The vow of chastity and marriage

THE Catholic Church, following the teaching and example of our Lord and of St Paul, esteems very highly the beautiful virtue of chastity. According to her teaching, the state of marriage is indeed good, and Jesus Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, but the state of virginity is better. For such as wish to follow Jesus Christ more closely and to dedicate themselves wholly to God, celibacy and absolute chastity are proposed as a counsel of perfection. There is no fear that the number who embrace this counsel will ever be so great as seriously to interfere with the proper increase of “ the population. There will always be a sufficient number left in the world to enter upon the married state. Nor is the heroic renunciation of the pleasures of married life made by religious lost upon the world. As long as there are numbers of men and women to be seen who for love of God and chastity lead solitary lives, it should be more easy for people in the world to curb their fleshly appetites so as to keep within the bounds of reason and virtue.

By the vow of chastity the religious promises Almighty God. that he will altogether abstain from all venereal pleasure, whether of thought or deed. In consequence he is bound to observe perfect chastity of body and mind, so that any act which he commits contrary thereto will be a double sin, against the virtue and against his vow. We saw, when treating of the Sixth Commandment, that sins by which venereal pleasure is directly sought or consented to are always grave, and so, when such sins are committed by religious, their grievous malice will be twofold.

One who has taken a solemn vow of chastity is incapable of contracting a valid marriage by the law of the Church, and a fortiori he cannot enter on valid espousals. A marriage contracted and consummated before the taking of a solemn vow of chastity remains valid, but by ecclesiastical law a marriage which has not been consummated is dissolved by solemn vows taken in a religious order (Can. 1119). A simple vow of chastity never annuls a previous marriage, but it makes the use of marital rights unlawful. It is a disputed point as to whether a simple vow annuls previous espousals. A simple vow of chastity certainly makes subsequent espousals invalid, as being an unlawful promise, and it renders subsequent marriage unlawful though not invalid, except the simple vow made in the Society of Jesus, which is a diriment impediment to marriage by a special privilege of the Holy See.

85. I. Effect of the impediment. 1. A spouse bound by a vow asks the debt in itself lawfully,¹ but illicitly; nevertheless he can, indeed is bound to, ask:

1. If the partner is in danger of incontinence. The reason is that in this hypothesis the obligation of asking arises from the end itself of marriage; and this obligation prevails over the obligation that would follow from the vow.

2. If the partner, although not asking for intercourse, for example out of shame, nevertheless desires it; for then there is equivalently a petition. One bound by a vow cannot ask because of the danger of his own incontinence; for this danger, to be overcome, is intrinsic to the vow (St. Alphonsus VI, 930).

2. A spouse bound by a vow is bound to render the debt as long as the partner asks it lawfully and licitly; he can, but in practice is not bound to, render it if the partner asks it lawfully but illicitly (n. 99); he cannot render it if the partner has yielded the right of asking or has been deprived of it by adultery (n. 97).

Note. The impediment of a vow regards not only intercourse, but also imperfect acts.

II. Cessation of the impediment. 1. If the wife is bound by a vow, the husband can, with sufficient probability, directly annul the vow; if the husband has vowed, the wife enjoys only the faculty of indirectly annulling it; if both have vowed, the husband can directly annul the vow of the wife, but she, once freed from her vow, can indirectly annul the vow of the husband (cf. St. Alphonsus III, 239).

2. Bishops and regular confessors can dispense married persons in a vow emitted either before or after marriage: 1. if the vow is not reserved;² 2. if it is reserved, but then only in order to the right use of marriage,³ except, for both cases, the vow which both emitted after marriage by mutual consent, in which the Supreme Pontiff alone can dispense (cf., however, what was said under 1). This is drawn, as regards Bishops, if there is question of a non-reserved vow, from can. 1313, 1; if of a reserved vow, from immemorial custom; as regards Regulars, from their privileges not yet revoked (St. Alphonsus VI, 986, 987; de Privilegiis, n. 108 sqq.).

Note. In order that Regulars may use the privilege, the deputation of the General or Provincial must be added, or, as others add, of the local Superior; according to some, a special deputation is not required (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Moreover, the dispensation can also be granted outside confession.

¹ For a vow of itself does not involve the cession of right with respect to the partner, but only an obligation toward God.

² Private vows reserved to the Apostolic See are only the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and the vow of entering a religious institute of solemn vows, which were emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age (can. 1309).

³ Therefore a dispensed spouse sins also against the vow if he injures chastity outside the use of marriage; after the death of the partner the vow fully revives.

797. • I. A vow diriment of matrimony is only a solemn vow of chastity ¹, emitted through profession in an approved Religion. For a simple vow of chastity, even perfect and perpetual, does not invalidate matrimony ², but only impedes it, according to what was said above, no. 779.

¹ It is called a vow of chastity, not a religious vow, because religious profession invalidates matrimony precisely and only insofar as it includes a solemn vow of chastity. Therefore the vows, even solemn ones, of certain Equestrian Orders which profess only conjugal chastity do not invalidate matrimony. See Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 6, no. 45.

² The simple vows which, by a special privilege of Gregory XIII, are emitted in the Society of Jesus after two years of novitiate must be excepted, as we said elsewhere in the note to no. 759 above.

II. The Order diriment of matrimony, however, is sacred Order, namely, the Presbyterate, Diaconate, and Subdiaconate.

The First and Second Lateran Councils speak concerning each of these impediments, and the Council of Trent, session 24, canon 9, says: If anyone shall say that Clerics constituted in sacred Orders, or Regulars who have solemnly professed chastity, can contract matrimony, and that the matrimony contracted is valid notwithstanding ecclesiastical law or the vow, let him be anathema ³.

³ ** In the sole Clementine Constitution On Consanguinity and Affinity, a latae sententiae excommunication is imposed both against those who knowingly do not fear to contract matrimony with a nun and against nuns, Religious, and Clerics constituted in sacred Orders who contract matrimony. Moreover, this excommunication was not absolutely reserved, although the guilty could not be absolved before separation; but after separation they could be absolved by any confessor, unless perhaps the excommunicated persons had been denounced, for then the Bishop alone could absolve them. But under the new law this excommunication is altogether reserved to Bishops or Ordinaries. For in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis issued by Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX in the year 1869, among the latae sententiae excommunications reserved to Bishops or Ordinaries, this is read in the first place: Against Clerics constituted in sacred Orders, or Regulars and nuns after a solemn vow of chastity, presuming to contract matrimony, and also all those presuming to contract matrimony with any of the aforesaid persons.

§ 1. Marriage is impeded by a simple vow of virginity, of perfect chastity, of not marrying, of receiving sacred orders, and of embracing the religious state.

§ 2. No simple vow invalidates marriage, unless invalidation has been established for some by a special prescription of the Apostolic See (Can. 1058).

A vow of virginity is a vow of integrity of flesh, and for its prohibited object has the first consummated carnal work, namely voluntary effusion of seed either through intercourse or through pollution. Whoever enters marriage while entangled by this vow sins gravely; for it is against the law of the Church, which constitutes this vow an impeding impediment; then such a person places himself in a state in which by law the vow is rendered impossible, for when the other spouse asks for the debt, he is bound to render it, and by consummating marriage he violates the vow. Until virginity has been lost, he cannot ask; once it has been lost, he can ask. He is bound to render to the co-party who has the matrimonial right, and it would be illicit to deny it.

A vow of perfect chastity is a vow of abstaining from all external and internal acts contrary to the virtue of chastity; and whether it was temporary or perpetual, or was emitted by a Protestant before conversion, until it has ceased by lapse of time or dispensation or another mode, it renders marriage illicit. One entering with the intention of consummating it sins gravely. Once marriage has been contracted, the vow does not cease, and therefore it must be observed insofar as it can be, with the right of the other spouse preserved; hence he cannot ask, but he is bound to render to the one asking according to his right. But whether the obligation of observing the vow of chastity induces the burden of entering religion and of using the two months formerly conceded for ratified marriage, let Wernz, vol. 4, n. 566, Rosset, and Feije be consulted. Here "rightly," says Wernz, loc. cit., "he denies this obligation. For a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing (chastity, not religion), and for the observation of a vow no one is bound to employ a means so extraordinary and difficult, indeed dangerous on account of doubtful vocation." Id., ibid. He must altogether abstain if the other consents or has lost the right. But if he can abstain only with difficulty, he must seek dispensation as soon as possible. If the other spouse dies, and the time for which the vow was emitted has not elapsed, the vow urges.

1°. He who, once this vow has been emitted, contracts Marriage, sins gravely, as is manifest.

2°. Once Marriage has been contracted, he can render and also ask the debt, because the observation of the vow has now been made impossible.

3°. On account of the same reason, once the spouse has died, he can at least probably contract a new Marriage.

Note that often the vow of not marrying is taken for the vow of virginity, although a distinction is given, because virginity properly regards integrity of flesh, which is possible even after Marriage. Wherefore, if it is established that some girl has made a vow of virginity properly so called, it is not licit for her, once Marriage has been contracted, to ask for the first time.

In practice there is often doubt what someone has vowed, whether virginity, celibacy, or chastity; wherefore the penitent will have to be questioned concerning the end which he proposed to himself in vowing, and, the doubt persevering, that which is least is to be held. - Cf. Lacroix, book 3, part 1, n. 357; Lehmkuhl, n. 719.

1°. He who emitted such a vow sins gravely by entering Marriage, both because he deceives the other and because he exposes himself to the danger of violating the vow.

2°. Before the consummation of Marriage he is bound to enter Religion; and therefore he sins mortally when he consummates the Marriage for the first time, whether by asking or by rendering the debt, because he must fulfill the vow when he can.

3°. After Marriage has been consummated, he can ask and render the debt, because execution of the vow has been made impossible, and the asking of the conjugal act is not against that vow, since he did not vow chastity but the religious State.

1°. He who emitted that vow sins gravely by entering Marriage, as is well known.

2°. He is bound to receive Orders if he can, for example, if he obtains the consent of the other. According to several, he is bound to enter Religion before the consummation of Marriage, even with the other unwilling, so that he may be able to fulfill the vow. But others more probably deny this.

3°. Once Marriage has been entered, he can consummate it if he is no longer able to fulfill the vow. - Cf. Heiss, § 18.

Those who deduce the incapacity for contracting marriage from the very nature of the solemn vow, by which the whole man is so alienated from himself and devoted to the divine service that he can do nothing regarding marriage, show that the antiquity of this diriment impediment is equal to that of the Religious state itself. Thus Sotus, de Iustitia, lib. 7, quaest. 2, art. 3, where he holds that he is not truly a Religious whose cause for dispensation from Chastity rests with the Supreme Pontiff; in such a way that he excludes from this state the Knights of S. John, who indeed observe Celibacy from a special Constitution of the Pontiff, not from the force of a vow.

But whatever may be said of this opinion, which we discussed above, where we treated of the dispensation of a vow.

The other opinion is that from the time of Innocent II alone, who obtained the Pontificate in the year 1140, this vow constantly dissolved marriage, whereas before it only impeded contracting it; so Suarez reports, cap. 21, where he adduces various Fathers and decrees of councils seemingly supporting this.

I assert, however, that from time immemorial, and therefore from the very beginning of the Church, this vow has had the force of dissolving a subsequent marriage.

It is proved by various Councils and Fathers, whom I shall cite in tomo 7, tract. ult., disp. 7, quaest. 7; which Fathers and Councils existed before Innocent II, and notably Innocent I, who in cap. 12 and 13, epist. 2, recalls that by the vow of solemn profession a subsequent marriage is made void.

It is proved secondly, because the adverse opinion is gathered from nothing else than a certain text of Innocent II, which reads thus: But such a union, which is known to have been contracted against the Ecclesiastical Rule, we do not judge to be marriages. But it is badly inferred from this text: Therefore. The minor is proved. Because wherever a declarative word is employed in some law, no new constitution is understood, but either a declaration or a renewal of the old: but in that text only a declarative word is employed; for instance, we judge (Censemus), therefore.

Nor does it stand in the way that the word Censeo in the Gloss on Clement. 1, de concess. praeb. suggests a new law; and also to censure (censere) in the law ff. de verborum signif. indicates the same as I command. For in the former passage the urgency is not pressing; because it signifies indeed a new law, which it supposes the old one to have been extinguished; and thus it can declare that it revived anew, and therefore constitute it anew.

But that in civil law Censeo signifies the same as I command cannot be drawn by any consequence to canonical law, in which the propriety and simplicity of words is more observed: properly, moreover, Censeo among Cicero and other experts of the Latin tongue denotes to opine, or to judge: Besides, I urge that strong Authority of D. Augustine: What the whole Church holds and is not held to have been instituted by any Council, is believed to be derived from Apostolic tradition; as is found in lib. 4, de Baptismo, cap. 24; but not even a trace is found in any Council in which this Chastity first dissolves marriage by Ecclesiastical institution; therefore it must be believed to be derived from the Apostles themselves: that the Church has always believed and held this is evident from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 9, saying of it that it has always been retained.

Nor is it credible that the Fathers, who cultivated chastity with such severity, could have, up to Innocent II, celebrated marriage, undissolved, for those bound by vows, or have been ignorant of its excellence: It is confirmed from D. Basil, lib. de vera virgine, where he upbraids adulteries and deflorations to women marrying after the profession of Virginity. Likewise from Chrysostom, epistola 6, ad Theodorum, where he speaks thus, for if a woman has not power over her own body, but the man; much more they who live more safely for Christ than for themselves cannot have the condition of their own body, which words splendidly show that before the times of Chrysostom it was in use that the profession of Chastity would leave no way open to marriage; and moreover that from the very origin of the Religious state this was customary: nor does the S. Doctor seem to me to disagree with this last opinion, who in dist. 37, art. 1, quaest. 2, teaches that sacred Order has the virtue of dissolving a subsequent marriage, with the reason of a vow, rather than by the obligation of an Ecclesiastical statute; as we saw in the preceding question, which difference he would not have indicated so expressly unless he had judged it to be intrinsic to the vow, that from the very instant at which it is solemnly emitted it draws with itself, by its own force, every incapacity for marriage: the opposite, however, I shall indicate probabiliter from his own mind in tomo 7, tract. ult., where we treat of the impediments of marriage.

Nor can it be objected that the aforesaid Fathers understood this of the simple vow of Chastity, whose violation even in a valid marriage can be called adultery, insofar as it alienates the faith given to Christ. I say this cannot be objected: For, as Suarez remarks, cited above, D. Ambrose, who spoke in the mind of the other Fathers, is understood signally of the solemn vow of virgins, cap. 5, ad virginem lapsam, where he has thus: She who has promised herself to Christ, and has received the sacred veil, has already married, has already been joined to an immortal spouse, where sacred veil denotes solemn and Religious Chastity; for in the simple vow no veil intervenes; as is known to all.

And although some Fathers, and Councils, even ancient ones, speak of the marriages of made Virgins only as illicit, not as void, as is seen in the Councils, Toletanum I, Arelatense II, and others in Suarez, loco cit., nevertheless nothing is concluded from that against the antiquity of this Chastity, since their authorities are only negative, not positive: Besides, it could happen that in the first centuries, while the power of pagan princes was flourishing and luxuriating, such marriages were tolerated; but that they were approved is found nowhere.

Heretics, who always dwell in extremes, are accustomed to harass the Church on both sides, as she holds the mean of virtue: for there were some, as Bellarmine reports, lib. 2, de Monach., cap. 38, who absurdly dreamt that not only a consummated but also a ratified marriage could be dissolved by the vow of religious chastity. But undeservedly is Justinian involved with those professing the former error, leg. ult., Cod. de Episcop. et Clericis, since that law can be understood either of sponsi de futuro, or of a marriage merely ratified; nor does anything sound there which by any legitimate consequence can be drawn to a consummated marriage.

Moreover, since almost this whole question pertains to the treatise on Marriage, I shall remit its former part to eo quaest. 16, where I shall prove that a consummated marriage is insoluble in every way: I shall treat the other part also in quaestione 15, in the same place, where I shall show that by natural and divine law the profession of Religious Chastity dissolves, or rather dissolves a ratified marriage.

There remains therefore one thing to be examined here, namely from what time it has been customary in the Church that the solemn and Religious vow of Chastity be of such virtue as to dissolve a ratified marriage. Now this can be established only by some example of antiquity, or by the Decree of some Pontiff. You have several examples in Suarez, cap. 24, but serving the matter little: For that D. John was sponsor at the marriage in Galilee, and rejected them, already ratified, in order to follow Christ, is not credible, since it rests on very slight conjectures; and from it would follow that Christ went there rather to condemn the marriage than to honor it with his presence: which repugns the whole catalogue of Fathers disputing against the heretics. Grant that D. Bonan. be adduced by S. Hieronym., 4. dist. 27, art. 3, quaest. 2; for he speaks not assertively but disputatively.

Nor likewise do the examples of Iphigenia, failing from the embraces of Hirtacius, press, since no marriage followed, but a preceding vow, which had impeded the ensuing marriage. Say the same of D. Caecilia, bound by a simple vow of Chastity; for by a Divine inspiration she foresaw that the marriage to be entered into with Valerian would serve only for his conversion, but would not break out into any carnal act: of Macarius, indeed, and Alexius it can be said that, through zeal for a more perfect life, embracing Celibacy or the hermitage, not religion, they left their spouses: For nowhere is it read of them that they professed the Religious life.

Nevertheless, not absurdly is it gathered from this that the examples of these induced posterity to send a messenger to a ratified marriage, and to pursue themselves with vows of higher perfection; although simpliciter, for the sake of greater perfection, no one can at his pleasure bid farewell to ratified nuptials; otherwise this would be licit even on account of the pursuit of simple celibacy; whereas it is not licit on account of the Episcopate, which in the apex of perfection surpasses the others.

Therefore only from the rescript of Eusebius the Pontiff do we have that this custom is most ancient, so that the special time at which it began occurs to no memory: For the said Pontiff says in Gratian, cap. desponsata, 27, quaest. 2: A betrothed girl may not be given by her parents to another man, yet she may choose a Monastery for herself. Now this Pope sat before the year 1300, yet that this custom is older is evident from his very words: For he does not speak as one newly statutes, but as one declaring what was already before statutes; otherwise he would not say: Licet, but rather, liceat, as Suarez subtly remarks, cap. 24.

Some difficulty can arise, from the fact that she is called desponsata, which particle can be understood of betrothal for the future, not of marriage for the present: This, however, does not press, if it be noted that the Pontiff there prescribes a single remedy for withdrawing from a marriage, that the girl enter a Monastery; but if she had been betrothed by words de futuro, it would not be so arduous a business as to require the judgment of the supreme Tribunal, since for dissolving betrothals relief is furnished by many other ways for a just cause.

Add that, by the perpetual consent of the Doctors, and by long custom, which interprets the law best, that text is explained of a ratified marriage, as Suarez notes, num. 2; whence it must be concluded, according to the rule of D. Augustine noted in the preceding question, that from Apostolic tradition this custom of dissolving a ratified marriage, annexed to the vows of Religion, has been derived down to our own times.