for no one ought to live unbecomingly.|| But when necessity has been supplied, and one’s position fairly considered, it is a duty to give to the indigent out of that which is over. That which remaineth, give alms.¶ It is a duty, not of justice (except in extreme cases), but of Christian charity —a duty which is not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must give place to the laws and judgments of Christ the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving—It is more blessed to give than to receive ;^* and Who will count a kindness done or refused to the poor as done or refused to Himself—as long as you did it to one of My least brethren, you did it to Me.^† Thus to sum up what has been said: Whoever has received from the Divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether they be external and corporeal or gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the minister of God’s providence, for the benefit of others. He that hath a talent, says St. Gregory the Great, let him see that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him arouse himself to mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to share the use and the utility thereof with his neighbor.^‡

^* St. Matthew xix. 23, 24.

^† St. Luke vi. 24, 25.

^‡ 2a 2æ Q. lxvi. Art. 2. § Ibid. Q. lxv. Art. 2. || Ibid. Q. xxxii. Art. 6. ¶ St. Luke xi. 41.

^* Acts xx. 35.

^† St. Matthew xxv. 40.

^‡ St. Gregory the Great. Hom. ix. in Evangel. n. 7.

§ II. Corinthians viii. 9. || St. Mark vi. 3.

¶ St. Matthew v. 3: “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” ** Ibid. xi. 28. “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”

As for those who do not possess the gifts of fortune, they are taught by the Church that in God's sight poverty is no disgrace, and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in seeking one’s bread by labor. This is strengthened by what we see in Christ Himself, Who whereas He was rich, for our sakes became poor ;§ and Who, being the Son of God, and God Himself, chose to seem and to be considered the son of a carpenter—nay, did not disdain to spend a great part of His life as a carpenter Himself. Is not this the carpenter, the Son of Mary?|| From the contemplation of this Divine example it is easy to understand that the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and poor; and that virtue, and virtue alone, wherever found, will be followed by the rewards of everlasting happiness. Nay, God Himself seems to incline more to those who suffer evil; for Jesus Christ calls the poor blessed;¶ He lovingly invites those in labor and grief to come to Him for solace;** and He displays the tenderest charity to the lowly and the oppressed. These reflections cannot fail to keep down the pride of those who are well off, and to cheer the spirit of the afflicted ; to incline the former to generosity and the latter to tranquil resignation. Thus the separation which pride would make tends to disappear, nor will it be difficult to make rich and poor join hands in friendly concord.

But if Christian precepts prevail, the two classes will not only be united in the bonds of friendship, but also in those of brotherly love. For they will understand and feel that all men are the children of the common Father, that is, of God; that all have the same last end, which is God Himself, Who alone can make either men or angels absolutely and perfectly happy; that all and each are redeemed by Jesus Christ and raised to the dignity of children of God, and are thus united in brotherly ties both with each other and with Jesus Christ, the first-born among many brethren; that the blessings of nature and the gifts of grace belong in common to the whole human race, and that to all, except to those who are unworthy, is promised the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven. If sons, heirs also, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ.^*

^* Romans viii. 17.

Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would it not seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these ?

But the Church, not content with pointing out the remedy, also applies it. For the Church does its utmost to teach and to train men, and to educate them; and by means of its Bishops and clergy it diffuses its salutary teachings far and wide. It strives to influence the mind and heart so that all may willingly yield themselves to be formed and guided by the commandments of God. It is precisely in this fundamental and principal matter, on which everything depends, that the Church has a power peculiar to itself. The agencies which it employs are given it for the very purpose of reaching the hearts of men, by Jesus Christ Himself, and derive their efficiency from God. They alone can touch the innermost heart and conscience, and bring men to act from a motive of duty, to resist their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow-men with a love that is unique and supreme, and courageously to break down every barrier which stands in the way of a virtuous life.

On this subject We need only recall, for one moment, the examples written down in history. Of these things there cannot be the shadow of doubt; for instance, that civil society was renovated in every part by the teachings of Christianity ; that in the strength of that renewal the human race was lifted up to better things,—nay, that it was brought back from death to life, and to so excellent a life that nothing more perfect had been known before, or will come to pass in the ages that have yet to be. Of this beneficent transformation, Jesus Christ was at once the first cause and the final purpose; as from Him all came, so to Him all was to be referred. For when, by the light of the Gospel message, the human race came to know the grand mystery of the Incarnation of the Word and the redemption of man, the life of Jesus Christ, God and Man, penetrated every race and nation, and impregnated them with His faith, His precepts, and His laws. And if Society is to be cured now, in no other way can it be cured but by a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions. When a Society is perishing, the true advice to give to those who would restore it is to recall it to the principles from which it sprung; for the purpose and perfection of an association is to aim at and to attain that for which it was formed; and its operation should be put in motion and inspired by the end and object which originally gave it its being. So that to fall away from its primal constitution is disease; to go back to it is recovery. And this may be asserted with the utmost truth both of the State in general and of that body of its citizens—by far the greater number— who sustain life by labor.

Neither must it be supposed that the solicitude of the Church is so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor, for example, should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life; and for this it strives. By the very fact that it calls men to virtue and forms them to its practice, it promotes this in no slight degree. Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity, for it merits the blessing of that God Who is the source of all blessings; it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure—twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restraint miserable in the midst of abundance ;^* it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance.

^* “The root of all evils is cupidity.”—I. Tim. vi. 10.

Moreover, the Church intervenes directly in the interest of the poor, by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here, again, it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praise of its enemies. Such was the ardor of brotherly love among the earliest Christians that numbers of those who were better off deprived themselves of their possessions in order to relieve their brethren; whence neither was there any one needy among them.^† To the order of Deacons, instituted for that very purpose, was committed by the Apostles the charge of the daily distributions; and the Apostle Paul, though burdened with the solicitude of all the churches, hesitated not to undertake laborious journeys in order to carry the alms of the Faithful to the poorer Christians. Tertullian calls these contributions, given voluntarily by Christians in their assemblies, deposits of piety ; because, to cite his words, they were employed in feeding the needy, in burying them, in the support of boys and girls destitute of means and deprived of their parents, in the care of the aged, and in relief of the shipwrecked.^‡

^† Acts iv. 34.

^‡ Apologia Secunda, xxxix.

Thus by degrees came into existence the patrimony which the Church has guarded with religious care as the inheritance of the poor. Nay, to spare them the shame of begging, the common Mother of rich and poor has exerted herself to gather together funds for the support of the needy. The Church has stirred up everywhere the heroism of charity, and has established Congregations of Religious and many other useful institutions for help and mercy, so that there might be hardly any kind of suffering which was not visited and relieved. At the present day there are many who, like the heathen of old, blame and condemn the Church for this beautiful charity. They would substitute in its place a system of State-organized relief. But no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian charity. Charity, as a virtue, belongs to the Church; for it is no virtue unless it is drawn from the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ; and he who turns his back on the Church cannot be near to Christ.

It cannot, however, be doubted that to attain the purpose of which We treat, not only the Church but all human means must conspire. All who are concerned in the matter must be of one mind and must act together. It is in this as in the Providence which governs the world: results do not happen save where all the causes co-operate.

Let us now, therefore, inquire what part the State should play in the work of remedy and relief.

By the State We here understand, not the particular form of government which prevails in this or that nation, but the State, as rightly understood ; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the Divine wisdom which We have expounded in the Encyclical on the Christian Constitution of the State. The first duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State. Now a State chiefly prospers and flourishes by morality, by well-regulated family life, by respect for religion and justice, by the moderation and equal distribution of public burdens, by the progress of the arts and of trade, by the abundant yield of the land—by everything which makes the citizens better and happier. Here, then, it is in the power of a ruler to benefit every order of the State, and amongst the rest to promote in the highest degree the interests of the poor, and this by virtue of his office, and without being exposed to any suspicion of undue interference; for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the common good. And the more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country, the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them.

There is another and a deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. To the State the interests of all are equal, whether high or low. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real component parts, living parts, which make up, through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are by far the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and to favor another; and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people, or else that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas of Aquin: As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in some sense claim what belongs to the whole.** Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called in the school distributive—towards each and every class.

But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so profitably to themselves, yet it is not to be supposed that all can contribute in the same way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may be made in forms of government, there will always be differences and inequalities of condition in the State: Society cannot exist or be conceived without them. Some there must be who dedicate themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who

• 2a 2æ Q. lxi. Art. 1 ad 2. make the laws, who administer justice, whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in the foremost estimation, for their work touches most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such a fashion as this; but they do in the most important way benefit the nation, though less directly. We have insisted that, since it is the end of Society to make men better, the chief good that Society can be possessed of is Virtue. Nevertheless, in all well-constituted States it is a by no means unimportant matter to provide those bodily and external commodities the use of which is necessary to virtuous action.^* And in the provision of material well-being, the labor of the poor— the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength in the culture of the land and the workshops of trade—is most efficacious and altogether indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation in this respect is so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of the working man that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the poorer population be carefully watched over by the Administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to support life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to be conducive to the well-being of those who work should receive favorable consideration. Let it not be feared that solicitude of this kind will injure any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all; for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to secure from misery those on whom it so largely depends. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a Government’s whole reason of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules. The gift of authority is from God, and is, as it were, a participation of the highest of all sovereignties; and it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised— with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches to details as well.

^* St. Thomas of Aquin. De Regimine Principum, I. cap. 15.