The Practical Importance of the Controversy Between Equiprobabilists and Probabilists

Since several think that the controversy between Probabilists and Equiprobabilists is destitute of practical value, we judge that certain things must be added concerning this matter. Now we hold that this question is practical, and this for the reasons to be explained.

I. It is certain that for every learned person there are several opinions which he judges to be probable in the probabilistic sense, but certainly less probable. Now, according to the opinion of the Probabilists, it is licit to put these into practice; according to the opinion of the Equiprobabilists, it is not licit. Thus I myself, though unlearned, in order to bring forward some examples for the sake of argument, judge the following propositions to be probable in the sense of the Probabilists, but certainly less probable:

1. An act following from another action and foreseen, for example, blasphemy uttered in drunkenness and foreseen, does not come under the name of sin, and therefore there is no obligation of declaring an act of this sort in confession. 2. Sins do not receive numerical distinction from the plurality of objects. 3. He who, in the state of grave sin, successively absolves several persons perpetrates one numerically single sin. 4. There is no obligation of using a privilege if it removes an impediment to the observance of law, so that, for example, a sick person who has the privilege of a private oratory, and can conveniently assist at Mass there but not in church, is not held to it. 5. In common necessity there is no grave obligation of giving alms from goods simply superfluous. 6. Even laws which regard direct taxes are purely penal. 7. The law of military service is purely penal. 8. The special affection of a buyer toward a thing, provided it rests not only on necessity or need but on utility, convenience, or delight, can be numbered among special titles of selling beyond the highest price. 9. A deaf-mute is not held to confess in writing if he cannot do so otherwise. 10. There is no obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without manifestation of an accomplice. 11. A grave sin declared as doubtful does not have to be declared again if afterward it is discovered to have been certainly committed. 12. In itself he does not sin gravely who, in a long series of confessions, omits only one or another necessary question. 13. A confessor does not sin gravely who for one or another grave sin imposes only a light penance. Come now: it would be licit for me to put into practice the opinions just mentioned, to which it would not be difficult to add very many others, if I were a Probabilist; now, since I adhere to Equiprobabilism, this very thing is illicit for me.

II. There is added that, as we shall note in the third scholion, the confessor is ordinarily held to impose not only on himself, but also on an unlearned penitent, the opinion which he himself holds as certainly more probable.

III. The final reason why this controversy seems practical is this: Probabilism of itself seems to lead to laxer opinions, to opinions, I say, which are not only certainly less probable, but improbable or slightly probable. For: 1. With the historical circumstances considered, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Pontiffs resisted Probabilism also for this purpose, that laxer opinions might be eliminated.¹ 2. The word "probable" is so vague and unbounded that it cannot be determined when an opinion ceases to be sufficiently founded. But doctrine of this sort, in view of man's inclination toward what is easier, of its own accord leads to embracing opinions more benign than is just.² 3. Finally, history and experience prove that not a few Probabilists, driven by force of their probabilistic and vague principle, inclined toward lax opinions later proscribed by the Church. I indeed confess that several more recent Probabilists are sufficiently moderate; but this in no way prevents me from not denying that some supporters of Probabilism, gradually and imperceptibly, incline toward opinions of which many are rejected by the graver Probabilists themselves as slightly probable or improbable. Opinions of this kind are, for example:

1. Only that occasion of sin is proximate in which someone is almost certainly or more probably going to fall, and not one in which he is only probably going to sin. 2. For receiving the sacraments of the living licitly, moral certainty, at least broad, concerning the state of grace is not required. 3. Extraordinary shame arising from an extraordinary circumstance excuses from the integrity of confession. 4. In itself broad moral certainty concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent is not required, but probability suffices in order that absolution be conferred licitly. 5. Grave fear excuses from the reservation of sin. 6. There is no obligation of denouncing a confessor guilty of solicitation in the case of amendment so great and such that every fear of repetition is excluded. 7. A soliciting priest who, worn out by old age and hindered by chronic illnesses, is never again going to hear confessions, is not to be denounced. 8. A cleric habituated in hidden sins, for example of lust, can receive sacred orders without a preceding trial of amendment.

From what has been said it is clear how great an error holds those authors who think that Equiprobabilism and Probabilism scarcely differ practically and that our controversy is merely theoretical.

¹ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 19 sq.

² Cf. Mandonnet, Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 511.

Practical Conclusions.—An instrument is called good when it produces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was intended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a timepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates accurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be harmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch with a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally corrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now, from what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience can be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved. Hence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a good conscience.

Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good conscience are as follows:

(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A person judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in his intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in his attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of sincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere love of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest examination of motives and actions: “The sensual man perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all things” (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).

(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One judges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas or principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light through prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models, to consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience says to God: “Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways” (Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: “Teach me Thy justifications. Thy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel” (Ps. cxviii. 12, 24).

Signs of a Good Conscience.—(a) Extraordinary holiness is not necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but because he does not always follow it.

(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because he does not follow it.

The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good conscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the severity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and as before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not by the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of Christ (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).

Equiprobabilism.—The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about the existence of the law.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law has not ceased.

(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been fulfilled—that is, that its obligation has not ceased.

The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession; for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been complied with or removed is certain.

The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation, or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.

The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession; for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide that there is no obligation.

(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In doubt improperly so called—that is, in that condition of mind in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some indecision between the more and the less probable—we should decide in favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.

(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed, if it is more probable.

Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.

(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is, assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).

(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows that it seems to exist.

Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any fear of error.

(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.

General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.—(a) From Authority.—St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation, the Redemptorists, but by many others.

(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.—Truth lies midway between extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.

(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.—According to principles of justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the guiding principles for the court of conscience.

Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.—(a) St. Alphonsus is one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral Theology, he was a Probabilist.

(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.

(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply, however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for solving all difficulties about duty.

The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.—(a) Granted that St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically, and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the only thing that gave him anxiety.

(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question—that for liberty and that for law—before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two sides.

(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to get the truth as nearly as possible.

General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.—all of which principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.

(b) Practical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the law or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?

Replies of the Equiprobabilists.—(a) The old (i.e., probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor Probabilism, if one is impartial in one’s use of them, and willing to use them against as well as for liberty.

(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to the best of one’s ability which side appears to be more probable or to have the presumption in its favor.

Practical Conclusions.—From the foregoing discussions one may deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert theologians:

(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you need not hesitate to follow your conscience.

(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but seek truth and decision.

(c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience, 611 sqq.).

Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a “Meliorist,” for the better and more perfect is more advisable than what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in higher station higher things are required.

(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a “Certitudinist,” that is, one must resolve doubts or slight probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in 661).

(c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist, when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).

(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).

(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).

(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.

(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is less, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the principles of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or Compensationism, according to conviction.

As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following rules are generally admitted:

(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral system, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a different moral system; for the Church allows liberty.

(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral system and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should decide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but for what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most advantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a Probabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that are less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always requires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act unwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more profitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation; for those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be recommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be entirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an obligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral Theology, would see is controverted.

In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to whether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor himself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the requisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor must prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided therefore by his own conviction.

(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and theologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a well-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the opinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent’s opinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it seems more prudent to leave him in good faith.

39. It differs from probabiliorism, because probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is more probable. - It differs from equiprobabilism, because equiprobabilists affirm that it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty when the contrary opinion for the law is equally probable or a little more probable; but not at all when the contrary opinion for the law is certainly and notably more probable.

40. But from what has been said it is clear that probabilism is called minus-probabilism by its adversaries without any truth. For probabilists do not say that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable, as probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow any except the more probable, and equiprobabilists the equally probable; rather, they say that it is lawful simply to follow a probable opinion; not at all that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable.

53. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted. - Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For even for these doctors it is very difficult to establish which sentence is more probable, which is notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, even what before appeared to one and the same person more probable, and much more probable, afterwards, when the matter has been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable. - Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is lawful to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable sentence; or they say that it is lawful to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not beget a certain obligation; since the will cannot be bound by its obligation without knowledge of the law. The first cannot be said, for although the sentence may be more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without certain conscience it is not lawful to act. But the second, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where true probability is had against the law, the law is now doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had. - Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more nearly to truth. But now this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more to truth, and the sentence which bore before itself some greater appearance of truth can be false. Besides, here there is no question of speculative but of practical truth; there is no question of the adherence of the intellect simply to truth, but of the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of a law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

348. Difficulties against Equiprobabilism. Since, as appears from what was said above, there is so small a difference between Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, all the difficulties by which the former labors press upon the latter. Besides, the fundamental principle of Equiprobabilism, "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," is indeed true in the matter of justice, and perhaps can also be applied in other matters, as is clear from what was said above; but the application which Equiprobabilism makes of it does not seem always to be right. For if a law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons persuade its obligation or disobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Hence in that case to distinguish between the cessation and the existence of the law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable. - Finally, he seems to commit an inconsistency who teaches that the confessor ought to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion less probable and less safe, and yet on the other hand establishes that it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one. But thus teach St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁵ and all the Equiprobabilists after him.¹⁴⁶ Hence the Probabiliorists, such as Billuart, proceed more logically, who reprove this mode of acting on the part of the confessor.

¹⁴⁵ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. above n. 346.

97. It is pleasing to relate various arguments and responses of the controversy, by which the question can in some way be judged.

I. The Equiprobabilists and Probabiliorists say: When something is certainly more probable, the contrary is no longer probable, and consequently we do not licitly do it.

The Probabilists respond, by distinguishing: The contrary is no longer probable in the strict and philosophical sense, i.e., worthy that we adhere to it by our judgment, granted; it is not probable in the broad and moral sense, i.e., founded on grave reasons, I subdistinguish: if the reasons are sought from the same principles on which the more probable opinion is founded, or if this latter notably exceeds it, granted; otherwise, I deny.

The objection contends that the probability of one proposition is elided by the probability of the other more probable proposition. But the elision of one probability by another does not consist in this, that one is destroyed by the other, but in this, that the other takes away its power of moving the intellect to prudent speculative assent. Yet the less probable opinion keeps its power of moving the intellect at the same time to judge that the opposite more probable opinion is not certain.

And St. Alphonsus himself at one time confessed this: "Our authors rightly respond that it is false: that the greater probability elides the lesser, unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable."1 2 Nevertheless we acknowledge that the Holy Doctor afterward no longer held this, but rather taught the contrary.

II. The very recent Equiprobabilists argue: In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward truth and conformity with the objective order and the eternal law, or with the divine reason and will establishing this order; and consequently, if it is impossible to arrive at that conformity certainly, we must tend as much as we can and embrace what comes nearer to it: in uncertainties, namely, the more truthlike is to be chosen. But he who chooses what he judges less probable does not sincerely tend toward truth and the eternal law, because he does not do this as much as he can. Therefore he does not do what he ought, and he sins.

a) To this some observe that the argumentation, if it is right, also proves - which nevertheless the Equiprobabilists deny - that one must adhere to an opinion a little more probable, because in it there is greater hope of conforming oneself to objective truth and to the eternal law. Indeed, logically it leads to tutiorism: for if there is an obligation to tend as much as we can toward conformity with a law prescribing good, which does not oblige for always, there will be a much greater obligation of tending toward conformity with a law prohibiting evil, which obliges for always. But this we shall never obtain better than by doing what is safer.

But, setting this aside, the Probabilists respond briefly thus:

In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward truth and conformity with the eternal law, I distinguish: i.e., we must endeavor to know the law and observe it once it is known as morally certain, granted; when we cannot know the law as morally certain, we must choose and do what is more probable, I deny. He does not sincerely tend toward truth and law who does not make serious efforts to know the law, granted; he who seriously endeavors but cannot know it certainly, denied.

b) But since the matter is of greater moment, a fuller response can also be brought forward. Before we hand it down, it must be noted: a) with St. Alphonsus,² with respect to us the eternal law is not a proper law, but only the natural law, i.e., our reason (which is a participation in us of the eternal law), obliges us; whence in the major of the argument nothing else is said except that in all things we are held to follow reason, and if it says nothing certain, we are held to follow what is more probable; b) the major can be understood of direct principles alone of reason and of the eternal law, or also of indirect and reflex principles. This being posited, the Probabilists respond thus:

² Th. M., I, n. 72. "The eternal law with respect to men is not a proper law; for the proper law with regard to them is natural law." Cf. n. 77.

1. If there is question of direct and reflex principles together, nothing is stated except what all admit, namely, that we cannot act except that which certainly seems licit or conformable to law, i.e., we cannot act except with a certain conscience (directly or indirectly) concerning the honesty of the action; which conscience, nevertheless, can also be formed from indirect principles.

2. If there is question of direct principles alone, I respond: In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward conformity with right reason and the eternal law and the divine will, and if we cannot conform to them certainly, we are held to do this as much as we can, I distinguish: if there is question of truth to be sought and of acts of the intellect, granted; for it would be absurd, for example, in dogmatic and speculative questions to choose what is less probable, or not to inquire what is more probable; and similarly it would be absurd in moral questions not first to seek, as far as morally possible, direct certitude concerning the existence of the law, as was said in n. 88. If there is question of acts of the will and of things to be done, I subdistinguish: if right reason, the eternal law, the will of God certainly prescribe, granted; if they do not prescribe, or not certainly, denied.

For right reason and the eternal law do not always oblige that we conform ourselves to them, but if they prescribe; and the will of God obliges only if He wills us to will something; moreover it is required that we know this certainly. Besides, as was said, since the same reason and eternal law also dictate that an uncertain law does not oblige, if we do not follow an uncertain law although more probable, we shall still be conformed to the eternal law and to reason according to higher principles through a reflex judgment.

III. They insist: The will, in order to operate prudently, must follow the judgment of the intellect. But the will following the less probable opinion does not follow the judgment of the intellect, but rather brings force and compulsion upon the intellect, so that it does not follow its own judgment, but is bent away from the part which appears more truthlike to a part which it does not have as true, contrary to its own nature.

It can be answered: There is a confusion between the speculative and practical order. The will cannot rightly and without fault bend the intellect to adhering to the less probable part as true - as certain Probabilists erroneously said - but it is not held to observe the more probable law, because this is not certain. And yet it follows the judgment of the intellect, which not only judges that such reasons are graver and that one must adhere to them, but at the same time judges that they are not certain, and consequently that the law does not oblige. And the will is conformed to this judgment of the intellect and to the higher law, and thus it brings no force upon the intellect.³

³ More recent Probabilists defend their system as if its necessary and only foundation were the principle: Under the influence of the will, the intellect can both physically and also reasonably and prudently restrain the judgment, namely, assent to the more founded opinion, and adhere to the less founded. This principle the adversaries very easily prove to be contrary to all sound philosophy, unheard of among the older scholastics, repugnant to psychological experience, and opposed to right reason and prudence; whence they boast that they overturn Probabilism without much effort. The older Probabilists spoke otherwise and more wisely, saying that the intellect prudently, indeed necessarily, cannot embrace anything except that which appears more founded; but that a law even truthlikely existing does not oblige, because for that reason it does not become morally certain. Let Laymann be heard, Th. M., book I, tr. 1, c. 5, n. 6: "Although every part of a question, if it is probable, can produce the assent of those opining, speaking absolutely, nevertheless it cannot do this in every intellect. For if the opposite part of the question seems more probable to you, or if you perceive greater weights of reasons on that side, although you can then restrain every assent, nevertheless, on the hypothesis that you wish to assent to one part or the other, it is necessary that you assent to the more probable; but to the other, which appears less probable to you, you then cannot assent. For if you assent to the less probable, or judge it true, by that very fact you judge the opposite false; which cannot happen while that opposite appears to you more probable or more truthlike, because the judging intellect according to specification is not altogether free, but is determined by the reasons and motives of the proposed object. Nor is St. Thomas opposed to this doctrine, I-II, q. 17, a. 6, where he says that, in those things apprehended which do not convince the intellect, it is in our power to assent or dissent. For this is true absolutely, because the intellect can be moved by command of the will so that, omitting the consideration of the reasons for one part of the question, it considers and evaluates the reasons occurring for the opposite part. But with the hypothesis standing, or in the composite sense, while, I say, one part of a contradiction appears more truthlike than the opposite part, the intellect cannot dissent from the former and assent to the latter, because that would be done without reason, indeed against reason..." And n. 7: "These things... show that it is licit to follow a probable opinion in acting. But that this can be done, even if to the one acting himself speculatively it appears less probable, and the opposite more probable, must be shown from this, that that speculative opining, by the very fact that it is uncertain and perhaps false, cannot be the rule of operation. Consequently the one acting must follow another rule, and that a certain one; namely, that in doubtful questions concerning morals anyone can operate according to an opinion which learned men defend as probable and safe in practice. Nor indeed does he then act against his own conscience, since conscience is not some speculative opining, but a practical certain judgment concerning what is to be done." In the same way Suarez, De Vol. et invol., disp. X, sect. 1, n. 5; Lessius, de Act. Hum., q. 17, a. 6; Pallavicini, in I-II, disp. 8, q. 6, a. 4, n. 9; Vasquez, in I-II, disp. 67, c. 1, n. 4.

From the arguments brought forward each one will be able to form some judgment for himself. But as to practice, as we have said, it does not matter much which system is chosen, provided that Probabilism is understood as truly moderate and is contained within the just limits of sound prudence.

But the patrons of each opinion, agreeing as to their substantial principle, admit various degrees: the former indeed in relation to the certainty which they will to have directly, and the latter in relation to the probability upon which they remotely rely; and therefore the first are split into absolute and mitigated tutiorists, and the second into probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists simply. Wherefore there have properly been five systems: absolute tutiorism, mitigated tutiorism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism, and probabilism. There is added laxism, which can scarcely be called a system, and scarcely merits the attention of a prudent man. Concerning each there will briefly be said something.

I. That norm of acting certainly ought to be judged reasonable and right according to which no danger of formally sinning is incurred, and all difficulties are satisfied; but whoever acts according to probabilism not only avoids the danger of any formal sin whatsoever, but also can very well solve all difficulties which are objected, as is manifestly clear from those things which have been said above. Therefore probabilism is a reasonable and right norm of acting, and therefore it is false that this excellence belongs to equiprobabilism alone. This argument would abundantly suffice for the end which we intend here; but it is better to proceed further, since all the arguments which were brought above against probabiliorists can be urged no less against equiprobabilists. And indeed there can be urged:

(a) An argument from reason. For either equiprobabilists admit that solemn principle, an uncertain law does not oblige, or they do not admit it. If the first, how will they prove that only then is a law uncertain when equal or almost equal probability militates against it? Does not true and solid probability, wherever it is present, destroy the certainty of the opposed sentence? If the other, the reasons upon which that principle rests would have to be answered by them.

(b) An argument from authority can be urged. For those sayings of the Fathers and Scholastics, no distinction having been made, ought to be applied to a probable opinion of whatever degree, the slight alone excepted; since nowhere among them is there discussion of an opinion equally or almost equally probable. Nor should you say that they speak of this equality as if implicitly and equivalently; for it is answered that there exists no nation and there is no dictionary in which the adjective equal has the same value as true and solid.

(c) The argument from consequences can especially be urged. For would not the same most grave difficulty be had both for confessors and for penitents? Certainly the same; for equiprobabilists no less than probabiliorists require, and ought to require, that comparative judgment which very few can effect, and which is the cause of that difficulty. Would there not likewise be a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine? Do all confessors have the eyes of the mind disposed and balanced in so equal a manner that concerning the same question they make for themselves the same opinion? Wherefore St. Alphonsus, in the Dissertation edited in the year 1755, n. 17, thus argues against probabiliorists: "Such an appearance, namely of greater probability, cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which appears more probable to one will appear less probable to another; indeed, to himself the opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." And again, ibid., n. 42: "Some opinion which is more probable to me will often be less probable to others, and therefore the law would be particular for those only to whom that opinion would appear more probable. But this surely would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people who are bound to observe it be more often divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions, according to his own sense would often instruct the faithful." Moreover, if you change the word more probable employed here by the holy Doctor into the word equiprobable, you have an excellent condemnation of equiprobabilism from the fluctuation of doctrine flowing from it.

Nor should you say that probabilists also are pressed by this inconvenience. For the holy Doctor responds, ibid., n. 43: "Nor is it valid to say that by following the benign sentence, deformity also can intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen, but it will always be true that when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests upon a certainly grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise; and this will already be enough for preserving the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person it is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not take away universal conformity. Yet this certainly does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions, in our case equiprobable opinions; because since greater or lesser probability depends upon moral motives, namely upon the judgment and weighing of reasons, which some deduce from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely but commonly that what to one is more valid appears weaker to another." Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 60.