Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 1. On Probabiliorism
345. Reasons for Probabiliorism. a) From authority. There is no other system which is supported so strongly from authority as Probabiliorism. For before the controversies about Probabilism arose, several Supreme Pontiffs seem to have given decisions according to the principles of Probabiliorism. Thus, for example, Innocent III,120 treating of a violated censure, says: "Although in this he does not seem to have been altogether culpable, nevertheless, because in doubts the safer way is to be chosen, he ought rather to have abstained than to handle the ecclesiastical sacraments." Therefore the Pontiff does not say: a doubtful law does not oblige, but rather the contrary. Eugenius I,121 Clement III,122 and Clement V have similar things, the last of whom says: "We, attending to the fact that in those things which regard the salvation of the soul, in order to avoid grave remorse of conscience, the safer part is to be held."123 After Bartholomaeus Medina introduced the system of Probabilism and obtained very many followers, the Supreme Pontiffs did not cease to put forward salutary warnings against it. Alexander VII in the Decrees of 24 Sept. 1665 and 18 March 1666 proscribed 45 propositions excerpted from books of the Probabilists.124 But Innocent XI manifestly favored Probabiliorism, who in the celebrated Decree of 26 June 1680 commanded Thyrsus Gonzalez, Praepositus General of the Society of Jesus, "that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also vigorously attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable, and let him be made certain that whatever he does and writes in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and attack the opinion of those asserting that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it shall please him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one; and let him command them that they submit themselves altogether to the mandate of His Holiness."125 And when Matthaeus Moya, under the pseudonym "Amadeus Guimenius," had written a little work for defending the opinions of the Probabilists, this little work, already previously placed on the Index, was again condemned, and indeed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680.126 - Clement XI in the year 1702 wrote to Thyrsus Gonzalez: "The Superiors of the Society will do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they see to it that the Jesuits abstain from teaching and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of an opinion less probable and less safe is licit, since it has been ascertained by His Holiness that this is altogether expedient for the safety and honor of the Society."127 Likewise Benedict XIV favored Probabiliorism, who warned the confessor "that he embrace that opinion which he shall have known to be more supported by reason and favored by authority."128 Besides, the same Pontiff ordered that the theology of Fr. Antoine, S.J., a vigorous Probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of Propaganda Fide. Clement XIII on 26 Feb. 1761, through a Decree of the Holy Office, condemned a sheet containing several theses favoring the system of Probabilism; indeed, the proposition, "Probabilism was supremely familiar to Christ the Lord," he specially condemned as erroneous and proximate to heresy.129 - From all these things it clearly appears how rightly Thyrsus Gonzalez wrote in the supplicatory little book offered to Clement XI in the year 1702: "It is certain that the Apostolic See has always inclined more toward the opinion contrary to Probabilism." The same is thought by Mausbach, Sawicki, Koch, Schmuckenschlager, Liese, Vinati, and very many others among the moderns.130 Hence it is also manifestly evident - which I would wish to be noted in passing - how undeservedly and calumniously Dollinger-Reusch,131 Harnack,132 Hoensbroech,133 and several others reproach the Catholic Church with having fostered lax moral doctrines. - Bartholomaeus Medina himself candidly confessed that his doctrine concerning Probabilism differed from the doctrine of the old authors; and in reality, up to this point no author could be adduced who clearly taught Probabilism before the sixteenth century. For the old authors, who are sometimes alleged as favorers of Probabilism, such as Lactantius, Basil, Gregory Naz., Augustine, Antoninus, Ioannes Nider, etc., when inspected more diligently rather favor Probabiliorism.134 This is especially true of St. Antoninus and of Ioannes Nider.135 - The first who seems to have expounded the principle of Probabiliorism clearly enough is Guilielmus Antisiodorensis, who flourished around the year 1230. He writes in the treatise on pollution: "That masterly rule, that one doubting about something whether it is illicit, and doing it while the doubt stands, sins because he commits himself to danger, must be understood of such a doubt as is vehement, and leads the mind more, or at least equally, to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have evident or fixed certitude in every way, because even this itself is not required." - For Probabiliorism among the old authors are cited: Alexander Halensis, Petrus de Tarantasia, Durandus, Petrus de Palude, Silvester Prierias, Cajetan, Franciscus de Victoria, and almost all theologians from the Order of Preachers, to which, assembled in General Chapter, Alexander VII in the year 1656 very much commended that its members fight for Probabiliorism.136
b) From reason. 1. In doubts the safer part must be chosen, at least if this is morally possible. For so teach not only great authors, but also many texts of the Decretals.137 But Probabiliorism is much safer and always chooses the safer part insofar as this is morally possible and necessary. Therefore Probabiliorism is the system to be preferred. The minor is proved: it is safer to follow the law than, the equally and truly probable law having been set aside, to follow liberty, as all admit. But Probabiliorism teaches that the law must always be followed, unless the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable; for if the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable, there exists a very small danger of violating the law. But a little is accounted as nothing, as the common adage says. - Nor should anyone say that Tutiorism is still safer than Probabiliorism and therefore that it must be followed; for, granted that Tutiorism is safer, it is impossible in practice, all admitting it. But no one is bound to the impossible.
2. Where the truth cannot clearly be found, we are bound at least to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth. Hence Rule of Law 45 in VI says: "In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth." But Probabiliorism approaches nearer to the truth, since it follows either the safe opinion or the manifestly more probable opinion. Therefore Probabiliorism is to be preferred among the diverse systems. See several other arguments apud Billuart.138
120 c. 5, X 5, 27.
121 c. 3, X 4, 1.
122 c. 12, X 5, 12.
123 c. 1, V 11 in Clem.
125 On the history of that Decree see Mandonnet, O. Pr., Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme; Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minusprobabilismo 2, 41; Brucker, S.J., in Etudes t. 86, 778 and t. 91, 831.
126 Cf. Index libr. proh., word "Guimenius," and Hurter, S.J., Nomencl. lit. Theol. cath. IV 611.
127 Apud Wouters l. c. 36.
128 Lettera circolare a tutti i Patriarchi ... sopra la preparazione all' anno santo, d. 26 June 1749, n. 20.
129 This whole Decree is alleged by St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 84, ed. Gaude. It is strange that it is not found in Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion.
130 See the individual testimonies apud Wouters l. c. 41. Thus, for example, the Tubingen Professor Ant. Koch writes: "Rome did not condemn Probabilism, but visibly favored the doctrine of the more probable opinion" (Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 3 Sept. 1904).
131 Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Nordlingen 1889.
132 Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte.
133 Die ultramontane Moral.
134 Cf. Billuart, De consc. diss. 6, a. 1.
135 Ioannes Nider, O. Pr., in his excellent book, whose title is Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae (P. 3, c. 1), expressly adopts the opinion of Blessed Albert and relies on almost the same words as St. Antoninus, who certainly favors Probabiliorism. Behold his words: "When, therefore, in some moral matter there are various and contrary opinions, he who would adhere to the opinion of the broader way seems to expose himself to the danger of mortal sin, because in doubt, since that opinion can be false and the contrary true." Then St. Antoninus responds that he who acts in strict doubt really sins. "But by acting against such a [slight] doubt one does not sin, while he adheres to the opinion of some doctor and has more probable reasons for it than for the opposite opinion" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10). - What can be said more clearly?
136 Acta capitulorum Gen. O. P. ed. Reichert vol. VII, p. 403. For the testimonies of individual authors see Concina, De Probabilismo diss. 1 and 2.
137 Cf. above. - The Decretals have it thus at least seven times: c. 3 X 3, 43; c. 3 X 4, 1; c. 12 X 5, 12; ib. c. 18 and c. 24; c. 5 X 5, 27; Clem. l. 5, tit. 11, c. 2.
138 L. c.
346. Difficulties. 1. The fundamental rule itself of Probabiliorism is not so certain. For this rule establishes: In doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion, the less probable opinion for the law having been set aside. But this rule cannot be proved certainly except by an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law. Yet this same argument seems almost equally to prove the principle of Probabilism: a doubtful law does not oblige; which nevertheless the Probabiliorists reject.
2. Probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For a) it can cause conflicts between the confessor and the penitent; because, if the penitent wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the confessor is bound to absolve him. Thus the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls common and to be followed, citing more than thirty authors for it.139 But the reason is that the confessor is not the competent judge of opinions, but only of the disposition of his penitent. But the disposition of the penitent consists in true contrition for sins committed and in the sincere purpose of not sinning in the future. Therefore a Probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. - b) Sometimes a benign probable opinion is much more useful for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than a rigid more probable opinion. For not rarely, on account of a rigid opinion imposed on him by the confessor, a penitent is altogether deterred from receiving the sacraments and thus grows foul in sins. Hence today perhaps there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the penitential tribunal, or who follows the opinion of Billuart saying: "If the opinion of the penitent is certainly less probable and the penitent recognizes it as such and wishes to follow it, the confessor ought to deny him absolution as indisposed, even if he says that he is a probabilist."140
139 Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604. The Holy Doctor leads the opposite opinion to absurdity in this way: "Two confessors have two contrary opinions, each of which appears more probable to itself; if one wished to confess to the other, this one would have to lay aside his opinion, taking his intellect captive, so that he might obey his confessor constituted as his judge. Conversely, however, if afterward the other were to confess to this one, this second confessor would have to resume his opinion, which appears to him more probable; for then he would have to judge according to his own proper judgment and would have to oblige him to lay aside the opinion which he had previously imposed on him as to be followed. And behold a comedy worthy of laughter, which would occur daily among confessors. Who has thought that Christ the Lord wished to oblige confessors and penitents to these burdens in the sacrament of Penance?" Cf. nevertheless Lugo, Respons. mor. l. 1, dub. 26 (Paris edition 1869, tom. 8, p. 40).
140 De consc. diss. 6, a. 4.