Scholion. On the Relation Between Natural or Acquired Virtues and Supernatural Virtues

I. Natural and supernatural virtues differ very greatly:

1. By reason of origin, as was explained in nn. 339, 340.

2. By reason of end, because natural virtues tend toward a natural end, supernatural virtues toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of motive or formal object; for the motive of natural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under natural reason; but the motive of supernatural virtue is the honorable, insofar as it stands under reason illumined by faith.

4. By reason of material object, insofar as supernatural virtue regards, besides the objects of natural virtue, many other things which have been established by God by positive law.

5. By reason of increase, diminution, and destruction, as we have explained.

6. By reason of the powers required for exercise; for the exercise of natural virtues the natural powers of themselves suffice; for the exercise of supernatural virtues grace is required.

7. By reason of merit, insofar as the just man, by an act of supernatural virtue, merits an increase of sanctifying grace and glory; for these things natural virtue is unfit.

II. Natural virtues assist supernatural virtues, insofar as by repetition of acts they remove contrary dispositions, and in that sense conduce to the exercise of supernatural virtues (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2).¹

¹ With regard to the supernatural virtues of fortitude and temperance, there is dispute about the subject of inherence. Cf. Potters, Compendium Philosophiae moralis, n. 293 sq., and the dogmatic theologians.