The Relation Between Natural or Acquired Virtues and Supernatural Virtues

28. Whether they exist. Supernatural virtues are habits infused by God, by which man can connaturally exercise supernatural acts. That virtues of this sort are infused by God is demonstrated by theological reason and is established from the Council of Trent.

a. It is required that nature, elevated to the supernatural state, be able connaturally to produce acts by which it tends to the supernatural end. But for this it is required that not only the external and transient principle, actual grace, but also the internal and permanent principle, namely power, be supernatural; and this is supplied by infused habits. Therefore God has adorned man with the habits of supernatural virtues.

Therefore, what in the order of nature are the powers of the soul, intellect and will, in the supernatural order are infused habits, namely the proximate principle of supernatural life; just as sanctifying grace, from which infused habits proceed, must be called the remote principle of supernatural life.

b. If it is asked only in general whether there are infused virtues, it must be answered that from revelation it is certain that supernatural virtues are infused into the soul: for from the Council of Trent we know that in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these gifts infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom he is joined: faith, hope, and charity.² Infused virtues are some theological virtues, others moral virtues.

These virtues are called theological, or divine, by reason of divine origin, because they are known only by divine revelation and are not acquired unless they are infused into us by God; by reason of essence, because they are supernatural in themselves; but especially by reason of the formal object, which is some divine perfection. On the contrary, the formal object of the other virtues is some created good. Yet the material object of the theological virtues, namely the true which we believe and the good which we hope for and love, at least the principal and primary object, is God Himself.

¹ St. Thomas I-II, q. 62-67. Suarez, De gratia l. 6, c. 4. Mazella, De virtutibus infusis^2 (Rome: Forzani, 1894). Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae (Freiburg: Herder, 1898), VIII, I. Tepe, Institutiones theologiae moralis generalis (Paris: Lethielleux, 1898), De virtutibus II, p. 147 ff. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1895).

² Sess. 6, c. 7.

29. On the theological virtues. 1. The theological virtues are those whose motive, or formal object, is God or some divine perfection.

2. There are three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity; and these indeed are required and suffice for us to come to the ultimate end.

a. St. Paul, writing concerning the theological virtues, says: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."¹ He is speaking of a genus of virtues distinct from all other virtues. Therefore the Council of Trent declares: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these infused at once through Jesus Christ, to whom he is joined: faith, hope, charity."²

b. Since we are destined to the supernatural end, God willed to render us capable of tending toward Him by proportioned acts, namely acts intrinsically supernatural and connatural to us. For this it was necessary that the habits of the theological virtues be infused into us. For in order that we may be able to tend to God, our supernatural end, it is necessary that we know Him supernaturally, that we be borne toward Him by a supernatural desire, and finally that we be supernaturally conformed to Him. But the first is had through faith, the second through hope, the third through theological charity, and therefore through the infused habits of the theological virtues (Ecclus. 2:8 ff.).

3. Several say that it is certain by faith from the cited place of the Council of Trent that the theological virtues are infused into us by God. They are infused all together at the same time with sanctifying grace, but they are not all lost together.

4. As often as sanctifying grace is increased, together with it the theological virtues also are increased with the remaining virtues: for so great is the connection between grace and the virtues that they are infused, preserved, and increased with it. But sanctifying grace is increased by reception of the sacraments and by good works.³

5. Although the theological virtues are all infused together with sanctifying grace and flow from it, nevertheless they are not all lost with it, but perish through acts opposed to them.

Charity, together with sanctifying grace, is lost through any mortal sin whatever; but faith and hope are lost only through mortal sin directly opposed to these virtues. For faith and hope precede charity by nature, dispose to it, and lead to it; for which reason, when charity has been lost, its prior dispositions are not lost, but remain in the sinner so that they may help him in recovering charity. Through the mortal sin of despair, hope is lost together with charity and sanctifying grace, but not faith, which is a prior disposition to hope and the foundation of all supernatural virtues. Finally, through the mortal sin of heresy, faith is lost together with sanctifying grace and all infused virtues.

¹ 1 Cor. 13:13.

² Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7.

³ Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 24.

30. On moral virtues. Moral virtues are those whose formal object is the uprightness of actions.

a. Since it is not certain by faith that moral virtues also are infused into us by God, there are theologians, the Scotists, who deny this; nevertheless their doctrine is rejected by others as erroneous. And indeed if it is established that the theological virtues are infused, this cannot be denied concerning the moral virtues. For if God infuses the theological virtues so that their acts may be exercised connaturally through internal principles, for the same reason He must also infuse the moral virtues. Therefore the Roman Catechism teaches: "To this grace there is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."¹

b. It is not established how many infused moral virtues there are. It seems one must say that the four cardinal virtues are infused, but no more. For since the remaining moral virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues as their integral or subjective parts, the habits of the latter suffice also for eliciting the acts of the former.

¹ On baptism, n. 51.

31. What the virtues effect. Infused habits, according to the common and truer opinion of theologians, give the very power, but not also the facility, of eliciting supernatural acts, because they indeed incline to their acts, but do not remove their impediments.

a. From these things the chief difference which exists between infused and acquired virtues is already clear: a. infused virtues give the very faculty, but not also the facility, of operating supernaturally. For when they are infused, they do not remove the impediments of operating which arise from concupiscence and from bad habits. Facility of operating is acquired through exercise of the infused habit. Acquired virtues, however, do not bestow the power but the facility of operating: for the power of operating is already present by nature; but since they are acquired by repeated acts and not without struggle, by this very fact they lessen or even entirely remove the difficulties of operating which arise from concupiscence or from a depraved custom. b. Infused virtues are infused with sanctifying grace in an instant of time, are increased by their acts not effectively but meritoriously, and are destroyed by mortal sin with sanctifying grace in an instant of time. Acquired virtues, however, are acquired not by one act but by repeated acts; by the same acts they are effectively increased, and by non-use or contrary acts they are gradually lessened and finally disappear.

b. Hence we sometimes see sinners, for example the impure, excel in some virtue, for example in justice; for not all acquired virtues are destroyed through mortal sin. On the contrary, we see just men having to fight against diverse and very vehement inclinations to evil: for infused virtues do not remove natural depraved habits, which are gradually weakened by contrary acts.

I. Natural and supernatural virtues differ very greatly:

1. By reason of origin, as was explained in nn. 339, 340.

2. By reason of end, because natural virtues tend toward a natural end, supernatural virtues toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of motive or formal object; for the motive of natural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under natural reason; but the motive of supernatural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under reason illumined by faith.

4. By reason of material object, insofar as supernatural virtue regards, besides the objects of natural virtue, many other things which have been established by God by positive law.

5. By reason of increase, diminution, and destruction, as we have explained.

6. By reason of the powers required for exercise; for the exercise of natural virtues the natural powers of themselves suffice; for the exercise of supernatural virtues grace is required.

7. By reason of merit, insofar as the just man, by an act of supernatural virtue, merits an increase of sanctifying grace and glory; for these things natural virtue is unfit.

II. Natural virtues assist supernatural virtues, insofar as by repetition of acts they remove contrary dispositions, and in that sense conduce to the exercise of supernatural virtues (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2).¹

¹ With regard to the supernatural virtues of fortitude and temperance, there is dispute about the subject of inherence. Cf. Potters, Compendium Philosophiae moralis, n. 293 sq., and the dogmatic theologians.

37. Since therefore man is destined to a supernatural end, he must tend to it by his own free acts. But since he cannot attain it by his own natural acts, supernatural virtues are therefore infused into man, which supply power to the intellect and will for connaturally producing supernatural acts. And, as in the natural order there is first the nature itself of the soul, and then its natural powers and acts, so in the supernatural order there is sanctifying grace, which inheres in the substance of the soul and elevates man to a supernatural nature; there are infused virtues, which inhere stably in the powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, to which they give force and power for eliciting supernatural acts; and finally there are actual graces, by which God actually concurs with each supernatural act of man, to prevent and excite, aid and perfect them. Wherefore an act at once vital and supernatural proceeds from a twofold proximate intrinsic principle, that is, from natural power and from the supernatural habit of infused virtue. This infused virtue is distinguished in two ways, theological and moral. The former has God Himself for its primary material object and some divine perfection for its formal object; the latter generally has for its formal object the very honesty of the human act. And as virtues are infused for the ordinary acts of supernatural life, so also the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred for extraordinary and more sublime acts of the supernatural life. To the former man is moved from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit and from the judgment of reason; to the latter he is moved by the instinct of the Holy Spirit alone. Through the infused virtues man is disposed to be made promptly movable according to the common aspect of Christian virtues, or according to their common rule; through the gifts man is disposed to be made promptly movable by divine inspiration. St. Thomas, I-II, qq. 63, 68.

The relation of man to God in human acts constitutes the moral order. Wherefore if human acts are fitting to that end, they will lead man through to God. Now some of these acts order man immediately to God, naturally by natural knowledge and love, supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Other acts immediately order man either in himself, so that the higher powers rule the lower and the lower are subjected to the higher; or to other creatures, so that he may use them only insofar as they are useful to him for attaining his end, and so that he may constitute a fitting society with other men, destined to the same end as himself. Wherefore all these other acts also, by preserving the order of nature established by God, although mediately, consequently order and lead man to God as ultimate end; and in this attainment and eternal possession of the ultimate end there is beatitude. Indeed, by destining man to this beatitude of eternal life and supplying him with the means for attaining it, God evidently imposes upon man by His will the necessity of applying the aforesaid means suitable for attaining the aforesaid end. This necessity constitutes moral obligation, which moral Theology attends to and considers in human acts. - Therefore God as the ultimate end of man is the supreme principle of the whole of moral Theology, by which namely all things which must be performed by man are understood and determined, so that he may act licitly and at last attain eternal life.

We divide this chapter into two articles: 1. on the existence and essence of the infused virtues; 2. on their properties.

614. Necessity of supernatural habits. - The end to which in fact we are destined consists in participation of the life proper to God, that is, in seeing and loving God in that mode by which He sees and loves Himself. Such an end is absolutely supernatural, and therefore no creature can arrive at it through the principles of its nature. Whence, in order that man may be ordered to it and tend to it by his acts, it is necessary that certain principles or habits be added to human nature, by which he may be elevated above himself, transported to the divine order, and made capable of eliciting divine operations proportioned to the supernatural end. This is done by the gift of habitual divine grace, which is formally sanctifying.

"Acts leading to the end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of the active principle; and therefore we see in natural things that no thing can perfect by its operation an effect which exceeds its active power, but only can produce by its operation an effect proportioned to its power. But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature,... and therefore man by his natural things cannot produce meritorious works proportioned to eternal life; but for this there is required a higher power, which is the power of grace." I-II, q. 109, a. 5.

615. What supernatural habits are given. - Grace, as Dogmatic Theology hands down, is as it were an entitative habit which perfects the very essence of the soul, which it elevates to the divine order, and renders deiform, that is, similar to the divine nature itself and participating in its life (II Pet. I, 4; I John III, 2); whence it is as it were a new supernatural and divine nature, or a new divine form inserted and communicated to us. Hence it is not a pure ornament of the soul, something merely static, but also a dynamic principle which founds and constitutes a new supernatural life, by which we live to God, live with Christ in God, and Christ lives in us (Rom. VI, 4-11; VIII, 2; John X, 10; II Cor. V, 15-17; Col. III, 3; Gal. II, 20), by which we are inserted into Christ as branches into the vine (John XV, 1-5), by which the seed of God and the beginning of divine life remain in us (I John III, 9), by which we are regenerated and born again from God unto new life (John I, 13; III, 5; Jas. I, 18; Tit. III, 5; I Pet. I, 23; I John III, 9), as sons of God (I John III, 1-3; V, 18; John I, 12; Eph. I, 5; Rom. VIII, 15; Gal. IV, 5-7).

But for life three things are required: a fundamental vital principle, vital operative faculties, and vital acts. Whence in the infusion of habitual grace there are given at the same time:

a) grace itself, which is a new vital principle elevating us to a new grade of intellectual life, which far exceeds rational life and is a participation of the very intellectual life of God; a new principle of new operation, namely, of the intuitive vision of God and of operation preparatory to it;

b) infused virtues which flow from grace: they are as it were new faculties by which the powers naturally implanted are perfected and elevated so that they are able to elicit supernatural acts, deiform acts. For "just as from the essence of the soul flow its powers, which are the principles of works, so also from grace itself virtues flow into the powers of the soul, through which the powers are moved to acts" (q. 110, a. 4, ad 1);

c) supernatural and meritorious vital acts which proceed from the virtues and by which we tend toward the supernatural end and merit to obtain it. But since, in our acts, we are not sufficiently directed toward that end which so surpasses our nature by our own reason, even illuminated by faith, but need the Holy Spirit Himself as guide, who moves us by the instinct and inspiration of actual grace so that, eliciting supernatural acts even in a superhuman mode, we may be conserved in supernatural life and progress in it; hence we also need principles or habits by which we are ordered to following the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the use of infused virtues, which are called the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

1. Concerning these may be consulted: Scheeben, Die Herrlichkeiten der gottlicher Gnade; Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire; Froget, L'Habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les ames justes; Waffelaert, De Unione iustorum cum Deo; Mercier, La Vie interieure; Marmion, Le Christ, Vie de l'ame; Janvier, Conf. de N.D.: La grace; La vertu; Sauve, L'Homme intime; Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection et Contemplation; Gardeil, La Structure de l'ame et l'experience mystique; and the articles which we wrote in the periodical Revue Eccl. de Liege, years 10, 11, 12, and 13.

616. The root of the whole supernatural life. - Therefore the very essence of grace, and the fundamental account from which all its attributes are conceived to be derived, is a physical participation of the divine nature insofar as it is intellectual, and therefore a resplendence of divine light in us (Eph. V, 8), and a participation of the life proper to God, which renders us deiform (q. 110, a. 3). From this follow:

A. First and immediately, absolute perfections: for because grace renders the soul deiform, therefore it renders it:

1. lovable and worthy of the love and friendship of God (John XV, 14-15), and pleasing and acceptable to Him; hence

2. also worthy of eternal life and divine beatitude (Col. I, 12-13; Rom. VI, 23; II Cor. I, 22; Eph. I, 13-14); thence

3. remotely capable of supernatural operations meritorious of eternal life: for supernatural nature is ordered to operation, and he who is worthy of eternal life ought to do works worthy of eternal life; whence

4. grace is the root of the virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, which flow from it and by which we are proximately capable of supernatural works; but especially it is the root of charity, by which we are proximately capable of meriting.

By all these is constituted the state of holiness and justice (Eph. IV, 24) and of supernatural beauty (Eph. V, 8).

B. Then from these result relations which are founded in the absolute perfections: because grace renders one a participant of the divine nature, pleasing to God and worthy of eternal life, therefore it renders man:

1. the adoptive son of God, especially of the Father, and therefore heir of eternal life (I John III, 1; Rom. VIII, 15-17); thence

2. brother of the Son and coheir (Heb. II, 11; Rom. VIII, 17), and image of the Word (Rom. VIII, 29), indeed, in the hypothesis of the Incarnation, a member inserted into Christ the Head, and it renders the soul a spouse united to Him (Eph. V, 28);

3. by means of charity which flows from it, it renders him a friend and associate of God, and a temple of the Most Holy Trinity dwelling within (John XIV, 23), especially of the Holy Spirit (I Cor. III, 17), so that we may be directed by Him on the way of eternal salvation and enjoy His love and presence.

C. Finally, from all these are derived further permanent and transitory effects: because grace renders us participants of the divine nature, it also renders us participants of divine operations, whence from it are derived:

1. supernatural operative habits, namely, infused virtues, theological and moral, and gifts of the Holy Spirit (II Pet. I, 5-7);

2. supernatural and meritorious acts, namely, divine operations.

617. Matter to be treated. - Concerning the mode by which God elevates us to supernatural being through habitual grace, enough is said in the treatise on grace. Whence it remains to speak of the supernatural operative principles or habits, which are the proximate principles of human acts and thus pertain specially to moral theology.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 3 and 4; q. 110, a. 2; q. 62, a. 1 and 2; q. 63, a. 2, 3, 4; De Virt., q. 1, a. 9 and 10; q. 5, a. 4.

618. Thesis. Supernatural operative habits are infused into us by God.

It is proved:

1. No one tends and operates perfectly to an end except through a permanent principle of operation, by which he is intrinsically inclined to that operation; whence God not only moves natural things to their acts, but has given to them permanent principles of operating to their end,¹ by which their motions become connatural and easy. Therefore also to our supernatural end (for which God certainly provides no less) He gave us supernatural habitual and permanent principles, so that we might operate and tend perfectly to it;² otherwise we would be moved not connaturally but as if violently.

¹ Remote: form; and proximate: powers.

² He gave the remote principle: habitual grace; and proximate principles: habits and virtues. - The argument is especially valid when the sweet Providence which we know from revelation is considered.

"It is not fitting that God provide less for those whom He loves for having supernatural good than for creatures which He loves for having natural good. But He provides for natural creatures in such a way that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows on them certain forms and powers, which are principles of acts, so that according to themselves they may be inclined to a motion of this kind; and thus the motions by which they are moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures. Much more, therefore, into those whom He moves toward obtaining eternal supernatural good, does He infuse certain forms, or supernatural qualities, according to which they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly toward obtaining eternal good" (q. 110, a. 2).

2. This is certain, because it is clearly deduced and is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, although it is not expressly defined: for it says that grace and charity inhere in us (can. 11), and that man is justified through the reception of grace and gifts (c. 7), and receives infused faith, hope, and charity (c. 7); all of which indicate habitual principles, especially because it attributes the same justification to infants (sess. 5, can. 4; sess. 6, c. 2), who are not capable of acts and of motion to act.

3. Whence the Scriptures say that the seed of divine life remains in us (I John III, 9), and describe justification as regeneration; these indicate the concession of a permanent principle.

619. What the essence of infused habits is. - Supernatural beings are not properly in the categories of natural beings, in the same way as God Himself, of whom they are a participation; nevertheless they are reduced to the categories according to a certain analogy, more or less, and thus sanctifying grace, since it is a spiritual and permanent accident, is reduced to quality, as an entitative habit. Similarly supernatural operative principles are reduced to quality, and indeed as operative habits, although they do not have all things in common with them. For they are neither pure habits nor pure powers, but have something of power and something of habit. For:

1. In something they fall short of the account of habit, because they do not give facility for operating in every way: they indeed confer an intrinsic inclination, aptitude, and promptitude toward the good, indeed a greater one than acquired habits, but not an extrinsic one, because they do not remove from us all obstacles to good, as is clear from a converted sinner, who does not experience a facility toward good much greater than before; whence they are not habits properly so called.³

³ "Facility of operating the works of virtues can be from two things, namely, from preceding custom, and infused virtue does not bestow this facility in its beginning; and again from strong inherence in the object of virtue, and this is found in infused virtue immediately in its beginning." St. Thomas, in IV Sent. d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5. Cf. q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 and De Virt., a. 10, ad 15.

2. But they make man able to operate supernaturally, which habit does not do, and in this therefore they do not agree with habit but rather with operative power.

3. But in all other respects they agree with habits, for a) just like habits, they reside in natural operative powers, which they elevate and with which they operate: for they do not give simply the power to act, but the power to act better and supernaturally; b) man, if they are active, uses them when he wills and in what grade he wills, intensely or remissly, and he can use them only for good; c) they can be increased and corrupted. All these things do not belong to power properly so called. Therefore they have more of the account of habit than of the account of power, and therefore they are customarily called supernatural habits.

620. Supernatural habits and virtues differ from natural ones in many ways:

a) On the part of essence: natural virtues are habits properly so called, whence they do not give power but facility of acting; supernatural virtues give the power of acting supernaturally, but not such facility in every way.

b) On the part of the efficient cause: natural virtues are acquired from the principles of nature and from our acts; supernatural virtues must be infused by God (q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, a. 1).

c) On the part of the nature and end to which they are ordered: by natural virtues man has himself well in order to human things and to natural acts suitable to human nature; by supernatural virtues man has himself well in order to this, that he be an adoptive son of God, destined to eternal life, and in order to this, that he exercise supernatural acts suitable to the divine nature (q. 54, a. 3; q. 63, a. 4).

d) On the part of the formal object: in natural virtues there is good according to the rule and light of human reason, or conformity to the natural end; in supernatural virtues there is good according to the supernatural rule and light of the law divinely revealed (which exceeds human reason), or conformity to the supernatural end. Therefore they are nobler than acquired virtues (q. 63, a. 4).

621. Observation. - By exercising supernatural virtues man will conquer and remove obstacles extrinsic to the habit, and thus will acquire facility in every way and perfect facility toward the good. For acts produced from a supernatural habit can be considered in two ways:

§ III. — Whether acquired moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity?

[Not here question of infused moral virtues, which are known to be inseparable from charity, as properties of sanctifying grace : nor of theological virtues; for faith and hope, according to Trident., sess. VI, cap. 6, precede charity in justification, and can. 28 of council strikes with anathema those who say that, « grace lost through sin, faith is always lost together with it, or that faith which remains is not true faith. » Dealt therefore now only with acquired moral virtues. For whose resolution,

I say : True acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, as they were in many gentiles, but imperfect ¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 2, c, et q. 71, a. 4, c.

First part is proved. Acquired moral virtue separated from charity has whatsoever pertains to essence of true virtue. Therefore. — The antecedent is proved. If something essential were lacking to virtue separated from charity, this would be order toward supernatural ultimate end. But order toward supernatural ultimate end is not something essential of acquired moral virtue : both because, as Angelicus says, IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 6, c, « end of moral virtues is human good, but human good of soul is to be according to reason : whence it must needs be that ends of moral virtues pre-exist in reason; » and because order toward supernatural end cannot be of essence of entitatively natural habit, such as acquired virtue is. Therefore.

It is confirmed. 1° Charity is not intrinsic and essential form of other virtues, otherwise all virtues would be of same species, but extrinsic only and accidental form, inasmuch as through her they are referred unto supernatural end, whereby as it were ornament they are formed in supernatural order. Therefore independently from charity they are true virtues. 2° Faith, according to definition of Trident., remains true virtue without charity. Why not acquired moral virtues?

Second part is proved. Perfect virtue is not without perfect prudence. But prudence, even acquired, is not totally destroyed through sin, but corrupted only in part, inasmuch as appetite is ill affected concerning end of some virtue against whom namely one sins. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Perfect virtue makes possessor simply good. Such however cannot sinner be called.

Thence you will infer that acquired moral virtues, although without charity they retain essence of virtue, are nevertheless not to be called virtues simply, but secundum quid; because they do not well order man respect simply ultimate end, but only respect ultimate end in some genus, and thus render man not absolutely and simply good. Whence virtues in gentiles are not to be called virtues simply, but according to essential reason of virtue. And perhaps opposite opinion pretends nothing else : whence question seems quasi nominal.]