Travellers and Pilgrims (peregrini)

339. Assertions. 1. Jurisdiction, since it is a power over a subject, cannot be exercised except over a subject;¹ but now, if we set aside the supreme pontiff, whose subject one becomes by entering the Church of Christ, someone can become the proper and ordinary subject of some ecclesiastical superior in only two ways: by domicile and by cooptation.

a. Domicile or quasi-domicile within the limits of the territory in which the ecclesiastical superior exercises jurisdiction is the chief manner by which almost all those who are subject to one having ordinary jurisdiction (pastor, bishop) are subjected.

b. By cooptation into a certain family, regulars, religious novices, boarder pupils, and domestic servants of monasteries are subjected to religious superiors.

Note. With respect to the exercise of sacramental jurisdiction, according to the new law all penitents are considered and treated as inhabitants of the place in which they make confession, and therefore by the very act of confession they are subjected to the confessor and become his subjects.

2. For validly hearing confessions there is required ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, and that granted expressly by writing or by words.²

a. Therefore tacit conferral of jurisdiction does not suffice, nor does presumed jurisdiction suffice, even if it is foreseen that it certainly would be granted if it were sought: for it must be granted expressly. Moreover it is not lawful to presume a condition on which the validity of an act depends.

b. Therefore also for absolving from venial sins and from mortal sins already remitted, jurisdiction is required, since the remission of venial sins also in the sacrament of penance is made in the manner of a judgment. Moreover no jurisdiction is granted in ordination itself, but only outside ordination through an act of the will of the ecclesiastical superior.

3. He who has jurisdiction, whether ordinary or delegated, can in that territory absolve all who approach, whether seculars or religious, whether pilgrims or wanderers, or the faithful of Oriental rites.³

¹ Cn. 201, 1.

² Cn. 879.

³ Cn. 881.

364. When Reservation Ceases. 1. Reservation ceases by the law itself:

a. In the confession of the sick, who cannot leave the house.

b. In the confession of spouses, who confess for the sake of entering marriage.

c. If the superior has denied the requested faculty of absolving for some determined case.

It had already been established long ago that, if a regular superior denies to a confessor who asks it the faculty of absolving from a case reserved in his order, the confessor can absolve, unless scandal or common harm is feared which cannot be removed without the matter being manifested to the superior.¹

d. If, in the prudent judgment of the confessor, the faculty cannot be sought from the superior without grave inconvenience of the penitent, or without danger of violating the seal.

Grave inconvenience of the penitent is considered to be present: a. if otherwise the penitent would give scandal; b. if he would incur infamy; g. if otherwise he would have to remain long in mortal sin and this would be hard for him; d. if the precept of paschal communion, or in a priest the necessity of celebrating, urges.

e. Outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent departed from it only in order to obtain absolution.

Therefore travelers can be directly absolved by any confessor from sins and censures reserved in their own diocese, but not likewise from sins and censures reserved in the diocese in which they confess, where they are treated as inhabitants of the place.

f. In danger of death. See n. 366, 5.

2. Reservation ceases by absolution:

a. By valid absolution given by him who has ordinary or delegated power of absolving from reserved sins.

Therefore any confessor can absolve from reserved sins from which the penitent has already once been directly absolved, if they are again submitted to the keys.

b. By confession, even invalid or sacrilegious, before a confessor having power over reserved matters, in which the reserved sin is accused; for the legitimate superior has already judged concerning the reserved sin, and the penitent has already received a congruous penance, which indeed in this case he is bound to fulfill, even if the confession was null.

c. By a valid confession before a confessor having power over reserved matters, in which the reserved sin is not accused through forgetfulness; this opinion is probable and therefore practically safe.

The reason for this opinion is this: reservation can be removed by indirect absolution if the confessor, furnished with due power, wills this; but it is to be presumed that the confessor wills to free a rightly disposed penitent from reservation, since he wishes to help him as much as he can (in quantum possum et tu indiges). Wherefore the penitent afterward can be duly absolved by a simple confessor from that sin which, equally as in the former case, remains necessary matter of confession.²

d. By confession of a doubtfully reserved sin before a simple confessor, even if afterward it is known to be certainly reserved; for this sin has already been directly remitted, the Church supplying jurisdiction.

What is to be done if a simple confessor, through inadvertence or ignorance, absolves from a reserved case:

a. If he absolves from a censure and sin reserved to the pope, the absolution of the censure is valid, provided it is not a censure ab homine or a censure reserved in a most special manner.³

b. If he absolves from an episcopal case, he should attend to the statutes of the diocese; for in many dioceses jurisdiction is conferred on the confessor in this case, so that he can directly absolve a penitent existing in good faith. But if nothing of this kind has been established:

a. The penitent who afterward knows that he was only indirectly absolved from a reserved sin should either return to the confessor and ask him to obtain for him the faculty of absolving, or approach another confessor having power over reserved matters and confess again the sin only indirectly remitted.

b. The confessor should admonish the penitent about the error committed, if this can easily be done, e.g., if he returns to confession, so that that error may be repaired. Or better, he should at once seek the faculty of absolving from that sin and see to it that the penitent returns again to confession and accuses himself at least in general of that sin, and he should absolve him, even if the penitent has not been warned about the error. But if he cannot easily either admonish or absolve the penitent, he should leave him in good faith.

¹ Thus Clement VIII established, as Urban VIII testifies in the constitution Sanctissimus, September 21, 1624. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 456.

² It is certain that in the time of jubilee even those who do not confess through forgetfulness a reserved sin or a censure incurred are freed from reservations and censures. For in this case the privilege of absolving is certainly granted, so that all penitents may be freed from their reservations and censures, provided they have duly fulfilled the works prescribed for gaining the jubilee (n. 332).

³ Cn. 2247, 3.

Are travelers held by the special laws of their own territory, or of the place in which they are staying? - A traveler is said to be one who, having a domicile or quasi-domicile somewhere, comes to some place with the intention not of remaining perpetually, but only of staying for some hours, or days, or at most for the lesser part of a year, which can extend even up to six months. A traveler is distinguished from a newcomer and a wanderer. - A newcomer is one who outside the territory of his own origin or prior domicile has placed his domicile or quasi-domicile. If he transferred his domicile, he is already an inhabitant, L. 239 de Verb. sign., and therefore some inhabitants are original, others newcomers. L. 4. 5 de Incol. C. One acquires domicile, even from the first day, who dwells somewhere with the intention of remaining perpetually, and "where someone has constituted the hearth and the sum of his affairs and fortunes, whence he is not going to depart again, if nothing calls him away from there." L. 7 C. de Incol. Somewhere: that is, in a parish or quasi-parish, by ecclesiastical law; in a municipality, by civil law. Intention in the external forum is presumed if the habitation is of ten years, or if a house has been built there, or the greater part of goods transported there. But a wife follows the domicile of her husband; a son in the household that of the parent under whose paternal power he is; and he who exercises some perpetual office somewhere has domicile there. L. 2. 8. 9 de Incol. C.

But quasi-domicile is acquired by one who remains somewhere, or by arriving there immediately stays there, with the intention of remaining for the greater part of a year; such are servants and students, who consequently besides legal domicile can have quasi-domicile, introduced by canon law. Quasi-domicile is no longer attended to as regards marriage. Someone can also from Roman Law have a double domicile, L. 5 and 6 Ad Municipalem et de Incolis. C. Ne. 22 seq. expressly establishes that no one can have several domiciles at the same time. From the Italian Code, a. 16, the civil domicile of a person is in the place in which he has the principal seat of his affairs and goods (interessi). But residence is in the place where the person habitually stays, ib.

Finally a wanderer is one who nowhere has a fixed and determinate domicile, but transfers himself from one place to another. Innoc. XII, C. Speculatores; L. 156, l. 6. n. 115 par. Secunda; C. I. preliminary dispositions 6 seq., and l. 1. a. 16 seq.; C. G. 102 seq.; C. H. 40 seq.; C. A. 29; C. B. 7-11; C. L. 40 seq. By the name of wanderers, as regards marriage, come all and only those who nowhere have a proper pastor or Ordinary by reason of domicile or monthly stay. A wanderer can contract marriage before any pastor, even if the other party is not wandering. Nevertheless the pastor is bound to make diligent inquiry concerning their free state. As regards wanderers, outside a case of necessity, let it not be licit for the pastor to assist at their marriages unless, the matter having been referred to the Ordinary or to a Priest delegated by him, he has obtained permission. Cf. v. 2. n. 1026.

Now a traveler is not held by the laws of his own territory; for law affects the territory, and he is outside it. C. 2 de Constit. in 6. - Except laws which regard the state of persons. For they adhere to the person. Hence he who is of age in his own homeland is of age everywhere. And thus also a private act everywhere retains its value; and therefore if an Italian or Frenchman has made a holographic testament, wherever he has made it, it is valid; because it is a private act, for which no public form has been constituted by the laws. Except also laws local and personal at the same time, as from the Decree of the Holy Office was the law of the Tridentine form to be observed in marriage. - Likewise except unless someone by fiction of law is judged still to be in his own territory. Thus, for example, if someone outside his own territory were to sell his own thing, existing in that same territory, he is bound to observe its laws in such a sale. Thus also a beneficed cleric who does not reside incurs penalties made there against non-residents. For the thing is judged to be consummated where it ought to have been done; whence the delinquent is held as morally present there where he harms by his action. - Laws: for if the discussion concerns precepts which immediately affect persons, it is certain that they oblige travelers, newcomers, and wanderers everywhere. Hence a priest, for example, suspended in his own diocese by particular sentence from priestly functions, cannot celebrate Mass in another diocese either. Cf. 171. 6; Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 32. n. 47; E. M. de Matr. 1026.

A traveler is indeed held by the laws of the place in which he is staying as regards contracts, as regards the form of judgments, and as regards other things necessary for the common good, whose violation namely would yield to the damage and injury of that place in which he is staying. Common and natural right demands this, by which travelers are by no means exempted. The same must be said as regards crimes, because it is equitable that crimes be punished everywhere. But as regards other things, unless scandal is present, a traveler is not held by the particular laws of the place, because law obliges only subjects. L. 1. 3. n. 332. And this probably has force even if the particular law prevails at the same time both in that place and in the homeland. For he is not held by the laws of the homeland, because absent, nor by the laws of this place, because a traveler. Now from C. Licet ult. de For. comp., no one is subjected to the power of another except by reason either of crime, or contract, or domicile or quasi-domicile, or by reason of a thing situated in the territory, or finally by reason of origin. L. 156. 159. - Traveler: for the common opinion teaches that it suffices that someone has contracted quasi-domicile, so that he is held by the laws of the place, even from the first day on which he arrived there with the intention of dwelling for the greater part of a year. L. 156; C. I. beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 6 seq. Traveler: the same must be said of a wanderer, who is not held by local laws as a traveler is not; and is held like him by general laws. Laws: he can use the favors of the place, for he can count himself among the inhabitants. If someone has already satisfied a common law in his homeland, more probably he is not bound to satisfy again when arriving in a place where by special privilege it urges later. Nor indeed is someone bound to satisfy the law if, before the law urges in that privileged territory, he departs from it and goes to a place where the time of the obligation of the law has already passed. The first reason is that there is no obligation of fulfilling the same precept again, since it has already been fulfilled in its own time. The second reason is that outside that privileged territory no obligation any longer urges. - Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 4.

By reason of public order, travelers are often held to exhibit testimony of their state, and permission of departure from the former domicile or quasi-domicile; and thus also from traveling priests wishing to celebrate Mass, a document of immunity from canonical penalty and irregularity is required. But from Decrees of the S. R. C., Apr. 3, 1821, n. 2613, Mar. 5, 1898, n. 3895, prayers or collects commanded by the Ordinary of the place are to be recited also by regulars and travelers.

Note: An exempt place is equated with a place situated outside the territory. Hence a traveler in an exempt place is also not held by the common law to fulfill it. On the contrary, he is held by a common law prevailing in the place where he is, even if in his homeland it no longer obliges; since he too is then under the common legislator, and law affects the territory. L. 160. 161.

It is also probable and safe in conscience that a traveler before departing from his own territory is not bound to hear Mass prescribed there, provided he will arrive outside the place where it urges before the time of obligation ceases; for example, before noon, if then the last Mass is celebrated. The reason is that the precept does not oblige you to wait. L. 157; Elbel 374. 375.

You will resolve: If there is a fast in your territory, and on the same day you go to a place where there is no fast, you can eat supper in the evening; indeed also breakfast in the morning, since fast is something indivisible. Existing in the morning in a place where there is no law of abstinence, you can eat meats, even if on the same day you are going to return home where there is fast. At home, however, you are certainly bound to abstain from meats, since abstinence is something divisible. L. 157; Elbel 372.

Who can dispense, and with whom? - R. To the first: Since dispensation is the relaxation of law, it is clear that it is an act of jurisdiction. Wherefore only he can dispense by ordinary power who made the law, or his superior, or successor; but by delegated power, he who has received from these the power of dispensing. The reason is that the legislator has as much power for loosing as for binding; he has equal power with his predecessors; finally he has the power of inferiors subordinated to himself. But an inferior has no power over the law of his superior.

The legislator cannot dispense even in his own law, if the law passes into a contract. For pacts are to be observed by all. But an inferior can dispense in the law even of a superior, if dispensation is generally permitted in the law, e.g., if it is said "until he is dispensed," if custom has prescribed it, if it is commonly admitted by theologians. Hence validly and licitly an inferior, by ordinary power, dispenses from a just cause in the law of a superior: 1. Concerning light things, i.e., those which do not oblige under mortal sin, even if recourse to the superior is easy. 2. In cases which occur frequently, and in doubtful cases. 3. When there is urgent necessity, recourse to the superior is difficult, and there is danger in delay. 4. Man cannot dispense himself from divine and natural law on account of his own preservation.

By ordinary power, delegated. Ordinary power is that which belongs to someone by force of his dignity, or of his office; delegated power, that which belongs by concession of him who has ordinary power. If delegated power is granted by law, it is equated with ordinary power, as being annexed to office and dignity; but if it is only from a superior, it is purely delegated. - L. 90, 190-192; l. 6, n. 902.

R. To the second: Dispensation can be made only with those who are subject to the jurisdiction of the one dispensing; for example, with inhabitants having domicile, whether they are in their own territory or outside it, L. l. 7, n. 81; with resident strangers, as long as they have quasi-domicile in the territory, S. O., 22 Nov. 1865, A. S. S., vol. 2, p. 671, who, once a dispensation has been obtained, can use it even when they go abroad, Suarez, l. 8, c. 26, n. 12; with wanderers, as long as they are staying in the territory, Bened. XIV, Not. 33, n. 10; indeed even with travelers, since travelers also by access to the local superior sufficiently become subjects while they are in foreign territory, and since this dispensation is personal, it adheres to the person, and therefore follows the traveler even outside the territory or diocese of the one dispensing, cf. 298; finally with themselves, although they have only delegated power, but general. The reason is "because it is purely voluntary jurisdiction, which can be exercised even toward oneself. Hence one can well dispense oneself in vows, oath, fast, etc." L. 183. General, because no one is excepted in a general faculty, in whatever way it is had. But it is otherwise if someone has been delegated only for particular cases. - L. 158, 183; l. 3, n. 262; E. M.

Can travelers enjoy the privileges of places through which they pass, even if these are against common law? R. Affirmatively. It is established from general custom.

What vows are reserved to the Pope? - By custom everywhere received and from Canon Law itself, besides the vows of religion and those annexed to them, are these five: 1. The vow of entering an approved religion. 2. The vow of perpetual and entire or total chastity. 3. The vow of pilgrimage to the sepulcher of the Lord in Jerusalem. 4. The vow of pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles Peter and Paul. 5. The vow of pilgrimage to visit the relics of St. James of Compostela. Hence in a general concession of dispensing in all vows, those five vows are not comprehended, although they are not expressly excepted. The reason is that those things which are specially reserved require a special concession. R. 81, de R. I., in 6; Struggl 48; L. 258.

Note: This reservation, as being odious, must always be interpreted strictly, and therefore reservation is not had: 1. If they are not perfect by reason of the vow, for example, if they are emitted under light obligation. 2. If they are not perfect by reason of affection toward the thing promised, for example, if you make a disjunctive vow, say of religion or fasting; or if you make a vow of chastity under a condition, even when the condition has been fulfilled, or a vow of going to Rome to visit the sepulcher of St. Aloysius Gonzaga, or of going to Palestine to serve pilgrims, the sick, etc. 3. If they are not perfect by reason of liberty, for example, if they are emitted from fear, even light fear inflicted by another. 4. If they are not perfect by reason of matter, for example, a vow of not marrying, or a vow of chastity as to external acts only and not also as to internal acts, of a non-approved religion, or of a religion in which solemn vows are not made.

But although vows are reserved, nevertheless their circumstances are not reserved, for example, of making a pilgrimage by begging, of entering religion immediately, etc. Struggl 49 seqq.; L. 258, 261; cf. here 616. Bishops, and those having similar jurisdiction, can rightly dispense in reserved vows in urgent necessity, for instance if access to the Pope is not easy, and in delay there is danger of grave harm, either spiritual, as of violation of the vow, scandal, quarrels, or temporal, one's own or another's, namely grave infamy of a woman and similar things. The aforesaid faculty, which is probably granted to Bishops and to others to whom the power of dispensing in reserved vows has been communicated by them when necessity is urgent, is not granted to Confessors in the Jubilee who have from the Pope the faculty of dispensing in simple vows. But Mendicants have it. Moreover the aforesaid dispensation is not to be granted except insofar as necessity obliges; hence, if it is enough that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Struggl 56; L. 258, l. 6, n. 987; Diana, tr. 1, de Dubiis Regular., r. 277.

A Bishop can dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity, emitted both before and after marriage, in order to asking the debt; because he can dispense from every impediment impeding the exercise of the conjugal act. Mendicant Confessors can do the same, and indeed both within and outside confession. L. 258, l. 6, nn. 986, 987. Although the faculty of dispensing from an oath is usually equated with, indeed associated with, the faculty of dispensing from a vow, nevertheless an oath of chastity, religion, etc., is not reserved. L. 259. Cf. 569.

Where can travelers, vagi, soldiers, and servants satisfy the precept of Easter Communion? - Travelers and vagi can communicate in any church, nor are they held to approach the parish of the place where they are staying; because they do not have their own pastor who ought to know them. - Soldiers in station, or having domicile in a city, ought to communicate in the parish in which they dwell; otherwise they can fulfill the precept in any church. Servants and all others having quasi-domicile are bound by the same law as inhabitants. L. l. 6, n. 300.

In which parish must an infant be baptized if the parents have neither domicile nor quasi-domicile, or are distant from it? - "Pilgrims, or those who do not have domicile (vagrants), can be baptized in the church which they choose, from cap. Nec numerus q. 3... But if a woman by chance gives birth in a village not her own, the offspring is to be baptized by the pastor of that village; nevertheless, if that village is little distant from her own village, e.g., by two or three hours, the offspring can also be baptized in her own church," L. 114; indeed must be, if there is no grave inconvenience.

Can a priest approved in some place receive the Confessions of travelers coming there? - Resp. In the affirmative absolutely as regards regular confessors, who have this special privilege from the Apostolic See. C. Inter cunctas of Paul III; C. Superna of Clement X. - In the affirmative also as regards secular priests. The reason is that such is the universal custom, which, having its origin at first from the tacit consent of Ordinaries, now, confirmed by long use, has been prescribed, and obtains the force of a universal law. - L. 569.

Who can absolve from reserved matters, and when? - Besides the Roman Pontiff and the Major Penitentiary, those who reserve, and those who act in their place, can absolve by ordinary right. Therefore Bishops absolve from episcopal cases, and their vicars general. C. Non putamus 2, de Consuet. in 6, each one in his own diocese; not likewise canon penitentiaries. L. 509. From cases reserved by Regulars, their superiors absolve, and at present all Confessors approved by the local Ordinary. Cf. here 790. But at present Regulars cannot absolve from papal cases, from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX on censures; nor can they absolve from episcopal reserved cases from prop. 12 condemned by Alexander VII. Yet they can absolve from those reserved to Bishops by the common law itself. For this faculty is found nowhere revoked. L. 599; S. O., March 22, 1881. - Likewise all absolve from reserved matters who receive special delegated jurisdiction over reserved matters.

Power of absolving from reserved matters, given simply for papal cases, or given even for papal cases, does not hold as regards cases reserved by Ordinaries. Benedict XIV, Constitution Pias Christi; L. 594. Power given by an Ordinary for absolving from reserved matters does not hold for papal cases. But each power given simply does not hold for specially reserved cases, or those reserved in a special manner. C. Si Episcopus 2, de Poenit. in 6.

Since pilgrims by common custom confess and are absolved as inhabitants of the place in which they stay, they cannot be absolved from reserved matters in the place of Confession by a simple confessor; but they can be absolved from matters reserved in their own country, unless they have come there in fraud of the reservation, and there is question of censures reserved ab homine. Clement X, Constitution Superna, June 21, 1670; S. C. C., Sept. 16, 1649, apud Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 5, c. 8; S. C. C., Nov. 12, 1612; S. Penit., Nov. 21, 1873. He comes in fraud of the reservation who comes for this principal end, of avoiding the judgment of his own pastor and of obtaining absolution from reserved matters. Therefore, if he comes in order to handle his other business, and then confesses, or even in order to confess better, he uses his own right. Concerning censures reserved ab homine; for as regards these a universal custom cannot be invoked, as for censures, even reserved ones, imposed by law, though others deny this. D'Annibale 346, vol. 1, ed. 3; L. 573, 574, 587, 592, 593; Filliucci, tr. 7, c. 10, n. 284; Gury-Dumas, Gury-Ballerini 582.

Confessors even privileged cannot absolve penitents of another rite from a case reserved by each one's own Ordinary. Leo XIII, Constitution Orientalium dignitas, Nov. 30, 1894. Cf. here n. 766. - At the point of death all can absolve from reserved sins and censures, because then there is no reservation from Trent, sess. 14, C. 7. Therefore for absolving from papal cases no permission of the Bishop is needed, and anyone can absolve from reserved matters, even when the superior or another having power is present. Cf. n. 773 and n. 799.

On the faculty of Cardinals to absolve from reserved matters, cf. vol. 1, n. 266 bis 1.

A superior who has ordinary jurisdiction can remove reservation outside Confession; and the penitent can then be absolved by any confessor. But one who has delegated jurisdiction, since it is given principally for absolving sins, can absolve from reserved matters only in sacramental Confession. Suarez, de Censur., d. 7, s. 5, n. 36; Lugo, d. 20, n. 74. "But can a superior absolve a penitent from reserved matters, and send him back to an inferior for the others? Some affirm universally... Others say that this is lawful only in a case of grave necessity, for example if the superior could not free himself from some very grave business, and on the other hand judged it necessary personally to hear the reserved sin. And Lugo, d. 20, n. 78, Salm., etc., admit this. But in a very rare case, with it added that the penitent would be under necessity of communicating and would not wish to confess the same sins twice. This last does not seem improbable, granted the case with all these conditions." L. 595. "One who has been absolved from reserved matters by a superior can afterward be absolved from the same by anyone; because they are no longer necessary matter of Confession." L. 596. - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 27; l. 4, d. 28; l. 3, d. 6; E. M.

What is to be said about the choice of burial? All can choose burial where they prefer, although outside their parish church or cemetery, provided they do not choose the churches of nuns, and choose a religious place, or at least one not profane, such as a private oratory, and the place has the right of burial. But these are excepted: 1. regulars, unless they die so far removed from their own monasteries that they cannot conveniently be carried to them; 2. those not yet pubescent, for whom the father can choose burial, or the mother, if he is dead. One who dies with no burial chosen for himself is to be buried in the tomb of his ancestors, namely the family tomb (which someone established for himself and his family), or the hereditary tomb (which he established for himself and his heirs). But otherwise someone is to be buried in that parish in which he died, if in it he had domicile or quasi-domicile. And if he died outside these places, he must be carried to the place of domicile or quasi-domicile; but if this is so remote that he cannot conveniently be carried there, he will be buried either in the cathedral church, if one exists there, or in the church of that parish in which he finished his day.

For acquiring the right of burial for oneself and one's family or heirs, with others excluded, the license of the Ordinary of the place is required, or of Regulars who can grant it from privilege for their churches, chapels, and cemeteries. Pirhing, book 3, title 28, sec. 3, n. 24.

By special law Bishops are to be buried in the cathedral church if they do not choose another place for themselves; a wife will be buried in the tomb of her last husband if she does not choose her own burial; but a husband, if he dies first without burial chosen, in that which the wife has chosen; exposed infants in the tomb of the hospital by which they were nourished; clerics in that church in which, when dying, they possessed a residential benefice; regulars in the church of their order, although they died outside the monastery, if they can conveniently be carried to it, and therefore all who enjoy the law of regulars, namely novices, servants, tertiaries, and female tertiaries who live perpetually in a monastery. But those who live apart can be buried in the church of the order whose habit they had assumed, if in these there exists their common burial and they have not died having chosen another; otherwise they are to be buried in the parish church. Women who, with license of the Apostolic See, had entered a monastery with the intention of remaining there perpetually are to be buried there; not likewise girls who were staying in the monastery for the sake of education, who are to be buried in the parish where the monastery is. C. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, h.t.; C. 1-5, e.t., in VI; Clementine 2, e.t.; S.C. Bishops and Regulars, June 8, 1731; May 6, 1870; April 5, 1878; A.S.S., vol. 5, p. 568; vol. 11, p. 352; Ferraris, h.v., n. 102; v. Moniales, art. 1, nn. 61, 62, 63; Schmalzgrueber, book 3, title 28, nn. 1-38, 72-82; Giraldi, Animadvers. ad Barbosa de Off. et Potest. parochi, part 3, chap. 26, n. 25; E.M.

380. 3° The Ordinary should not revoke approval from one who truly remains suitable, since in this matter he acts as judge, who is bound to pass judgment according to truth; therefore he sins if he revokes or suspends it without cause.² Nevertheless one to whom approval has been denied even unjustly cannot validly absolve, since jurisdiction also has been denied to him, without which absolution is invalid.³ - Besides, the Bishop is not bound to confer jurisdiction on every suitable person: for this is left to his judgment.

² Code, c. 880.

³ From the old law it was clear from the condemnation of proposition 13 by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665, apud Denzing., n. 984; cf. Viva, op. cit. on proposition XIII; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 736-737.

394. (B) From law, or from the Code: (a) Cardinals and Bishops, whether residential or titular, from the accepted authentic notice of canonical provision having been completed, can choose for themselves and their families a priest for receiving confessions; if he lacks jurisdiction, he obtains it by the law itself, even with respect to reserved sins and censures also, with the sole exception of censures reserved to the Apostolic See in the most special manner and those which are attached to the revelation of the secret of the Holy Office.²

² Code, c. 239 and 349.

(b) Any priests undertaking an overseas journey, provided they have from their own Ordinary, or from the Ordinary of the port, whether initial or intermediate, the faculty of receiving confessions, can during the whole journey validly and licitly absolve both the faithful sailing with them, and the faithful who for any reason come to the ship, and those who, when they themselves call at land in passing, ask to confess to them, and can validly and licitly absolve them even from cases reserved to the Ordinary of the place.³

³ Code, c. 883.

447. (a) When the penitent accuses a reserved sin (reserved by the Pope or by the bishop), the confessor should immediately weigh whether or not all the conditions necessary for incurring the reservation are present. If it is established that the sin is truly reserved, and at the same time the confessor lacks the due faculties, then, unless there is urgency, he should admonish the penitent either to approach the Superior, or to return after a few days, when, namely, the necessary faculties will have been obtained: penitents will generally choose this latter; in which case they can be permitted to declare the other sins.

860. Here, however, it is asked whether banns must be promulgated in several parishes.

(A) General rules. (a) If each betrothed person has domicile or quasi-domicile in the same parish, and in that parish only, the publications must be made there only.

(b) But if the betrothed have domicile or quasi-domicile in different parishes, banns must be promulgated in each.

(c) If one or each betrothed has several domiciles, or domicile in one parish and quasi-domicile in another, announcements must be made in all these parishes, unless nevertheless the Bishop dispenses, or one domicile is principal and the other wholly secondary.

(d) "If a party has dwelt in another place for six months after attaining puberty, the pastor is to set forth the matter to the Ordinary, who according to his own prudence either shall require publications to be made there, or shall prescribe that other proofs or conjectures concerning freedom of state be gathered. If there is some suspicion concerning an impediment contracted, the pastor even for a shorter stay shall consult the Ordinary, who is not to permit the marriage unless first the suspicion is removed."¹

¹ Code, c. 1023.

(e) If the contracting parties, after the proclamations have been begun, leave their prior domicile and acquire a new one (which can happen especially as regards servants), it seems more consonant with the end of the law not to interrupt the announcements begun in the former place where the betrothed are known; nor will they have to be made in the new domicile, where they are scarcely known at all. Nevertheless the pastor of the new domicile has the right of assisting at the nuptials, as is said below.

The former law partly abrogated

114. 1. By the former law, by order of Alexander VII, those dwelling in the Pontifical State had to offer their books to be approved by the previous censure of the Cardinal Vicar of the City and of the Master of the Sacred Palace. Now the special obligation, if any remains, is circumscribed to the City alone.

Force of the present article. It imposes an obligation

2. Proceed now: the obligation seems to remain. For although the sentence of the law is in itself ambiguous and can be taken of a mere privilege,¹ nevertheless the reason of the former disposition remains in such a way that a correction of that law, which would be inexplicable, does not seem to have to be admitted. The usage of the City agrees, in which the Masters of the Sacred Palace urge their right in this way.²

But the reason of this sanction is drawn from a certain peculiar authority with which books that are considered to have been written under the eyes of the Holy See are vested, so that they seem to have to be fortified by the caution of Roman censure.

And it confers a privilege

3. At the same time, however, the article confers a most equitable privilege, by which these books, even if they are published elsewhere, need have no other approval. Thus the law is not made harsher for the inhabitants of the City, and fitting honor is given to Apostolic censure.

Whom it affects

4. Those properly dwell in the City who there have at least a quasi-domicile.³ Those, however, who actually stay at Rome even for a shorter time will be able, as pilgrims, to share in the privilege of the inhabitants.

¹ Cf. Palmieri, in this place; Ojetti, Analecta Eccl., 1898, pp. 383, 384.

² Cf. Wernz, n. 121, note 104.

³ Quasi-domicile is acquired by real habitation joined with the intention of staying in some place for the greater part of the year. Thus the opinion received in the curia, although some, as Lehmk. II, 775, are content with staying through a notable part of the year: as, for instance, through 4 months. Penn., A. S. S., cited place, n. 74, p. 495, judges that no space of stay is required for the use of that privilege.

193. Notions. As to residence, according to the Code of Canon Law c. 91, four kinds of persons are distinguished: 1. peregrini; 2. vagi; 3. inhabitants; 4. newcomers.

1. A peregrinus is called one who indeed has a domicile or at least a quasi-domicile in some place, but now is staying outside this place, for example, for the sake of a journey, yet with the intention of returning after a short time to the place of domicile or quasi-domicile.

2. A vagus or vagabond (Wohnsitzloser) is properly called one who has a domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere, either because, having left his proper domicile or quasi-domicile, he has not yet acquired a new one, or because he has never had a true domicile or quasi-domicile. Thus, for example, as vagi are held those craftsmen or beggars who run about through diverse places, choosing a fixed habitation nowhere. The state of a vagus is judged in canon law to be something extraordinary and odious, and therefore is not to be presumed, but strictly proved.⁶⁹

3. An inhabitant is called one who stays in the place of his domicile. Domicile in some place is acquired by residence which is either a) joined with the intention of remaining there perpetually (or at least for an indefinite time), or b) prolonged to a completed ten-year period.⁷⁰ The mind or intention of remaining perpetually must be proved in the external forum, which indeed can be done in diverse ways, for example, by oath, by transferring a great part of one's goods, by prolonged habitation, etc. But when this intention is present, domicile is acquired as soon as habitation begins.⁷¹ Whence, for example, some schoolmaster who for an indefinite time has accepted his office in some place acquires domicile in this place from the first day of habitation. - Domicile is lost with more difficulty than it is acquired, both because in doubt concerning a domicile left behind its preservation must be presumed, and because domicile is judged for the faithful to be something favorable and its loss something odious. Wherefore a domicile once possessed is not lost except by renunciation or by the acquisition of another true domicile.

4. A newcomer is called one who resides in the place of his quasi-domicile. But someone acquires quasi-domicile in a place when he dwells in it for the greater part of a year, or at least with the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year. The greater part of a year is certainly judged to be a time exceeding six months; wherefore a residence prolonged for 181 days in some place always suffices for acquiring quasi-domicile, without inquiry needing to be made concerning the intention of remaining there for the greater part of a year.⁷² Nor is it necessary that this residence be uninterrupted; for a small interruption does not destroy the intention of residing in that place. Quasi-domicile is usually had, for example, by students staying in academies outside their homeland, soldiers in camps (commonly, garrison), servants in the domicile of the master, etc.

Divisions of Domicile. 1. Domicile or quasi-domicile is distinguished as parochial or diocesan, according as it is obtained either in some parish or quasi-parish, or only in a diocese, apostolic vicariate, apostolic prefecture.⁷³ Therefore someone can have a diocesan domicile (quasi-domicile) without a parochial domicile; but everyone who has a parochial domicile (quasi-domicile) thereby also has a diocesan domicile.

2. Domicile is distinguished as voluntary, which is acquired by one's own choice according to the two modes indicated above; and necessary or legal, which is acquired by another's choice from the disposition of law. Thus a wife (not legitimately separated from her husband) has the domicile of her husband; an insane person the domicile of his curator; an underage son the domicile of the one to whose power he is subject (c. 93).

⁶⁹ Cf. Sacred Rota, March 4, 1916 (Act. Ap. Sed. VIII, 373).

⁷⁰ Cod. iur. can. c. 92.

⁷¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 778.

⁷² Cod. iur. can. c. 92, § 2.

⁷³ Ibid., § 3.

194. Principle 1. A peregrinus is not held to the strictly territorial particular laws of his domicile or quasi-domicile, unless, however, their transgression in his own territory would do harm.⁷⁴

The reason is obvious. For such laws are territorial and oblige only those who in fact are staying in such territory. Hence, for example, an inhabitant of Spain who on July 25 is living outside Spain is not held to hear Mass, to which he would be obliged if existing in Spain on account of the feast of the Apostle James. - Indeed authors commonly teach that some inhabitant can leave the place of domicile or quasi-domicile precisely for this cause, that he may be exempt from the particular law of his own place.⁷⁵ For example, if there is a fast in some parish because the parish church is to be consecrated on the next day, a parishioner could leave the limits of the parish for the purpose of not being obliged to the fast. For no strictly territorial law prohibits departure from the territory itself, since everyone remains free to dwell in his own territory or not.⁷⁶ - But I said that a peregrinus is not held to strictly territorial particular laws. For if some law of a place is not strictly territorial, but rather personal, then it obliges subjects everywhere on earth and follows them everywhere as a shadow follows the body. Thus, for example, laws concerning military service to be undertaken oblige subjects even living in another land, unless, however, they have obtained legitimate expatriation. Not rarely it is rather difficult to discern whether some particular law is strictly territorial or personal. Thus laws and penalties made by some bishops for their clerics about not approaching taverns and spectacles, about not playing cards, etc., are not clearly known as territorial or as personal; and therefore then it is not clearly established whether a cleric transgressing laws of this kind outside his own diocese contracts the special penalties determined by the bishop. If solid doubt remains concerning the mind of the legislator, the penalty made is not incurred, since it is of strict interpretation.⁷⁷ Indeed it is generally established in law: "A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is established."⁷⁸

A peregrinus is held to observe the particular laws of his domicile or quasi-domicile if their transgression in his own territory would do harm; for example, if a diocesan law rightly forbids all inhabitants to furnish aid to some harmful institute existing in the diocese, then an inhabitant, even while journeying outside the diocese, cannot licitly furnish such aid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., c. 14, § 1.

⁷⁵ The contrary is asserted, but not sufficiently proved, by Concina (De iur. nat. et gent. lib. 1, diss. 4, c. 2, q. 8).

⁷⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 157.

⁷⁷ Thus also Génicot, Cas. consc. I, 21 (de leg., cas. 1).

⁷⁸ Cod. iur. can. c. 8.

195. Principle 2. A peregrinus is not obliged by the particular laws of the place where he dwells outside his own domicile or quasi-domicile, except in three cases: 1. if otherwise scandal or some other detriment would arise for the inhabitants; 2. if there is question of contracts to be entered into; 3. if there is question of penalties inflicted on account of a delict committed.⁷⁹

It is declared: A peregrinus generally is not obliged by the particular laws of the place where he dwells, because he is not subject to the legislator of that place; for he is subject to the legislator not from the fact that he dwells for a short time in his territory, but from the fact that he acquires domicile or at least quasi-domicile there.⁸⁰ Wherefore if, for example, a bishop prescribed a feast day in his diocese, he neither could nor wished to oblige anyone except his own subjects.

But the three enumerated cases are excepted, in which not now the particular positive law, but rather the natural law itself induces the obligation. This indeed appears easily by inspecting the individual cases. For 1. if a peregrinus by not publicly observing a feast day prescribed by particular law would give true scandal, he would be held to observe it.⁸¹ Likewise, 2. if by his transgression he would cause some other detriment to the inhabitants; for the natural law itself prohibits causing scandal or detriment to others. - The same reason applies concerning contracts and other acts to be entered into under a special juridical form. Hence that adage: The place rules the act.⁸² For if a peregrinus did not observe particular laws made concerning the validity of acts and contracts, the act or contract would be invalid, and the peregrinus could always withdraw from the act or contract entered into, which would cause great detriment to the inhabitants. Whence if, for example, someone wishes to make a contract of purchase in some foreign place, he is held to fulfill the conditions required by the particular law of this place. As to the civil contract of marriage, special international stipulations have force. - 3. The third exception, namely, as to penalties contracted from a public delict, follows both from canon law establishing:⁸³ "The accused obtains the forum in the place of the delict committed"; and from natural law. For if a peregrinus committing a delict in another place could not be punished by the legitimate authority of that place, he would often escape unpunished, or at least his chastisement would become very difficult. Whence also international law admits this exception. For if, for example, a Frenchman committed a crime in Switzerland and has been captured, he is condemned by a Swiss tribunal according to Swiss laws, but not according to the laws of France.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ In this way this principle is stated in Cod. iur. can. c. 14, § 1, n. 2: "Peregrini are not bound by the particular laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts."

⁸⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, 332.

⁸¹ In this case not only is that advised, but it is truly commanded:

⁸² Cf. Cod. iur. can. c. 1565.

⁸³ Cf. c. 3 and 20, X, 2, 2; Cod. iur. can. c. 1565.

⁸⁴ In the Spanish Civil Code it is expressly stated: "Penal laws, laws of police, and laws of public security oblige all who dwell in Spanish territory" (a. 8). The same code establishes similar things concerning the form and solemnity of contracts (a. 11). - Sometimes peregrini, from a special statute, are held to observe other particular territorial laws. Thus from the statute of the Supreme Pontiff, for example, a priest saying Mass in another church is held to observe the directory of that church if a feast double and above is celebrated there. All priests, even peregrini and exempt, must recite the Collects (prayers) commanded by the bishop of the place (S. C. R., March 5, 1898. Decret. auth. 3985).

196. Principle 3. A peregrinus is held to common laws which are observed in the place of his actual residence, although in the place of his domicile or quasi-domicile these laws have been abolished or suspended by legitimate dispensation,⁸⁵ or more briefly: Peregrini cannot use the privileges of their own territory.

The reason is that such dispensations exercise no liberating force outside the territory for which they have been granted. Wherefore, for example, an inhabitant of some region in which there is in force an Indult of eating meat on Ember days cannot use this Indult if he is staying in another place where the common law is in force. - But it is plain of itself that such an inhabitant can eat meat everywhere on earth if he has obtained a personal Indult.

If you have been at Rome, live in the Roman manner;
If you have been elsewhere, live as they do there!

⁸⁵ Cod. iur. can. c. 14, § 1, n. 3.

197. Principle 4. A peregrinus can use the privileges and indults in force in that territory in which he is here and now staying.⁸⁶

The reason is that a territorial privilege or Indult is judged to be given for all, whether inhabitants or travelers, who are staying in such territory (unless, however, the contrary has been expressly established, as, for example, Pius X did in the Constitution Provida). Hence, for example, an Italian traveling in Switzerland can use the privileges there in force concerning fasting and abstinence. - On the contrary, on account of the same reason, a peregrinus cannot use the particular privileges in force in the place of his own proper domicile or quasi-domicile, as is plain from Principle 3.

⁸⁶ Cod. iur. can. ibid.; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 161.

357. Particular laws are some territorial, others personal. - The Pontiff and inferior legislators, such as bishops and prelates, can make particular laws which obligate a part of the Church; of these, some are territorial, which immediately affect the territory and mediately persons of the territory as such, that is, insofar as they pertain to the territory; others are personal, which immediately affect certain persons, and which, like particular precepts, cling to their bones and accompany them and obligate them wherever they go: thus a priest suspended in his own diocese cannot celebrate in another. But since a community is defined by territory, and subjects are not obligated except insofar as they are part of the community, hence canon 8, § 2: "A law is not presumed personal, but territorial, unless something else is clear."

358. Subjects of particular laws. - In a territory there can be:

1. Inhabitants, who have domicile there, and newcomers, who have acquired quasi-domicile (can. 13, § 2): domicile is acquired in some parish (or quasi-parish) or at least in a diocese (or quasi-diocese) by residence prolonged to a completed decade, indeed even from the beginning by residence alone with the intention of remaining there perpetually; quasi-domicile is acquired by habitation prolonged for the greater part of the year, that is, after six months, and also from the beginning by habitation with the intention of remaining for the greater part of the year (can. 92). Both are lost by departure from the place with the intention of not returning (can. 95). These are obligated to territorial laws: a) while they are physically present in the territory (can. 13, § 2); b) also while they are physically absent but morally or juridically present, if transgression of the law in their own territory causes harm (can. 14, § 1), e.g., by reason of a thing situated in their own territory, or of an action or omission which they exercise there, or of a delict committed there; c) when absent from the territory and not morally present, they are not bound, because only those who are in some way in the territory are obligated; even if they depart precisely so that they may be exempted from the law, although thus they can sin by intention: for no one transgresses the law who uses his own right.

1. Let it be noted, according to canon 93, that a wife not legitimately separated from her husband necessarily retains the domicile of her husband; an insane person, the domicile of his curator; a minor, the domicile of him to whose power he is subject. But a minor, having passed beyond infancy, can obtain his own quasi-domicile; likewise a wife not legitimately separated from her husband can obtain a quasi-domicile, and one legitimately separated can even obtain a domicile.

2. Travelers, who elsewhere have domicile or quasi-domicile, but accidentally for a short time are staying outside their own territory with the intention of returning, such as merchants and travelers making excursions:

a) generally they are not bound by the laws of their own territory, unless the transgression harms their own territory, as was said under 1), b) and c) (can. 14, § 1);

b) nor per se are they bound by the laws of the territory in which they are present, even if they are similar to the laws of their own territory, because law obligates only subjects or members of the community;

c) nevertheless per accidens they are bound, by force of the common law, by reason of the thing about which they are acting or of the action which they exercise there or of the delict which they commit (because by this reason they are subjects), or from natural law, by reason of the order to be preserved and disturbance and scandal to be avoided; whence they are bound to laws of public security or those which are specially enacted for travelers. Hence canon 14, § 1, 2: "nor by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, except those which provide for public order (insofar as they provide for order), or determine the solemnities of acts";

d) nevertheless they are bound to the universal laws of the Church even if in their own territory they had been abrogated, e.g., to abrogated feasts (can. 14, § 1, 3);

e) but they are not bound to those universal laws if in the place in which they are present they have been abrogated, because local privileges are participated in by all who are staying in the place (can. 14, § 1, 3);

f) but if in one place they have already satisfied the common law, in another they are not bound, except by reason of scandal, because the Church is judged not to will to obligate twice to the same thing.

3. Vagabonds, who have domicile or quasi-domicile nowhere, but pass or wander from place to place, are now obligated by laws both general and particular which are in force in the place in which they are staying (can. 14, § 2); whence they become subjects of the Ordinary or pastor of the place where they are actually dwelling (can. 94, § 2).

4. Exempt persons, who by a fiction of right are judged to be outside the territory and are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the territory, such as religious strictly so called with regard to the laws of the Ordinary of the place (can. 615):

a) these are not bound to territorial laws per se and by force of the laws themselves;

b) per accidens they can be bound from fittingness or equity, namely, by reason of scandal to be avoided, or the common good to be obtained, with regard to those things which are not repugnant to their exemption and privilege;

c) they are bound with regard to certain causes expressed in law (e.g., with regard to the care of souls) according to the principles of can. 336, § 2 and 619.

Such causes are:

1. by reason of doctrine (the bishop is at the same time as it were an apostolic delegate in a matter of faith), e.g., with regard to the public preaching of the word of God (can. 1338, § 2; 1334 and 609, § 3; Council of Trent, sess. 5, c. 2; sess. 24, c. 4); with regard to schools, oratories, patronages, and other works in those things which regard religious and moral instruction (can. 1382), prior censorship of books to be published (can. 1385-86), prohibition of books (can. 1395, § 1), examination of those to be ordained (can. 996-997);

2. in protecting divine worship (can. 1261, 1265, 1274, 1279), e.g., with regard to prayers and solemnities (can. 612), processions (can. 1291-1292), pious associations (can. 686, § 3; 703), feasts and fasts (can. 1244); laws regarding celebration of Mass, stipend, collections (can. 831, § 3; 804, § 3), etc.;

3. in the care of souls, not only if they are pastors, but generally, not only with regard to instruction and morals, as was said, but also with regard to the administration of the sacraments toward seculars and religious women (can. 874, § 1; 876);

4. in certain matters of discipline, censures and interdicts upon the people, promulgating indulgences (can. 919);

5. by reason of a delict committed outside the convent, when the superior, having been warned, neglects to punish (can. 616, § 2).

1. Some deny this; but it is not demonstrated that the received discipline was changed by the new Code of right.

359. Cases.

1. as to a prohibiting law (e.g., abstinence from meats or from servile works): a) per se he is bound to observe it as long as he is in the former place, because a negative precept obligates always and for always; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept is indivisible (e.g., fasting): for he has the right of not observing the law in the other place, and if he uses that right, now the precept becomes impossible to observe even in the first place;

2. as to a preceptive law (e.g., hearing sacred Mass): a) he is bound to observe it if during the whole time in which the possibility or opportunity of observing the law is given he remains in the former place, because while he is subject to the law he cannot, by beginning a journey, place an impediment to fulfilling the law; hence he must hear Mass if before the last Mass or, while only one is celebrated, before that one he will not be in the other place; b) if before the end of this time in which the law can be observed he arrives at the other place, he is probably not bound, because he has the right of waiting for the last opportune time for fulfilling the law, e.g., if before the time at which the only or last Mass is celebrated he will arrive at the other place. Nor does it stand in the way that one foreseeing an impediment is bound to forestall it, because that is true only when, the force of the precept remaining, someone is to be impeded; but here he is absolved from the obligation of the precept.

1. as to a prohibiting law: a) per se he is bound to observe it from the moment at which he is in the second place, e.g., to abstain from meats or to fast, because at this moment he is subject to the law; b) nevertheless per accidens he is not bound if the precept has already become impossible to fulfill, e.g., if in the former place he had already used his right of eating several times so that fasting has become impossible; but if he has not used that right, and the fast can still be observed, he is bound to it unless there would be grave inconvenience;

2. as to a preceptive law, he is bound to observe it if he has returned before the end of the time in which it can still be observed, e.g., if before the last Mass, because from this moment he is subject to the law and obligated to it, unless, however, it cannot be fulfilled morally, that is, without grave inconvenience.

C. One who in traveling merely passes through a place where there is obligation, although he is not obligated in the place from which he set out or to which he is going, is not judged to be obligated unless he remains in the place of transit, because to interrupt a journey is a sufficiently great inconvenience and as it were an extraordinary means.

D. One who has satisfied the common law in one territory is not per se bound to satisfy again if he comes into a place where the same precept urges to be observed, because there does not exist an obligation of fulfilling the same precept twice.

Let it be noted that in the aforesaid cases an obligation is often given per accidens by reason of avoiding scandal.

Question 3. Are pilgrims held by the laws of their own territory?

Before the question is answered, it must be said what comes under the name of inhabitant, newcomer, pilgrim, and vagus:

A person is called: an inhabitant, in the place where he has domicile; a newcomer, in the place where he has quasi-domicile; a pilgrim, if he is staying outside the domicile and quasi-domicile which he still retains; a vagus, if he has no domicile or quasi-domicile anywhere (Can. 91).

Response. Negatively, generally speaking:

§ 1. Pilgrims;

1st. Are not bound by the particular laws of their own territory so long as they are absent from it, unless either their transgression harms in their own territory, or the laws are personal (Can. 14).

Moreover, a law is not presumed personal but territorial, unless something else is clear, Can. 8, § 2. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156; and Hom. Ap. n. 39. - Lacroix, n. 683. - Elbel, n. 370. - Scav. n. 222.

Question 4. Are pilgrims held by the laws of the place in which they are staying?

Response. Pilgrims are not bound by the laws of the territory in which they are staying, excepting those which provide for public order, or determine the solemnities of acts (Can. 14).¹

3rd. But they are held by general laws, even if these do not have force in their own territory, but by no means if they do not oblige in the place in which they are staying (Can. 14). They are also held by laws as regards contracts, as regards delicts, and as regards those things which are necessary for the common good. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 2; p. 1094, n. 27.