Those Bound by Particular Laws

Those Bound by Particular Laws.—The particular laws of the Church oblige all those who are subject to her general laws, and who become subject to the laws of a locality by reason of domicile or personal presence (Canon 13, Sec.2).

There are two kinds of domicile. (a) A true domicile or home is acquired in a place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s abode there, with the intention of remaining permanently or indefinitely; finally, after ten years, when one has lived there so long, even though there was no intention of remaining permanently (Canon 92, Sec.1). (b) A quasi-domicile or residence is acquired in a place in two ways: immediately, when one takes up one’s abode there with the intention of remaining there for at least the greater part of the year; finally, after the greater part of the year, when one has lived there so long (Canon 92, Sec.2).

With regard to abode, four classes of persons are distinguished in Canon Law (Canon 91): (a) an inhabitant, who is one that has a domicile in a place and is present there; (b) a resident, who is one that has a quasi-domicile in a place and is present there; (c) a stranger, who is one that is outside the places of his domicile and quasi-domicile; (d) a vagus or homeless person, who is one that has no domicile or quasi-domicile anywhere.

The rules as regards those who are not strangers are: (a) inhabitants and residents are subject to the diocesan, provincial, and other particular laws of their territory (Canon 13, Sec. 2); (b) the homeless are subject to the local laws of the territory where they are present (Canon 14, Sec. 2).

The rules for strangers with reference to general laws (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 3) are; (a) a stranger is obliged to follow these laws, if they are observed in the place where he is, even though they are not in force in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile; (b) a stranger is not obliged to observe general laws, if they are not in force where he is, even though they are in force in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile. Thus, the general law of abstinence on Friday does not oblige one who is travelling in a place where the law has been suspended, even though he would be obliged by it at home. The traveller would do better, however, to keep to the practice of his home.

The rules for strangers with regard to the particular laws of their own domicile or quasi-domicile (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 1) are; (a) they are obliged in two cases—first, when those laws are not territorial but personal and obligatory on them everywhere (as is the case with the statutes of religious superiors), and secondly, when the violation of a territorial law would be harmful in its own territory (as when by fiction of law one must be considered as present on account of the law of residence); (b) they are not obliged in other cases. Thus, if one is travelling on a feast-day that is a diocesan holyday in one’s home diocese, but not in the diocese where one is, one is not obliged to hear Mass.

The following are the rules for strangers with regard to the particular laws of the place where they are: (a) they are obliged in two cases—first, when natural law itself requires that a territorial law be observed by all, and secondly, when the Church includes strangers among those who are subject to a territorial law; (b) they are not obliged in other cases. Thus, if a person is travelling on a feast-day that is observed as a holyday of obligation both in his home diocese and in the diocese where he is, but not as a general holyday of the Church, he is not obliged to hear Mass; for the law of his home diocese does not bind him, since he is out of its territory, and the law of the diocese where he is does not bind him, since he is not a subject of that law.

The natural law requires that strangers should conform themselves to local laws in the following cases:

(a) when non-observance would be a cause of scandal, which the natural law commands one to avoid. In this sense we understand the rule of St. Ambrose: “When you are at Rome, do as the Romans do.” Hence, if a stranger would cause real scandal by eating meat on a local day of abstinence, he would be obliged to abstain from it;

(b) when a local law deals with the solemnities required for validity of contracts (Canon 14, Sec. 1, n. 2). If strangers were not obliged by laws of this kind, they could take advantage of the inhabitants, a thing that is contrary to natural justice. Thus, “the place rules the act”;

(c) when the local law has for its object the maintenance of public order (Canon 14, Sec. 1, 11. 2); for the natural law demands that public safety be guarded. Hence, a stranger who commits a crime is subject to the penalties of the local law (Canon 1566).

Examples of territorial laws that oblige even strangers according to the precept of the Church are the laws that require all, even strangers, to follow the Calendar of the Church where they celebrate Mass, and to say the collectae imperatae prescribed by the bishop of the local diocese.

The rules given for strangers can be applied also to those who are in places exempt from local jurisdiction (e.g., in the monasteries of exempt regulars). The exempt are those who by fiction of law are held to be outside the territory of every diocese, and are subject, not to the local bishop, but directly to the Pope (Canon 515).

There are various cases, however, in which exempt religious are subject to the territorial laws of the diocese where they are. Thus: (a) when they accept parishes in a diocese, they are subject to the Ordinary in those matters that pertain to the parishes; (b) when the common good or the avoidance of scandal requires it, they should conform to a diocesan law.

Those who have a personal privilege can use it anywhere, for a personal privilege, like a personal precept, follows the person, not the territory.

94. • QUESTION 3. Whether travelers are held by the laws of their own territory?

I answer 1. Generally no, because law, which regards a community, is territorial, and does not affect persons except through territory. - Thus all.

I answer 2. If they depart with the intention of withdrawing themselves from the obligation of the law, it is disputed.

Concina, Collet, Antoine, and certain others affirm; because, as they say, one's own fraud ought to patronize no one.

But the Doctors more commonly and more probably deny; because one departing from the territory does not act in fraud of the law, but uses his own right. - St. Alph., book 1, no. 156. - Elbel, no. 370. - Lacroix, no. 683, etc. ⁵.

⁵ What is said of the laws of one's proper territory is valid also of the law of common right, when the traveler is staying where this is not in force. St. Ligorius, book 1, no. 156. Yet what is added, that it does no harm if someone leaves his territory with that intention, has no place if he leaves his territory in order to be absolved from reserved sins, or in order to celebrate matrimony clandestinely in a place where the decree of Trent concerning the necessary presence of the parish priest and two witnesses for the validity of matrimony is not in force.

QUESTION 4. Whether travelers are held by the laws of the place in which they are staying?

I answer 1. Affirmatively, if they have a quasi-domicile there ⁶, which is acquired by habitation and the intention of living somewhere for the greater part of the year. The reason is that through quasi-domicile they become truly subjects of that place. - Thus nearly all. - St. Lig., book 1, no. 156.

⁶ But now if they have a quasi-domicile there, they are no longer travelers. For a traveler is called whoever is staying somewhere, having neither domicile nor quasi-domicile.

I answer 2. All travelers and vagrants are held to the special laws of the place in which they are staying, 1. as to contracts, 2. as to things necessary for the common good. - Thus all.

I answer 3. As to other laws, there is a threefold probable sentence.

The first sentence, more probable, excuses them, scandal being excluded, because law does not oblige except subjects. - Thus St. Lig., book 1, no. 156, etc.

The second sentence obliges them to all laws, because he who feels the advantage ⁷ ought also to feel the burden. - Collet. - Antoine.

⁷ The traveler feels the advantage insofar as he is both exempted from observing the proper laws of his own territory, and enjoys the privileges of the place in which he travels.

The third sentence distinguishes thus: They are held to all laws if they have arrived at the end of the journey; but if they have not arrived, only they are held to negative laws. - Thus Suarez with certain others ⁸, who nevertheless concedes that the first sentence also is probable.

⁸ Suarez (On Religion, tr. 2, book 2, ch. 14, nos. 18 and 23) in reality contends that travelers, even those passing through, for the time in which they rest in some place, are held by its laws, and indeed not only negative, but also positive, unless they bring some harm or inconvenience; and therefore he judges that a traveler who remains there for the whole morning time of a feast day is obligated to hear Mass. Nevertheless, from the general canon the mere probability of this sentence is not sufficient to induce an obligation. Wherefore also void and of no value is that conclusion which Suarez deduces from this sentence of his, that a traveler is subject to the reservations of sins proper to the territory in which he travels.

A human law binds all those for whom it is made and who are subject to the authority of the legislator.

The laws of the Church oblige only baptized persons who have attained the use of reason. Theoretically, Protestants, too, are in some manner subject to the jurisdiction of the Church,¹ but "a probable opinion teaches that it is not the Church's intention to bind them by such of her laws as proximately regard the sanctification of individual souls, rather than the public good," because "harm rather than good would follow from intending these laws to bind heretics and schismatics." ² A general law obliges all who have attained the use of reason and are subject to the authority of the legislator. All such, therefore, are in duty bound to acquaint themselves with the laws under which they live.

¹ 1 Cor. V, 12-13.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VII, can. 7-8 de Bapt.; letter of Pius IX to Emperor William I, August 7, 1873.

² Thos. Slater, S.J., A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 93.

A particular law is one made for a limited class of persons or for a particular territory only. Particular laws of the latter kind bind those for whom they are made, who have a domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory concerned and actually reside there.

To have a domicile means to live in a place for ten years or with the intention of residing there permanently. A quasi-domicile is acquired by living in a place with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year, or by actually residing there for the greater part of a year.³

³ Codex Iuris Can., can. 13, 92.

Foreigners (peregrini) are not bound to obey the particular laws of either their own country or the one in which they are sojourning, with the exception of those which regard the public welfare or prescribe legal formalities.⁴ Strangers (vagi, who have no domicile or quasi-domicile anywhere) are bound to obey the general as well as particular laws of the territory in which they sojourn.

⁴ Codex: Iuris Can., can. 14. Cfr. St. Augustine, Epist., 36, c. 14, 11. 32: "I shall tell you what the venerable Ambrose replied when I asked him about this: When I am here [in Milan], I do not fast on Saturday; when I am at Rome, I fast on Saturday; and to whatever church you come, he said, observe its custom if you wish neither to suffer scandal nor to cause it." —IDEM, Epist., 54 (al. 118), c. 2, n. 2; "But other things which vary through places and regions of the earth—such as that some fast on Saturday and others do not; some communicate daily in the Body and Blood of the Lord, while others receive on fixed days; in one place no day passes on which the offering is not made, in another it is made only on Saturday and Sunday, and elsewhere only on Sunday—and whatever else of this kind can be observed: this whole class of things admits of free observances. In these matters no discipline is better for a serious and prudent Christian than to act in the manner in which he sees the church act to which he may happen to come. For whatever is proved to be contrary neither to faith nor to good morals is to be regarded as indifferent and observed for the sake of fellowship with those among whom one lives." (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 200). Hence the well-known adage: "Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more; si fueris alibi, vivito sicut ibi." —Cfr. H. Noldin, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, qu. IV, art. 1, § 124, 5.

A journey undertaken in fraudem legis, i. e., with the express purpose of escaping an obligation, leaves that obligation in full force. However, if a man actually leaves a place with the intention of not returning to it, the obligation ceases, even though his motive was to escape the law. An actual change of domicile always entails a change of jurisdiction, no matter what the motive for which it is effected.

Children who have not yet attained, and adults who have permanently lost, the use of reason, are not bound by any human law. The reason is that they are incapable of performing moral acts.⁵ Under certain conditions, however, such persons may be forced to conform to particular precepts, e. g., that of abstinence.

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 3: "Lex seu praeceptum est vinculum rationis."

A sovereign is subject to his own laws, not coactive, i. e., as regards their coercive force, for no one properly is coerced by himself; but directive, i. e., as regards their directive force, for the sake of order and good example. In the words of St. Thomas, "He ought voluntarily and not of constraint to fulfil the law," though strictly speaking he is above it, "inasmuch as, if expedient, he can change the law and dispense from it according to place and season."⁶

⁶ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 96, art. 5, ad 3 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, p. 294).—St. Ambrose, Apol. Proph. David, II, c. 3, n. 8 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 890). —IDEM, Epist., 21, n. 9 (P. L., XVI, 1004). —St. Isidore, Sent., III, c. 51, n. 1-2, cited in the Decretum Gratiani, c. 2, D. 9 (P. L., LXXXIII, 723; Corpus Iuris Can., ed. Friedberg, Vol. I, col. 16). — On the question of domicile and quasi-domicile see Aug. Bachofen, P.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. II.

It goes without saying that the members of legislative bodies are bound to observe the laws which they themselves have made.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 96, art. 5. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 57 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 92 sqq. —A. Boudinhon, art. "Domicile" in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 103-106.—A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 204 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, Vol. I, pp. 138 sqq.

— I. Principle. Universal ecclesiastical laws of themselves oblige all the baptized who are habitually capable of reason. For human law cannot reach those to whom the use of reason is lacking. Wherefore neither unbelievers nor catechumens are obligated by the precepts of the Church.

— What of baptized heretics or schismatics?

a) No question is raised concerning those who by a recent apostasy have gone over to the non-Catholic camp, or have professed unbelief. These, by their own fault, have deprived themselves of the goods of ecclesiastical communion; nor can they report from their rebellion the benefit of exemption.

b) But others belong to sects established long ago by quasi-birth itself or by education in infancy, so that a far greater presumption of good faith must be said to profit them.

The controversy which arose concerning them after the pseudo-Reformation of the sixteenth century seems able to be solved briefly in this way.

Some ecclesiastical laws have been directly constituted to protect public order and the common good of Christian society: such are the laws concerning the form and conditions of marriage. Heretics and schismatics are of themselves subject to those laws. Nevertheless, by a positive concession, which was first made general by the decree Ne temere, 2 Aug. 1907, and now is confirmed by c. 1099 of the Code, non-Catholics who contract among themselves are nowhere held to observing the Catholic form of marriage. But they must be said to be subject to ecclesiastical impediments, except disparity of cult from c. 1070.

Other laws directly intend the sanctification of individual persons. There are various precepts and prohibitions concerning the observance of feasts, concerning fast, abstinence, books to be published or read, etc. Baptized non-Catholics have the title of subjection in baptism. Is it the mind of the Church that we should hold them as exempt? A positive indication is lacking. Indeed, c. 87 indirectly manifests the contrary mind of the Church. For after it has said: "By baptism a man is constituted a person in the Church of Christ, with all the rights and duties of Christians," it immediately adds: "unless, as regards rights, there stands in the way an obstacle impeding the bond of ecclesiastical communion, or a censure laid by the Church." Therefore the law seems to deny that anything stands in the way of duties. Nor is a general dispensation necessary for sparing many sins: for by ignorance or by persuasion of immunity from formal sin there are excused not only those who adhere in good faith to a heretical sect, but also, at least of themselves, others who remain in a non-Catholic sect with doubtful or bad faith.

Nevertheless it seems to be according to the mind of the Church that today Catholics, in their civil dealings with non-Catholics of whom we are speaking, should not be held back by scruples of cooperation in acts which, on account of ecclesiastical prohibition alone, are materially evil.

Therefore we shall say: saving the positive exemption from the form of celebration of marriage, non-Catholics are bound by ecclesiastical laws, even merely preceptive ones. Nevertheless, with non-Catholics whose marriage Catholics know to be invalid on account of an impediment of ecclesiastical law, Catholics will deal as with putative spouses, in regions where non-Catholics enjoy every civil right; and they will readily furnish those things which heretics desire against positive law unknown by them; yet they will not induce them to violate those precepts.

We allow its probability to the more benign opinion, which judges non-Catholics to be truly exempt from these precepts. Wherefore we admit with Frassinetti that heretics, when they are converted to the true Church, are not to be interrogated about violated precepts of the Church concerning Sacred Times. Yet distinguished writers who report the benign opinion, Lehmkuhl, I, 228; Noldin, I, n. 147; Prummer, Manuale, I, n. 186, warn that it is forbidden to Catholics to induce non-Catholics to act against the law.

— What of those who are doubtfully baptized?

1° In the external forum, if it is established at least probably that baptism was conferred, baptism is presumed valid, and therefore gives the rights of Christians and imposes the duties. If the fact itself is not established, recourse will be had to presumptions. These failing, that principle will remain to be applied: A fact is not presumed but proved.

2° But in the internal forum, presumptions are not necessary. Wherefore, if baptism is only probable, we shall use this principle, that no one is held by an uncertain precept. That solution is confirmed by the very reason of equity. For, in his whole spiritual life, a man only probably baptized can promise to himself no certain fruit of absolution, the Eucharist, etc. Why would you make burdens more certain than advantages? Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 3, c. 2, n. 335 incline to this side, against Lehmk. II, 426, and Ill. D. Magnaiolt, in his learned discussion of this argument. Cf. our Epitome iuris can. I, § 1.

— "By merely ecclesiastical laws there are not held ... the baptized who do not enjoy sufficient use of reason, nor those who, although they have attained the use of reason, have not yet completed the seventh year of age, unless something else is expressly provided by law." Therefore:

1° The habitually insane are immune, to whom, therefore, on days of abstinence meats may be offered.

But what if they have lucid intervals? Of themselves, indeed, they are held by laws; but since c. 88, § 3 expressly establishes: "To infants are assimilated all who are habitually destitute of the use of reason," we can consider them as simply exempt even through lucid intervals.

Nevertheless c. 2201 must be observed, which pronounces incapable of delict only those who actually lack the use of reason. For penal laws, although they are of strict interpretation, protect public order more directly.

Moreover those remain subject to laws and are excused by ignorance alone who labor only under accidental or temporary insanity.

2° All are immune who, by reason of age, have not yet attained ready use of reason. Such persons from can. 88 are judged to be impubes persons who have not yet attained a full seven years. Indeed, by the positive sanction of c. 12, although they may have attained the use of reason, they are not obligated by ecclesiastical laws before the completed seven years, "unless something else is expressly provided."

The exceptions are: the obligation of Paschal communion, from c. 859, § 1; of annual confession, from c. 906.

And it is expedient that, insofar as it can reasonably be done, children from tender years be accustomed to observing the laws of the Church.

— From c. 2230, impubes persons are excused from penalties latae sententiae. Before the Code, however, the received interpretation, founded on cc. Pueris and Referente, 1 and 2 De delictis puerorum (V. 23), equated girls and boys in this matter, so that, in order to delict, the common age of puberty was established as fourteen years. From c. 6, 2° and 3° this interpretation seems even now able to be sustained. Cf. Genicot-Salsmans, II, 566.

— From c. 1254 § 2, from the law of fasting are exempt all who have not yet completed the twenty-first year, and all who have begun the sixtieth.

— Preliminary matters. In order to discern who are subject to laws which have been enacted for a particular territory, one must distinguish inhabitants (incolae), newcomers (advenae), travelers (peregrini), and vagi. On these there is c. 91. "A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a traveler, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; ¹ a vagus, if he has domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere."

Therefore, since this division of persons is taken from domicile or quasi-domicile, the notions of ecclesiastical domicile ² and quasi-domicile must here be set forth. Ecclesiastical, I say.

In civil law they are accustomed to distinguish domicile from residence. Some laws, thus English, Belgian, French, Italian law, acknowledge for the same person only one general domicile, while other laws, thus Roman law formerly and now German law (Code art. 7), do not exclude a plurality of domiciles. Therefore the Code of Italy (art. 16), imitating the Code of France, defines domicile as the place where someone has the principal seat of his affairs and things, while from the Code of Germany domicile is had wherever there is residence with the will of stable abiding.

Civil laws are moreover accustomed to permit that, for the transaction of certain affairs, a particular domicile be chosen, in which the parties can judicially be summoned and sued. Thus industrial societies are accustomed to establish for themselves a domicile which is called the social seat (le siege social).

The same canonical Code permits this in c. 1565 § 2, although it abstains from the name of domicile for designating the place chosen by contract in which the contracting parties can be cited and sued.

In the common notion, domicile designates the stable seat or habitation of someone. But in law necessary domicile and voluntary domicile are distinguished.

Necessary or legal domicile, by the law itself, independently of every fact, is assigned to a wife not separated, to an insane person, to a minor under twenty-one years: these respectively have the domicile of the husband, of the curator, of the person to whose power they are subject (c. 93).

Voluntary domicile, from present law, is acquired by abiding in some place with the mind (intention) of remaining there perpetually, if nothing calls one away from there, or by abiding prolonged to a completed decade. When abiding is joined with the mind of remaining, domicile is acquired from the first day. In the other case, it is necessary that ten years have elapsed. But the place, by present law, can be a parish or quasi-parish, or a diocese or quasi-diocese (apostolic vicariate, apostolic prefecture). Hence domicile can be parochial or diocesan (c. 92).

But this is to be carefully noted: abiding can be strictly personal, when the person himself, in a morally continuous manner, is present there; and a relatively brief absence does not impede this continuity. And it can be quasi-real, i.e. continuing in a house built, bought, or rented for oneself. Thus one is judged to remain perpetually, and consequently to acquire and have domicile, in the place where he has procured for himself a stable summer house.

Quasi-domicile is a certain imitation or diminished manner of domicile. By present law quasi-domicile is acquired by abiding in a parish (or quasi-parish), or at least in a diocese (or quasi-diocese), either joined with the mind of remaining there at least for the greater part of the year, if nothing calls one away from there, or in fact prolonged for the greater part of the year (c. 92 § 2).

A minor, after he has gone out from infancy, and a wife can obtain quasi-domicile; a legitimately separated wife can obtain even domicile (c. 93 § 2).

Domicile and quasi-domicile are lost by departure from the place with the mind of not returning. Yet a wife, an insane person, and a minor cannot have this efficacious will as regards domicile (95).

The Code does not expressly say how legal domicile is lost. But it seems that this must be said from the nature of the matter. Legal domicile ceases as necessary, when personal independence has been acquired. Yet it will remain as voluntary, as long as the person who is his own master has preserved the mind of dwelling there or of returning.

The same Code assigns legal quasi-domicile to no one. Therefore there is no reason why, with R. P. Maroto, ¹ we should think that legal or necessary quasi-domicile is obtained by persons who are not their own masters. Therefore the fact is to be considered. If, however, the husband, the curator, or the person to whom the minor is subject has nowhere domicile, but only quasi-domicile somewhere, the person who is not his own master has acquired his own quasi-domicile or has not. In the former case, he will participate only in that quasi-domicile. In the other case, lest he be called a vagus, the quasi-domicile of the husband, tutor, or curator will enter into the place of legal domicile. We say this, supplying the silence of the law from the norm of c. 20.

Nothing prevents someone from having two or three domiciles. The classic case is that of him who is accustomed to dwell half the year in one place, the other half in another place. Someone can also easily have a domicile distinct from a quasi-domicile. But can the same person have two quasi-domiciles at the same time? Before the Code this was commonly denied; and it still seems to have to be denied, since neither in fact nor in intention can someone dwell in two places at the same time for the greater part of the year. Yet the difficulty can now be raised from c. 95, by which quasi-domicile is not said to be lost except by departure without the mind of returning. Wherefore R. P. Maroto ¹ has gone over into the different opinion.

Moreover, someone can be a vagus in a parish who has domicile in the diocese, but not conversely; and he is not fully a vagus unless he possesses not even domicile or quasi-domicile in the diocese.

But now let us return to our matter, i.e. to subjection to law.

¹ D'Annibale, Summula, I, 80, separates travelers from wayfarers. In the Code, however, that distinction seems to be passed over.

² On Domicile, cf. Laurin, Archiv. XXVI, 165 ff.

¹ Institutiones iuris canonici, I, n. 410, note.

¹ Ibid. n. 413.

— Principle concerning personal subjection. 1. The inhabitants and newcomers are subject to particular laws of the territory if at the same time they actually abide there. Yet even when absent, they are held by the laws of their own territory, if the transgression of them harms in their own territory, or if the laws are personal (c. 13, § 2; 14, § 1, 1°).

2. Travelers:

a) are held by general laws even if these do not have force in their own territory, but by no means if the place in which they are staying is exempt;

b) are not held by the laws of their own territory, except for the reason which was just mentioned under n. 1;

c) are not held by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, "except those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts."

Public order is to be understood as immediately public; it includes those dispositions whose public observance seems to have to be required indiscriminately: v.g. a local interdict, precautions concerning the admission of celebrants in a church, laws which cannot be violated without scandal, and all laws which have been expressly established concerning travelers. For the words "public order" are rather little defined, and they receive interpretation from the will of the legislator and from received usages. Perhaps it can be said that public order is provided for by those laws which have been enacted rather for averting common harm than for promoting the common good. For travelers of themselves ought not to cooperate with the common good of another territory; yet they cannot be harmful. (Ball.-Palm., I, tr. 3, n. 362, use this formula: they are held "by laws ... which have been specially enacted for the good of that place by reason of the necessity of the republic.")

Therefore, of themselves travelers participate in the exemptions and advantages, but not in the burdens, of the places in which they are staying. And this holds even if the particular law has force both in their own territory and in the place where they are staying: for travelers escape each particular law. ¹

Yet the case would be different if the law, v.g. in a provincial or national council, were imposed upon several dioceses at the same time. An inhabitant of that province or a citizen of that nation is bound to that law as long as he is staying in the province or nation (Ball.-Palmieri, I, tr. 3, n. 362).

3. Vagi, contrary to what many thought concerning particular laws, from the clear disposition of c. 14, § 2, "are obligated by both general and particular laws which have force in the place in which they are staying."

¹ Many, however, with St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 156, reject this.

— Applications. 1. He who, on a day of fast or feast, is staying in a place where then there is no fast or feast, need neither fast nor abstain from servile works.

2. A traveler who is staying in a place where on that day a fast or feast is to be observed must further inquire this: whether the precept to be observed is of common law or of particular law. In the former case, but not in the latter, he will have to observe the fast or feast. He must moreover guard against scandal, from the general law.

3. One departing from a town where there is no fast or abstinence will be able there to eat meats and to take a full meal twice, although on the same day he has returned home where he would have had to fast. But having returned home, he will have to abstain from meats; yet he will no longer have the possibility of fasting, since by two full meals the fast has already been substantially injured.

4. One about to depart from a place where fasting has force from the general law, but on the same day about to arrive at an exempt place, will have to observe the law of abstinence having force there, but not the law of fasting, because the observance of fasting is indivisible, and for part of the day he will be exempt. Cf. Baller.-Palm., I, tr. 3, n. 351.

5. Travelers, before they leave their own territory, probably are not bound to observe precepts there, when, within the useful time for fulfilling those precepts, they will arrive at a place immune from those precepts. Thus, he who before dinner is about to arrive at a place where there is no feast, is not bound to hear Mass in his own territory.

6. A Belgian or German cannot at Rome, on days of fasting, eat cheese in the evening collation. For although, while the Code has force (c. 1250), abstinence from milk foods now no longer pertains to common law, nevertheless common law, or c. 1251, commands that on days of fasting, morning and evening, the approved custom of places be observed concerning the quantity and quality of foods.

7. It is sometimes conceded that the twofold weekly abstinence which, from c. 1252 § 2, must be observed during Lent on Friday and Saturday, be observed on Wednesday and Friday. What then is it permitted for travelers to do?

a) In a place where the days indicated by the Code are observed, they will have to observe abstinence just as the inhabitants of that place: for the inhabitants observe the common law. Cf. c. 14, 3;

b) In a place where abstinence is kept on Wednesday, if they spend the whole week there, they will have the option of observing Wednesday or Saturday. For in the case, the local privilege is not one of dispensation, but of a changed day. Therefore travelers can use the local privilege so that they transfer their obligation to Wednesday; and they can also observe the common law on Saturday;

c) If on Wednesday they have used the local privilege and therefore have observed abstinence, they will not be bound to abstain from meats a third time because on Saturday they have fallen upon a place where the common law is observed;

d) But what if they so travel that on Wednesday they are in a place where abstinence is kept on Saturday, but on Saturday in a place where abstinence is to be kept on Wednesday? You might say at first sight that they are held by the Saturday abstinence. Yet, the Church so permits travelers to accommodate themselves to the usages of places, that it can probably be said that they are not held by the Saturday abstinence: the Church is not judged to wish to bind one to a singularity. In a similar cause concerning fast, after Sanchez, ¹ Laymann, ¹ and Lacroix, ² Lehmkuhl ³ admits this, calling it a benign interpretation of the mind of the Church. Yet he himself forbids that one deliberately pass from one place to another to avoid the obligation. However, the mind of present law permits us to disregard that exception. For concerning the very reservation of cases, c. 900, 3° declares that it lacks force outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent has departed from it to seek absolution. Cf. also Noldin, Princ. 149.

¹ In Decal. l. 1, c. 12, n. 30.

¹ Theol. mor. l. 1, tr. 4, c. 11, n. 8.

² Theol. mor. l. 3, p. 2, n. 1271.

³ Theol. mor. I, 236.

— Local subjection or exemption. Nor do particular laws oblige in a fully exempt place. ⁴ Such indeed is a place which is judged to be outside the territory, because another exercises similar power there. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, in l. 5, t. 39, n. 49.

But today are the houses of exempt religious sufficiently exempt, so that lay guests ought to observe no other laws except personal laws or those by which the regulars themselves are held, and so that they are not there liable to episcopal censures? With Suarez, ⁵ we think this should rather be denied.

For those places are not exempt according to themselves, but only by reason of the religious. Wherefore the Code nowhere directly says: houses of regulars are exempt places; but it has elegantly expressed in c. 615 the exemption subordinated to persons in this way: "Regulars ... with their houses and churches ... are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary." Moreover, contrary to what happens in another territory, where, as much as the common good demands, they are bound by local laws, in that house lay persons would have no superior who could command them. Finally, the regulars themselves do not avoid in their exempt houses the diocesan laws to which they are subject; why would a layman there avoid the laws to which he himself is subject? And those houses are so much in the territory that the parish priest of the place can validly assist at marriages there.

Yet St. Alphonsus, I, 157, judged the opposite opinion very probable; Ballerini-Palmieri, De legibus, I, 347, do not wish to decide the matter; and even while the Code has force, approved authors, such as Noldin, I, 151; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 97; Cappello, De censuris, n. 9, adhere to the same. Wherefore we do not deny probability to the opinion which thinks that guests, in houses of regulars, are of themselves immune from episcopal laws and censures. For the rest, today rare cases will occur.

⁴ Cf. Suarez, De censuris, l. 5, c. I, n. 5; D'Annibale, I, 205 (12); 306 (28).

⁵ Ibid. n. 6.

193. Notions. As to residence, according to the Code of Canon Law c. 91, four kinds of persons are distinguished: 1. peregrini; 2. vagi; 3. inhabitants; 4. newcomers.

1. A peregrinus is called one who indeed has a domicile or at least a quasi-domicile in some place, but now is staying outside this place, for example, for the sake of a journey, yet with the intention of returning after a short time to the place of domicile or quasi-domicile.

2. A vagus or vagabond (Wohnsitzloser) is properly called one who has a domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere, either because, having left his proper domicile or quasi-domicile, he has not yet acquired a new one, or because he has never had a true domicile or quasi-domicile. Thus, for example, as vagi are held those craftsmen or beggars who run about through diverse places, choosing a fixed habitation nowhere. The state of a vagus is judged in canon law to be something extraordinary and odious, and therefore is not to be presumed, but strictly proved.⁶⁹

3. An inhabitant is called one who stays in the place of his domicile. Domicile in some place is acquired by residence which is either a) joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually (or at least for an indefinite time), or b) prolonged to a completed ten-year period.⁷⁰ The mind or intention of remaining perpetually must be proved in the external forum, which indeed can be done in diverse ways, for example, by oath, by transferring a great part of one's goods, by prolonged habitation, etc. But when this intention is present, domicile is acquired as soon as habitation begins.⁷¹ Whence, for example, some schoolmaster who for an indefinite time has accepted his office in some place acquires domicile in this place from the first day of habitation. - Domicile is lost with more difficulty than it is acquired, both because in doubt concerning a domicile left behind its preservation must be presumed, and because domicile is judged for the faithful to be something favorable and its loss something odious. Wherefore a domicile once possessed is not lost except by renunciation or by the acquisition of another true domicile.

4. A newcomer is called one who resides in the place of his quasi-domicile. But someone acquires quasi-domicile in a place when he dwells in it for the greater part of a year, or at least with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year. The greater part of a year is certainly judged to be a time exceeding six months; wherefore a residence prolonged for 181 days in some place always suffices for acquiring quasi-domicile, without inquiry needing to be made concerning the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year.⁷² Nor is it necessary that this residence be uninterrupted; for a small interruption does not destroy the intention of residing in that place. Quasi-domicile is usually had, for example, by students staying in academies outside their homeland, soldiers in camps (commonly, garrison), servants in the domicile of the master, etc.

Divisions of Domicile. 1. Domicile or quasi-domicile is distinguished as parochial or diocesan, according as it is obtained either in some parish or quasi-parish, or only in a diocese, apostolic vicariate, apostolic prefecture.⁷³ Therefore someone can have a diocesan domicile (quasi-domicile) without a parochial domicile; but everyone who has a parochial domicile (quasi-domicile) thereby also has a diocesan domicile.

2. Domicile is distinguished as voluntary, which is acquired by one's own choice according to the two modes indicated above; and necessary or legal, which is acquired by another's choice from the disposition of law. Thus a wife (not legitimately separated from her husband) has the domicile of her husband; an insane person the domicile of his curator; an underage son the domicile of the one to whose power he is subject (c. 93).

⁶⁹ Cf. Sacred Rota, March 4, 1916 (Act. Ap. Sed. VIII, 373).

⁷⁰ Cod. iur. can. c. 92.

⁷¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 778.

⁷² Cod. iur. can. c. 92, § 2.

⁷³ Ibid., § 3.

194. Principle 1. A peregrinus is not held to the strictly territorial particular laws of his domicile or quasi-domicile, unless, however, their transgression in his own territory would do harm.⁷⁴

The reason is obvious. For such laws are territorial and oblige only those who in fact are staying in such territory. Hence, for example, an inhabitant of Spain who on July 25 is living outside Spain is not held to hear Mass, to which he would be obliged if existing in Spain on account of the feast of the Apostle James. - Indeed authors commonly teach that some inhabitant can leave the place of domicile or quasi-domicile precisely for this cause, that he may be exempt from the particular law of his own place.⁷⁵ For example, if there is a fast in some parish because the parish church is to be consecrated on the next day, a parishioner could leave the limits of the parish for the purpose of not being obliged to the fast. For no strictly territorial law prohibits departure from the territory itself, since everyone remains free to dwell in his own territory or not.⁷⁶ - But I said that a peregrinus is not held to strictly territorial particular laws. For if some law of a place is not strictly territorial, but rather personal, then it obliges subjects everywhere on earth and follows them everywhere as a shadow follows the body. Thus, for example, laws concerning military service to be undertaken oblige subjects even living in another land, unless, however, they have obtained legitimate expatriation. Not rarely it is rather difficult to discern whether some particular law is strictly territorial or personal. Thus laws and penalties made by some bishops for their clerics about not approaching taverns and spectacles, about not playing cards, etc., are not clearly known as territorial or as personal; and therefore then it is not clearly established whether a cleric transgressing laws of this kind outside his own diocese contracts the special penalties determined by the bishop. If solid doubt remains concerning the mind of the legislator, the penalty made is not incurred, since it is of strict interpretation.⁷⁷ Indeed it is generally established in law: "A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is established."⁷⁸

A peregrinus is held to observe the particular laws of his domicile or quasi-domicile if their transgression in his own territory would do harm; for example, if a diocesan law rightly forbids all inhabitants to furnish aid to some harmful institute existing in the diocese, then an inhabitant, even while journeying outside the diocese, cannot licitly furnish such aid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., c. 14, § 1.

⁷⁵ The contrary is asserted, but not sufficiently proved, by Concina (De iur. nat. et gent. lib. 1, diss. 4, c. 2, q. 8).

⁷⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 157.

⁷⁷ Thus also Génicot, Cas. consc. I, 21 (de leg., cas. 1).

⁷⁸ Cod. iur. can. c. 8.

195. Principle 2. A peregrinus is not obliged by the particular laws of the place where he dwells outside his own domicile or quasi-domicile, except in three cases: 1. if otherwise scandal or some other detriment would arise for the inhabitants; 2. if there is question of contracts to be entered into; 3. if there is question of penalties inflicted on account of a delict committed.⁷⁹

It is declared: A peregrinus generally is not obliged by the particular laws of the place where he dwells, because he is not subject to the legislator of that place; for he is subject to the legislator not from the fact that he dwells for a short time in his territory, but from the fact that he acquires domicile or at least quasi-domicile there.⁸⁰ Wherefore if, for example, a bishop prescribed a feast day in his diocese, he neither could nor wished to oblige anyone except his own subjects.

But the three enumerated cases are excepted, in which not now the particular positive law, but rather the natural law itself induces the obligation. This indeed appears easily by inspecting the individual cases. For 1. if a peregrinus by not publicly observing a feast day prescribed by particular law would give true scandal, he would be held to observe it.⁸¹ Likewise, 2. if by his transgression he would cause some other detriment to the inhabitants; for the natural law itself prohibits causing scandal or detriment to others. - The same reason applies concerning contracts and other acts to be entered into under a special juridical form. Hence that adage: The place rules the act.⁸² For if a peregrinus did not observe particular laws made concerning the validity of acts and contracts, the act or contract would be invalid, and the peregrinus could always withdraw from the act or contract entered into, which would cause great detriment to the inhabitants. Whence if, for example, someone wishes to make a contract of purchase in some foreign place, he is held to fulfill the conditions required by the particular law of this place. As to the civil contract of marriage, special international stipulations have force. - 3. The third exception, namely, as to penalties contracted from a public delict, follows both from canon law establishing:⁸³ "The accused obtains the forum in the place of the delict committed"; and from natural law. For if a peregrinus committing a delict in another place could not be punished by the legitimate authority of that place, he would often escape unpunished, or at least his chastisement would become very difficult. Whence also international law admits this exception. For if, for example, a Frenchman committed a crime in Switzerland and has been captured, he is condemned by a Swiss tribunal according to Swiss laws, but not according to the laws of France.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ In this way this principle is stated in Cod. iur. can. c. 14, § 1, n. 2: "Peregrini are not bound by the particular laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts."

⁸⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, 332.

⁸¹ In this case not only is that advised, but it is truly commanded:

⁸² Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 1565.

⁸³ Cf. c. 3 and 20, X, 2, 2; Cod. iur. can. c. 1565.

⁸⁴ In the Spanish Civil Code it is expressly stated: "Penal laws, laws of police, and laws of public security oblige all who dwell in Spanish territory" (a. 8). The same code establishes similar things concerning the form and solemnity of contracts (a. 11). - Sometimes peregrini, from a special statute, are held to observe other particular territorial laws. Thus from the statute of the Supreme Pontiff, for example, a priest saying Mass in another church is held to observe the directory of that church if a feast double and above is celebrated there. All priests, even peregrini and exempt, must recite the Collects (prayers) commanded by the bishop of the place (S. C. R., March 5, 1898. Decret. auth. 3985).

196. Principle 3. A peregrinus is held to common laws which are observed in the place of his actual residence, although in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile these laws have been abolished or suspended by legitimate dispensation,⁸⁵ or more briefly: Peregrini cannot use the privileges of their own territory.

The reason is that such dispensations exercise no liberating force outside the territory for which they have been granted. Wherefore, for example, an inhabitant of some region in which there is in force an Indult of eating meat on Ember days cannot use this Indult if he is staying in another place where the common law is in force. - But it is plain of itself that such an inhabitant can eat meat everywhere on earth if he has obtained a personal Indult.

If you have been at Rome, live in the Roman manner;
If you have been elsewhere, live as they do there!

⁸⁵ Cod. iur. can. c. 14, § 1, n. 3.

197. Principle 4. A peregrinus can use the privileges and indults in force in that territory in which he is here and now staying.⁸⁶

The reason is that a territorial privilege or Indult is judged to be given for all, whether inhabitants or travelers, who are staying in such territory (unless, however, the contrary has been expressly established, as, for example, Pius X did in the Constitution Provida). Hence, for example, an Italian traveling in Switzerland can use the privileges there in force concerning fasting and abstinence. - On the contrary, on account of the same reason, a peregrinus cannot use the particular privileges in force in the place of his own proper domicile or quasi-domicile, as is plain from Principle 3.

⁸⁶ Cod. iur. can. ibid.; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 161.

198. "Vagi are obliged by both general and particular laws which are in force in the place in which they are staying." Thus the Code of Canon Law c. 14, § 2 expressly establishes, and therefore the controversy formerly existing about this matter is finished. In some matters, and especially as to the celebration of marriage, special laws have been made for vagi, as will be said below in the treatise on marriage.

199. Scholion. On Some Particular Cases. If someone has already fulfilled the precept of a common law in one place, he is not held to fulfill it again if he comes to another place where this precept now obliges. For it is not equitable that one and the same precept cause a double obligation and have to be fulfilled twice. Whence, for example, if an inhabitant of Holland fasted on August 14 on the Vigil of the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he is not held to fast again on the following Saturday, when the Vigil of this feast is celebrated in Prussia, if at that time he is staying in Prussia. On the contrary, the opinion of several theologians seems too formalistic (although probable), teaching, for example, that an inhabitant of Holland who on August 14 is staying in Prussia is not held to fast in Prussia, because on that day there is no fast there; and also that he is not held to fasting on the following Saturday, when he is then returned to Holland, because on that day there is no fast in Holland, since the feast of the Assumption has already been celebrated.

There are several matters in which the principles given above must be applied; notably in the absolution of reserved cases, for example, whether a penitent who committed a reserved sin in his domicile can be absolved outside his domicile by any confessor whatever. - But it will be better to treat the individual cases in their proper places.

357. Particular laws are some territorial, others personal. - The Pontiff and inferior legislators, such as bishops and prelates, can make particular laws which obligate a part of the Church; of these, some are territorial, which immediately affect the territory and mediately persons of the territory as such, that is, insofar as they pertain to the territory; others are personal, which immediately affect certain persons, and which, like particular precepts, cling to their bones and accompany them and obligate them wherever they go: thus a priest suspended in his own diocese cannot celebrate in another. But since a community is defined by territory, and subjects are not obligated except insofar as they are part of the community, hence canon 8, § 2: "A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is clear."

358. Subjects of particular laws. - In a territory there can be:

1. Inhabitants, who have domicile there, and newcomers, who have acquired quasi-domicile (can. 13, § 2): domicile is acquired in some parish (or quasi-parish) or at least in a diocese (or quasi-diocese) by residence prolonged to a completed decade, indeed even from the beginning by residence alone with the intention of remaining there perpetually; quasi-domicile is acquired by habitation prolonged for the greater part of the year, that is, after six months, and also from the beginning by habitation with the intention of remaining for the greater part of the year (can. 92). Both are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning (can. 95). These are obligated to territorial laws: a) while they are physically present in the territory (can. 13, § 2); b) also while they are physically absent but morally or juridically present, if transgression of the law in their own territory causes harm (can. 14, § 1), e.g., by reason of a thing situated in their own territory, or of an action or omission which they exercise there, or of a delict committed there; c) when absent from the territory and not morally present, they are not bound, because only those who are in some way in the territory are obligated; even if they depart precisely so that they may be exempted from the law, although thus they can sin by intention: for no one transgresses the law who uses his own right.

1. Let it be noted, according to canon 93, that a wife not legitimately separated from her husband necessarily retains the domicile of her husband; an insane person, the domicile of his curator; a minor, the domicile of him to whose power he is subject. But a minor, having passed beyond infancy, can obtain his own quasi-domicile; likewise a wife not legitimately separated from her husband can obtain a quasi-domicile, and one legitimately separated can even obtain a domicile.

2. Travelers, who elsewhere have domicile or quasi-domicile, but accidentally for a short time are staying outside their own territory with the intention of returning, such as merchants and travelers making excursions:

a) generally they are not bound by the laws of their own territory, unless the transgression harms their own territory, as was said under 1), b) and c) (can. 14, § 1);

b) nor per se are they bound by the laws of the territory in which they are present, even if they are similar to the laws of their own territory, because law obligates only subjects or members of the community;

c) nevertheless per accidens they are bound, by force of the common law, by reason of the thing about which they are acting or of the action which they exercise there or of the delict which they commit (because by this reason they are subjects), or from natural law, by reason of the order to be preserved and disturbance and scandal to be avoided; whence they are bound to laws of public security or those which are specially enacted for travelers. Hence canon 14, § 1, 2: "nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, except those which provide for public order (insofar as they provide for order), or determine the solemnities of acts";

d) nevertheless they are bound to the universal laws of the Church even if in their own territory they had been abrogated, e.g., to abrogated feasts (can. 14, § 1, 3);

e) but they are not bound to those universal laws if in the place in which they are present they have been abrogated, because local privileges are participated in by all who are staying in the place (can. 14, § 1, 3);

f) but if in one place they have already satisfied the common law, in another they are not bound, except by reason of scandal, because the Church is judged not to will to obligate twice to the same thing.

3. Vagabonds, who have domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere, but pass or wander from place to place, are now obligated by laws both general and particular which are in force in the place in which they are staying (can. 14, § 2); whence they become subjects of the Ordinary or pastor of the place where they are actually dwelling (can. 94, § 2).

4. Exempt persons, who by a fiction of right are judged to be outside the territory and are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the territory, such as religious strictly so called with regard to the laws of the Ordinary of the place (can. 615):

a) these are not bound to territorial laws per se and by force of the laws themselves;

b) per accidens they can be bound from fittingness or equity, namely, by reason of scandal to be avoided, or the common good to be obtained, with regard to those things which are not repugnant to their exemption and privilege;

c) they are bound with regard to certain causes expressed in law (e.g., with regard to the care of souls) according to the principles of can. 336, § 2 and 619.

Such causes are:

1. by reason of doctrine (the bishop is at the same time as it were an apostolic delegate in a matter of faith), e.g., with regard to the public preaching of the word of God (can. 1338, § 2; 1334 and 609, § 3; Council of Trent, sess. 5, c. 2; sess. 24, c. 4); with regard to schools, oratories, patronages, and other works in those things which regard religious and moral instruction (can. 1382), prior censorship of books to be published (can. 1385-86), prohibition of books (can. 1395, § 1), examination of those to be ordained (can. 996-997);

2. in protecting divine worship (can. 1261, 1265, 1274, 1279), e.g., with regard to prayers and solemnities (can. 612), processions (can. 1291-1292), pious associations (can. 686, § 3; 703), feasts and fasts (can. 1244); laws regarding celebration of Mass, stipend, collections (can. 831, § 3; 804, § 3), etc.;

3. in the care of souls, not only if they are pastors, but generally, not only with regard to instruction and morals, as was said, but also with regard to the administration of the sacraments toward seculars and religious women (can. 874, § 1; 876);

4. in certain matters of discipline, censures and interdicts upon the people, promulgating indulgences (can. 919);

5. by reason of a delict committed outside the convent, when the superior, having been warned, neglects to punish (can. 616, § 2).

1. Some deny this; but it is not demonstrated that the received discipline was changed by the new Code of right.

359. Cases.

1. as to a prohibiting law (e.g., abstinence from meats or from servile works): a) per se he is bound to observe it as long as he is in the former place, because a negative precept obligates always and for always; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept is indivisible (e.g., fasting): for he has the right of not observing the law in the other place, and if he uses that right, now the precept becomes impossible to observe even in the first place;

2. as to a preceptive law (e.g., hearing sacred Mass): a) he is bound to observe it if during the whole time in which the possibility or opportunity of observing the law is given he remains in the former place, because while he is subject to the law he cannot, by beginning a journey, place an impediment to fulfilling the law; hence he must hear Mass if before the last Mass or, while only one is celebrated, before that one he will not be in the other place; b) if before the end of this time in which the law can be observed he arrives at the other place, he is probably not bound, because he has the right of waiting for the last opportune time for fulfilling the law, e.g., if before the time at which the only or last Mass is celebrated he will arrive at the other place. Nor does it stand in the way that one foreseeing an impediment is bound to forestall it, because that is true only when, the force of the precept remaining, someone is to be impeded; but here he is absolved from the obligation of the precept.

1. as to a prohibiting law: a) per se he is bound to observe it from the moment at which he is in the second place, e.g., to abstain from meats or to fast, because at this moment he is subject to the law; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept has already become impossible to fulfill, e.g., if in the former place he had already used his right of eating several times so that fasting has become impossible; but if he has not used that right, and the fast can still be observed, he is bound to it unless there would be grave inconvenience;

2. as to a preceptive law, he is bound to observe it if he has returned before the end of the time in which it can still be observed, e.g., if before the last Mass, because from this moment he is subject to the law and obligated to it, unless, however, it cannot be fulfilled morally, that is, without grave inconvenience.

C. One who in traveling merely passes through a place where there is obligation, although he is not obligated in the place from which he set out or to which he is going, is not judged to be obligated unless he remains in the place of transit, because to interrupt a journey is a sufficiently great inconvenience and as it were an extraordinary means.

D. One who has satisfied the common law in one territory is not per se bound to satisfy again if he comes into a place where the same precept urges to be observed, because there does not exist an obligation of fulfilling the same precept twice.

Let it be noted that in the aforesaid cases an obligation is often given per accidens by reason of avoiding scandal.