Chapter II: On Marriage as Sacrament

779. Among many peoples the contract of marriage bore before itself something sacred and religious, and was often celebrated with sacred rites.¹ But Christ raised the same to the dignity of a sacrament, so that, among Christians, it is a sign not only sacred, but also productive of grace. That we may embrace in this chapter questions both speculative and practical, we shall speak: 1° of the sacrament itself; 2° of the celebration of this sacrament.

¹ P. Sauzet, Reflexions sur le Mariage civil et le Mariage religieux, Lyon, 1853, p. 11 sq.; Glasson, Le Mariage civil et le Divorce dans l'antiquite, Paris, 1880, p. 139 sq.; R. Lemaire, Le Mariage civil, Paris, 1904, p. 4-15.

We shall declare four things: 1° the existence of this sacrament; 2° its nature; 3° its effects; 4° by way of corollary, the power of making laws concerning marriage.

780. (A) Errors. Formerly the Gnostics and Manichaeans condemned nuptials as evil, as being an incentive of concupiscence and a means by which original sin is propagated. Protestants indeed are far from the error of those forbidding to marry, since they extol nuptials above virginity; but they commonly deny, Ritualists excepted, that marriage is a sacrament. Luther indeed says:³ "Marriage is not a sacrament of the New Law, since the divine promise is lacking to it"; but Calvin¹ affirms that the notion of a sacrament is no more suited to nuptials than to agriculture or to the shoemaker's art, and that they were not regarded as a sacrament before the times of Gregory I.²

² St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 42, a. 1-3; Bellarmine, De sacr. Matrimonii, c. 1-5; Sanchez, l. II, disp. 10; Drouin, l. X, de sacr. Matrim., q. I; Liebermann, cap. II, a. 1; Perrone, De Matrim. christ., l. I, sect. I, c. 1; Carriere, De Matrimonio, p. I, sect. 2, c. 1; Palmieri, c. II, th. 7-9; de Augustinis, a. 1; Billot, th. 36.

³ De Capt. Babyl., § de Matrim.

¹ Instit., l. IV, c. 19, n. 34.

² Modern Protestants willingly acknowledge that Marriage is a religious institution: "Marriage is not a sacrament in the sense in which Baptism and the Supper are, nor in the sense of the Roman Church, although it must be regarded as a holy institution. Its celebration is an act of religion only. Therefore we ought to enter this state with due solemnity and in the fear of God. Let the ceremony be performed by a minister of Christ, who alone can vindicate to himself authority in the law of God; who alone can receive, and in the act refer to God, the vows pronounced by the contracting parties" (Hodge, op. cit., t. III, p. 377). But the Ritualists acknowledge it as one of the lesser sacraments: "The same is to be said of the holy institute of Matrimony. As regards this sacred rite, we are able with willing mind to show that this sacramental title can be applied to it authentically; the Book of Homilies speaks of it as of a sacrament, which binds man and woman by the bond of eternal love. From the same book it is gathered that marriage is a certain kind of life instituted by God when man was still enjoying innocence; that it expresses the mystical union of Jesus Christ and the Church; that at the nuptials of Cana in Galilee it was honored by the presence of Christ, and by His first miracle then performed. Rightly therefore and deservedly among us it is called the sacrament of marriage" (Morgan Dix, Sacramental System, p. 87-88).

781. (B) Doctrine of the Church. Before Christ, marriage indeed was not a sacrament productive of grace, nay, nor was it counted among the sacraments of the Old Law; nevertheless it was called a sacrament by some Fathers, but in a broader sense, insofar as it was the sign of a sacred thing, namely of the future conjunction between Christ and the Church; for, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, Adam cast into sleep³ represented Christ dying on the cross, Eve represented the Church flowing from His side; as a man leaves father and mother and cleaves to his wife, so the Word in a certain way left the Father that He might cleave to the Church; as two spouses are in one flesh, so the Word was made flesh, so that from His union with flesh one person arose; as from Adam and Eve men were born, so from Christ and the Church spiritual children are born daily. But Christ raised the matrimonial contract to the dignity of a sacrament properly so called, as we are now about to prove.

³ Gen., II, 18-25.

782. Thesis: Marriage legitimately celebrated among Christians is a sacrament properly so called. It is of faith from the canon of Trent: "If anyone shall say that Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical Law instituted by Christ the Lord, but was brought into the Church by men, and does not confer grace, let him be anathema."

It is not indeed proved from Scripture, but it is suggested. 1° In the Gospel there is indeed found no explicit declaration of Christ concerning the institution of the sacrament of marriage, but from those things which He brought forth concerning the unity and indissolubility of the matrimonial bond, His mind can probably be inferred.¹ For when He was asked by the Pharisees whether it was lawful to dismiss a wife for any cause whatever, He recalls to their memory the words of Genesis concerning the unity and indissolubility of marriage. But when they objected that divorce had been permitted by Moses, He said: "Because Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so." Wherefore He promulgates a new law concerning the indissolubility of marriage: "Whoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery; and he who shall marry her who has been put away commits adultery." The disciples themselves think this law too difficult: "If the case of a man with his wife is so, it is not expedient to marry." In reality divorce, or at least the privilege for a man of repudiating his wife, flourished among almost all peoples, and, because of the natural inconstancy of the human heart, was regarded as natural and necessary: for from things commonly happening, it was judged morally impossible to cleave to one wife through the whole of life. Yet Christ demands this absolute fidelity not from a few, but from all. But He cannot wisely demand this unless He infuses the grace necessary for furnishing that which commonly surpasses human powers. But given the economy of the New Law, the grace which is necessary for a permanent state of life is usually conferred through a sacrament. - The inference is confirmed from the doctrine of the Apostle.

¹ Matt., XIX, 1-10.

783. 2° St. Paul, treating of the mutual duties of spouses, in order to induce spouses more efficaciously to fulfill the same, brings forward the example of the union of Christ with the Church: "Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord. For the man is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church: He is the savior of His body. But as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let women be to their husbands in all things. Men, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for her, that He might sanctify her... that she might be holy and immaculate. So also men ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hated his own flesh: but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ also does the Church. Because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."¹ Now, from these words of the Apostle, Christian Marriage: (a) is a sacred sign; (b) a sign of grace; (c) and very probably produces grace, and thus is truly and properly a sacrament.

¹ Ephes., V, 22-32.

(A) Christian Marriage signifies something sacred; namely, the union of Christ with the Church.

For the Apostle exhorts Christian spouses that wives be subject to husbands, as the Church to Christ (Ephes., V, 22-24), and that husbands love wives as Christ loves the Church (25-28), because in the same way as the husband is the head of the wife and the wife the body of the husband, so Christ is the head of the Church and the Church the body of Christ (23). Hence the things which Adam pronounced of Eve, that she was bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh, are equally true of the Church relative to Christ; for we are members of the body of Christ, of His flesh and of His bones (30). Therefore, as a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they are two in one flesh (31), so the Son of God left the bosom of the Father and cleaves to the Church through the communication of grace, and with the members of the Church constitutes one mystical body. This is a sacrament, that is, according to the force of the Greek word mysterion, a mystical sign, and indeed a great one, both because it signifies a great thing, namely Christ the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and because it signifies this most sacred thing in a wondrous manner (32). Therefore the marriage of Christians signifies something sacred.

784. (B) It is a sign of sanctifying grace; for it signifies the union of Christ with the Church; but this union is perfected through sanctifying grace, according to that word of the Apostle: "Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for her, that He might sanctify her" (25-26); and in reality the union of Christ with the Church brings forth fruits of sanctity; therefore Christian marriage signifies sanctifying grace.

(C) Finally, Christian marriage produces the sanctifying grace which it signifies. This third point St. Paul does not teach openly; nevertheless he suggests it, insofar as he hands down those things which, although of themselves they do not suffice, yet by reason of the Christian economy, which he rightly must be said to suppose, probably persuade the matter. For Christian marriage is presented as a supernatural and permanent union: (a) supernatural, because the mutual duties of spouses, such as are described by the Apostle, are supernatural by a double title, from the exemplar which is proposed, namely Christ's love for the Church and the Church's devout subjection toward Christ, - and also from the motive which is assigned, namely from the fact that the man is the head of the woman as Christ is the head of the Church; (b) permanent, for the love and obedience which the Apostle commanded to Christian spouses ought to imitate the love of Christ and the subjection of the Church, which are something constant and permanent. But the union of spouses cannot be supernatural without grace, nor permanently supernatural without habitual grace, to which actual graces are joined, especially since such a permanent union presents a special difficulty, because of the inconstancy of human nature, as was noted above, n. 782. Therefore Christian marriage requires habitual grace, together with the right to actual graces. Moreover, given the economy of the New Law, sanctifying grace, with the right to actual graces, is usually conferred through a special sacramental rite, which not only signifies grace, but produces it. Therefore Christian marriage very probably not only signifies sanctifying grace, but also truly produces it; therefore it is truly a sacrament of the New Law.

785. It can be objected: Already from the time of Adam, marriage was a sign of the union of Christ with the Church; therefore from the time of Adam it conferred grace. But the consequent is false; therefore also the antecedent.

Response. From the beginning marriage was only the sign of the future union of Christ with the Church, while Christian marriage is the sign of the union already accomplished. Moreover, the mere adumbration of a future thing does not require so much perfection as a certain reproduction and extension of a thing accomplished. Hence before Christ, the sign of that future union was the matrimonial state alone, without sacramental grace, while Christian marriage, in order that it may be a worthy image both of the physical and of the moral union of Christ with the Church, must, according to St. Paul, be distinguished by special charity and by the virtues which charity begets.

Indeed, the matrimonial state itself before Christ gradually lost the prerogatives of unity and indissolubility, by which it chiefly represents the union of Christ with the Church. On the contrary Christian marriage became necessarily one and indissoluble. Special grace indeed was not required in order that the matrimonial state, disfigured by polygamy, divorce, and also by the tyranny of the man over the wife, might remain a certain very imperfect sign of the union of Christ with the Church; but special grace must altogether be present in Christian marriage, such as is described by the Apostle, namely firm in unity and indissolubility and adorned with constant love between the spouses, so that it can not only recall to mind the union of Christ with the human race, but express to the life His most devoted charity toward the Church and the Church's most faithful charity toward Christ.

Nor is it useful to add that in the cited text there is question only of the marriage of Adam with Eve; for Adam was speaking not so much of himself as of his posterity, when he said: "A man shall leave his father and his mother"...; for he himself did not have parents whom he would leave; therefore he spoke prophetically of the matrimonial union of posterity, and indeed of that union which more perfectly figures the union of Christ with the Church, namely of that which exists among Christians.

786. By Tradition. In the historical progress of this dogma, three stages can chiefly be distinguished.

1° In the four earlier centuries, only implicitly and obscurely do the Fathers teach that marriage is a sacrament productive of grace. For they are wholly occupied in defending the honesty and sanctity of marriage against the Gnostics and Manichaeans, and its indissolubility against the jurists. Nevertheless, when they assert that marriage is a sacred and religious sign, they set forth certain principles which suppose that by the same a certain grace is conferred.

Thus St. Ignatius declares that nuptials are a sacred thing, according to the Lord, to be celebrated with the judgment of the bishop:¹ "But it is fitting that the bridegroom and the bride contract marriage with the judgment of the bishop, that the nuptials may be according to the Lord, not according to cupidity." Tertullian thus extols the dignity of Christian marriage:² "Whence shall we suffice to recount the happiness of that marriage which the Church reconciles, and the oblation confirms, and the blessing seals, the angels announce, the Father holds ratified?" Now so splendid a description, regard also being had to the context where the pious and holy conversation of the spouses is depicted, supposes grace to be annexed to Christian marriage. - This is more clearly inferred from this testimony of Origen:¹ "And indeed God is He who has joined the two into one, so that, from the time when the woman has married the man, they are no longer two, and, because God is the author of the conjunction, therefore grace is in those who have been joined by God." There indeed it is not declared that this grace is bound to marriage itself, but nothing prevents these words from being understood in this way. Ambrose likewise commemorates this grace; after he has treated of the grace of baptism, he writes concerning Christian marriage:² "We know that God is, as it were, the president and guardian of marriage, who does not suffer another's bed to be polluted; and if anyone has done this, that he sins against God, whose law he violates, whose grace he loosens. And therefore because he sins against God, he loses the fellowship of the heavenly sacrament." Elsewhere he asserts³ "that marriage itself is sanctified by the priestly veil and blessing": by which words it is at least suggested that grace is annexed to marriage. - Some Fathers teach that Christ, by assisting at the nuptials of Cana, showed His mind of binding grace to marriage. Thus St. Epiphanius:⁴ "For two reasons Christ seems to me to have been invited. First, that He might bind by the chastity and honesty of nuptials the lust of mad men in the world, like to water and flowing away; then that He might amend what was lacking and soften it with the sweetness and grace of most pleasant wine."

¹ Ad Polycarpum, c. 5, p. 293, ed. Funk.

² Lib. II ad Uxorem, c. 9, P. L., t. I, p. 1302.

¹ Comment. in Matth., 14, n. 16, P. G., XIII, 1230.

² De Abraham, lib. I, c. 7, P. L., t. XIV, p. 442.

³ Ep. 19 ad Vigil., n. 7, P. L., XVI, p. 984.

⁴ Haeres. 51, n. 30, P. L., t. XLI, p. 942.

787. 2° From the time of Augustine to the twelfth century, it is more expressly asserted that marriage is a sacrament productive of grace, not indeed in express words, but equivalently. The holy Doctor distinguishes three goods in nuptials, which excuse intercourse from sin: offspring, fidelity, and sacrament: offspring, which is therefore born that it may be reborn through grace; fidelity, by which spouses are joined by a perennial bond; sacrament, "which neither separated nor adulterous spouses lose; let them guard it concordantly and chastely."⁵ But that this sacrament is not an empty sign, but truly efficacious or productive of grace, is clear from these words: "Without doubt the reality of this sacrament is that male and female joined in marriage persevere inseparably as long as they live, nor is it lawful, except for the cause of fornication, that a spouse be separated from a spouse."¹ Now, according to Augustine's manner of speaking, the reality of a sacrament is nothing other than grace; therefore he signifies that through the grace of the sacrament spouses are so helped that, notwithstanding their natural inconstancy, they persevere inseparably united. And thus that which we were saying in the biblical argument is confirmed, namely that the indissolubility of the bond supposes the conferral of grace.

⁵ St. Augustine, De nuptiis et concup., l. I, c. 17, P. L., t. XLIV, p. 424.

¹ Ibid., c. 10, p. 420.

Elsewhere he speaks of the sanctity of this sacrament, which likewise consists in its indissolubility, and under this respect he compares marriage with baptism and order, by which an indelible character is impressed: "Therefore the good of nuptials among all nations and all men consists in the matter of generation, and in the fidelity of chastity; but what pertains to the people of God consists also in the sanctity of the sacrament, through which it is unlawful even for one departing by repudiation to marry another, while her husband lives, not even for the sake of bearing children... In the same way, if an ordination of clergy is made for gathering a people, even if the gathering of the people does not follow, nevertheless the sacrament of ordination remains in those ordained."² From this he concludes that marriage is indissoluble, even if children have not been begotten; in this consists the sanctity, or grace, of the sacrament.

² De bono conjugali, c. 24, P. L., t. XL, p. 394.

788. Almost at the same time, St. Cyril of Alexandria, writing concerning the nuptials of Cana, taught that Christ was present there that He might sanctify the principle of human generation: "When nuptials were being celebrated, chastely indeed and honorably, the mother of the Savior is present, but He Himself also, together with His disciples, came invited; not so much to feast, as that He might work a miracle and moreover sanctify the principle of human generation, that is, as it pertains to the flesh." There indeed it is not asserted that marriage is a sacrament, but only that Christ wished to sanctify the principle of human generation; and surely this could not better be done than by raising marriage to the dignity of a sacrament.

Around the year 458, St. Leo the Great, relying upon the doctrine of Paul, declares that marriage is a sacrament, or a sign of the union of Christ and the Church: "Whence, since the society of nuptials has been so constituted from the beginning that, besides the conjunction of the sexes, it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church (Ephes., V, 32), there is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to marriage, in whom it is taught that there was not the nuptial mystery."³ There indeed nothing is said explicitly concerning grace, but the argument proposed above concerning the text of St. Paul returns.

³ St. Leo, ep. 167 ad Rusticum, n. 4, P. L., t. LIV, p. 1204-1205.

789. The thesis is confirmed from liturgies. For in the most ancient Sacramentaries and Orders or Rituals, whether Latin or Greek, there are to be found ceremonies and prayers for nuptials, from which it is inferred that marriage is a thing divinely instituted, joined with sanctification and grace.

Thus, for example, it is declared "that God is He who connects spouses by legitimate society, and pours forth upon spouses the help of His blessing, so that in the conjugal fellowship they may be joined by mutual sanctity, and the rudiments of the woman may be sanctified"; so, for example, in the Armenian liturgy it is read: "Bless, O Lord, and sanctify the marriage of Thy servants... For Thou hast not prohibited nuptials, but hast sanctified them and blessed them in priestly fashion."¹ - It is confirmed from ancient monuments,² in which the celebration of nuptials is found depicted; for there are shown a man and a woman joining right hands, and between them stands the monogram of Christ, or sometimes Christ Himself crowning the spouses, so that from this it may appear that marriage is a sacred thing; indeed in a Greek coin pertaining to the fifth or sixth century, Christ is shown as joining spouses and imparting grace to them, for this inscription is read: Θεοῦ χάρις (grace of God). Now all these things, which indeed by themselves alone would not suffice to demonstrate the thesis, are nevertheless like traces which show that the Catholic doctrine concerning the elevation of marriage to the dignity of a sacrament was handed down implicitly from antiquity, so that the Church did nothing else, in the definitions of a later age, than to set forth explicitly and distinctly what previously was held obscurely and implicitly.

¹ Gallanus, De Conciliat. eccles. armenae cum roman., t. II, q. 3, § 5. Cf. Martene, De Ant. Eccl. Ritibus, l. 1, c. 9, a. 5 sq.; Goar, Eucholog. Graecorum, De officio coronationis (i.e., of nuptials, in which the bride was crowned), and other authors cited above; Duchesne, Origines du culte chretien, ch. 14.

² Garrucci, Vetri, tab. 26-30; Martigny, Dict. des Antiquites, word Mariage; Perpetuite de la Foi, ed. Migne, t. III, p. 965.

790. 3° From the twelfth century, marriage is counted among the seven sacraments, although among theologians even to the fourteenth century it was disputed whether and how it produces grace. Thus, in the year 1181, Lucius III decreed against the Albigensians that those were to be struck with anathema who think and teach otherwise concerning the sacraments than the Roman Church does; now among the sacraments he counts marriage.³ Likewise, in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, there was read, in the name of the Greeks, the confession of faith of Michael Palaeologus, in which it was declared that there are seven sacraments, among which marriage was counted.⁴

³ Decretal., lib. V, t. 7, c. 9; Denzinger, n. 339.

⁴ Denzinger, n. 388.

Theologians, already from the twelfth century, teach almost unanimously that there are seven sacraments, and they reckon marriage among them. But, because the efficacy of the sacraments had not yet been clearly defined, some doubted whether it conferred grace. Three opinions flourished, according to the testimony of Albert the Great:¹ some said, with Praepositinus and William of Auxerre, that marriage was indeed a sign of grace, but did not produce it; and this seems to have been the opinion of Peter Lombard. Others held that through marriage grace is conferred, but only for avoiding evil. Others finally taught that grace is conferred also in relation to good; Albert adhered to these. - St. Thomas likewise embraced this opinion as the more probable when he explained the book of the Sentences,² and as certain in the Summa theologica.³ Scotus likewise held that grace is conferred upon marriage, although he admits that some think otherwise: "Because the Church commonly holds that the sacrament of marriage is the seventh among the ecclesiastical sacraments... therefore it can be said that God has annexed to the matrimonial contract a sacrament properly so called."⁴ Nevertheless, afterwards Durandus, although he admits that modern theologians commonly teach that grace is conferred upon marriage, asserts that certain canonists think otherwise, and therefore concludes that the matter has not yet been defined by the Church.⁵

¹ In Sentent., IV, 26, 14.

² In Sentent., IV, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3; cf. Supplement, q. 42, a. 3.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2ae, q. 100, a. 2, ad 6.

⁴ In Sentent., IV, 26, q. 1, n. 13.

⁵ In Sentent., IV, 26, q. 3, n. 5-6.

From the time of Durandus, not only theologians, but canonists taught that grace is conferred upon Christian marriage, and indeed as something certain.

Soon the Council of Florence, in the Decree for the Armenians (1445), declared that marriage is one of the seven sacraments, and therefore productive of grace. Therefore, when the Protestants denied this, the Catholic Church, not only Western but Eastern, already publicly professed this truth; Trent therefore deservedly defined it as being of Catholic faith.

This argument can also be proposed by way of prescription, as we noted in De Sacramentis, n. 23.

791. Reason shows how fitting it is that marriage should truly be a sacrament, productive of grace. For by this spouses are deputed to a most noble work and one most useful to society, both civil and spiritual, namely the procreation and education of offspring; they are connected by an indissoluble bond, nor can they fly to other nuptials unless the other spouse has died; but obligations of this kind are so grave that not rarely they require not common but heroic virtue. Moreover, the sacraments were instituted for this end, that they may confer grace in those states of life which are of the greatest moment, and upon which the salvation of souls most depends, especially when from the same there arise onerous duties, which scarcely can be fulfilled without special help. Therefore it was fitting that sacramental grace be annexed to Marriage, by the force of which the procreation and education of children would be sanctified, and Christian spouses would be able to bear more easily the burdens imposed upon them.

792. 1° Marriage, whether ratified or consummated, is in itself an honest and laudable work. It is certain against the Gnostics, Manichaeans, and others cited above.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 41; Drouin, l. IX, q. II; Carriere, p. II, c. II; Billuart, disp. I, a. 2; Palmieri, th. 2; Billot, th. 39.

(A) Scripture. For that is good and laudable which God Himself instituted, Christ confirmed, and the Apostles commended; but thus it is concerning Marriage. (a) God indeed instituted it, both by creating the first parents diverse in sex, and by associating them in a close covenant that they might procreate offspring: "Male and female He created them, and He blessed them and said: Increase and multiply."² Indeed sometimes He commanded the same, by ordering a brother to take the wife of his deceased brother, that he might raise up seed for his brother.³ (b) Christ confirmed it, both by being present at the nuptials of Cana, by raising the matrimonial contract to the dignity of a sacrament, and by recalling the same to its pristine indissolubility.⁴ (c) The Apostles commended the same; thus St. Paul calls marriage honorable;⁵ he says that he who joins his virgin in marriage does well, and he commands spouses to render the debt;⁶ he admonishes younger widows to marry, and reproves the doctrine of those forbidding to marry.⁷

² Gen., I, 27-28; cf. II, 21-24.

³ Deut., XXV, 5.

⁴ John, II, 1 sq.; Matt., XIX, 4 sq.

⁵ Hebr., XIII, 4.

⁶ I Cor., VII, 38; VII, 3.

⁷ I Tim., V, 1-3, 14.

(B) We do not institute a special argument from tradition, since it is acknowledged by all that the Fathers, not only in passing, but expressly, in their works, defended the honesty of marriage. Let Tertullian against the Marcionites, Clement of Alexandria, l. III Stromata, St. Jerome in the books against Jovinian, St. Augustine De Bono conjugali, De Nuptiis, etc., be approached, if time is present.

793. (C) Theological reason. That indeed is good and laudable which is necessary for the propagation of the human species, is in itself a noble work, and moreover can be honored by a good end; but marriage (a) in the present order of things, insofar as it has been constituted by God Himself, is necessary for the conservation and propagation of the human species; (b) it is in itself a noble work, since spouses, by giving themselves to the marital matter, together with God procreate a human body, into which a rational soul is infused: which work is akin to creation itself; (c) finally it can be honored by a good end, for example by the virtue of religion, that offspring may be procreated for the worship of God, by love of country, that citizens may be generated who may be a guard for the State, by the motive of justice, that the debt may be rendered, or it can also be intended as a remedy of concupiscence. It is indeed true that the use of marriage is often not without some lust; but this is accidental, and moreover such pleasure is not evil unless it so dominates that it excludes the other honorable ends: and this indeed must be turned as a vice not to marriage itself but to those who abuse it.¹

¹ Tertullian (ad Uxorem, II, 9, P. L., t. I, p. 1302) thus splendidly describes the sanctity and happiness of Christian spouses: "Both are brothers, both fellow-servants, no distinction of spirit or flesh. And truly two in one flesh; where there is one flesh, there is one spirit. Together they pray, together they prostrate themselves, and together they pass through fasts, teaching each other, exhorting each other, sustaining each other. Each is alike in the Church of God, alike at the banquet of God, alike in straits, in persecutions, in refreshments; neither hides from the other, neither avoids the other, neither is burdensome to the other; the sick are freely visited, the needy are supported; alms without torment, sacrifices without scruple, daily diligence without impediment; no furtive signing, no trembling congratulation, no mute blessing; psalms and hymns sound between the two, and they mutually challenge one another who may better sing to his God. Seeing and hearing such things, Christ rejoices, sends His peace to these; where the two are, there He also is; where He also is, there also the evil one is not."

794. 2° The state of virginity or celibacy, undertaken for God, is more excellent than the matrimonial state. It is of faith from Trent:² "If anyone shall say that the conjugal state is to be preferred to the state of virginity or celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or celibacy than to be joined in marriage, let him be anathema."

² Sess. XXIV, can. 10.

This proposition is directed against Jovinian (fourth century), and the Innovators who contended that nuptials are either to be equated with virginity or even preferred to it. That the proposition may be rightly understood, it must be noted that the comparison is instituted between the state of virginity and the conjugal state, not between persons who are found in either state: for there can be married persons who are more perfect than some virgins. Besides, the celibacy concerning which there is question is not only lack of the conjugal bond, which is sometimes combined with a disgraceful life, but celibacy undertaken for God, by which a life exempt from the pleasures of the flesh is led.

(A) Scripture. (a) When Christ had explained to the Apostles the various burdens of marriage arising from its indissolubility, they exclaimed: "If the case of a man with his wife is so, it is not expedient to marry"; but seizing this occasion, the Savior asserts that certain ones cultivate virginity on account of God, and yet that not all grasp a word of this kind, because of its sublimity: "And there are eunuchs who have castrated themselves for the kingdom of heaven: he who can grasp it, let him grasp it."² Moreover, these things imply that the state of virginity is more excellent than the conjugal state: for thus, according to Jerome,³ the words of Christ can be understood: "Those eunuchs are pleasing to Me whom not necessity, but the will, has castrated: freely do I receive into My bosom those who have abstained from nuptials on account of the kingdom of heaven, and for My worship have refused to be what they were born... It is of great faith and of great virtue to be the most pure temple of God, to offer oneself wholly as a holocaust to the Lord, and, according to the Apostle, to be holy in body and spirit."

² Matt., XIX, 9-12.

³ Contra Jovin., l. I, c. 7, n. 12, P. L., t. XXIII, p. 228.

(b) The Apostle teaches the same more expressly;⁴ for although there he writes honorably concerning marriage, he proposes virginity, as something better, by way of counsel: "It is good for a man not to touch a woman (1)... for I wish all of you to be as myself (7)... but I say to the unmarried and to widows: it is good for them if they so remain, as also I (i.e., without a wife) (8)... He who is without a wife is solicitous for the things that are the Lord's, how he may please God; but he who is with a wife is solicitous for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife, and he is divided (32)... Therefore both he who joins his virgin in marriage does well; and he who does not join her does better" (38). These things are so clear that Protestants strive to twist them, asserting that the Apostle there speaks only hypothetically, namely thinking that the second advent of the Lord was already near (29); but in vain, for the reason alleged, namely that he who is without a wife is solicitous for those things which are the Lord's, remains true in all places and times, and luminously demonstrates that the state of virginity is more apt for the service of God.

⁴ I Cor., VII, 1-40.

This also is the open doctrine of the Fathers, as is to be seen from their works: cf. St. Cyprian, de habitu Virginum; St. Ambrose, de Virginibus; St. Jerome, contra Jovinianum; St. Augustine, de sancta virginitate, etc.

795. (B) Theological reason. For that state is more excellent than the conjugal state in which the divine good is preferred to the human good, and the good of the soul to the good of the body; but virginity is ordered to the good of God, for whose love the pleasures of the flesh, even lawful ones, are freely despised; and to the good of the soul, since it disposes it to the contemplative life, to prayer, and to the consideration of those things which are God's;¹ while marriage is ordered to the good of the body, which is the multiplication of the human race, and pertains to the active life, by which a man and woman living in marriage necessarily have to think of the things which are of the world. Hence Christ chose a virgin mother, Himself perpetually cultivated virginity, loved a virgin disciple before the rest, and to him alone, dying on the cross, commended His virgin mother, manifestly showing by His example that the virginal state is of greater price than the conjugal state.²

¹ Hence St. Thomas (Opusc. de perfect. vitae spiritualis) teaches that especially those who tend to perfection ought to abstain from marriage, "because through this man is most entangled in secular cares" and is most ensnared by conjugal affection.

² St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 152, a. 4.

796. Nor should it be said that marriage is a sacrament, and therefore more excellent than virginity, which does not have the notion of a sacrament. For here we compare the state of virginity with the conjugal state, not with the sacrament of Marriage; moreover, although the sacrament of Marriage confers graces ex opere operato, it does not follow from this that it is better than virginity: for graces of this kind are given because of the dangers and burdens of marriage, which are absent in the virginal state; besides, in place of the graces which spouses receive by the sacrament of Marriage, virgins are able to obtain much greater ones on account of the fervent acts of love and devotion which, by the Apostle's testimony, they elicit far more easily than the married.

Nor should it be said that celibacy contains itself within the limits of a private good, and therefore is less useful than the matrimonial state. For it contributes much to the common good of society, both by way of example, by teaching how unbridled passions are restrained, from which the sanctity of marriage is imperiled; and by making a continent man most apt for exercising works of charity, namely the care of the poor, orphans, and the sick, or the education of little ones, etc.; and also by recalling to memory that heavenly fatherland, where they neither marry nor are given in marriage.

Nor should it be said, with many Protestants, that continence is morally impossible, and therefore that those who vow virginity fall into the snare of the devil; for to preserve continence for a long time is indeed very difficult, indeed morally impossible for those who reject the means proposed by Christ, but not for those who flee dangerous occasions, give themselves to mortification of the flesh, study or labor, and at the same time are assiduously devoted to prayer, and frequently receive the sacraments, especially the Eucharist; for by these means concupiscence is efficaciously restrained. This the Protestant Leibnitz candidly acknowledged:¹ "Let clerics and religious be firmly persuaded that, for preserving continence, there is scarcely need of any other thing than to avoid idleness and dangerous occasions, and to have a firm will, the grace of which God does not deny to one asking it with fervent zeal." In reality, among the Protestants themselves, are there not widowers and widows and unmarried virgins, upon whom the obligation of preserving continence for a long time lies? Is it permissible to presume that all these are given over to vice? If it is not permissible, why are Catholic priests or others who vow virginity for God accused as though guilty of incontinence?

¹ Systema theolog., n. 66. This had already been observed by St. Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 31; Sts. Chrysostom and Jerome on chapter XIX of Matthew; St. Augustine, l. VI Confess., cap. XI; cf. M. Rosset, op. cit., t. I, n. 398 sq.

We shall set forth: 1° that the nature of the sacrament consists essentially in the contract itself; 2° who are the ministers; 3° what are the matter and form of this sacrament.

797. State of the question. Christ could have instituted the sacrament of marriage in a twofold way: either by adding to the natural contract some external sign productive of grace, for example a priestly blessing, or by raising the matrimonial contract itself to the dignity of a sacrament. Now, in the seventeenth century, Marcus Antonius de Dominis², Bishop of Spalato, afterwards a heretic, and J. Launoy³, and also in our times J. Nuytz, professor of Turin, taught that the sacrament so supervenes upon the contract of marriage already constituted that it can be separated from it, and therefore that diriment impediments can be established by princes, since the contract of marriage is by its nature civil. Politicians willingly embraced this doctrine, that they might thus more easily be able to make laws concerning marriage.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 2; Bellarmine, de Matrim., c. 7-8; Billuart, diss. I, a. 5; Carriere, p. I, sect. 3, c. I, a. 1; Perrone, sect. I, c. 6; Palmieri, th. 10; Pesch, n. 718 sq.; Billot, th. 37.

² De Republ. christiana, l. III and V, c. 2.

³ De regia in matrim. potestate, t. I, p. 2, c. 4.

Certain Catholics, as M. Cano,⁴ thought indeed that the contract is the matter of the sacrament, but that the priestly blessing is the form, so that if the blessing is omitted, marriage exists as a contract, but not as a sacrament. A few others, after Vasquez,⁵ indeed acknowledged that the contract is the whole and integral sacrament, but held that contracting parties could by their own intention effect that a natural contract exist without the sacrament.

⁴ De Locis theolog., l. VIII, c. 5.

⁵ De Sacram., disp. 138, c. 5, n. 63-64.

But the Catholic doctrine is that the matrimonial contract itself has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, so that among the baptized there cannot be given a contract of marriage unless at one and the same time it is a sacrament.

798. Thesis: "Among the baptized a valid matrimonial contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament" (can. 1012, § 2). It is certain.

It is said among Christians; for Infidels can contract valid marriages, which have the notion of a contract, but not of a sacrament.

(A) By Scripture it is not indeed demonstrated but suggested; for from the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians praised above, with the interpretation of the Fathers added, that very marriage was raised to the dignity of a sacrament which God had instituted from the beginning; but what God had instituted from the beginning is nothing other than the matrimonial contract itself; therefore the contract itself, and not some other accessory rite, was truly raised to the dignity of a sacrament. - In reality, no rite, no prayer, no matter or form is determined in Scripture, besides the matrimonial contract itself; therefore every marriage legitimately celebrated among Christians is a sacrament; and conversely, if the sacrament is not present, neither will there be a true matrimonial contract.

799. (B) Tradition. (a) The Fathers indeed did not directly examine this question, but they so spoke of Christian marriage that from this it can be drawn out that the contract itself was raised to the dignity of a sacrament. All the Scholastics who flourished before the sixteenth century declared this more openly, teaching, after St. Thomas,¹ that the words by which consent or the matrimonial contract is expressed are the form of the sacrament, or, after St. Bonaventure,² that the sacrament of Marriage has legitimate persons for matter, and consent for form: and this indeed implies that consent, or the matrimonial contract, pertains to the essence of the sacrament, and cannot be torn away from it.

¹ Supplement, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1.

² In IV, dist. 28, a. 1, q. 5.

(b) The same is also inferred from various documents of the Church. First, the Decree for the Armenians has these words:³ "The efficient cause of marriage regularly is mutual consent expressed by words concerning the present." Hence thus: here certainly there is question of Matrimony as sacrament, since the Decree is an instruction concerning the sacraments; but the efficient cause, and therefore the essence, of this sacrament is declared to be mutual consent, or the matrimonial contract; therefore the contract cannot be separated from the sacrament. The same can be drawn from Trent: for it teaches⁴ that clandestine marriages were ratified and true marriages as long as the Church did not make the same null: and this indeed implies that they were a true sacrament, for, according to Innocent III,¹ marriage "exists true and ratified, because the sacrament of faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost, but renders ratified the sacrament of marriage." But in clandestine marriages nothing is found except the matrimonial contract; therefore such a contract truly constitutes the sacrament, and cannot be separated from it.

³ Denzing., n. 597.

⁴ Sess. XXIV, de Reformat., c. 1.

¹ Decretal., l. IV, tit. 19, c. 7, ap. Denzing., n. 351.

(c) Finally the matter has been placed beyond every doubt by the express declarations of Pius IX and Leo XIII.

The former, in an Allocution held to the Cardinals (September 27, 1852), reproving the law by which marriage was held only as a civil contract, gives this reason for the aforesaid condemnation: "Since no one from among Catholics is ignorant or can be ignorant that Matrimony is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law instituted by Christ the Lord, and therefore that among the faithful there cannot be a marriage which at one and the same time is not a sacrament; and for that reason any other conjunction whatever between a Christian man and woman, made even by the force of any civil law whatever, is nothing other than a base and deadly concubinage so greatly condemned by the Church; and therefore that the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal covenant; and that it altogether pertains to the power of the Church to decree all those things which can in any way pertain to the same marriage." But the latter, in the Encyclical Arcanum (February 10, 1880), where he splendidly sets forth the Catholic doctrine concerning Christian marriage, has these words: "Nor should anyone be moved by that distinction so greatly proclaimed by the Regalists, by the force of which they disjoin the nuptial contract from the sacrament... For a distinction of this kind, or rather a tearing apart, cannot be proved; since it has been ascertained that in Christian marriage the contract is not dissociable from the sacrament; and therefore that a true and legitimate contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament. For Christ the Lord increased marriage by the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, provided only that it is made by law... And so it appears that every just marriage among Christians is in itself and through itself a sacrament: and that nothing is more abhorrent from truth than that the sacrament is some added ornament, or an extrinsically appended property, which can be separated and severed from the contract at the discretion of men."

The Code, can. 1012, thus condenses this doctrine: "Christ the Lord raised the matrimonial contract itself among the baptized to the dignity of a sacrament. Wherefore among the baptized a valid matrimonial contract cannot subsist unless it is by that very fact a sacrament."

800. Corollary. Hence, even if the baptized contracting parties are entirely ignorant that the matrimonial contract is a sacrament, they nevertheless effect the sacrament by the very fact that they intend to contract maritally. But if, well instructed, on account of their impiety they should be unwilling to make a sacrament, a distinction must be made: if their predominant intention is to enter marriage, they effect the contract and the sacrament together; but if their intention is so depraved that they prefer to choose concubinage rather than the sacrament of Marriage, their union is concubinary, not marital.

801. Melchior Cano seems to have been the first who taught that not the contracting parties themselves, but the Priest who joins them in marriage, are the ministers of the sacrament;² many theologians embraced his opinion, among whom are Sylvius, Drouin, Tournely, and others: but today the ancient opinion, which had flourished for so many centuries, is altogether certain from the practice and declarations of the Church.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 45, a. 5; q. 46, a. 2; Bellarmine, c. 6; Drouin, lib. X, q. II; Billuart, diss. I, a. 6; Carriere, pars I, sect. 2, c. 2; Perrone, sect. I, c. 2; de Augustinis, a. 3; Palmieri, th. XI.

² De Loc. theolog., l. VIII, c. 5. Melchior Cano attributes his opinion to William of Paris, Peter Paludanus, indeed to St. Thomas, but undeservedly, as Perrone shows at length, l. c., p. 48 sq.

802. Thesis: The ministers of the sacrament of Matrimony are the contracting parties themselves, and not the Priest blessing the nuptials. It is certain.

(A) From ancient Rituals. For as Martene,³ a man very well versed in ancient rites, rightly observes, in this way marriage was formerly celebrated: the spouses stood before the priest at the doors of the church; then, right hands having been mutually given, they furnished consent, "in which the ancients placed the whole essence of the sacrament of marriage. For among them those words of the pastor, I join you, were unheard of, in which some of the more recent Scholastics constitute the form of this sacrament." In reality these words are lacking in most ancient Rituals. Now if the essence of the sacrament of marriage consists in the sole consent of the spouses, not in the blessing of the priest, the contracting parties themselves, who furnish the consent, administer the sacrament to themselves.

³ De Antiquis Eccl. Rit., p. II, c. 9, a. 1.

(B) By the authority of theologians. The old Scholastics declared this openly; thus St. Thomas writes:¹ "Consent expressed by words concerning the present, between persons legitimate for contracting, makes marriage, because these two are of the essence of the sacrament; but all other things are of the solemnity of the sacrament, because they are employed for this, that marriage may be made more fittingly." In the same place (ad 2) he adds: "And therefore the blessing of the Priest is not required in marriage, as though of the essence of the sacrament." Now it certainly would be required, if the Priest were the minister of marriage. St. Bonaventure² and other theologians even to the sixteenth century taught the same. Now it is impossible that the teaching Church should have erred in so grave a matter through many centuries. Therefore.

¹ Supplement, q. 45, a. 5.

² In IV Sent., dist. 28, q. 5.

(C) By the practice and declarations of the Church. (a) Trent declared that clandestine marriages, contracted without the presence of a Priest, were ratified and true, as long as the Church did not make them null.³ But from ecclesiastical usage of speaking a ratified marriage is the same as the sacrament of marriage; for Innocent III says (l. c.): "Although a true marriage exists among infidels, nevertheless it is not ratified; but among the faithful it exists true and ratified: because the sacrament of faith, which once has been admitted, is never lost, but renders ratified the sacrament of marriage, so that it may endure in spouses while that endures." Therefore, according to Trent, marriages celebrated without the presence and blessing of a priest can be ratified, that is, a true sacrament. Therefore priests are not the ministers of this sacrament, but the contracting parties are.

³ "Although it is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages, made by the free consent of the contracting parties, are ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church did not make them null; and therefore those are deservedly to be condemned, as the holy Synod condemns them with anathema, who deny that they are true and ratified..." (Sess. XXIV, de Ref. Matrim., c. 1.)

(b) Moreover, when the doubt had been proposed whether marriages performed at the time of the Gallican disturbance, without the presence of a Priest, were to be revalidated by the blessing of a Priest, the Congregation deputed for the affairs of the Gallican Church answered (April 22, 1792) "that the faithful are to be exhorted that, when they can have the supply of a Priest, they ask a blessing from him, who nevertheless will declare to them that a blessing of this kind pertains least of all to validity."

(c) This thesis is altogether confirmed from can. 1098, according to which in some cases it is lawful to contract without the presence of a priest.

(D) Theological reason. From what was said in the preceding thesis, the matrimonial contract is inseparable from the sacrament itself, and therefore those truly effect the sacrament who at the same time perfect the contract; but the contracting parties themselves, not the Priest, perfect the matrimonial contract, as is clear; therefore the contracting parties themselves effect the sacrament, or in other words are the ministers of the sacrament.

803. (E) Principles for solving difficulties. Since it would be too tedious to refute one by one the various arguments brought forward by adversaries, let it suffice to set forth some principles, from which they can be solved.

(a) Arguments taken a pari from other sacraments have little or no force, since each sacrament has its own proper matter and also its own ministers. Therefore adversaries say in vain that regularly priests alone are the ministers of the sacraments, and therefore of marriage; for the parity is denied, since marriage is a contract and follows the laws of a contract; but besides, is not baptism, ministered by a layman, valid? Why therefore would marriage, ministered by laymen, be invalid?

(b) The minister of the sacrament is one thing and the minister of solemnity another; therefore, if in ecclesiastical documents there is question of the Priest as minister of marriage, it must be determined from the context whether the question is about the minister effecting, or only sanctioning, the sacrament by a special blessing.

(c) Marriages celebrated without the presence of a Priest were called illicit, or sometimes illegitimate, because they were contracted against the laws of the Church; but from this it least of all follows that the same were invalid. Again, some attribute sacramental power to the priestly blessing, but, when the context is inspected, the sense is that a blessing of this kind is a certain sacramental. Sometimes it is asserted that marriage, without that blessing, is not a sacrament of the true name, because the contracting parties, violating the law of the Church, were not receiving the grace of the sacrament. By the help of these principles, the principal difficulties can be solved: but if any authorities remain against our thesis, they cannot weaken the force of the decisions of the Church.

804. All theologians hold that the matter of the sacrament of Matrimony is the contract itself. But some, with Melchior Cano, thought that the form was to be placed in the blessing of the Priest: and this opinion indeed remains refuted from the things already said. Therefore the common and certain doctrine is that the matter and form of the sacrament are situated in the matrimonial contract itself. But this is explained in diverse ways.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 45, a. 5; Bellarmine, c. 6; Drouin, l. X, q. 3; Billuart, diss. I, a. 7; Carriere, p. I, sect. 2, c. 3; de Augustinis, a. 4; Billot, th. 37, corollary I, p. 344.

(A) Certain ones, with Navarrus, said that internal consent is the matter, but that the form consists in the external signs which express the consent; which cannot be admitted, for the matter ought to be in some way sensible, independently from the form; but merely internal consent is in no way sensible.

(B) Others held, with Vasquez, that the bodies of the contracting parties, or dominion over them, are the matter, but that the form is constituted by the words signifying consent. We indeed admit that dominion over the bodies is the remote matter, about which the sacrament is concerned, but we deny that it is the proximate matter; for such dominion in no way signifies grace, but the proximate matter of a sacrament ought in some way to signify the grace produced by it.

(C) Therefore the common opinion is that the remote matter is the right over bodies in order to conjugal acts, that the proximate matter is consent, insofar as it expresses the reciprocal handing over of bodies, and that the form is the same consent, insofar as it signifies their mutual acceptance. (a) Benedict XIV first declared this:² "The legitimate contract is at once both the matter and the form of the sacrament of Matrimony; namely, the mutual and legitimate handing over of bodies, by words and nods expressing the interior assent, is the matter, and the likewise mutual and legitimate acceptance of bodies is the form." (b) It is confirmed by reason: for that which is determinable holds itself in the manner of matter, and that which is determining in the manner of form; but the mutual handing over of bodies is something only determinable, since it is only the beginning of the contract, and remains in suspense until acceptance comes; but the acceptance of bodies is something determining, since it completes the contract and renders it efficacious; therefore.

² Brief to the Archbishop of Goa, March 19, 1758.

It is indeed objected that the matrimonial contract is not the matter and form of this sacrament, because it least of all signifies grace. But undeservedly; for a contract of this kind signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which is, as it were, the font and cause of the grace proper to this sacrament, and therefore the grace itself by which the spouses themselves are sanctified; but besides, that consent also directly represents that spiritual union of souls which is one of the principal graces annexed to this sacrament.

805. From the three theses set forth above, certain corollaries can now be drawn.

(A) Marriage is a contract sui generis, bearing special characteristics before itself; namely it is: (a) natural, insofar as it is founded on the natural inclination of men, and is ordered to the good of nature, namely the propagation and education of the human race; but it far excels other contracts, both because it was instituted by God, and because it is concerned not with material things, but with the very persons contracting and their affections, and because it cannot be dissolved by the consent of the contracting parties but of its own nature is indissoluble, as was shown above; (b) sacred and sacramental, since it signifies the union of Christ with the Church and has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament; (c) ecclesiastical, insofar as it is ordered to the good of the Church and is governed by many laws of the Church; (d) civil, as tending to the good of the republic, and in some accessory matters subject to the civil power.

806. (B) Marriage among Infidels is not a sacrament, since Baptism is the door of all the sacraments, so that none can be validly received by the non-baptized. Nevertheless their marriages are valid as natural contracts: "Although a true marriage exists among infidels, nevertheless it is not ratified," says Innocent III (l. c.). But heretics who have been validly baptized, and contract legitimately, validly receive the sacrament of Matrimony, even if they are ignorant of or deny the existence of this sacrament. For provided that they have the general intention of marrying according to the laws instituted by Christ, they validly effect the natural contract of Matrimony, and, since among the baptized this cannot be separated from the sacrament, they truly receive also the sacrament.

807. On the occasion of this matter two questions are discussed among theologians: (a) The former is whether a marriage contracted by non-baptized persons becomes a sacrament, if each spouse is afterwards baptized. Some deny this, among whom are Vasquez, the Salmanticenses, Carriere¹, etc., because matrimonial consent already validly given cannot be renewed: for a thing once given cannot validly be given anew, since it is no longer under the power of the giver. But others more commonly and more probably affirm this with Sanchez, Bellarmine, Perrone, and others;² for although a new contract is not posited simply, nevertheless there is effected a new contract morally distinct from the former, since converted infidels consent that the marriage previously contracted become indissoluble and represent the union of Christ with the Church; therefore nothing prevents the consent thus renewed, explicitly or implicitly, from being the matter and form of the sacrament and conferring grace. Indeed a renewal of the contract is not required, but the prior consent given in infidelity suffices. For the sole reason why this contract was not at the same time a sacrament is that the Christian character was lacking to the contracting parties; therefore, as soon as they receive the baptismal character, the obstacle is removed, and nothing prevents the contract from being at the same time a sacrament. This moreover is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle; for in the epistle where he treats of the sacrament of Matrimony, he addresses the Ephesians, recently converted, of whom very many had contracted marriage before receiving Baptism, and nevertheless supposes that these same persons have been sanctified by the sacrament of Matrimony.

¹ Salmanticenses, c. 3, n. 82; Collet, c. II, n. 278; Carriere, n. 150.

² Sanchez, l. II, disp. IX, n. 5; Wirceburgenses, n. 285; Benedict XIV, De Synodo dioeces., l. VIII, c. 13, n. 8; de Augustinis, a. 5.

808. (b) The latter question is whether the marriage of a faithful person with an infidel is a sacrament. It is of course supposed that such a marriage has been permitted by the Church: otherwise it would be invalid. But, this being posited, many deny it, as Sanchez, Billuart, the Theologians of Wurzburg,³ because marriage is a contract, and just as for one contract there are required essentially two persons able to contract, so for a sacrament there are required two persons able to furnish sacramental consent; but in the case of which there is question, only one of the contracting parties is able for the sacrament. - But others, and indeed more probably in our judgment, affirm that a marriage of this kind is a sacrament in the faithful party; thus the Salmanticenses, Tournely, Perrone¹, etc. For the faithful person who, by dispensation of the Church, enters marriage with an infidel effects a true matrimonial contract, and moreover he or she is capable of grace; but every matrimonial contract effected by a baptized person has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament; therefore in the present case the contract is truly a sacrament. Nor should it be said that a sacrament cannot limp, or be valid in one party but invalid in the other; for this is asserted wholly gratuitously, and, although we admit that the matter depends on the will of God, nevertheless of itself nothing prevents one and the same sacrament from being valid in one who labors under no impediment, but invalid in the other who is incapable of the sacrament; in reality absolution given to two persons at once can be valid for the one who is rightly disposed, but invalid for the one who lacks contrition. It can also be added that it would have been very harsh for Christian women, who in the earlier centuries had to marry pagans, to be deprived of sacramental grace so necessary to them.

³ Sanchez, l. II, disp. VIII, n. 2; Billuart, d. I, a. 5, pet. 7; Wirceburgenses, n. 288.

¹ Salmanticenses, cap. XII, n. 82; Tournely, q. II, a. 2, ed. Veneta 1739, p. 45.

809. Since Matrimony is one of the sacraments of the New Law, it produces habitual grace ex opere operato, as was expressly defined by Trent:³ "If anyone shall say that Matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord... and that it does not confer grace, let him be anathema."

² Drouin, l. X, q. 4; L. Habert, Theol. dogm. et moralis, de matrim., c. 5; Carriere, n. 58 sq.; Bonal, n. 84.

³ Sess. XXIV, can. 1.

But the grace which it confers is not first grace but second, since, by the testimony of Trent, it was instituted not for remitting sins, but for sanctifying spouses. Again the grace proper to this sacrament consists in the right to receive, at the opportune time, actual graces necessary for Christian spouses to fulfill their duties rightly: 1° for the Christian procreation and education of offspring; 2° for mutual love and fellowship of life; 3° for restraining concupiscence.

810. 1° For the Christian procreation and education of offspring; for this is the principal end of marriage: for just as Christ was joined to the Church for no other end than that, from this divine marriage, adoptive children of God might be born, so spouses ought to be united that they may generate and holily educate children, who may be useful not only to the earthly fatherland, but also the best citizens of the Church and candidates of the heavenly kingdom. Moreover, for this there is required a special grace, which is conferred through the sacrament of marriage: for men, vitiated by original sin, naturally seek their own pleasure rather than the good of offspring; but, with the help of sacramental grace, they raise their minds higher, and with pious Tobias are able to say: "And now, O Lord, Thou knowest that I take my sister as wife not for the cause of lust, but solely for love of posterity, in which Thy name may be blessed unto ages of ages."¹ Nor is less grace required for educating children holily; for, as Leo XIII says (Encycl. Arcanum): In protecting children and especially forming them to virtue, all the cares and thoughts of parents must be vigilant: Fathers, educate them in the discipline and correction of the Lord.² From this it is understood that the duties of spouses are not few nor light; yet for good spouses, on account of the virtue which is received in the sacrament, they become not only tolerable, but even pleasant.

¹ Tob., VIII, 9.

² Ephes., VI, 4.

811. 2° For fostering chaste love; for often nuptials are disturbed by the discord of spouses, when each follows his or her own inclinations: the man, by abusing his power, regards the wife not as a help like himself, but rather as a servant whom he treats badly; the wife in her turn despises the husband and refuses to be subject to him; from this there arise innumerable quarrels, which overturn the peace of the family and render life miserable to each spouse. But the sacrament of Matrimony meets this evil, by the force of which the man loves his wife as Christ loves the Church, and the wife is subject to the man as the Church to Christ, and both more cheerfully bear mutual infirmities and pardon each other mutually: "They themselves, namely," says Leo XIII (l. cit.), "must always be so disposed in soul that they understand that each owes to the other the greatest love, constant fidelity, and careful and assiduous protection. The man is the prince of the family and the head of the woman; yet she, because she is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones, is to be subject and obedient to the man, not in the manner of a slave, but of a companion; so that, namely, neither honor nor dignity be absent from the obedience furnished. But in him who presides, and in her who obeys, since each bears the image, the one of Christ, the other of the Church, let divine charity be perpetually the moderator of duty." Moreover, sacramental grace works all these things in those who are rightly disposed.

812. 3° For moderating concupiscence; for those who loosen the reins to the propensities of corrupted nature defile the nuptial bed with every uncleanness, and, not content with one wife, are inclined to many, and, if polygamy is prohibited, have recourse to divorce, and indulge every kind of lust, as is reported of the pagans. But the grace of the sacrament remedies this vice; helped by it, Christian spouses are able to restrain the headlong impulses of lust and to use their rights chastely, not so much from desire for pleasure as for offspring; by the same grace it comes about that they perpetually adhere to each other in such a way that neither fosters adulterous loves: for as "Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself up for her that He might sanctify her,"¹ so the Christian man pursues his wife with chaste love, and the wife her husband, so that from that mutual love they become more holy.

¹ Ephes., V, 25-26.

Nevertheless, that the sacrament of Matrimony may work the aforesaid effects, it must be received with a right intention and in the state of grace. Therefore pastors, both privately and publicly, should exhort adolescents not to approach the sacrament without fitting dispositions, from which they are able to receive such great fruits, so necessary for the whole course of life.

813. Since the contract of marriage has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, by that very fact it is subject to the power of the Church.

¹ St. Thomas, Quodlibet., V, a. 15; Bellarmine, c. 32; Sanchez, l. VII, disp. III; Drouin, l. IX, q. VI, c. 1; Billuart, diss. VI, a. 23; Carriere, p. III, sect. II, c. 2, n. 520 sq., with the emendations inserted in the sixth edition of the Compendium, n. 130 sq.; Perrone, l. II; Palmieri, th. 28 sq.; de Angelis, Praelect. juris can., tom. III, p. I, p. 24 sq.; Cavagnis, Institut. juris publ., 3rd ed., l. V, n. 184 sq.; Billot, th. 47-48; Paoli, Etude sur les origines et la nature du mariage civil, Paris, 1890; R. Lemaire, Le Mariage civil, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904.

Nevertheless, not only the Innovators, who held that marriage is not a sacrament, denied this authority of the Church, but also M. A. de Dominis, Launoy, not a few Regalists, and also the Jansenists who were present at the Synod of Pistoia (1786): these indeed were not ashamed to teach that the power of making laws concerning Christian marriage, especially for annulling marriages, belongs to secular princes alone, and not to the Church, except perhaps from the indulgence of princes. Moreover, not a few Catholic authors, especially in France, thought that the power of establishing diriment impediments belonged not only to the Church, but also to princes, because marriage is a contract both civil and ecclesiastical. Yet today this opinion cannot be admitted, after repeated declarations of the Holy See. What the Church and what the civil power can decree concerning marriage, the following propositions will declare.

814. First thesis: The Church has the power of establishing by her own right impediments diriment of marriage, and of judging matrimonial causes which regard the bond of marriage. It is of faith from Trent:² "If anyone shall say that the Church could not constitute impediments diriment of marriage, or erred in constituting them, let him be anathema. - If anyone shall say that matrimonial causes do not pertain to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema" (sess. XXIV, can. 4, 12). Now canons of this kind are dogmatic, whatever a few may have said to the contrary; for here there is question of a matter not disciplinary, but pertaining to faith, namely of the very power of the Church and of her infallibility in the exercise of this right. Besides, that this power is in the Church by her own right, and not by concession of Princes, is gathered from the condemnation of the proposition of the Synod of Pistoia, in which the opposite error was defended: for such a proposition was reproved as contrary to Trent and proceeding from a heretical principle.¹

² Trent, sess. XXIV, can. 4, 12.

¹ Ap. Denzing., n. 1422-23.

815. (A) By the practice of the Church. Christ Himself had established the law of indissolubility, contrary to Roman law; Paul had promulgated the privilege of faith, above, n. 730. Adhering to their footsteps, the Church established various statutes concerning marriage; especially by her own right she established diriment impediments, and, when the occasion was given, judged concerning matrimonial causes as to the bond itself. (a) First, the law of the Church is most ancient by the force of which marriages of virgins who had solemnly vowed their virginity to God were held not only illicit but also invalid; thus, for example, Gelasius I writes:² "But we have known that certain men rashly join themselves to sacred virgins, and after the purpose dedicated to God mingle incestuous covenants and sacrilegious ones"; now incestuous covenants surely cannot be called a valid marriage. Moreover, a law of this kind was taken from no civil Code; therefore it was enacted by the Church herself by her own right. (b) Likewise the Council of Neocaesarea (314), can. 2, establishes:³ "If a woman has married two brothers, let her be cast out until death. But at death, on account of humanity, if she shall have said that, if she recovers, she will dissolve the marriage, she will have penance"; by which words it is supposed that the marriage of which there is question was held as null. Now this impediment was not borrowed from civil law, since this latter established the same thing only in the year 355.⁴ (c) The Synod of Macon (585), can. 16, declared that marriages contracted by widows of clerics were null: "let the wife of a subdeacon, exorcist, or acolyte, when he has died, not dare to join herself to a second marriage"; which is found in no civil law. (d) Finally, at Trent, the Orators of the King of the Gauls asked that clandestine marriages, and marriages contracted without the consent of parents, be declared null: the former was granted, but the latter denied; this indeed clearly proves that the authority of the Church in establishing impediments was fully acknowledged, and indeed independent from the right of princes.

² Ep. ad Episcopos Lucaniae, c. 20, P. L., t. LIX, p. 54.

³ Ap. Bruns, t. I, p. 71.

⁴ Cod. Theod., l. III, tit. 12, Etsi licitum.

Leo XIII (Arcanum) briefly gathers this argument thus: "The Church exercised power over the marriages of Christians in every time and place, and exercised it in such a way that it appeared that the power was her own, not sought by the consent of men, but divinely obtained by the will of her Author... No one is ignorant how many things concerning the impediments of bond, vow, disparity of worship, consanguinity, crime, public honesty, were constituted by the prelates of the Church in the Councils of Elvira, Arles, Chalcedon, the Second of Milevis, and others,¹ which often differed greatly from decrees sanctioned by imperial law. Nay, it was so far from the case that ruling men arrogated to themselves power over Christian marriages, that rather they acknowledged and declared that this power, as great as it is, is in the possession of the Church. In reality Honorius, Theodosius the younger, Justinian (Novel 137) did not hesitate to admit that, in those matters which touch nuptials, no more was lawful to them than to be guardians and defenders of the sacred canons."

¹ D'Aguirre, Conc. Hisp., tom. I, can. 13, 15-17; Harduin, Act. Concil., tom. I, can. 11, 16-17.

Deservedly therefore the Code, c. 1016: "The marriage of the baptized is ruled not only by divine law, but also by canonical law, saving the competence of the civil power concerning merely civil effects..."

816. (B) Theological reason. Marriage, celebrated among Christians, is a sacrament, and, from what has been said, the contract is so closely connected with the sacrament that one cannot exist without the other; but a sacrament is something altogether sacred, which transcends the power of civil authority and is subject to the power of the Church alone. Nor should adversaries say that marriage is a natural contract and as such subject to civil authority; for Christ, by elevating this contract to the dignity of a sacrament, rendered it sacred and withdrew it from civil authority, since this latter has no power concerning sacred things. "Therefore since marriage is sacred by its own force, by its own nature, of its own accord, it is fitting that it be ruled and moderated not by the command of princes, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone has the magisterium of sacred things" (Leo XIII, l. c.).

817. Second thesis: The civil power cannot establish laws regarding the bond of marriage, but only concerning the temporal and separable effects of the contract. It is certain. To understand this, it is helpful to note that the temporal effects of marriage are of two kinds, some inseparable from the contract itself, for example the mutual rights and duties of spouses as to bed and habitation, and the legitimacy of offspring; but others separable from the very substance of the contract, for example dowry, donations on account of nuptials, hereditary succession, etc.

(A) The former part is proved: (a) by the practice of the Church; for the Church never acknowledged this power in princes, but on the contrary judged civil laws concerning the matrimonial bond to have no force; thus Gregory the Great reproved marriages of cousins permitted by princes; Benedict XIV¹, speaking of the law by which Theodosius had prohibited marriages of Jews with Christians, says: "This law, as having been established by a lay prince, ought to have no force in marriages"; likewise Urban VIII and Pius VII² declared that the civil law invalidating marriages entered without the consent of parents had no force in the forum of conscience.

¹ Litt. February 9, 1749, to the Cardinal of York.

² Litt. June 27, 1805, to Napoleon.

(b) By the authority of the Roman Pontiffs; let it suffice to report the words of Pius VI³: "It is a dogma of faith that marriage, which before the advent of Christ was nothing other than a certain indissoluble contract, after the advent of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law... Hence it comes about that to the Church alone, to whom the whole care concerning the sacraments has been entrusted, there belongs every right and power of assigning her own form to this contract raised to the more sublime dignity of a sacrament, and therefore of passing sentence concerning the validity or invalidity of marriages." In the same place he refutes those who say that the canon of Trent (above, n. 814) does not say ecclesiastical judges alone, or all matrimonial causes: "For the words of the canon are so general that they comprehend and embrace all causes; but the spirit or reason of the law extends so widely that it leaves no place for any exception or limitation."

³ Brief to the Bishop of Motula, September 16, 1788.

(c) Theological reason. For marriage, as Pius VI rightly says, l. cit., is not a merely civil or natural contract, but one of the seven sacraments; but the Church alone, by the force of the power divinely entrusted to her, can make laws concerning the sacraments; therefore. Nor should it be said that in modern societies, which are of mixed religion, the civil power must make laws concerning the very essence of marriage, so that uniformity may be preserved for all citizens. For, to preserve this uniformity, it suffices that the State determine the civil conditions and effects arising from the matrimonial contract, nor is it required that it touch the matrimonial bond itself. Indeed liberty of conscience itself demands that, in mixed societies, no law be made concerning the matrimonial bond itself: for since the statutes of the various spiritual societies concerning this matter are not the same, from any civil law whatever concerning the bond it would happen that some citizens would be held to regard as invalid a marriage which according to their conscience is valid, or conversely. Therefore one thing remains, namely that the State regard only the civil effects of the matrimonial contract.

818. (B) The latter part is declared and proved, namely that the civil power can establish laws concerning the temporal and separable effects of marriage, for example dowries, inheritances, and generally possessions of temporal goods which follow from the marital contract. (a) It can prohibit, not indeed under penalty of nullity, but under other penalties, for example pecuniary fines, loss of civil rights, that marriages be made unless those conditions are observed which the public good requires, for example that minors not contract without the consent of parents, that soldiers not marry except by permission of military authority, etc. (b) It can also deny to marriages prohibited by it the recognition of certain civil effects, for example recognition of dowry, of the right of succeeding in the privileges of the father, where such privileges are acknowledged, etc. (c) It likewise has the right of registering marriages and of considering this registration as legal proof of the existence of the aforesaid marriage, although from equity it has been received that this proof can be supplied by an equivalent one, if the legal one is lacking. The reason why the State can establish all these things is that on the one hand these do not affect the substance of the contract, but are accessory to it, and on the other hand the civil power can determine concerning matters of this kind whatever the public good requires; for it least of all can be denied that all those things which we have enumerated can contribute to the good of society.

It is nevertheless disputed among theologians whether the State can deny to children born from marriages in themselves valid, but prohibited by civil law, civil legitimacy and the right of succession to the paternal inheritance by intestacy. The reason for doubting is that these two rights are partly from nature, partly from civil law. Yet all acknowledge that denial of these rights is foolish and cruel, since there are other more efficacious penalties for impeding those marriages, and it is not expedient to punish in children the offenses of parents.¹

¹ Cf. de Angelis, op. cit., p. 43 sq.; Palmieri, th. 31.

819. Some theologians think that the State does not have power to make laws concerning the marriages of infidels, because these, although they are a mere contract, bear something religious before themselves, and moreover it is greatly to be feared that the State, if a power of this kind is conceded to it, may transgress just limits and invade the sanctuary of the family and of religion.²

² Thus Perrone, De Matrim., II, 439 sq.; Feije, de Impedimentis, n. 67.

The common opinion, however, holds that this power belongs to the secular prince, so that he can establish diriment impediments for the common good. (a) For this was openly declared by the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide in an Instruction which was issued in the year 1821:³ "Although among infidels marriage is true, nevertheless it can be referred only to the office of nature and of the community, and therefore is plainly to be moderated by natural and civil law. It follows from this that secular princes, whether faithful or infidel, retain the fullest power over marriages of their infidel subjects, so that, by impediments being imposed which are not contrary to natural and divine law, they may rescind the same completely not only as to civil effects, but also as to the conjugal bond." This was also confirmed by several decisions of the S. C. P. F. and of the Holy Office.

³ Ap. Collectanea, n. 1447, with note. Cf. Resemans, De competentia civili in vinculum conjugale infidelium, Rome, 1887; Cavagnis, l. c., n. 185; Gasparri, op. cit., n. 287 sq.; Sasse, II, p. 470.

(b) For princes can determine all those things which pertain to the common good of civil society, provided that the matter of which there is question, as being sacred, has not been withdrawn from their authority. But it especially concerns civil society that there exist a certain norm constituted by public authority, according to which marriages are rightly contracted; for by the law of nature this was not sufficiently determined in certain circumstances. Moreover, the marriage of pagans, although in some regions it is accidentally consecrated by some religious rite, nevertheless is not a sacrament, nor was it subjected by Christ to the authority of the Church, since the Church vindicates to herself no direct right over marriages of this kind. Therefore civil power can make laws concerning this matter. Nor indeed can the right of princes be denied because they can abuse it; otherwise, how many rights would remain untouched? Nor ought we to be wiser than the Roman Congregations themselves.

We shall speak: 1° of the preliminaries to the celebration of marriage; 2° of the celebration itself.

820. Here we shall treat of those things which are premised for the licit and worthy reception of the sacrament: 1° of espousals, which are sometimes, although not necessarily, premised to nuptials; 2° of the examination of the spouses, by which the pastor inquires whether they are able for marriage; 3° of the proclamation of banns, which regularly ought to precede marriage; 4° of the consent of parents; 5° of the dispositions necessary for the worthy reception of the sacrament.

Division:

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 43; Sanchez, lib. I; Reiffenstuel, lib. IV, tit. I; Schmalzgrueber, lib. IV, tit. I; St. Alphonsus, n. 831-878; Carriere, n. 360-374; Kenrick, n. 1-27; De Angelis, lib. IV, tit. I; Santi, lib. IV, tit. I; Bangen, tit. I; Heiss, p. 44-54; Ballerini A., n. 1-386; Gasparri, I, n. 1-120; Lehmkuhl, n. 657-672; De Becker, p. 7-21; Genicot, n. 440-447; Noldin, n. 34-59; Wernz, op. cit., n. 84-126; Esmein, Le Mariage en Droit can., Paris, 1891, t. I, p. 139-187.

On the nature of espousals.

On the effects of espousals.

On the dissolution of espousals.

On the manner of acting of pastors concerning espousals.

821. 1° Notion. (A) Before the promulgation of the Code, only a bilateral or espousal promise was acknowledged in ecclesiastical law. But from the Code² a promise, whether unilateral or bilateral, is acknowledged, and the same canonical value is attributed to each, provided that the same formalities are fulfilled in each case.

² Indeed "a promise of marriage, whether unilateral or bilateral or espousal, is null for each forum, unless it has been made by a writing signed by the parties and either by the pastor or the local Ordinary, or by at least two witnesses." Code, c. 1017.

A promise of marriage is an internal, free, and externally manifested promise, by which one party toward the other, or each party toward the other mutually, obliges himself or herself from justice to contract future marriage between themselves.

(B) Espousals are premised to marriage, not indeed necessarily, but fittingly: (a) so that the contract of marriage may be entered more maturely, namely with mutual knowledge of the character and morals of each spouse; and so that the parties may dispose themselves more perfectly for receiving the grace of the sacrament; (b) so that impediments may be detected more safely, if any are present; (c) so that honorable relations between the spouses may more easily be fostered, and thus wandering and dangerous loves may be warded off.

The use of espousals, which flourished among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, is most ancient in the Church, as is clear from the Council of Elvira (305), which strikes with canonical penalties those who break espousals.¹

¹ Elvira, can. 54, ap. Bruns, t. II, p. 9.

822. 2° Conditions necessary for the validity of espousals.

The general principle is that those conditions are required which are necessary for a valid contract; namely, the promise of future marriage must be: true, free, externally manifested, between determinate persons and persons able by law.

823. (A) True, that is, with the intention of gravely obliging oneself from justice, and therefore with that advertence and deliberation which is required for mortal sin.

Hence if the promise is made without sufficient advertence (which rarely happens today, since it is made in writing) or without internal intention, by feigning consent, or in jest, it is not valid, because true consent is lacking. Nevertheless one who promises fictitiously is held to repair the damage inflicted on the other.

824. (B) Free, and therefore immune both from substantial error and from grave fear; for since a grave obligation is induced by espousals, it cannot be contracted without the free assent of the will. Therefore whatever destroys liberty relative to marriage likewise takes it away relative to espousals.

825. Some indeed contend that espousals entered from grave fear are only rescindable, and not null by that very fact, provided that it is established that the consent was truly internal; but, since here there is question of a contract requiring full liberty, we think, with St. Alphonsus (n. 844), that they are null in this case.

826. (C) Externally manifested, and indeed, if there is question of Catholics, according to the norm of the decree Ne temere and of the Code, "by a writing¹ signed by the parties, and either by the pastor, or by the local Ordinary, or by at least two witnesses. But if each party or either party does not know how to write, this is to be noted in the writing itself; and another witness is to be added, who, with the pastor or local Ordinary, or with the two witnesses of whom above, signs the writing."

¹ This or a similar formula can be used:

On the 15th day of May 1913, before me, pastor of the church N... in the diocese X, there appeared A. C. Boileau, son of N. and N., and D. R. Lenoir, daughter of N. and N., who declared that they wished to enter true espousals between themselves; namely, A. C. Boileau promised that he would take D. R. Lenoir as wife; and she promised that she would accept A. C. Boileau as husband.

Witnesses of this promise, besides the undersigned pastor, were: J. B. M. (whose domicile is inscribed) and F. R. S.

There are indicated there the place, day, month, and year, and afterwards the pastor, spouses, and witnesses sign the writing.

You will find another Gallican formula in Ami du Clerge, May 1, 1913, p. 880.

This form is so necessary for validity that, if it is lacking, immediately, without any declaration of a judge, espousals deservedly are held as null in each forum.² - Already from the response of the Sacred Congregation concerning Extraordinary Affairs, November 5, 1901, it had been declared that in Spain and in Latin America espousals celebrated without a public writing are invalid even in the internal forum.

² Code, c. 1017, § 1.

The form required is: (a) A writing signed by the parties; but any writing suffices, even one written previously and separately, composed by anyone whatever, indeed a formula printed in type, provided that there is clearly expressed there the mutual promise of nuptials between determinate persons, whether absolute or conditioned. For validity it is required that the day, month, and year be designated; but not the place, although this is altogether expedient, so that the authenticity of the act may more easily appear. - But the writing ought to be signed by the parties, that is, by the contracting parties themselves, if they are able to write; but if each party or either party does not know how to write, this is to be noted in the writing itself, and another witness, besides those of whom below, is to be added, who signs the writing.

(b) The writing is moreover signed by the pastor of the place, or by the local Ordinary,¹ or at least by two witnesses. - Now competent is the pastor of the place where the act is made, or, where parishes have not been canonically erected, the priest to whom the care of souls has been committed. But the local Ordinary is anyone having ordinary jurisdiction or jurisdiction equivalent to ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum; thus the Supreme Pontiff for the whole world, the Bishop in his diocese, an Abbot nullius or Prelate, an apostolic Vicar, an apostolic Prefect, a capitular Vicar while the see is vacant, the legitimate administrator of a diocese or apostolic Vicariate, the Vicar General of a Bishop; - but not Cardinals in their titles, nor nuncios or apostolic delegates, unless these have obtained special faculties. - But the Ordinary and the pastor cannot validly delegate another priest, even a vicar delegated to the universality of matrimonial causes,² to espousals, as is clear from response V, March 28, 1908. (c) But suitable witnesses can be any persons who are able to testify and are able to subscribe. (d) According to a recent decision of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, July 27, 1908, ad I, for validly entering espousals, the parties are held to sign the writing in one context with the pastor or Ordinary, or with two witnesses; and therefore the witnesses ought to be present while the parties sign, so that they are witnesses of the contract itself, as is customary in writings in which there is the force of a public document; nor does it suffice that a writing, signed by one party with the pastor or with two witnesses, be sent to the other party, who in turn signs with the pastor or with two witnesses.

¹ S. Cong. Concil., March 28, 1908.

² Fourneret, Le Mariage chretien, p. 51.

Corollary: concerning espousals between absent persons. From what has been said it follows that espousals cannot be made between absent persons by letter, or by a writing signed at a different time by the parties, as formerly; and deservedly, lest a way be opened to frauds. But they can be contracted through a procurator specially designated for contracting espousals with such a determinate person: before the required witnesses he will sign the writing together with the other party; nevertheless he would act invalidly if meanwhile the mandator had revoked his consent even internally.

827. (D) Between determinate persons; therefore if someone promises marriage to two or three sisters, saying, I pledge that I will marry one of you, the espousals are not valid, because the person is not sufficiently determined.

828. (E) Between persons able by law, that is, who are able to contract marriage both validly and licitly. For a promise concerning a thing which is not in the power of the one promising, or which cannot be furnished by him without sin, cannot be valid; for example, espousals contracted by one who had already validly promised to marry another person are null, even if the second espousals were confirmed by an oath.

(a) Now infants before the completion of seven years are not able. According to the common opinion, they are able after seven years have been completed; but if they contracted espousals before puberty,¹ they can withdraw from them after puberty has been attained. Besides, since discretion of mind and deliberation are required for the validity of espousals, if they are contracted long before puberty, they will often be invalid. - And surely it is very rarely expedient that they be entered at a tender age, or even immediately after puberty has been attained; for it is fitting that a long time not intervene between espousals and marriage, since otherwise the spouses are exposed to indulging excessive familiarity.

¹ Males juridically attain puberty when the fourteenth year has been completed, females when the twelfth year has been completed.

(b) Moreover, those who are bound by a diriment or prohibiting impediment are not able, unless they have sought a dispensation; but they are doubtfully able before the dispensation has been obtained. (See below, n. 830.)

829. 3° On espousals entered under condition. In a general way, the principles set forth above (n. 698 sq.) concerning conditioned consent are valid here. Yet certain special difficulties must be solved here.

(A) On espousals contracted conditionally between persons laboring under some impediment. (a) Espousals entered with an indispensable impediment are certainly not valid, that is, one in which the superior cannot or does not usually dispense, or also when in the case a just cause for dispensing is lacking: for then the condition is impossible or unreasonable; moreover, there is no obligation to the impossible.

(b) Espousals entered with the intention of contracting marriage at the time when the impediment has ceased, either of itself or from the very will of the contracting parties, without dispensation, are certainly valid; for example, I promise to marry you as soon as the vow of chastity, emitted for two years, has expired, - or as soon as you have embraced the Catholic religion.

(c) It is certain that espousals are valid if, after a dispensation has been obtained, the espousal consent is renewed either explicitly or implicitly, for example by consenting to the publication of banns: for then it takes place between persons able by law.

830. (d) But if the consent given under this condition, "if the superior shall dispense," has not been renewed after the dispensation has been obtained, it is disputed whether the espousals are valid or not at that instant at which the dispensation is granted. The opinion affirming seems more probable, provided that the consent of both still perseveres; for here there is question of an honorable and possible condition; now the general principle is that contracts entered under such a condition are valid as soon as the condition is verified, without any renewal of consent. Nevertheless, since some probably affirm that espousals in this case are invalid, as being celebrated at a time when the contracting parties were not able in the present, the obligation of standing by the promises cannot be urged, but only advised.

831. (B) If espousals are entered under a base condition, for example of having intercourse, they are indeed not valid before the sin has been committed, since no one can oblige himself to sin; but, once intercourse has been had, there is already an obligation of contracting marriage, not indeed from the promise, which is certainly invalid as not given in writing (can. 1017, § 1), but by the force of the unnamed contract facio ut facias: for the woman did not furnish access to her body except on that condition that marriage would be celebrated. But if, because of various circumstances, nuptials are morally impossible, some compensation is owed to the woman.¹

¹ The civil law concerning this matter is not the same in all regions; in some the injured party has a right to exact marriage, as in several States of America; in others only to compensation, as in France, not indeed from law, but from jurisprudence; cf. Baudry-Lacant., t. I, n. 484.

832. (C) If espousals are contracted under penalty, that is, under that condition that a sum of money be paid if marriage is not entered, it is disputed whether this condition is valid. - Now all admit that the penalty is not to be paid by him who justly withdraws from the contract: for penalty supposes a delict. But if someone unjustly withdraws, some affirm that he is held to pay the money; for the matter holds itself thus when earnests are handed over; moreover, between earnests and money to be paid there is no substantial difference; - yet many deny this, because a stipulated penalty diminishes the liberty of marriage: and this harms the public good; nevertheless an exception is given when the penalty is to be paid by an outsider, because this stipulation harms liberty less. - In practice, while the controversy stands, the confessor cannot compel one unjustly withdrawing to pay the penalty.

833. (D) Sometimes espousals are entered under earnests; earnests are, as it were, a pledge which the spouses hand over to one another under this law, that, if marriage does not follow, the one unjustly withdrawing loses what he gave and is held to return what he accepted. A condition of this kind seems sufficiently just, and renders young persons more cautious in promising marriage; hence it is licit and begets obligation. - But it is disputed whether a stipulation concerning earnests to be paid double or quadruple is valid; since this does not differ from a contract under penalty, the same must be said of it as concerning a penal condition attached to espousals.

Gifts which the spouses hand over to one another, and especially the man to the woman, differ in some way from earnests. When they are not of great value, regard being had to the fortune of the contracting parties, they seem to have been given absolutely, and therefore are not to be restored if the espousals are dissolved. But if they are of great price, and given with regard to future marriage, regularly they are to be returned when marriage does not follow, because they were given under condition; nevertheless they can probably be kept by the faithful party, if the other party withdraws unjustly, as compensation for fidelity not observed.

Two are enumerated: -

834. 1° The obligation of marrying at the opportune time. (A) A certainly valid promise of marriage, whether unilateral or bilateral (espousals), obliges under grave sin to entering the promised marriage, unless a just cause of dissolution is present. For since it is a contract, it obliges each party from justice or at least from fidelity (when the promise is unilateral); and indeed under grave sin, especially if it is bilateral, since the object of the contract, namely marriage, is a grave matter. - Hence one withdrawing without just cause not only sins, but also from justice is held to repair the damage inflicted on the other.

It was said certainly valid; because if they are doubtful with doubt of fact or of law, the obligation is not to be urged, according to all, since obligations ought not to be imposed unless they are first proved.

835. (B) As to the time at which this obligation must be fulfilled, (a) if it has been fixed in the contract itself, this is to be stood by, unless a just cause of delay intervenes; but if it has not been determined, the promise must be fulfilled according to the custom of the region, by the judgment of a wise man, or when the other party has reasonably demanded it.¹ - If a difficulty arises between the spouses, the ecclesiastical judge can establish a term, and when this has elapsed, the one who does not wish to marry by that very fact renounces his or her right, so that the other party recovers his or her liberty.

¹ "Let Bishops and pastors take care that marriages not be delayed longer than a year after espousals have been entered." S. C. Prop. Fid., April 13, 1807, ap. Gasparri, n. 68.

(b) If one party should unjustly refuse to enter marriage, he or she should at most be admonished by the ecclesiastical judge rather than compelled by censures. Moreover, "from a promise of marriage, although it may be valid and no just cause excuses from fulfilling it, there is not given an action for seeking the celebration of marriage; nevertheless one is given for the reparation of damages, if any is owed."¹

¹ Code, c. 1017, § 3.

(c) When espousals have been entered under an honorable and possible condition, the parties are held to wait for the event of the condition; as soon as the condition is fulfilled, they pass into absolute espousals, provided that neither party has revoked consent, except perhaps in the case in which the condition was "if the superior shall dispense," as was said above, n. 830.

836. 2° The obligation of omitting those things which can impede the future marriage, but especially carnal intercourse with a third person; for espousals give an initial right to the body of the other (a right to the thing, not in the thing), which is violated by intercourse with another person.

Hence fornication in spouses probably takes on a special malice, especially if it is committed by the woman, who is rendered much worse from it. Yet since the contrary opinion does not lack probability,² the burden of confessing this is not to be urged, unless the betrothed woman has conceived and introduces another's offspring into the family of the future husband.

² Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. XVI, n. 178; St. Alphonsus, n. 847; D'Annibale, n. 512, not. 46.

837. Until Pentecost 1918 espousal promises induced a twofold impediment: namely a prohibiting one with any other person, and the diriment impediment of public honesty. Each has practically been abolished.³

³ Code, tit. VII, cap. III and IV.

Espousals are dissolved not only by death, as marriage is, but also by various causes, among which are enumerated: -

838. 1° Mutual consent of the betrothed; for in contracts which depend on the will alone, the rule of law is applied: by whatever causes a thing is born, by the same it is also dissolved. This is true also of espousals confirmed by an oath; for the oath which is annexed to them is emitted under this tacit condition: unless it is remitted by the other party. Yet the consent ought to be free, just as the espousal consent itself, and therefore extorted neither by deceit, nor by force, nor by fear.

If espousals were entered before puberty, they are prohibited from being dissolved before the years of puberty, lest they be contracted and dissolved rashly; but as soon as either betrothed person has attained puberty, he or she can withdraw from the espousals, without waiting for the other, because a contract entered in tender age lacks firmness. But if within three days after attaining puberty and knowledge of the aforesaid privilege, the betrothed person does not declare before a judge or witnesses that he or she rejects the contract, by that very fact he or she is judged to ratify the same.

839. 2° Violation of espousal fidelity through subsequent fornication, or a grave immodest act by which either betrothed person has become more vile in common estimation; then the innocent party, but not the other, can withdraw from the espousals. The reason is that fidelity is broken without penalty toward the same one who breaks fidelity.

Hence if the betrothed woman fornicates with another man, the betrothed man is no longer bound, for a double reason: because the betrothed woman broke fidelity, and has become notably more vile. Say the same if she has freely suffered herself to be touched shamefully by another man, at least frequently. - If the betrothed man fornicates, the betrothed woman is free to pass to other vows; but if he has committed immodest touches with a third person, only rarely and occasionally, the espousals are not dissolved, because from this he has not become much more vile in common estimation; otherwise, if frequently, so that it can deservedly be feared that he will violate conjugal fidelity. - If each fornicates, according to some, the espousal obligation remains, because a mutual compensation of the delict is had; according to others, the espousals are dissolved for each party; finally, according to a few, the betrothed man is freed from obligation, but not the betrothed woman, because the sin of the betrothed woman is more shameful than that of the betrothed man, and her condition has become more vile. - Therefore, as concerns practice, in these various cases the espousal obligation cannot be urged.

Spiritual fornication also is equated with carnal sin, namely apostasy and heresy, which suffice for freeing the innocent person from the obligation undertaken.

840. 3° The choice of a more perfect state, namely the reception of sacred order, religious profession even without a solemn vow, indeed very probably a simple vow of perpetual chastity in the world. For espousals are entered under the tacit condition "unless I shall have chosen a more perfect state." Yet the case is excepted in which the betrothed man had intercourse with the betrothed woman under a formal promise of nuptials, or inflicted on her damage which can be repaired only by marriage.

(a) As soon as one party has manifested the purpose of entering religion, or sacred orders, or a seminary so as to prepare himself for sacred orders, the other party can pass to other vows. If the former changes his mind and does not enter religion or orders, more probably his obligation, which was only suspended, now revives, provided that the latter has not contracted new espousals;¹ probably, however, this obligation does not urge, because it was extinguished by the sincere intention of choosing a more perfect state; hence if he had deceitfully affected this intention, he would not be freed from the obligation. - Certainly, however, one is freed who, having undertaken a more perfect state, has been legitimately dispensed from it.²

¹ Thus the Salmanticenses, cap. II, n. 21; St. Alphonsus, n. 870; Gasparri, n. 92, etc.

² Thus Bonacina, quest. I, punct. 5, n. 2; Ballerini P., n. 186, ed. 3.

(b) Although a vow of perpetual chastity emitted in the world more probably dissolves espousals in the internal forum, the ecclesiastical judge deservedly is accustomed to compel the one vowing to keep espousal fidelity, or to enter some religion; otherwise someone could easily feign a vow of chastity in order to exempt himself from the obligation undertaken.

841. 4° A notable change supervening, or antecedent though not known.

(A) The general principle is that espousals are dissolved by that change which, if known from the beginning, would have prohibited them; or which would render the marriage unhappy. The reason is that those entering espousals are judged to contract under the clause: things remaining in the same state; otherwise marriage would beget displeasure and would obtain unhappy effects.³

³ St. Thomas, Sentent. IV, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

(B) But this notable change can occur in goods of the body, of fortune, of the soul, or in external circumstances.

(a) In goods of the body, for example if a permanent chronic disease supervenes upon either party, as syphilis, paralysis, blindness; or a grave mutilation or deformity (especially in the betrothed woman); or if the betrothed woman, even unwillingly, has suffered intercourse, because from this she has become more vile.

(b) In goods of fortune: if each has become poorer, so that they cannot sustain the burdens of marriage; if only one has become much poorer, whether because he or she lost part of the goods or disinheritance is seriously feared, the other party can withdraw. But if each has become richer, the espousals are not dissolved. If one unexpectedly has become much richer, of itself the contract subsists; nevertheless if because of this other nuptials, much more opulent, offer themselves, it is probable that the party made richer is not held to stand by the espousals with the loss of a great gain; therefore in practice the obligation is not to be urged.

(c) In goods of the soul, if either party becomes prone to drunkenness, gambling, pleasure, impiety; or has committed an infamous crime, as homicide, grave theft, etc.

(d) In external circumstances, if enmities have arisen between the families; or if parents obstinately oppose the marriage; or if discord of minds exists between the parties; or if one party transfers domicile to a distant region, without the knowledge or against the will of the other party, and there is no hope that he or she will return shortly.

842. 5° Impossibility of entering marriage, namely when an impediment supervenes, whether diriment or impeding: for no one is held to the impossible.

(a) Marriage validly, although illicitly, contracted with a third person certainly frees the innocent party from every obligation. But it is disputed whether, as regards the other party, the espousals are dissolved or only suspended. St. Alphonsus (n. 875) holds as more probable that the espousals are only suspended; for he who contracts marriage does not become absolutely unable to fulfill the promise, but only for a time; hence, when the spouse has died, the obligation revives, if the innocent party is still free. Yet not a few probably judge the obligation to be wholly extinguished, since the marriage entered is of itself a permanent impediment lest the first promise be fulfilled. - Hence in practice the confessor cannot compel the widower or widow to stand by the promises, nor prohibit the other party from pursuing his or her right before an ecclesiastical judge.¹

¹ Thus Gury-Ballerini, n. 733, note (b).

(b) When an impediment supervenes without the fault of either party, the espousals are dissolved for each party, unless the betrothed man had inflicted on the other party damage which cannot be repaired except by marriage: for then he would be held to seek a dispensation from the impediment. - If the impediment is culpable on the part of each, the espousals are dissolved, and neither is held to ask for or accept a dispensation. - But if the impediment arises from the fault of only one, the innocent party indeed is freed from the obligation, but not the other, lest he or she derive advantage from his or her own iniquity; hence this party is held to seek a dispensation, if the other insists upon his or her right.

843. Corollary. On the obligation of manifesting defects which can stand in the way of marriage. (a) Defects which would render marriage invalid must be manifested to the other party, unless they are such that they can be corrected before the nuptials; otherwise injury would be done both to the sacrament and to the other party. Thus it is if someone labors under an indispensable diriment impediment, or under a defect the absence of which the other party exacts as a condition without which not, for example if the betrothed man expressly said: I contract with you, if you are a virgin, or the first-born of Peter.

(b) Likewise an occult defect must be manifested, if it suffices for dissolving espousals, or is such that it renders marriage harmful or disgraceful; for example an incurable contagious disease; pregnancy of the betrothed woman; defamation which, although now occult, shortly will become public. Say the same very probably, if it is prudently feared that, when the defect is detected, grave enmities and perpetual quarrels will arise, for example if the betrothed woman a little before had intercourse with another, although she is not pregnant. The reason is that he sins against justice who, by voluntary deception, inflicts grave damage on another.

(c) But if the defect does not render the nuptials harmful, but only less desirable (for example if the betrothed woman is falsely thought rich, noble, a virgin), it is not necessary to manifest it, because no one is held to defame himself or herself and deprive himself or herself of hope of marrying, when by silence he or she does not inflict grave damage on another.

844. 6° Dispensation granted by the Supreme Pontiff. If espousals are valid, and not dissolved by any of the causes mentioned above, the Roman Pontiff can dispense from the obligation of contracting marriage for a just cause, namely if, after all things have been diligently weighed, greater goods are expected from dispensation than from the fulfillment of the promise. This he can do as interpreter of divine law, insofar as the public good demands that an obligation not be urged which would obtain unhappy outcomes; nevertheless he is not accustomed to do this except after admonitions and threats that the espousal obligation be fulfilled, and when a grave cause urges, for example when a civil marriage has been contracted with a third person and the first betrothed woman does not wish to renounce her right.

But the Bishop does not enjoy this faculty, but only can judge whether the espousals are valid or not, whether there is a just cause of dissolving them or not.

845. 1° As to the dissolution of espousals. (A) If the cause of dissolution is certain and evident, the injured party regularly can enter new espousals or marriage with a third person, without recourse to the ecclesiastical judge: for neither by the law of nature, nor by the common canonical law, is it prescribed that in this case recourse be had to the authority of the judge.

It was said regularly; for an exception is given: (a) by the law of nature, if recourse to the judge is necessary for avoiding scandal, for example when the espousals are publicly known and the cause of dissolution is unknown; (b) by positive particular law, where diocesan Statutes prescribe this.

846. (B) But if there is some doubt and a complaint is made from one or the other side, the sentence of the Bishop is to be awaited. Now a threefold case can occur:

(a) If each party admits that the espousals were null, or at least dissolved, although the parents contradict, the betrothed are free from every obligation, because in a matter of this kind they are to be believed more than the parents.

(b) If each party confesses that the espousals were valid, and have not been dissolved, these things are to be established: if the betrothed man does not stand by the promises and the betrothed woman does not complain before the pastor or Ordinary, she is judged to renounce her right; - if she complains and demands that the promise be fulfilled, the pastor ought to admonish the betrothed man concerning his obligation: if this does not suffice, he will remit the case to the Ordinary, who likewise will admonish the betrothed man and set a time limit; when this has elapsed uselessly, the betrothed woman will be free; nevertheless he will not coerce him to the nuptials by censures, according to the new discipline, as was said above, n. 835, (b).

847. (C) He who without just cause withdraws from espousals, or by his own fault furnishes a cause for withdrawing, is held to repair the damage thence brought upon the other: whether positive, namely the expenses made in view of the future marriage; or negative, from the fact that, for example, the betrothed woman cannot so easily find another man.

848. 2° As to the visits of the betrothed.¹ Pastors and confessors ought to take care that the visits of the betrothed and of those in love not become a proximate occasion of sin. Visits of this kind are not per se illicit; for no one is held to marry an unknown person, but can and generally ought for some time to try what character, what morals, and what qualities he or she is endowed with; otherwise, once marriage has been entered, dissensions, quarrels, and divorces could arise. But since those frequent visits and conversations easily are an occasion of sins, whether internal or external, because of the innate frailty of man, certain cautions are to be suggested to penitents.

¹ Sanchez, lib. IX, disp. 46; St. Alphonsus, n. 452, and Praxis, n. 65; Konings, n. 1454; Aertnys, l. VI, n. 340-344; Ciolli, I, n. 95; Berardi, De occasionariis, n. 244-261; St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, IIIrd Part, ch. 17-22; Wood-Allen, What a Young Woman ought to know, Philadelphia, 1898, p. 247-257.

(a) Visits of this kind, especially frequent ones, are licit only for those who can and wish to enter marriage within a reasonable time, namely within a year; for since they are made in view of marriage, and are not without danger, they cannot be permitted unless there is a founded hope of celebrating the nuptials shortly.

Hence generally they are not licit when they take place between persons wholly unequal, since there is no hope of marriage; or between those who can marry only after a long time; or when already from the beginning the young man solicits the girl to sin, because he seems to be impelled by lust rather than by the hope of an honorable marriage.

(b) Let the visits not be too frequent or too prolonged; especially let not a man alone with a woman alone remain for a long time, in places removed from the sight of others, at night: for such a manner of acting, as experience proves, often excites lust, induces excessive familiarities, stimulates depraved motions of the flesh, and also foul thoughts and desires. - Hence, if at some time they are alone together, let no more signs of benevolence be shown than are usually offered before parents.

Wherefore parents themselves are to be admonished not to leave the betrothed for a long time; and deservedly on this matter Ballerini says:¹ "Therefore with parents and especially with mothers one must deal most severely, and the grave obligation of this watchful custody and caution must be urged; to this there ought to impel not only conscience, but also the fear lest daughters, once corrupted, dishonored in the paternal home, grow old."

¹ Gury-Ballerini, n. 413, note near the end.

849. (c) Embraces and kisses had as a sign of benevolence, in an honorable manner, according to the custom of the country, for conciliating and fostering mutual love in order to marriage, are per se licit; for the end is honorable, and besides these are honorable signs of love.

But pressed kisses and kisses rather often repeated are not without danger; and immodest touches are not more licit for the betrothed than for the unmarried. Therefore concerning this, younger persons are to be cautiously admonished, especially girls, who because of the innate sense of modesty more easily shrink from these familiarities, that they carefully ward off whatever passes beyond the limits of decency; and all the more because they are shortly despised by their betrothed if they show themselves too easy in this matter.

(d) In order that these dangers may be removed more efficaciously, the betrothed are to be gently induced to the frequent reception of the sacraments: for strengthened by sacramental grace and the admonitions of the confessor, they will more easily flee the danger of sinning; and if, because of human frailty, they shall have sinned, they will immediately rise, and by using the means which a wise confessor will suggest, they will avoid worse delicts.

Before marriage is celebrated, the nuptial banns must be proclaimed, and the examination of the betrothed themselves must precede the banns, by which the pastor can know whether anything stands in the way of the valid or licit celebration of the marriage.

¹ Benedict XIV, Constit. Nimiam licentiam, May 18, 1743; Bangen, tit. II, p. 1-26; Scavini, III, n. 937-938; Joder, Formulaire Matrimonial, pp. 4-23 and 39-49; Haine, q. 34; Gasparri, n. 126-148; id., Des Procès d'état libre, ap. Canoniste, 1890, pp. 62; 155; 296 sq.; Konings, n. 1542-1544; Lesêtre, La Confession des futurs mariés, ap. Revue du Clergé français, t. XXX, March 1902, p. 5-23.

850. 1° The obligation of this investigation is established: (a) from the Ritual itself,² where it is declared that the pastor ought to inquire "who and what sort of persons they are who wish to contract Matrimony; whether there is any canonical impediment between them; whether they wish to contract spontaneously, freely, and according to the honesty of the sacrament, etc."; (b) by the authority of Benedict XIV, who in the Constitution Nimiam licentiam, n. 10, has these words: "The burden has likewise been enjoined upon the proper pastor, that before the announcements concerning a marriage to be entered are publicly made in church, he himself should strive to explore both the betrothed man and the betrothed woman separately, cautiously, and, as is said, in the ear, whether by their own will, spontaneously and freely, and with true consent of mind, they are mutually joined in marriage"; (c) from can. 1020, § 1; (d) from the very office of pastor, whose part it is to care that the sacrament of Matrimony be administered not only validly, but also licitly and worthily; but he cannot accomplish this unless he questions the betrothed themselves: for the knowledge which is obtained from others often is insufficient, especially when there is question of occult impediments, or of the subjective dispositions of the parties.

² De Sacram. Matrimonii, n. 1.

851. 2° The object of this investigation is threefold: concerning the free state of those about to marry; concerning the impediments which can stand in the way of their marriage; concerning Christian doctrine, in which they must be instructed.

(A) On the free state. (a) Formerly by common law, when the betrothed or their parents notified the pastor concerning the marriage to be celebrated, he had to declare that two witnesses were to be presented for each party, known and suitable, who would depose concerning the free state of those about to marry, that is, would testify that they were immune from every matrimonial bond.

(b) But in practice these things have gone into desuetude in most regions. Now the pastor is held: 1) to exact the testimony of baptism, unless baptism was conferred in his own territory;¹ 2) in the better manner in which it can be done, to inquire concerning the free state of the betrothed, especially of outsiders, from whom testimonial letters will be required, signed by the pastor of the domicile or quasi-domicile, and of wanderers, for whom recourse will be had to the Bishop.² Otherwise it could happen, as in fact it does happen especially where divorce prevails, that the marriage is invalid because of the impediment of ligamen. Nevertheless it is not necessary to have recourse to the Bishop, if there is question of those who, having left a parish, dwell for a time in another parish of the same place, because these are not properly wanderers.

¹ Code, c. 1021, § 1 and 1103, § 2 and 3.

² Code, can. 1029, 1032.

852. (B) On other impediments. The pastor must furthermore prudently investigate whether any canonical impediment, prohibiting or diriment, intervenes between the contracting parties or not.

Therefore he will question the betrothed man and the betrothed woman separately and cautiously: (a) whether by their own will, spontaneously and freely, with true consent of mind, they wish to be joined in marriage; (b) whether they are conscious of any impediment of consanguinity, affinity, etc.; (c) whether they have given fidelity or a pledge to others; (d) whether they have obtained or at least sought the consent of the parents; (e) whether they have satisfied, or are prepared to satisfy, those things which are required by civil law.³ - The manner of instituting this questioning is left to the prudence of the pastor, and must be different according to the different condition and character of the persons.¹

³ Cf. Code, can. 1019, 1020, 1029, 1030, 1034.

¹ You will find a formula of questioning at Joder, op. cit., p. 8-10.

The right of questioning the betrothed belongs to the proper pastor; if the betrothed belong to different parishes, each pastor can question his own subject; nevertheless it is better that the pastor who assists at the marriage (generally the pastor of the betrothed woman) examine both, if they are not too distant from his church.

If from this investigation some public impediment is detected, one cannot proceed to the publications except after a dispensation has been obtained.² - But if the impediment is occult, the pastor will not suspend the publications, lest perhaps from this it become public, but will immediately seek a dispensation from the competent authority.³

² Code, c. 1031, § 2, n. 2.

³ Code, c. 1031, § 2, n. 1.

853. (C) On Christian doctrine. Since, according to the Ritual (l. c.), the pastor must inquire whether "each knows the rudiments of faith, since they must afterwards teach these to their children." Hence the Holy Office decreed,⁴ in the year 1697, "that marriage is not to be proclaimed in church by pastors, unless beforehand they have found the betrothed sufficiently instructed in the rudiments of the Christian religion." Benedict XIV likewise sanctioned this, l. c.

⁴ Ap. Benedict XIV, De Syn. dioeces., lib. VIII, cap. 14, n. 3. - Hence deservedly the Third Council of Baltimore says, n. 125: "An opportune examination should also be placed before the marriages of the faithful, by which the contracting parties are examined and instructed concerning religion."

The pastor therefore will take care that the betrothed sufficiently know: (a) the truths necessary by necessity of means and of precept, namely the Apostles' Creed, the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, the Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation, the acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition, and those things which regard the sacraments; for they are held to know these both for attaining their own salvation, and for instructing their children concerning this matter.

But if some are found who are dull of mind and of scanty memory, so that they cannot retain all these things, it suffices that they know and believe the principal mysteries of faith; but that they perceive in an imperfect manner the other things which are necessary by necessity of precept, provided they are prepared frequently to attend sermons, lest truths of this kind slip away altogether from their mind.⁵

⁵ Thus Benedict XIV, l. c., n. 6.

(b) The duties proper to the state, namely the indissolubility of the matrimonial bond, the mutual duties of spouses, their duties toward children to be begotten, the necessity of educating offspring in a Christian manner, etc.¹ The pastor can seize this occasion for admonishing the betrothed concerning certain vices to be avoided, concerning the dangers which are found in secret societies, concerning the evils which are accustomed to follow from drunkenness or the frequenting of taverns, etc. - Yet this must be done prudently, according to the different condition of those about to marry; which is especially true of the mutual duties of spouses; for nothing must be said which could furnish scandal, with attention paid not only to the customs of each region, but also to the age and authority of the pastor. Hence if the betrothed woman asks what is licit for married persons, it will be enough to answer that all those things are licit which are required for the generation of offspring; and if she desires more, let her be referred to her mother or to another person of proved virtue, adding nevertheless that doubts which arise concerning the liceity of certain acts must be set forth to the confessor.

¹ You will find a form of examination and instruction at Joder, p. 10-24.

Besides, when it is established that the betrothed are well instructed, the obligation of questioning them concerning the truths of faith or the duties of their state does not urge so strictly, and the examination can be carried out briefly.² Nevertheless, when the betrothed refuse to be taught Christian doctrine, they are not to be barred from contracting marriage.³ - Moreover, all are to be admonished that they prepare themselves for marriage by a previous confession, and not defer it to the very day of the nuptials; for thus occult impediments, if there are any, can be detected at an opportune time, and richer fruits are received from the sacrament.

² Sometimes the reading of certain books can be advised, in which the duties of spouses are chastely described; for example, Monsabré, Conf. sur le Mariage, rendered into English by Hopper, New York, 1890; F.-A. Vuillermet, La Vocation au Mariage, Lethielleux, 1913; Girardey, Popular Instructions on Mariage, New York, 1896; Taylor, A Sure way to a Happy Marriage, from the German of Sickinger.

³ Response of the Pontifical Commission for interpreting the Code, June 2-3, 1918.

Division.

⁴ Reiffenst., lib. IV, t. III, n. 3-51; Schmalzgr., l. IV, t. III, n. 1-88; Salmant., cap. VIII, n. 71-107; St. Alphonsus, n. 989-1007; Carrière, I, n. 375-442; Kenrick, n. 127; Ball. P., n. 572-599; Konings, n. 1533-1540; Lehmkuhl, n. 673-677; Feije, n. 240-279; Génicot, n. 448-453; Noldin, n. 145-149; Gasparri, n. 149-194; Deshayes, Questions pratiques sur le Mariage, q. 56-90.

On the notion and obligation of banns.
On the circumstances of promulgation.
On dispensation from the law of banns.
On the revelation of impediments arising from the banns.
Scholion: on morganatic marriages and marriages of conscience.

I. On the Notion and Obligation of Banns

854. 1° Notion. Matrimonial banns (from the German word bann, public promulgation) are public promulgations which are sent before a future marriage, especially for this end, that impediments, if there are any, may be detected.

Already in antiquity the practice prevailed of approaching the pastor before the nuptials, so that he could inquire whether there was any impediment or not. Thus Charlemagne, in the year 802, ordered that nuptials not be celebrated before the priests, with the elders of the people, had diligently inquired into the consanguinity of those being joined. Likewise in many places espousals were contracted publicly, so that the future marriage might become known to all: which was equivalent to banns.

But the manner of publicly announcing marriage in churches took its beginning in Gaul,¹ then in England; afterwards it was extended to the whole Church by the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (1216), which the Council of Trent confirmed and enlarged. According to the Lateran Council, it suffices that the publications be made once; but three are required according to Trent. Therefore where Trent has not been promulgated as to the part which regards the banns, one publication strictly speaking suffices, although a threefold one often is more prudent.

¹ Thus Odo de Subiaco, Bishop of Paris, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, ordered that marriages be published in church, so that all the faithful could denounce to the episcopal court impediments which they knew.

855. 2° Obligation of banns. (A) Principle: The law of the proclamation of banns regularly obliges under grave sin both the pastor and those about to marry. For there is question of a law of grave importance, as is established: (a) from the very end of the law, which is manifold: that impediments, if there are any, may be more easily detected, and clandestine marriages avoided; - that children may not marry without the knowledge of their parents; - that the prayers of friends may be offered for the betrothed.

(b) From the Code (c. 1022-1030), which, although it does not renew the penalties previously enacted against violators of the law, nevertheless sets forth the matter so that from the context it is clearly established that the obligation of proclaiming the banns is grave.

856. (B) The principle is declared. This law obliges under grave sin even if the pastor knows otherwise that those about to marry are detained by no impediment; because the law is founded on the presumption of danger, and therefore does not cease in a particular case where in fact such danger is absent; for great inconveniences generally would follow if the application of the law were permitted to the judgment of pastors.

Certainly it is mortal to omit three publications, without dispensation; to omit only one would more probably be only a venial sin; indeed some think that the omission of two does not exceed venial sin, provided that the danger of a hidden impediment is removed by waiting several days before the nuptials are permitted, so that thus the faithful have time for denouncing impediments, if there are any. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (n. 990) more probably teaches that the omission of two is a mortal sin.

It was said that regularly the banns are to be promulgated, because certain exceptions are given: -

(a) If the marriage cannot be deferred without great inconvenience, and a dispensation from the banns cannot be obtained from elsewhere, for example if a dying man wishes to marry his concubine: in this case, the sworn affirmation of the contracting parties suffices (can. 1019, § 2); (b) in marriages of princes, by universal custom, because they are so well known that an impediment, if there is any, can easily be detected; (c) in mixed marriages between Catholics and heretics, or between the faithful and infidels, announcements regularly are not made, lest marriages of this kind seem thus to be approved; nevertheless recently the Holy See declared that proclamations can be made in mixed nuptials which are contracted after dispensation has been obtained, with mention of the religion of the contracting parties nevertheless suppressed, if the Ordinary shall have judged them necessary for detecting impediments;¹ (d) in marriages of conscience (below, n. 871).

¹ Code, c. 1026. - Thus the Holy Office responded, July 4, 1874, "that proclamations can be made in the marriages of which there is question, insofar as they are contracted with apostolic dispensation, the religion of the contracting parties nevertheless being suppressed." Yet the S. Congregation adds that it is more expedient to dispense from the banns, if the freedom of state of the contracting parties has been made more certain from elsewhere, in order to avoid danger of astonishment or scandal. (Collect. P. F., n. 1223; Gasparri, n. 621.) - According to the Statutes of the diocese of Baltimore, n. 55, proclamations should not be made except when, because of civil laws, they cannot be omitted; in which case they are to be made after Mass. Now the civil law requires them when those about to marry do not wish to pay money to obtain a license.

II. On the Circumstances of Banns

857. The manner in which banns must be promulgated is described by the Code in these words:² "The publications of marriages must be made by the proper pastor." "The publications are to be made on three continuous Sundays and other feasts of precept, in church during the solemnities of Masses, or during other divine offices to which the people come in numbers." Four things are declared there: 1° the person promulgating; 2° the place where the banns must be promulgated; 3° the time; 4° the form of promulgation.

² Can. 1023, § 1, 1024.

858. 1° On the person promulgating. Banns must be promulgated by the proper pastor of the contracting parties, who can perform this either by himself or through another priest or cleric; but not through a layman, except in a case of necessity, for example when, the pastor being absent, the only priest who is present to celebrate the sacred rite can in no way understand or speak the language of the parishioners (which sometimes happens in the United States of America, because of the multiplicity of languages which are used in various churches). Now the proper pastor is the pastor of the domicile or quasi-domicile;¹ but for wanderers, who lack domicile, the pastor of the place where they contract.

¹ Code, c. 94.

859. 2° On the place. The place where banns must be promulgated is the parochial church, or another taking the place of the parochial church, as is a vicarial or annexed chapel to which a territory is assigned; but not a small chapel, whether public or private, unless nevertheless in this particular case it takes the place of the church, and there is a great concourse of people there: for then the end of the law is obtained. - For the same reason, if on the occasion of a sermon, procession, or pious pilgrimage the people were gathered in a place distinct from the parochial church, the announcements could be made there, with the license of the Bishop acceding.

860. Here, however, it is asked whether banns must be promulgated in several parishes.

(A) General rules. (a) If each betrothed person has domicile or quasi-domicile in the same parish, and in that parish only, the publications must be made there only.

(b) But if the betrothed have domicile or quasi-domicile in different parishes, banns must be promulgated in each.

(c) If one or each betrothed has several domiciles, or domicile in one parish and quasi-domicile in another, announcements must be made in all these parishes, unless nevertheless the Bishop dispenses, or one domicile is principal and the other wholly secondary.

(d) "If a party has dwelt in another place for six months after attaining puberty, the pastor is to set forth the matter to the Ordinary, who according to his own prudence either shall require publications to be made there, or shall prescribe that other proofs or conjectures concerning freedom of state be gathered. If there is some suspicion concerning an impediment contracted, the pastor even for a shorter stay shall consult the Ordinary, who is not to permit the marriage unless first the suspicion is removed."¹

¹ Code, c. 1023.

(e) If the contracting parties, after the proclamations have been begun, leave their prior domicile and acquire a new one (which can happen especially as regards servants), it seems more consonant with the end of the law not to interrupt the announcements begun in the former place where the betrothed are known; nor will they have to be made in the new domicile, where they are scarcely known at all. Nevertheless the pastor of the new domicile has the right of assisting at the nuptials, as is said below.

861. (B) Special rules. From the Code: (a) the banns of minors² must be proclaimed both in the place of quasi-domicile, if they have one, and in the place where the parents or guardians reside;³ but prudence requires that they not be announced without the consent of the parents or guardians,⁴ especially where civil law requires this consent.

² From the Code, both males and females are minors before the twenty-first year has been completed. (Can. 88, § 1).

³ Code, c. 93, § 1, § 2.

⁴ Code, c. 1034.

(b) The banns of soldiers are to be promulgated in the garrisons or places where they reside; and, in addition, in the domicile of the parents or guardians if they are minors, or, if they have become of age, in the parish where they resided before undertaking military service.⁵

⁵ In Gaul, soldiers cannot marry without the consent of the minister of war, or of the President of the corps to which they belong. Cf. Baudry-Lac., n. 528 and 540.

(c) The marriages of wanderers cannot be celebrated unless the pastor has obtained the license of the Bishop and has diligently inquired concerning their free state;⁶ yet this is not to be understood of those who wander about in the same city. The Bishop can also establish in what place the announcements must be made: generally they are made in the parish where the wanderers contract; but sometimes also in the place of origin, or where they have resided for a longer time, especially if there is doubt concerning their free state.

⁶ Code, c. 1032.

N. B. If doubts arise concerning all these things, the Bishop should be approached, who, since he is able to dispense from the banns, a fortiori can establish where the proclamations must be made.

862. 3° On the time. Banns must be promulgated (a) on three Sundays and other feasts of precept; but not on suppressed feast days, unless by license of the Ordinary, which can be given if on these days there is a great concourse of people.¹

¹ Which rule can be inferred from various decisions of the S. C. of the Council.

(b) On three continuous feast days, that is, with no feast day omitted; yet this does not oblige under grave sin, since it is not necessary for obtaining the end of the law, and it is free from every fault if a reasonable cause accedes. But if three feast days immediately follow one another (for example, Easter day and Monday and Tuesday after Easter), it is better to interrupt the announcements, so that the faithful can think about impediments for a longer time. Yet the pastor who promulgates the banns on three successive days cannot be blamed, provided that after the last one he waits a longer time, so that impediments can be manifested.

(c) During the solemnities of Masses, that is, during the parochial or conventual Mass. If nevertheless the pastor had omitted the last announcement at Mass because of forgetfulness, and the nuptials were urgent, he could proclaim the banns at vespers, or in another solemn act of religion, if there is a great concourse of people.²

² Thus from the Code, c. 1024.

Once the proclamations have been made, one is not immediately to proceed to the celebration of the marriage; but three days must be awaited "unless a reasonable cause demands otherwise,"³ so that time may be given to the faithful for revealing impediments, if any exist.

³ Code, c. 1030.

If the marriage is not celebrated within six months after the announcements have been made, according to the Code⁴ these must be repeated, unless it seems otherwise to the Bishop. Concerning this matter it is necessary to read the diocesan Statutes, which are varied for various regions.

⁴ Code, c. 1030, § 2.

863. 4° On the form of Banns. No special form was prescribed by Trent; therefore that form is to be observed which is found in the Ritual⁵ or in the diocesan Statutes. There must be expressed in the vernacular tongue the name and surname of the betrothed, and also of their parents, their native place and place of domicile. If there is question of widows or widowers, the name, day, and year of the death of the prior spouse are to be expressed; if a previous marriage has been declared null, or dissolved by the authority of the Holy See, this likewise must be made known; the same must be said if dispensation from some publicly known impediment has been obtained. Finally, the faithful are to be admonished concerning the grave obligation of manifesting impediments to the pastor, if they know any;¹ if a dispensation from some publication has been granted, this is to be manifested, lest perhaps the faithful, expecting another publication, not reveal an impediment at the opportune time.

⁵ "The announcements are to be made in this manner. During the solemnities of Masses let the pastor admonish the people in the vernacular tongue to this effect: Let it be known to all here present that N. man, and N. woman, of such or such family, and parish, God helping, intend to contract marriage with one another. Therefore we admonish each and all, that if anyone has known that there is some impediment of consanguinity, or affinity, or spiritual relationship, or any other impediment between them, which would mutually impede the marriage to be contracted, he ought to denounce it to us as soon as possible; and this we admonish the first time, if it shall have been the first; or the second, if it shall have been the second; or the third, if it shall have been the third announcement." Commonly a shorter form is found in the Statutes.

¹ Code, c. 1027.

But circumstances which can defame the contracting parties are to be carefully omitted; for example, if one is illegitimate, the parents are not to be named; if a woman had been a concubine, although commonly held as a wife, let her be designated under the name by which she is usually called.

Let the promulgation be made in a loud and intelligible voice; otherwise the end of the law is in no way obtained.

"The local Ordinary can for his own territory substitute for the publications the public affixing, at the doors of the parochial church or of another church, of the names of the contracting parties for the space of at least eight days, yet in such a way that, in this space, two feast days of precept are included." (Code, c. 1025.)

III. On Dispensation from the Banns

864. 1° Principle: Not only the Supreme Pontiff, but also the local Ordinary has the power of dispensing from the banns for a just cause. For Trent openly declares this (l. c.): "Unless the Ordinary himself shall have judged it expedient that the aforesaid announcements be remitted; which the Holy Synod leaves to his prudence and judgment." More explicitly the Code: "The proper local Ordinary, according to his own prudent judgment, can for a legitimate cause dispense from publications, even those to be made in another diocese. If there are several proper Ordinaries, he has the right of dispensing in whose diocese the marriage is celebrated; but if the marriage is entered outside the proper dioceses, any proper Ordinary can dispense."¹

¹ Code, c. 1028.

Now under the name of Ordinaries of places come the Bishop, the Vicar General, the Vicar Capitular or Administrator for his own diocese; the Abbot and Prelate nullius for his own territory; Apostolic Vicars and Prefects, and those who, when the aforesaid are lacking, meanwhile succeed in governance² from the prescription of law or from approved constitutions. But pastors do not enjoy this power, unless they have been expressly delegated to it;³ and therefore if the Bishop denies dispensation, they cannot go against his decision. Nevertheless, "in dangers of death, if other proofs cannot be had, the sworn affirmation of the contracting parties, that they have been baptized and are detained by no impediment, suffices, unless contrary indications are present."⁴

² Code, c. 198.

³ In many dioceses of the United States of America, for example in Baltimore (Statut. n. 55), pastors can dispense from one proclamation, for a just cause, except in the case of wanderers; from two, where Mass is not celebrated every Sunday; from all, in those counties in which there is no church.

⁴ Code, c. 1019, § 2.

865. 2° For granting a dispensation, a legitimate cause is required, according to the prudent judgment of the Ordinary, as is established from can. 1028 already cited, - a greater one if there is dispensation from all, but a lighter one if there is dispensation only from one or two. According to St. Alphonsus (n. 1005), some are causes on account of which the Bishop is bound, but others on account of which he can dispense.

(A) He is bound to dispense as often as this is necessary for avoiding grave damage, common or private, spiritual or temporal; namely (a) if there is a founded fear lest the marriage be maliciously impeded, for example by a guardian or stepmother contemplating other nuptials; (b) if it is feared lest one party withdraw, especially in the case of defloration or espousals; (c) if either of the betrothed is at the point of death and wishes to legitimate offspring; (d) if one party is immediately about to depart into a distant region, and the marriage cannot be deferred; (e) if from the proclamations infamy would arise, or some other damage of soul or body, for example if those about to marry are already held by the community as true spouses, or if infamy threatens on the part of the deflowered betrothed woman.

(B) He can dispense: (a) if those about to marry would be exposed to the mockery of men, because, for example, they are very old, or very unequal in condition; (b) if it is morally certain that no impediment is present; wherefore dispensation is often granted to magnates, because, since they are known, impediments are more easily detected.

IV. On the Obligation of Revealing Impediments

866. 1° Principle: Whoever, certainly knowing that there is some diriment or prohibiting impediment between those about to marry, is held under grave obligation to reveal it, unless a legitimate cause excuses. This is certain.

This obligation arises: (a) from the very precept of charity, by which we ought to impede a grave evil of our neighbor insofar as it can be done; for from an illicit marriage a grave evil is born, namely the profanation of the sacrament; but from an invalid one graver evils proceed, namely concubinage, illegitimacy of children, etc.; (b) from the virtue of religion, which commands that we take precautions against irreverence toward the sacrament; (c) from the positive law of the Church, which, while it orders marriages to be announced, implicitly commands the faithful to manifest impediments known to them; which moreover is explicitly enjoined in the form of announcement such as is found in the Ritual (l. c.)¹ and in the Code, c. 1027.

¹ Besides, in some dioceses penalties are established against those not denouncing, for example in Baltimore an excommunication of ferendae sententiae. (Statutes, n. 57.)

867. 2° The principle is declared. It is said (A) whoever, whether he is from the parish, or from elsewhere, of whatever sex or age. Hence the contracting parties themselves are held to this: but if there is question of an occult impediment from which dispensation can be obtained, there is no obligation of manifesting it in the external forum; it suffices that it be declared to the confessor, so that he may seek dispensation.

(B) Certainly knowing; for if there is a mere suspicion arising from an uncertain rumor or from testimony which does not deserve faith, there is no obligation of manifesting the matter. Yet juridical proof is not required, but a well-founded persuasion suffices.

868. (C) Unless a legitimate cause excuses, namely: (a) grave damage or danger of grave damage either to the one revealing, or to a third person; for law does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

Hence those are not held to denounce who prudently fear that, from the revelation of the impediment, grave dishonor or bodily damages threaten themselves or their own, or grave scandal would be caused, or the infamy of a third person; but one excused from denouncing ought, if he can, to impede the marriage from being contracted without dispensation. - But temporal damage or dishonor coming to the betrothed themselves from the revelation of the impediment does not excuse, because it is less than the spiritual damage which otherwise they would incur. Moreover, that their reputation may be spared, the betrothed themselves ought first to be warned privately; but if they spurn the warning, they ought to impute the defamation to themselves.

(b) The uselessness of denunciation, namely when no fruit is hoped from it, or when it is known that dispensation has already been sought. Some say that he also is excused who knows the impediment only from hearing, and does not remember from whom he heard it; but it is more advisable in this case to reveal the impediment, since this manifestation can be corroborated by other indications or furnish occasion for a serious investigation.

869. (c) The sacramental secret, or that which is committed to someone by reason of public office, for example to a pastor, physician, midwife, advocate, etc.; for the public good, which is preferred to the private good, demands that such a secret be altogether observed.

But if these persons have known the impediment from elsewhere - not by exercise of their office - they are held to reveal it, unless by acting thus they would come under suspicion of violating the secret committed to them. Besides, all these ought privately to admonish those about to marry themselves concerning the existence of the impediment, and exhort them to manifest it; indeed the pastor can, without violation of the seal, and generally ought, secretly seek a dispensation.

But the confessor, who from the confession of a penitent detects a public impediment, ought to urge him to manifest the same to the pastor, or to grant permission to himself to seek dispensation; but if the impediment is occult, with the license of the penitent, he himself should secretly ask for dispensation.

But the natural secret, promised or committed (not however by office, as above), does not dispense from the obligation of denouncing; for from the secret being kept there would follow damage to an innocent third party, insofar as injury is brought upon one of the betrothed, and also damage to public right, insofar as injury is brought upon the sacrament; now a natural secret does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

Moreover, the denunciation must be made at the opportune time, that is, before the marriage; indeed it is expedient that it be made as soon as possible, morally speaking, after the first promulgation of banns, so that either the nuptials may immediately be prohibited, or a dispensation obtained.

870. 3° On the manner of acting of the pastor in receiving revelations. The pastor, receiving a denunciation, (A) must weigh the value of the testimony: (a) by inquiring what sort of person the denouncer is, what authority he enjoys, whether he is moved by envy or only by love of the truth; (b) what sort of proofs he brings, whether full or half-full; (c) by questioning other witnesses, if it can be done; by approaching those about to marry themselves and their parents, so that he may see whether they are conscious of the impediment or not.

(B) When these things have been completed:

(a) In the case of a certain and indispensable impediment, he ought to admonish the betrothed concerning the impossibility of celebrating the nuptials; in the case of a certain and dispensable impediment, "if the impediment is occult, he shall carry out or complete the publications, and shall report the matter, withholding the names, to the local Ordinary or to the Sacred Penitentiary; if it is public and is detected before the publications have been begun, the pastor is not to proceed further, until the impediment is removed..., if it is detected after the first or second publication, the pastor shall complete the publications, and refer the matter to the Ordinary." (Code, c. 1031, § 2.)

(b) If there is doubt concerning the existence of some impediment, the pastor should accurately investigate the matter, by questioning under oath at least two witnesses worthy of faith, provided that there is not question of an impediment from the knowledge of which infamy would arise for the parties, and, if it shall have been necessary, the parties themselves also; if the doubt remains, he is not to assist at the marriage without consulting the Ordinary.¹

¹ Code, c. 1031.

(C) If only the pastor or Ordinary knows an impediment, without being able to prove it, it is disputed whether he can and ought to stand in the way of the marriage; the more common and safer opinion affirms this, unless a dispensation can be obtained; for here there is question not of a penalty to be inflicted, but of the gravest evils to be averted.

Scholion: On Marriages of Conscience and Morganatic Marriages.²

² Benedict XIV, Constit. Satis Vobis, November 17, 1741; Quaest. Canon. 397; De Syn. dioeces., l. XIII, c. 23, n. 12 sq.; F. Mazzei, de Matrimonio conscientiae, Rome, 1768; Bangen, II, p. 50-52; Carrière, n. 440-442; Feije, n. 343-346; Rosset, II, n. 1193-1204.

871. 1° On marriages of conscience. (A) They can be defined as those marriages which, with the announcements omitted, are celebrated secretly before the proper pastor, or another delegated priest, and two witnesses, under this law, that they remain secret.

(B) The conditions that they be contracted licitly are recounted by Benedict XIV and the Code: (a) Let them not be celebrated without the license of the Ordinary,¹ nor permitted by the Ordinary except from a most urgent and most grave cause,² for example, for impeding the danger of concubinage; (b) let a diligent inquiry be made by the Bishop, so that it may be established that no impediment stands in the way, especially a prior ligamen; (c) for assisting at the marriage let the pastor of one or the other contracting party be deputed; or, if he is lacking, a priest endowed with doctrine and prudence; (d) when the marriage has been celebrated, let a written document be shown to the Bishop, in which the celebration is described with note of the place, time, and witnesses who were present; let the same be transcribed in a secret book secured with seals; (e) let the spouses be admonished that, if offspring shall have been born, they immediately write to the Bishop, who will describe the name of the infant and of the parents in the secret book, so that the legitimacy of the offspring may be established;³ (f) if they have not given notice concerning born offspring, the marriage must be divulged.⁴

¹ They cannot be permitted by the Vicar General without a special mandate. (Code, c. 1104).

² Code, c. 1104.

³ Code, c. 1107.

⁴ Code, c. 1106.

These things are besides to be noted from the Code: "The permission of the celebration of a marriage of conscience carries with it the promise and grave obligation of preserving the secret on the part of the assisting priest, the witnesses, the Ordinary and his successors, and also of the other spouse, when the other does not consent to divulgation."⁵

⁵ Code, c. 1105.

"The obligation of this promise, however, on the part of the Ordinary does not extend to the case in which either some scandal or grave injury toward the sanctity of marriage threatens from observance of the secret, or the parents do not take care that children received from such a marriage be baptized, or take care that they be baptized with false names expressed, without meanwhile providing to the Ordinary within thirty days notice of the offspring received and baptized, with sincere indication of the parents, or they neglect the Christian education of the children."⁶

⁶ Code, c. 1106.

872. 2° Morganatic marriages, or marriages ad morganaticam,⁷ consist in this: that a noble man, after the death of a wife likewise noble, marries another from a humbler order, with the condition added that both the woman and the children thence to be born can acquire nothing from that marriage besides those things which are necessary for honorable support. Hence the wife and children are not fully admitted into the family of the man, nor do they obtain his nobility or inheritance; and under this respect marriage of this kind differs from marriage of conscience, by force of which the children have a right to the paternal inheritance.¹

⁷ Morganaticum arises from two Germanic words (morgen, gabe, morning gift), because the wife and children must be content with that gift which they receive from the beginning, as it were on the morning day of the nuptials; by some it is also called marriage of the left hand.

¹ St. Thomas, Opusc. XXXVII, De Erudit. Principum, l. V, c. 26-29; St. Alphonsus, n. 882-884; Rosset, t. V, n. 3546-3548.

873. State of the question. (A) It is certain that the consent of parents is not required for the validity of the sacrament of Matrimony; for Trent declared this, against the Protestants, striking with anathema those who "falsely affirm that marriages contracted by children of a family without the consent of parents are void, and that parents can make them ratified or void."³ For children of a family, even minors, provided they are pubescent and enjoy the use of reason, have power over their own body in order to marriage, and therefore validly can, even against the will of their parents, hand this power over to others through marriage. Hence Trent did not wish to agree to the request of the King of France, who wanted marriages of children entered against the will of parents to be held as invalid.

² Sanchez, lib. IV, c. 23; St. Alphonsus, n. 849-850; Carrière, n. 443-452; Kenrick, 41-42; Gasparri, n. 485-488; Génicot, n. 514-516; Vantroys, Étude historique et juridique sur le consentement des parents au mariage de leurs enfants, Paris, 1899.

³ Sess. XXIV, de Reformat. Matr., cap. I.

(B) Therefore the question is concerning the liceity of contracting marriage without consulting parents or against their will, and also concerning the mutual duties and rights of parents and children in this matter. Now St. Alphonsus (n. 849) sets forth four opinions: the first teaches that children of a family sin lethally if they enter marriage, whether parents have not been consulted or are unwilling;⁴ the second says that they are held under mortal sin to seek the counsel of parents, but not to follow it;⁵ the third holds that they sin only venially if they contract whether parents have not been consulted or are unwilling;⁶ the fourth distinguishes: if parents are trying to turn a son away from every marriage, with danger of incontinence, he is not held to obey; otherwise, if parents justly impede.⁷

⁴ Pontius, l. II, c. I, n. 26; Sylvius, Supplem., p. 47, a. 6, concl. 4, etc.

⁵ Sanchez, l. IV, disp. 23, n. 10; Laymann, p. I, c. I, n. 14; etc.

⁶ Salmant., c. VI, n. 22; Sporer, n. 206; etc.

⁷ Lacroix, n. 570, with the authors there cited.

What seems more probable to us the following rules will declare.

874. Rule 1: Per se, minor children sin gravely who contract espousals or marriage with parents wholly unconsulted.

For such a manner of acting is opposed to the reverence due to parents, since it brings with it a certain contempt in a grave matter; and also to prudence, which demands that the counsel of parents be sought in a matter which, because of the affinity contracted, contributes to the temporal good, peace, happiness, and honor of the whole family.

It is said per se, because per accidens this omission is free either from every fault, or at least from mortal fault, according to various circumstances:

(a) There is no fault if there is a grave and just cause, for example if the son is far away, and cannot easily seek the counsel of the parents, or if it is prudently feared lest they unjustly impede the nuptials; in this case, however, one must beware of illusions.

(b) Likewise there is no fault if espousals are contracted under the condition that the parents consent, or with the intention and hope of obtaining their consent to the nuptials at a more opportune time.

(c) There will be only slight fault if it is prudently judged that the parents care little about this, because they are little solicitous concerning those things which pertain to the children, provided their own tranquillity is not disturbed. - Hence in practice attention must be paid to the customs of places and to the relations existing between parents and children.

875. Rule 2. Per se, children are not held, strictly speaking, to obey parents in order to marriage. For in all things which pertain to the choice of a state, they now do not depend on parents, but are truly of their own right; therefore, provided they have reverently sought the counsel of parents, they are not held, by the command of parents, to embrace the matrimonial state rather than the celibate state or religious life, nor to marry this person rather than that one; parents indeed can use persuasion in this, but not precept.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 104, a. 5; Supplem., q. 47, a. 6.

Yet per accidens parents could command that a son or daughter enter marriage, if this were the only means for relieving their grave poverty; or forbid that a daughter marry a young man ruined in morals or impious; for in these and similar cases, children are already held to perform this, since parents do nothing except urge the fulfillment of a natural precept.

876. Rule 3. Parents per se sin gravely when they absolutely deny consent to children desiring to enter a suitable marriage. For thus they unjustly affect them with grave sorrow, stand in the way of their happiness, scatter seeds of discords, and expose the children to the danger of sinning basely.

It is said per se; because, if from the marriage to be contracted very grave scandals or hatreds are foreseen, because, for example, there is excessive inequality of the betrothed, or the union tends to the damage of an honorable family, they have a just cause of dissenting. Yet it is not sufficient, for denying consent, that one of the betrothed be of mediocre condition, since this can be compensated by other qualities.

Nor per se are parents excused from fault because of civil law, which in some regions grants them the faculty of denying consent;¹ for human law cannot confer privileges contrary to divine law. Nevertheless some, because of civil law, are in good faith, and can be left in it, if it is prudently feared lest they resist the priest admonishing them.

¹ In Gaul, a son and daughter, until they have completed the twenty-first year, need the consent of parents: if these disagree, the father's consent suffices; if one of the parents is dead, or incapable of giving consent, the consent of the other suffices; when father and mother are dead, grandfathers and grandmothers succeed to their rights in this matter; if both lines disagree, that dissent is equivalent to consent. Cf. Cod. civ., art. 148-160, and law of June 21, 1907 (Dalloz, Mariage, 9 sq.)

All these things agree sufficiently with can. 1034: "Let the pastor gravely exhort minor children of a family not to enter nuptials without the knowledge of parents, or when parents are reasonably unwilling; but if they refuse, let him not assist at their marriage, unless the local Ordinary has first been consulted."

In most States of the United States of America, minors indeed contract validly, provided they are pubescent, but illicitly, unless the consent of parents given in writing or orally accedes; and in some States, not only the delinquents, but also the ministers before whom the nuptials are entered, are fined with various penalties. Cf. Bishop, op. cit., § 551-559. - Here it is worthwhile to note with Kenrick (n. 44) that children of a family, to whose marriage parents unjustly do not wish to consent, can licitly evade the civil laws by betaking themselves to another State; but it is not licit for them by a false oath or false witnesses to declare that they have reached the years of majority.

877. No one can validly receive the sacrament of Matrimony unless he is baptized,² as was said above. Besides, it is altogether becoming that those about to marry be confirmed,¹ as those who need divine strength for professing their faith in the new state of life which they have chosen; indeed, by usage or particular law, in certain dioceses this is required for the licit reception of Matrimony: there the betrothed must prove that they have not only been baptized, but also confirmed.

² Code, c. 1021, § 1.

¹ Code, c. 1021, § 2.

When these things have been briefly set forth, it remains to speak concerning the dispositions of those about to marry.

They are chiefly four: 1° right intention; 2° prudence in selecting a spouse; 3° the state of grace; 4° competent knowledge; but since it was said above concerning this last disposition (n. 853), we shall note a few things concerning the three former ones.

878. 1° Right intention. (A) The betrothed ought in contracting to set before themselves that intention which God Himself had in instituting marriage.

Now the primary end is the procreation and education of offspring; but the secondary ends are the consolation and help of common life, and also the moderation of concupiscence, as we showed above, n. 679-682: therefore the betrothed can intend these ends, even principally, provided that the primary end is not excluded. Besides, there are other extrinsic ends, such as concord to be conciliated between families, the honor of the family to be preserved, the acquisition of riches, etc.; these it is licit to seek, provided they are honorable in themselves, and the primary end is not excluded: but if the end is not honorable, as disordered pleasure or immoderate desire of riches, there is a sin more or less grave according to the gravity of the disorder.

879. 2° Prudence in selecting a spouse. Since marriage is indissoluble, an error committed in this matter can scarcely be repaired, and often becomes a perpetual cause of quarrels, domestic unhappiness, and prepares the way for adulteries and divorce. Wherefore: -

(A) In order to proceed cautiously, (a) the one about to marry will pray frequently and fervently, that he may obtain from God a most faithful spouse: "House and riches are given by parents; but a prudent wife is properly from the Lord."² (b) He will carefully weigh the character, qualities, and defects of the one whom he intends to marry; for, if the qualities and defects of things to be bought are attentively inspected, how much more must the qualities and defects of a betrothed person be weighed, since temporal happiness and in some way eternal happiness often depend on this choice; for a wife is a perpetual consolation or a perennial torment; by persuasion and example she can lead the man to the practice of virtue and religion, or on the contrary to sin or infidelity: "Blessed is the husband of a good woman; for the number of his years is double. A strong woman delights her husband, and will fill the years of his life in peace¹... Every wound is sadness of heart, and every wickedness is the wickedness of a woman²... It will be more pleasing to dwell with a lion and a dragon, than to dwell with a wicked woman"³... Now to detect vices and virtues is not the work of one day, but requires long and attentive consideration. (c) Besides, since it is difficult for younger persons, especially those taken by love, to form a right judgment concerning the qualities of the other betrothed person, let them seek the counsels of parents and friends, who are not so easily deceived concerning the qualities or defects of the other party.

² Prov., XIX, 14.

¹ Ecclesiasticus, XXVI, 1-2.

² Ecclesiasticus, XXV, 17.

³ Ecclesiasticus, XXV, 23.

880. (B) In selecting a spouse, (a) exterior qualities are not to be regarded exclusively or chiefly: beauty, vain adornment, riches, dignities, or anything of this kind; but rather intellectual, moral, and religious qualities, which can contribute more to the mutual happiness of the betrothed than vain beauty and other fleeting gifts. - Yet health of body is not to be omitted, since for conjugal life a sound mind in a sound body is required; hence those rather are to be kept from marriage who cannot discharge the function and duty of father or mother, at least until they become sufficiently robust.

(b) Attention must also be paid to stock, or progeny and the family of the consort: for offspring not rarely obtain by inheritance the vices or qualities of parents, in the order not only physical, but also moral.

(c) A certain equality, or at least proportion, between the betrothed is desirable: by reason of age;⁴ the man can be older than the woman (by about five or ten years), but not the reverse, since a woman grows old more quickly than a man. But it is not becoming that a young girl marry an old man: for soon she will hold him as hateful, and perhaps will foster adulterous loves. - By reason of education, insofar as a certain parity is necessary for a true companionship of minds. - By reason of condition; for if a noble man takes a common woman, soon both he himself, and especially his family, will despise her as rustic; if a poor man marries a rich woman, he himself shortly will be contemned both by the wife and by her family. - By reason of character, not indeed in the sense that both ought to be endowed with the same virtues or defects, but insofar as one ought to complete and perfect the other; for example, if one is prone to anger, it is expedient that the other be mild, lest perhaps they quarrel perpetually.

⁴ Concerning the age at which it is becoming for young persons to marry, nothing absolute can be said; generally it is expedient to enter marriage between the twentieth and thirtieth year, and it is not fitting to defer longer except for special reasons. Cf. H. Joly, La Crise du Mariage, ap. Le Correspondant, January 10, 1902, p. 108-138; Turgeon, Le Féminisme, t. II, p. 67-80.

(d) Finally both ought to be joined by mutual love, not indeed by a mad and lustful love, but by an honorable and supernatural one, by which each seeks not so much his or her own pleasure as the happiness of the other. Hence marriages entered on account of riches or honors, without mutual love, or with voluptuous love founded only on exterior qualities, for the most part obtain unhappy outcomes.

881. 3° The state of grace. For marriage is a sacrament of the living, so that one approaching it knowingly and willingly in the state of mortal sin becomes guilty of sacrilege. Indeed it is not prescribed by divine law or by general ecclesiastical law that those about to marry confess before marriage; strictly speaking it suffices that, if they are guilty of grave sin, they elicit an act of perfect contrition. But Trent¹ "exhorts spouses that, before they contract, or at least three days before the consummation of marriage, they diligently confess their sins, and piously approach the sacrament of the Most Holy Eucharist." Indeed, since they are about to enter a new state of life, it is becoming that they make a general confession, so that they may receive richer graces, and begin conjugal life more fervently.

¹ Sess. XXIV, de Reformat. Matrim., cap. I.

In certain dioceses confession before the nuptials is prescribed, and therefore the nuptial blessing regularly cannot be granted unless a certificate of confession has been shown. It is said regularly; for strictly it is not to be exacted when grave inconvenience is seriously feared, for example lest the betrothed, who have already contracted civil marriage, live in concubinage. Moreover diocesan Statutes cannot prescribe confession by way of an impediment.².. "Let not the pastor omit, according to the different condition of persons, to teach the betrothed the sanctity of the Sacrament of Matrimony, the mutual obligations of spouses and the obligations of parents toward offspring; and let him vehemently exhort them that before the celebration of marriage they diligently confess their sins, and piously receive the Most Holy Eucharist."³

² Card. Gasparri, De Matrimonio, n. 230.

³ Code, c. 1033.

882. Corollary. From this it is permissible to infer what is to be done with the unworthy and those bound by censure who wish to marry.

(A) A betrothed man or woman entering marriage with a consort whom he or she certainly knows to be in the state of mortal sin, much more probably does not sin, provided the nuptials cannot be abandoned without grave inconvenience, which will scarcely ever be lacking; for he or she is indeed the minister of the sacrament, but not by force of a certain consecration, and his or her cooperation in the sin of the other is only material; besides, a sufficient reason is supposed to be present; therefore the cooperation in the case is licit.

(B) The pastor can, and when asked generally ought, to assist at the marriage of those who are occultly guilty of sin or bound by censure: for here he is not the minister of the sacrament, but only an authorized witness, and therefore his cooperation is not so immediate; besides, the sacraments cannot be denied to occult sinners publicly asking. "If a public sinner or one notoriously bound by censure shall first have refused to approach sacramental confession or to be reconciled with the Church, let the pastor not assist at his marriage, unless a grave cause urges, concerning which, if it can be done, he should consult the Ordinary."¹ But as regards the marriage of a Catholic party with a party who has cast off the faith without having enrolled himself or herself in a false religion, or has enrolled in Societies condemned by the Church, recourse is to be had to the Bishop.²

¹ Code, c. 1066.

² Code, c. 1065.

Section II. - On the Celebration of Matrimony³

³ Rit. Rom., De Sacram. Matrimonii; Missale Rom., Mass for bridegroom and bride; De Herdt, t. III, 271-283; O'Kane, Notes on the Rubrics, ed. 5, 1088-1114; Gasparri, n. 1001-1054.

883. Marriage indeed essentially consists in consent: but this regularly must be expressed in the manner, time, and place prescribed by the Church; hence we shall speak both of the rite and of the time and place of celebration; here, however, there is question only of marriages between Catholics, since below it will be set forth what is to be done in mixed marriages.

I. On the Rite of Celebrating Matrimony

This rite consists of a twofold part: 1° the celebration itself, described in the Ritual; 2° the nuptial blessing, which is found in the Missal.

1° On the Celebration of Matrimony

884. (A) The pastor, or another priest delegated by him, is vested in surplice and white stole, - or, if he is immediately about to celebrate, in alb, stole, and chasuble of the color corresponding to the Mass, but not in maniple, which he receives immediately before the Mass. - Let at least one minister be employed, vested in surplice, who carries the book and the vessel of blessed water with the sprinkler.¹

¹ The use of spreading a white veil over the betrothed, which prevailed in some dioceses, was reproved by the S. Congregation of Rites, September 7, 1840, ap. Gasparri, n. 1010.

(B) Marriage is customarily celebrated before the high altar, or, if this is impeded, before another altar. The bridegroom stands at the right of the bride; the witnesses stand nearby either beside or behind the betrothed, so that they can see and hear; after them, parents and relatives, by whose presence it is becoming that the nuptials be honored.

(C) Constrained neither by force nor by grave fear² (which condition also is required for validity), the priest before the altar asks for and receives the consent of the contracting parties. - Let the betrothed clearly express their consent in such a way that the pastor and witnesses cannot doubt concerning it.

² Code, c. 1095, § 1, n. 3.

885. (D) When the mutual consent of the contracting parties has been given and accepted, let the priest order them to join right hands with one another, saying: "I join you in matrimony. In the name of the Father +, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen." Afterwards let him sprinkle them with blessed water, saying nothing.

Yet the Ritual continues: "Or let him use other words according to the received rite of each province"; from which it follows that legitimate customs prevailing in this matter can be observed.³

³ Thus in the United States of America, the betrothed, while they join right hands, give faith to one another with these words: "I, N., take thee N. for my lawful wife (husband), to have and to hold from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part." (Excerpta, ed. 8, p. 207.) A similar formula is employed in Hibernia and England, as O'Kane, n. 1107, attests.

(E) Afterwards the ring will be blessed, even in second nuptials, with the prayers described in the Ritual, and it is sprinkled with blessed water in the manner of a cross. The bridegroom, having received the ring from the hand of the priest, places it on the ring finger of the left hand of the bride, in sign of mutual fidelity and love.⁴ - If the ring is broken or lost, a new one can be blessed by the same formula, at any time. - After the handing over of the ring, the priest reads certain prayers over the betrothed.

⁴ In certain regions two rings are blessed, one for the bridegroom, the other for the bride. Others are blessed together with the ring: coins; which is laudable; others a ring (pièce de monnaie, coin): which is less laudable.

When several are joined in marriage at the same time, after first having received the consent of each one, the priest, having said the formula for each: "I join you..." there is nothing to prevent the blessings of the rings and the remaining blessings from being made in common by words in the plural number.¹

¹ Thus S. Office, September 1, 1841, ap. Acta S. Sedis, XXVI, p. 635.

886. Ceremonies (and indeed customs from c. 1100) oblige in conscience; the omission of all, without cause, would be a grave sin; the omission of one would be only a venial sin. Yet some think with St. Alphonsus (n. 899) that the words "I join..." or similar ones cannot be omitted without mortal sin.

2° On the Nuptial Blessing

887. (A) When the ceremonies described above have been completed, a votive Mass for bridegroom and bride is celebrated as often as this is permitted; and the nuptial blessing is given:² namely, after the Pater noster has been said, the priest, standing at the Epistle corner turned toward the betrothed kneeling before the altar, says over them two prayers which are found in the Missal; then, after Benedicamus Domino or Ite Missa est has been said, before he blesses the people, having turned toward the betrothed, he recites over them the prayer Deus Abraham; finally he admonishes them with a grave sermon that they preserve fidelity to one another, and sprinkles them with blessed water.

² Sometimes the ceremonies of the Ritual are also called the nuptial blessing; but properly this name is reserved for the prayers contained in the Missal.

(B) But this blessing cannot be given outside Mass, notwithstanding contrary custom. For thus the Ritual prescribes and the S. Congregation of Rites decreed³, by mandate of Pius IX, and the Code again sanctioned.⁴ Moreover a votive Mass for the betrothed can be celebrated in closed time when, by permission of the Ordinary, the nuptial blessing is given, with only Sundays and feasts of precept excepted, feasts of the first and second class, privileged Octaves of the first and second order, privileged Ferias, and the Vigils of the Nativity of the Lord.⁵

³ The S. Congregation, on September 1, 1838, had permitted this blessing to be given outside Mass; but, on June 23, 1853, it revoked this decree, and mandated that the blessing be imparted only in Mass. Cf. Decreta authentica S. C. Rit., nn. 3016 (formerly 5190), 3079 (5275), 3380 (5640).

⁴ Code, c. 1101, § 1. The nuptial blessing: a) can be given to spouses even after they have long lived in marriage; b) can be given only by a priest or by the delegate of a priest who can validly and licitly assist at the marriage (Code, c. 1101).

⁵ S. C. Rit., June 14, 1918. Cf. Code, c. 1108.

And when Ordinaries, by license of can. 1108, permit the nuptial blessing on the Nativity of the Lord and the Sunday of the Resurrection, to the Prayer of the Mass of the respective Feast there is added, under a single conclusion, the commemoration for the betrothed, as on the Feasts of Epiphany, Pentecost, the Most Holy Trinity, and Corpus Christi.¹,

¹ S. C. Rit., June 14, 1918.

From the decree of the Holy Office of September 1, 1841, the priest is not held to apply the Mass for the betrothed, unless he receives an alms from them; in the same Mass the priest can bless several betrothed couples;² the celebrating priest, but not another, must sprinkle with blessed water the betrothed kneeling before the altar; it is not licit to bless the betrothed in a Mass of the dead, but rather the blessing is to be transferred to another day.³

² In this case, according to De Herdt, n. 282, the prayers are not to be said in the plural, but as they are placed in the Missal.

³ S. Office, September 1, 1841, ap. Acta S. Sedis, XXVI, p. 635.

888. (C) According to the common opinion, a Mass with the nuptial blessing is of precept, not of mere counsel, unless a reasonable cause excuses. Yet more probably it does not oblige under mortal sin, as St. Alphonsus rightly teaches (n. 988). - The blessing is to be granted as often as the bride has not received it, whether she is a virgin, or a widow, or deflowered, even if the bridegroom is a widower and previously received the blessing; but not if the bride is a widow and has already once received the blessing. The reason is that the blessing, as it lies in the Missal, is properly uttered over the woman, and therefore it must be recited as often as the bride has not been blessed. - When the blessing is not given, the Mass for bridegroom and bride must be omitted.

According to the rubrics of the Missal, the priest, "after he has consumed the Blood, communicates the betrothed"; therefore this communion must be made within the Mass, and, according to the mind of the rubric, by way of sacrifice, insofar namely as two small hosts must be consecrated in this Mass for the bridegroom and bride. This indeed is altogether becoming, but does not strictly oblige; for the solemn blessing can be given even when the betrothed do not communicate; but Pastors ought to exhort those about to marry that they communicate in the nuptial Mass.

(D) The votive Mass for the betrothed, as we have already said, is permitted on any days, except Sundays, and also feasts of the first and second class, privileged Octaves of the first and second order, privileged Ferias, and the Vigils of the Nativity of the Lord, Epiphany, and Pentecost.⁴ - It must be said as a private votive Mass.

⁴ Il Monitore eccles., XXX, 235; Cong. of Rites, June 14, 1918.

On days on which the Mass for bridegroom and bride is prohibited, the Mass of the day must be said with commemoration of the nuptial Mass.

II. On the Time and Place of Celebration¹

¹ Thus S. Rit. Cong., March 21, 1874, ap. Acta S. Sedis, XII, p. 474.

889. 1° On the time. From the Code, marriage can be contracted validly and licitly at any time;² but the solemnities of nuptials are prohibited in the closed, or forbidden, time, that is, from the first Sunday of Advent to the day of the Nativity inclusively; and from Ash Wednesday to Easter Sunday inclusively; in each case the closed time begins from midnight. - Yet local Ordinaries can, with liturgical laws preserved, permit the nuptial blessing even in the aforesaid times for a just cause, after admonishing the betrothed that they abstain from excessive pomp.³

² Code, c. 1108. Therefore the custom by which, in our region, the matrimonial contract itself is prohibited "in closed time" is contrary to common law.

³ Code, c. 1108, § 2 and 3.

The reason for this prohibition is that the aforesaid times are devoted to prayer and penance or spiritual gladness, from which nuptial solemnities distract minds.

890. 2° On the place. "Marriage between Catholics is to be celebrated in the parochial church; but in another church or oratory, whether public or semi-public, it can be celebrated only by license of the local Ordinary or pastor. The Ordinaries of places can permit marriage to be celebrated in private houses only in some extraordinary case, and with a just and reasonable cause always acceding; but in churches or oratories, whether of a Seminary or of religious women, Ordinaries are not to permit it, unless necessity urges, and opportune cautions have been employed. But marriages between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party are to be celebrated outside the church; but if the Ordinary prudently judges that this cannot be observed without graver evils arising, it is committed to his prudent judgment to dispense on this matter (the celebration of Mass always excluded)."⁴

⁴ Code, c. 1109.

"When the marriage has been celebrated, the pastor or he who takes his place shall as soon as possible describe in the book of marriages the names of the spouses and witnesses, the place and day of the marriage celebrated, and other things according to the manner prescribed in the ritual books and by the proper Ordinary; and this even if another priest, delegated either by himself or by the Ordinary, assisted at the marriage. Besides, the pastor shall note also in the book of the baptized that the spouse contracted marriage on such a day in his parish. But if the spouse was baptized elsewhere, the pastor of the marriage shall transmit notice of the contract entered to the pastor of baptism, either by himself or through the episcopal Curia, so that the marriage may be entered in the book of the baptized."⁵

⁵ Code, c. 1103.

Chapter III