Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 9: The Subjects of Human Law
A human law binds all those for whom it is made and who are subject to the authority of the legislator.
The laws of the Church oblige only baptized persons who have attained the use of reason. Theoretically, Protestants, too, are in some manner subject to the jurisdiction of the Church,1 but "a probable opinion teaches that it is not the Church's intention to bind them by such of her laws as proximately regard the sanctification of individual souls, rather than the public good," because "harm rather than good would follow from intending these laws to bind heretics and schismatics." 2 A general law obliges all who have attained the use of reason and are subject to the authority of the legislator. All such, therefore, are in duty bound to acquaint themselves with the laws under which they live.
1 1 Cor. V, 12-13.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VII, can. 7-8 de Bapt.; letter of Pius IX to Emperor William I, August 7, 1873.
2 Thos. Slater, S.J., A Handbook of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 93.
A particular law is one made for a limited class of persons or for a particular territory only. Particular laws of the latter kind bind those for whom they are made, who have a domicile or quasi-domicile in the territory concerned and actually reside there.
To have a domicile means to live in a place for ten years or with the intention of residing there permanently. A quasi-domicile is acquired by living in a place with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year, or by actually residing there for the greater part of a year.3
Foreigners (peregrini) are not bound to obey the particular laws of either their own country or the one in which they are sojourning, with the exception of those which regard the public welfare or prescribe legal formalities.4 Strangers (vagi, who have no domicile or quasi-domicile anywhere) are bound to obey the general as well as particular laws of the territory in which they sojourn.
4 Codex: Iuris Can., can. 14. Cfr. St. Augustine, Epist., 36, c. 14, 11. 32: "I shall tell you what the venerable Ambrose replied when I asked him about this: When I am here [in Milan], I do not fast on Saturday; when I am at Rome, I fast on Saturday; and to whatever church you come, he said, observe its custom if you wish neither to suffer scandal nor to cause it." —IDEM, Epist., 54 (al. 118), c. 2, n. 2; "But other things which vary through places and regions of the earth—such as that some fast on Saturday and others do not; some communicate daily in the Body and Blood of the Lord, while others receive on fixed days; in one place no day passes on which the offering is not made, in another it is made only on Saturday and Sunday, and elsewhere only on Sunday—and whatever else of this kind can be observed: this whole class of things admits of free observances. In these matters no discipline is better for a serious and prudent Christian than to act in the manner in which he sees the church act to which he may happen to come. For whatever is proved to be contrary neither to faith nor to good morals is to be regarded as indifferent and observed for the sake of fellowship with those among whom one lives." (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 200). Hence the well-known adage: "Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more; si fueris alibi, vivito sicut ibi." —Cfr. H. Noldin, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, qu. IV, art. 1, § 124, 5.
A journey undertaken in fraudem legis, i. e., with the express purpose of escaping an obligation, leaves that obligation in full force. However, if a man actually leaves a place with the intention of not returning to it, the obligation ceases, even though his motive was to escape the law. An actual change of domicile always entails a change of jurisdiction, no matter what the motive for which it is effected.
Children who have not yet attained, and adults who have permanently lost, the use of reason, are not bound by any human law. The reason is that they are incapable of performing moral acts.5 Under certain conditions, however, such persons may be forced to conform to particular precepts, e. g., that of abstinence.
5 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 17, art. 3: "Lex seu praeceptum est vinculum rationis."
A sovereign is subject to his own laws, not coactive, i. e., as regards their coercive force, for no one properly is coerced by himself; but directive, i. e., as regards their directive force, for the sake of order and good example. In the words of St. Thomas, "He ought voluntarily and not of constraint to fulfil the law," though strictly speaking he is above it, "inasmuch as, if expedient, he can change the law and dispense from it according to place and season."6
6 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 96, art. 5, ad 3 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. I, p. 294).—St. Ambrose, Apol. Proph. David, II, c. 3, n. 8 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 890). —IDEM, Epist., 21, n. 9 (P. L., XVI, 1004). —St. Isidore, Sent., III, c. 51, n. 1-2, cited in the Decretum Gratiani, c. 2, D. 9 (P. L., LXXXIII, 723; Corpus Iuris Can., ed. Friedberg, Vol. I, col. 16). — On the question of domicile and quasi-domicile see Aug. Bachofen, P.S.B., Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, Vol. II.
It goes without saying that the members of legislative bodies are bound to observe the laws which they themselves have made.
READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 96, art. 5. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 57 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 92 sqq. —A. Boudinhon, art. "Domicile" in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 103-106.—A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., pp. 204 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, 11th ed., Freiburg 1910, Vol. I, pp. 138 sqq.