II. On the Practical Importance of the Controversy Between Equiprobabilists and Probabilists

Since several think that the controversy between Probabilists and Equiprobabilists is destitute of practical value, we judge that certain things must be added concerning this matter. Now we hold that this question is practical, and this for the reasons to be explained.

I. It is certain that for every learned person there are several opinions which he judges to be probable in the probabilistic sense, but certainly less probable. Now, according to the opinion of the Probabilists, it is licit to put these into practice; according to the opinion of the Equiprobabilists, it is not licit. Thus I myself, though unlearned, in order to bring forward some examples for the sake of argument, judge the following propositions to be probable in the sense of the Probabilists, but certainly less probable:

1. An act following from another action and foreseen, for example, blasphemy uttered in drunkenness and foreseen, does not come under the name of sin, and therefore there is no obligation of declaring an act of this sort in confession. 2. Sins do not receive numerical distinction from the plurality of objects. 3. He who, in the state of grave sin, successively absolves several persons perpetrates one numerically single sin. 4. There is no obligation of using a privilege if it removes an impediment to the observance of law, so that, for example, a sick person who has the privilege of a private oratory, and can conveniently assist at Mass there but not in church, is not held to it. 5. In common necessity there is no grave obligation of giving alms from goods simply superfluous. 6. Even laws which regard direct taxes are purely penal. 7. The law of military service is purely penal. 8. The special affection of a buyer toward a thing, provided it rests not only on necessity or need but on utility, convenience, or delight, can be numbered among special titles of selling beyond the highest price. 9. A deaf-mute is not held to confess in writing if he cannot do so otherwise. 10. There is no obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without manifestation of an accomplice. 11. A grave sin declared as doubtful does not have to be declared again if afterward it is discovered to have been certainly committed. 12. In itself he does not sin gravely who, in a long series of confessions, omits only one or another necessary question. 13. A confessor does not sin gravely who for one or another grave sin imposes only a light penance. Come now: it would be licit for me to put into practice the opinions just mentioned, to which it would not be difficult to add very many others, if I were a Probabilist; now, since I adhere to Equiprobabilism, this very thing is illicit for me.

II. There is added that, as we shall note in the third scholion, the confessor is ordinarily held to impose not only on himself, but also on an unlearned penitent, the opinion which he himself holds as certainly more probable.

III. The final reason why this controversy seems practical is this: Probabilism of itself seems to lead to laxer opinions, to opinions, I say, which are not only certainly less probable, but improbable or slightly probable. For: 1. With the historical circumstances considered, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Pontiffs resisted Probabilism also for this purpose, that laxer opinions might be eliminated.¹ 2. The word "probable" is so vague and unbounded that it cannot be determined when an opinion ceases to be sufficiently founded. But doctrine of this sort, in view of man's inclination toward what is easier, of its own accord leads to embracing opinions more benign than is just.² 3. Finally, history and experience prove that not a few Probabilists, driven by force of their probabilistic and vague principle, inclined toward lax opinions later proscribed by the Church. I indeed confess that several more recent Probabilists are sufficiently moderate; but this in no way prevents me from not denying that some supporters of Probabilism, gradually and imperceptibly, incline toward opinions of which many are rejected by the graver Probabilists themselves as slightly probable or improbable. Opinions of this kind are, for example:

1. Only that occasion of sin is proximate in which someone is almost certainly or more probably going to fall, and not one in which he is only probably going to sin. 2. For receiving the sacraments of the living licitly, moral certainty, at least broad, concerning the state of grace is not required. 3. Extraordinary shame arising from an extraordinary circumstance excuses from the integrity of confession. 4. In itself broad moral certainty concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent is not required, but probability suffices in order that absolution be conferred licitly. 5. Grave fear excuses from the reservation of sin. 6. There is no obligation of denouncing a confessor guilty of solicitation in the case of amendment so great and such that every fear of repetition is excluded. 7. A soliciting priest who, worn out by old age and hindered by chronic illnesses, is never again going to hear confessions, is not to be denounced. 8. A cleric habituated in hidden sins, for example of lust, can receive sacred orders without a preceding trial of amendment.

From what has been said it is clear how great an error holds those authors who think that Equiprobabilism and Probabilism scarcely differ practically and that our controversy is merely theoretical.

¹ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 19 sq.

² Cf. Mandonnet, Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 511.