Who can own property

Our Lord not only inculcated the duty of fraternal correction,¹ but he taught that in the first instance it was to be done in private, then in the presence of witnesses, and finally the delinquent was to be denounced to the public authorities in order that public morality might be safeguarded and the sinner more effectually corrected. This order should, of course, be followed per se, for charity and justice demand that our neighbour’s secret fault should not be made known to others except in special cases and for good cause. However, cases are not infrequent in which it is lawful to denounce a delinquent immediately to the superior without first attempting to correct him fraternally. Such cases are the following:

(a) If the sin be public, the sinner’s reputation is not injured unjustly by at once informing the superior, which accordingly may be done.

(b) If the paternal admonition of the superior will in all likelihood be more sure and efficacious than the fraternal correction of a private person, the superior may be immediately informed as a father, whose duty it is to correct his children for their good, not as a judge, whose duty it is to safeguard public interests by punishing crimes.

(c) If harm threatens the community from the action of the delinquent, and it can only be effectually prevented by the intervention of the superior’s authority.

(d) If the delinquent be one of a religious community whose members have voluntarily renounced their rights in this matter, and agreed that anyone who becomes aware of their faults may straightway inform the superior, such a one suffers no injury if the rule be acted on. However, even in this case there must be good reason for making the fault known to the superior, such as the sinner’s correction, the good name of the community, the preservation of discipline. If the sin was committed in the past, and there is now no good reason for making it known to the superior, it would be sinful to make it known to him. Religious have a right to their reputation.

Sometimes members of communities, and boys or girls at school, who know that serious harm to morals is being done by a black sheep among the flock, are bound under penalty of grave sin to give information to superiors so that the suitable remedy may be applied. Such cases require careful treatment from the confessor, who is bound to instruct his penitents concerning their obligations, and to refuse them absolution if they are not prepared to fulfil those obligations which bind them under penalty of grave sin. On the other hand, the seal of confession must be safeguarded at any cost.

¹ Matt. xviii 15

None but an intellectual being endowed with intellect and will can own property. For such alone, or persons as distinct from things, are the subjects of rights; persons alone can freely dispose of objects which are necessary or useful for the attainment of man’s destiny. Persons alone can suffer a formal injury by the wilful violation of their rights against their will, and so they alone are capable of having rights and holding property.

God, who is the Creator of all things, is also their universal Lord and Master. He can do what he pleases with his own; however he may treat his creatures, they cannot complain of God’s injustice toward them. He is bound only by the laws of his own infinite Goodness and Wisdom.

Other pure spirits whom God has created might conceivably have rights of ownership, but as they have no use for material things with which we are specially concerned, we need not further consider them in this connection.

All men, even imbeciles, who will never have the use of reason, and infants still unborn, are subjects of rights and capable of holding property. For they all require many things for their support, preservation, and defence, for the perfect development of all their faculties, mental and bodily, and for the orderly and secure attainment of their end. As, then, they are under the obligation of striving for the attainment of their end, and they have the right to do so, they have also the right to the necessary means. This reasoning is not invalidated by the incapacity of infants and imbeciles to use their faculties and administer their property. Their rational nature gives them their rights; their capacity to use them is not a necessary condition of their existence. A man who is asleep retains his rights, though he cannot then exercise them. Besides, whatever defect there might be in the title of infants and imbeciles to the rights of men is supplied by the provisions of positive law, which confers rights of property independently of the knowledge or acceptance of the owner.

Inasmuch as man is a social animal, and develops his faculties in the society of his fellows, whose help he constantly needs, nature herself has given him the right to form private societies, companies, or corporations, for the furtherance of common ends, independently of that larger public society which we call the State, and to which all belong. As Leo XIII teaches: “‘ Private societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are severally part of the State, cannot nevertheless be absolutely and as such prohibited by the State. For to enter into a society of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle—namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society.¹

The State, of course, has the right of control over such societies as are founded for civil purposes, and they are subject to the just laws which the State may make in their regard. English law acknowledges both corporations aggregate, consisting of more than one person united for the purpose of pursuing a common end, and corporations sole, consisting of but one person like the sovereign or the rector of a church. A corporation is a moral entity, a fictitious person, with rights of its own, distinct from the rights of the physical persons who compose it. As far as property is necessary for the attainment of its end, a corporation has the right of ownership, though this right is subject to the control and regulation of the supreme authority. Leo XIII in his encyclical on labour warmly approves of workmen forming their own unions and societies for the defence of their rights and the furtherance of their welfare.

¹ Encyclical on the Condition of Labour, May 15, 1891.

The fact that a woman marries does not of itself take away or lessen her natural capacity to possess property. Her husband is indeed the head of the family, and is presumed to be better able to administer family affairs than his wife. Moreover, the law of England used to give the husband very extensive rights over his wife’s property. For in general any freehold estate of which the wife was seized at the time of the marriage, or of which she became seized afterwards, became vested in her husband and herself during the coverture, and the husband was entitled to the profits, and had the sole control and management. By marriage a husband became possessed of his wife’s leaseholds in her right. He was not only entitled to the profits and management of them during the joint lives, but he could dispose of them as he pleased by any act during the coverture. The personal chattels of the wife became in general the absolute property of the husband.¹

By degrees inroads were made on the rigour of the common law, and means were found to secure separate property to a married woman. By the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 great changes were introduced, so that now a woman married after the first day of January, 1883, possesses as her separate estate all her property, whether acquired before or after the marriage. All women who were married before the above date similarly possess as their separate estate all property which comes to them after that date. Practically, therefore, during her life and that of her husband a married woman has rights of property as if she were single.

Furthermore, she has a right to support for herself and her children, even those of a previous marriage, at her husband’s expense, according to her condition in life, and she may effect an insurance on her own or on her husband’s life for her separate use.

¹ Stephen’s Commentaries, 2, p. 277.

We have already seen that not only physical persons but corporations or societies can also own property. The Church is a perfect, independent, and visible society founded by Christ our Lord, and endowed by him with all the rights and privileges which are necessary to enable her to attain her end. This end is the sanctification and salvation of souls by the preaching, propagation, and exercise of the Christian religion. It is obvious that for the support of the Church’s ministers and missionaries, for the building and upkeep of churches, for the decent and proper exercise of religious worship, and for numerous other purposes, ample revenues and lands are required, and, inasmuch as the Church has the obligation and the right to work for the end for which she has been founded by God, so she has the right to the necessary means. This reasoning is confirmed by the condemnation by the Popes of several false propositions bearing on the Church’s right of ownership¹ (Can. 1495).

¹ Props. 10, 32, 33, 36 of Wyclif; and Prop. 26 of the Syllabus.

We do not propose to treat here of the capacity of religious to own property; that question will be best considered when we treat of the state of religious. Here we only inquire into the property rights of the secular clergy.

The property of the clergy is divided by theologians into four kinds. What they possess as private persons, whether it has been given or bequeathed to them or they have inherited it, is called their patrimony. Quasi-patrimony is what they have obtained by the exercise of their ministry in stole fees, stipends, and casual offerings. Ecclesiastical goods are derived from the revenue of benefices. Savings are what a cleric has acquired by living sparingly and which he might have spent by living according to the ordinary standard.

Of these different kinds of property, patrimony and quasi-patrimony belong to the cleric; they are his private property, of which he has the ownership just like anybody else, for he is not deprived of the right to possess property by becoming a cleric. What he saves also from what he might have spent lawfully on his support belongs to him, for the labourer is worthy of his hire; he has a strict right to a decent living from the revenues of the Church, and what he saves from the sum required for this belongs to him as his own.

There is a difficulty concerning the profits derived from his benefice if the cleric has one. He may, of course, use the income derived from this source for his maintenance according to his rank; but supposing that a balance remains over, what must he do with that? Ecclesiastical law prescribes that he must employ it for pious purposes, and must not squander it or enrich his relations with it. He is bound under pain of sin to give it to the support of religion, or to the poor, or for educational or other pious causes. If he does not do this, he certainly sins against obedience; but does he also sin against justice, and is he therefore bound to make restitution ? This is a disputed question among divines. The more probable opinion is that he does not sin against justice and so is not bound to restitution; for the income derived from his benefice is his own property, and he may do what he pleases with his own, unless there be some free disposal of his property. law which restricts his In this case there is such a law, which must be observed, but which for all that does not make an act which it prohibits unjust; it only makes it unlawful (Can. 1473). . 2. In English-speaking countries there are few well-endowed benefices, so that in general the clergy have to be supported by the offerings of the faithful. As Leo XIII says in his Constitution Romanos Pontifices, May 8, 1881, the offerings of the faithful were not regarded as ecclesiastical property where religion and the clergy were sufficiently provided for from other sources. In Britain, however, the offerings of the faithful are almost the only means available for the maintenance of divine worship, the building and repair of churches and schools, the support of charitable institutions and of the clergy. Hence it becomes a matter of importance to be able to decide what offerings belong to the clergy as their own property, and what constitute ecclesiastical property and belong to the Church. Of the latter property the clergy are only the administrators, and they are bound to render an account of their administration to their superiors and to God. Rules for settling what offerings are private and what ecclesiastical property were drawn up by the Second Provincial Synod of Westminster, approved in the year 1856; and Pope Leo XIII sanctioned those rules and ordered them to be observed wherever his Constitution Romanos Pontifices should be in force. I here give Father Guy’s version of the rules: “ (1) Offerings of the faithful for the propagation and ornament of religion, for the support of the clergy, the relief of the poor, and other pious uses, are considered as made to God and the Church, and the administrators or guardians of them, whether ecclesiastics or laymen, are to be deemed merely dispensers of them, under an obligation of rendering an account to God of their stewardship. As here now it is required among the dispensers that a man be found faithful in those things which concern the rightful administration of Church property, it seems proper that in this synod we should treat this matter more fully, inasmuch as having been occupied with matters more important in the First Provincial Council, we deferred the consideration of this subject to a more convenient opportunity. _“* (2) Every effort must be made to determine, if there be any doubt, the intention and purpose of the donor or testator of each fund, and that the proceeds of it may be rigidly applied to the use prescribed by him.

“‘(3) If this intention cannot be ascertained from any trustworthy document, rules or canons by which a safe judgement may be formed in such cases should be observed.

(4) Whenever a church or school or any other building intended for religious uses is erected or provided, either wholly or in part, from money contributed by the faithful, or granted by any society administering the alms of pious Catholics, every edifice of this kind is to be considered as belonging for ever to the place where it stands.

“‘(5) The same judgement must be passed on buildings erected by any benefactor, unless it is clearly proved that he made a declaration that in erecting such an edifice he did not intend it for the advantage of the faithful of that place, but that he wished to confer a benefit on some particular order. The rules laid down in this and the preceding number as to rights in foundations are in the case of Regulars to be applied to new foundations only. ** (6) But the Bishop shall not be allowed on this account to take away a mission lawfully entrusted to any religious order. These rules regard merely a case in which a religious body either cannot or will not retain the care of a mission—for example, if a superior remove it to some other place, or for any other reason it there cease to exist altogether, and not for a time only. “ (7) If, however, any mission be founded altogether or for the most part by funds belonging to any religious body, which for good reasons may wish to leave entirely and go elsewhere, we recommend that a distinct agreement be made between the Bishop and the superiors of the order as to what has to be done; so that on the one hand just rights may not suffer, and on the other no scandal may arise nor grievous loss of souls ensue. (8) Much less is it lawful for any cleric, or even for the Bishop himself, to alienate Church property, as is evident from almost numberless decrees of canon law. If, however, on account of reasons approved of by the canons, such an alienation become necessary, the priest can never act in this matter without the authority of the Bishop, nor the Bishop without the precautions required by canon law.

“‘(9) In every mission where money is contributed by the faithful in the ways hereafter described it is to be accounted Church property, and not a donation to the priest. For from this money he must provide not only for his own decent support, but for the expense of religious worship, for the maintenance of the fabric, for payment of debts, where there are any, and for other wants. Wherefore, if any priest leave a mission during the course of the year, he has not a right to his proportion of the yearly income until the amount justly due for expenses be deducted. In like manner, what he has provided for the use of the church from the income of the - church—for example, wax candles, wine for the most holy Sacrifice, sacred furniture—these he should leave behind him, without any compensation, unless he can clearly show that the supply is excessive. “

(10) All are aware that there are now in operation different methods of raising money for the support of missions. The following in particular we do not disapprove of, till the charity of the faithful shall provide in a better way. They are:

(a) Letting of seats or places in the church to certain persons or families at a fixed rent to be paid to the church.

(b) Church collections made at the Offertory. (c) According to a custom prevailing generally in England, payment of a fixed sum, according to the part of the church which they occupy, by those who do not rent seats, yet are not content to occupy what is called the free space. (d) Sermons by some distinguished preacher of the word of God, after which the alms of the congregation, whose number is often swelled by a concourse of strangers, are collected for the general or particular use of the church or for some special purpose. (e) Collections which are either made from house to house, by persons appointed for the purpose, or by societies and confraternities lawfully appointed, or which are gathered from tens or hundreds as is done in the excellent society called the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, or contributions made by the more wealthy portion of the congregation at fixed times or yearly. “

(11) Although it is certainly much to be desired that many of these methods of maintaining the Church were done away with, yet experience has taught that it is as yet impossible altogether to dispense with them. Wherefore, in those places where one or more of these methods prevail, they ought to be so kept on that no innovations be introduced without the authority of the Bishop. Especially the free space should not be diminished nor narrowed without consulting him. But whatever money comes to the mission by these means, it should be considered as belonging not to the priest personally, but to the general wants of the mission. Therefore, whatever furniture, either sacred or domestic, he acquires from these sources, or whatever he expends in keeping in repair the church or other buildings in any way belonging to it, in this expenditure he is not making provision for himself, but is providing for the mission from mission property. ‘

(12) As soon, therefore, as any priest enters on a mission, an inventory of all property belonging to the mission should be placed in his hands by the dean or by someone deputed by the Bishop. The missionary is bound to keep the furniture and buildings in good repair, yea, rather to improve them, that he may deliver to his successor as much at least as he received himself. Should he provide for the renewing of what is grown old and mean, or procure something new and more elegant to ornament the place, a distinction must be made as regards the sources from which the expense is defrayed.

(a) If the priest has procured these things from his own property, or from the gifts of friends well disposed towards him, or in fine, from that portion of the income of the church which he might have expended on his own decent maintenance, they are to be considered as his own property, provided he has kept all that he received in good order. (b) But if these things were procured out of the general revenues of the church, or by gifts and collections from the congregation, or by money granted by the Bishop or the administrators of the temporalities of the diocese, they are to be deemed entirely the property of the mission, nor is it lawful for the priest on any account to claim them. “*

(13) It is also to be generally understood according to a rule of canon law that things adapted for ecclesiastical purposes given to a missionary are, unless there is proof to the contrary, given to the mission; but things adapted for personal use are presumed to be given to the priest personally, as are also such church things as are given by a flock to a priest as tokens of gratitude or affection. ‘

(14) Retributions for Masses are the property of the priest. In like manner, where it is the custom, which is a very ancient one in England, of making presents to each priest at Easter and Christmas, these gifts of right belong to them. But the priest should be on his guard lest he incur the suspicion of avarice, by receiving anything on account of his administering the sacrament of Penance.

“‘(15) As to the application of money derived from stole fees, there is no uniform practice throughout the whole Church. For though the Church detests all filthy lucre in extorting or exacting money for the administration of the sacraments, yet the Council of Lateran, held under Innocent III in the year 1215, prescribed that the laudable customs in accordance with which offerings were made by the faithful to the ministers of the altar, on occasion of the administration of the sacraments, should be observed. The proceeds derived from this source should be ordinarily considered as belonging to the priests; though they are distributed in different ways in different places. That distribution seems to be the best which is most conducive to alleviate the burthens of the mission. “

(16) Whilst, therefore, we forbid anything to be asked for and much more anything to be exacted before the celebration of baptism and matrimony, and even after the celebration as a right, we leave it to the prudence of Bishops to determine in their diocesan synods what seems best adapted to the customs and state of places. Especially should they most vigilantly correct all abuses, if any exist, as to the amount or to the exaction of these offerings, by enforcing everywhere an equitable arrangement.”

These provisions seem to be in harmony with Canons 1182, 1519-1528, etc., of the new Code, and so it would seem that they are still in force.

TITLE is a cause sufficient to confer property in a thing. There are several kinds of title, some derived from the natural law, others due to positive law, and others which have their effect from the will of private persons. They may be reduced to title by occupation, by accession, by prescription, and by contract. On account of its importance and the abundance of material we will treat of contract in a separate Book; the other three titles must be considered here.

Occupation is the taking possession of some material thing with the intention of making it one’s own. It will be a lawful title to ownership of property if the thing occupied had previously no owner, and actual possession is taken of it with the purpose of making it one’s own. If these conditions be fulfilled, it seems useless to investigate further how occupation is capable of conferring property. Whether the fact of occupation sanctioned by the community is sufficient, or whether we say that by occupation a man’s labour is mingled with the thing, and thus the connection of ownership is set up, is really immaterial. It is a title universally acknowledged and is derived from Nature herself.

As is clear from the definition, there cannot be occupation without actual, or at least constructive, taking possession of the thing, whether it be movable or immovable; it is not sufficient merely to see the thing at a distance, nor is it enough to take hold of it with the intention of seeing what it is, without any idea of retaining it for one’s own.

Most things of value, especially the land, have owners already, and so a title to ownership by occupation can only arise with reference to certain classes of property which are not of very great importance. In moral theology this title is at the root of ownership derived from finding lost property, treasure-trove, and the capture of fish and wild animals. Here English law only partially agrees with what seems safe in conscience.

The Chief Kinds or Ways of Occupation.—(a) Animals.—Domestic animals (e.g., dogs, cats) may not be occupied, even though they have strayed from their owner; tamed animals (e.g., bees, pigeons, songbirds) may be occupied only when they have recovered their liberty; wild animals (e.g., birds, foxes, fishes, hares, etc., at large) may not be occupied, unless they are kept in a small enclosure from which they cannot escape.

(b) Land and Plants. These may be occupied only when they have no present owner.

(c) Treasure-trove.—This is a deposit of precious movables hidden away so long ago that it is impossible to discover the owner. According to natural law it may be occupied by the finder, but the civil law sometimes decides that the find must be divided with the owner of the place or with the government.

(d) Lost Property.—This embraces those movables which an owner has recently parted with, through accident or forgetfulness, without any intention of giving up his ownership of them, and which are now easily findable, although their owner is not known. The finder is obliged to make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If he neglects to make these efforts, proportionate to the worth of the found article, and is convinced that he might have found the owner, he is considered by some theologians to be a possessor in bad faith and bound to reserve the article for the owner or turn it over to the poor or to pious causes. Having made the effort unsuccessfully, according to natural law, he may use the article as his own. The prescriptions of civil law as to the time interval before he may begin to use the article must be observed.

(e) Abandoned Goods.—According to natural law one may occupy goods voluntarily relinquished by the owner (e.g., an old automobile left by the roadside), but the civil law sometimes awards certain classes of goods (e.g., immovables) to the State.

(f) Vacant Goods.—According to natural law the goods of one who died without heirs may be occupied; but under the civil law they usually devolve to the State, whether they be movables or immovables.

Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.—What is the guilt of one who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for other purposes?

(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user is to make only a temporary loan of the money.

(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin, or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing the amount for the company’s benefit).

(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus, if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is ordinarily present, this case would be rare.

What is ownership? - Among the three species of justice, as has already been said, commutative justice alone is strictly and properly justice altogether. For in legal justice there is lacking distinction toward another; for every citizen is part of the community. But in distributive justice there is lacking right strictly so called; for in the distribution of common goods, toward obtaining a part of them, there is given only mere dignity, and in no way property. But since commutative justice is exercised only between private persons, and renders to each one what is his own proper thing, hence it alone is strictly and properly justice altogether, and it is chiefly treated in this treatise. But since commutative justice regards equality of thing to thing, it is concerned only with the right of property, which is customarily called property and ownership.

Ownership is: the moral power of disposing at will of some corporeal thing as one's own, unless nevertheless it is prohibited by law, agreement, or the will of a testator. "Moral power," and thus it is distinguished from physical power; moral power, and therefore legitimate. "Of disposing of a thing," and thus it is distinguished from jurisdiction, which is also called ownership of jurisdiction, so that it may be distinguished from ownership of property: for jurisdiction is the moral power of governing; nor is it exercised immediately over a thing, but over a subject person. "Corporeal," because of incorporeal things one does not have ownership, but rather a right. "At will," that is, by selling, donating, or even destroying without cause, which although otherwise prohibited, because God permits ownership to each one only for this purpose, that it may serve his own necessity and utility and that of his own people, nevertheless does not violate the right of another and is not against commutative justice. "As one's own," for ownership properly is a right in the thing, and not precisely a right to the thing, which tends to that right and is perfected and completed by it. Much less is ownership mere possession of a thing. "Unless prohibited by law": by natural law, if one cannot dispose of his own thing without injury to anyone; by positive law, and thus alienation of their things is not permitted to minors except from a just cause and with certain solemnities observed, though in this case ownership is not taken away, but only its use is impeded. "By agreement": this would be, for example, if it were agreed between seller and buyer that the buyer is not to use the thing bought except after a certain day. "By the will of a testator": this would be, for example, if the testator had bequeathed a farm to someone on this condition, that he not use it except after a year. C. I. 436; C. G. 544; C. H. 348; C. A. 353, 354; C. B. 903; C. He. 641; C. L. 2167 ff.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66; Gousset 673; E. M.

Physical and Moral Persons. I. Here on earth, all men and only men are capable of dominion and rights. Public authority can restrict this capacity on account of the common good.

II. Men, however, can be considered either as individuals or as several conspiring toward an end. From that very conspiring there arises a new unity, and therefore a new being, not indeed physical, but one which reason knows and which, through the various rights and offices consequent upon its constitution, enters the moral order. But insofar as this being is a subject of right, it also becomes, in the juridical sense, a true person, which is called juridical or moral.

The conspiring itself can have an origin either voluntary or necessary.

And we know that, by natural divine Providence, i.e. with nature as guide, it came to be that men coalesced into perfect societies of the temporal order, which from Nature itself borrow an inviolable existence and rights for pursuing their end. These are civil societies as such; they are also States, or political powers, independent from the citizens or members, and furnished with all rights which are necessary on account of the common good.

But within perfect Society itself, smaller societies are connaturally formed, whose origin must be referred to the free consent of citizens, not to political authority. Those which, on account of their end or means, are illicit or dangerous can be prohibited or destroyed by political authority; but, contrary to what the liberal school contended, they are neither created by the State nor do they obtain from the State the right of existing with necessary means. That right flows immediately from the very right of physical persons. Formal recognition of them can add protection and rights; but even before that recognition they exist as true persons. Yet because they can more easily than individual men become harmful, and because the faculty of providing for the common good cannot be renounced by the State, there is a more frequent cause and a more frequent use of prohibitions by which liberty of acting or possessing is contained within narrower limits for moral persons.

Historically, however, the laws which ordered the new affairs of France at the end of the eighteenth century were very hostile to societies which associated persons of the same art or profession, or intended a non-economic end; while, on the contrary, they began to favor greatly societies of things, or industrial and mercantile societies. But that intolerance toward personal societies, which hostile inclinations toward the Catholic Church and therefore toward religious Congregations nourished, could not endure for long; and, with unequal speed, for example under the name of syndicates, from the middle of the nineteenth century societies of persons began to be publicly recognized. At the same time lucrative societies have abused persons and things not a little; and now, increasing constantly in extension and wealth, they have become so powerful that they have seemed able to decide about war and peace and to make public authority itself subject to them.

Present civil laws. At present, for every association and destination of things to a special end, even philanthropic or religious, the laws of Holland, of the United States of North America, and of England are most convenient; corporate law has been developed most of all in Germany.

• Although the German Code, art. 21, for the juridical capacity of societies which do not pursue an economic end, requires only inscription in the register of the Amtsgericht (inferior tribunal), nevertheless by article 81 of the introductory law the laws of the States are confirmed by which the law alone can confer the same capacity on religious associations. The more liberal Code of Austria, art. 26, regularly confers on lawful societies the same rights by which singular persons enjoy. For the rest, the Codes of Latin law do not agree in this matter. After the Code of France, which seems completely to ignore juridical persons, the Codes of Spain, art. 35; of the Mexican republic, art. 39; of Portugal, art. 33, require the intervening authority of law in order that a moral person come to be; while the civil Code of Switzerland, art. 52, exempts ecclesiastical and family foundations, and all honorable associations which do not pursue gain as their end, from inscription in the commercial registers which is necessary for societies which have profit as their end, in order that they become juridical persons; and art. 54 sanctions the principle of the capacity of these persons. The Code of the Brazilian republic, art. 16, is content with inscription in the public registers in order that civil or religious associations be constituted and be moral persons. The recent Belgian law of 27 July 1921 now procures great facility for obtaining civil personality ¹, while France so arranged the law of 1 July 1901 on the liberty of associations that by force of that law very many religious were punished with exile.

It is helpful to compare briefly the liberal regime of Holland with the regime of France. In Holland, the juridical constitution of the Church is sanctioned by art. 168 of the Fundamental Law itself. But the law of 22 Apr. 1855 reserved to a special law the recognition of a moral person which wished to exist indefinitely or for at least thirty years; but below thirty years, royal approval of the statutes suffices, which can be denied only for reasons of the common good, to be expressed in the decree itself. Wherefore most associations are constituted by this more level way for 29 years and 11 months; when that space has elapsed, they are again confirmed. Thus religious houses exist civilly. But those ecclesiastical associations which pertain more intimately to the organic constitution of the Catholic Church borrow their juridical character from the law of 10 Sept. 1853. The laws of the Church and the ordinations of bishops concerning these associations obtain civil firmness as legitimate statutes. But as to capacity, moral persons of themselves are equated to physical persons; nevertheless they cannot have usufruct beyond 30 years, and certain of them, e.g. churches and religious institutions, need royal approval in order to accept legacies and donations. Cf. Duynstee, op. c., n. 25-40. - In France, however: a) undeclared associations are not a moral person; but alongside them a certain society, as existing in fact, has been admitted by judges; b) declared associations can receive no donation, no legacy, but only assessed contributions of members; c) associations instituted because of or on the occasion of the war, if they have been permitted, can receive, besides the contributions of members, also liberal gifts; d) associations which have been declared "publicly useful" (d'utilité publique) must be erected by decree; then they have full faculty of acquiring by gratuitous title; e) associations of religious congregations (congréganistes) are forbidden to exist without the authority of law. The law by which they are permitted defines in what way they must exist; f) syndical associations can freely have every kind of possessions and acquisitions ². - Recently also, as legitimate for ecclesiastical goods, there have been recognized diocesan associations, concerning which there is the encyclical letter of the Supreme Pontiff Maximam gravissimamque, 18 Jan. 1924. - We omit lucrative societies, which continue to enjoy protected liberty.

Therefore civil society still must be purified more fully of the errors of the liberals who contended: a) that moral persons can be created and suppressed by the State alone; b) that while everything which is not prohibited is lawful to physical persons, moral persons can do only what has been conceded to them; c) that associations which go beyond an economic end must be regarded as dangerous and suspect; d) that the goods of an extinct moral person can be usurped by the treasury.

Furthermore, of itself, not only by public power but also by private agreement, certain goods can be devoted to a definite end, for so long a time or in perpetuity, that that universality of things seems to imitate a person in some way.

Thus far concerning civil society. But religious society, or the Church, by the positive will of Christ its founder has been so constituted that all its rights, for dispensation, have been committed to Peter and his successors.

Hence, independently of the members of the Church, the Church and the Holy See, from the divine ordination itself, have the character of a moral person (c. 100, § 1); while the rights of lesser societies in the Church exist dependently upon hierarchical power. Moreover this dependence can assume various forms, so that it can be more or less open and explicit. But the discipline of today, by force of c. 100, § 1, is that "the other inferior moral persons in the Church receive that [character of a moral person] either from the prescription of the law itself or from a special concession of the competent ecclesiastical Superior given by formal decree for a religious or charitable end."

By the prescription of the law itself religious Institutes and religious houses are persons.

Canonical law distinguishes collegiate moral persons (or persons composed of persons) and non-collegiate ones, such as benefices and universals of things applied to a definite end.

Nothing further would have to be said in this chapter, unless the peculiar condition of certain persons, of itself or by positive law, gave place to a peculiar regime which affects the capacity of acquiring and disposing. They are children under family power, wives, clerics, and religious. But the cause of the peculiar regime is one thing for the first two classes of persons, another for the latter two.

¹ Loi sur les associations sans but lucratif. Cf. on that law the annotations of R. D. Ferdinand Claeys Bouuaert^†.

² Cf. Colin and Capitant, I, p. 953.

600. • The subject of dominion is the owner of some thing, or he whose some thing is.

Hence 1° to God alone belongs supreme and absolute, and therefore independent, dominion over created things, as Scripture cries out: The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and all they who dwell in it.³ Indeed he can communicate this dominion to no one, because it depends on creation and conservation, from which God cannot abdicate himself. Yet this does not prevent God from being able to communicate particular dominion to rational creatures, according to that: but the earth he has given to the children of men.⁴

2° On earth every and only man is capable of dominion. It is proved. "He alone can have a right who is capable of suffering injury ... but he alone suffers injury who suffers it unwillingly; but he ought to be unwilling not indeed by a will by which he wishes a thing to be his, but by a will by which he wishes to retain right to the thing itself, or to obligate others not to take it away. But brutes cannot have such a will, since they can know neither moral obligation nor turpitude; therefore they cannot be unwilling, just as they cannot give permission or transfer dominion for the same reason, because, since they do not know moral right, they cannot yield their own right. ... Therefore only intellectual nature, which can know objects of this kind, is capable of having dominion."¹

3° Nor are infants incapable of dominion, nor even the insane; for the use of reason, of which they lack, is necessary only for disposing here and now of goods, or for the exercise of right (n. 589), but not for having dominion, which is founded in the nature of man and his powers, not in the actual exercise of the powers. (a) p. 475.

We must treat especially of the dominion 1° of children of a family, - 2° of wives, - 3° public and national dominion, - 4° of colleges or corporations, - 5° of the Church and clerics. But concerning the dominion of Religious it will be said below in the Treatise on States, where the vow of poverty is treated.

612. • Public dominion is called the dominion of the republic over all things destined to the public and common use of citizens. Thus each State has dominion over bridges, canals, and roads.

Over roads which we are accustomed to call national, namely those which were made by authority of the supreme assembly, Congress, through various States on account of the transmission of letters and documents, the easier passage of soldiers, and other uses common to the whole nation, authority belongs to the general government. But this authority should scarcely be called by the name of dominion, since each State is supreme and would bear with difficulty dominion in the true sense of the name exercised by the general assembly.¹

613. • It pleases one to call national dominion the public lands which namely the President, in the name of the Federated States, buys from the Indians by the right, as they call it, of pre-emption, with money or merchandise handed over for them. In this way it has happened that the Indian tribes have little by little withdrawn farther away; and these, each year, by a new cession of lands made for a very small price, easily supply the general treasury with a means of increasing the public treasure, by selling to new settlers the lands thus bought.²

614. • Not only physical persons (individuals), but also moral persons are capable of dominion. Among these colleges (corporations) obtain the chief place.

Definition. - "A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and are vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be, as a single individual." Therefore it differs from a contract of society or partnership (n. 1018).

615. Division. "Corporations are divided: 1° Into aggregate and sole. A corporation sole consists of a single person, who is made a body corporate and politic, in order to give him some legal capacities and advantages, and specially that of perpetuity, which, as a natural person, he cannot have. A bishop ... is given in the English books as an instance of a corporation sole; and he and his successors in perpetuity take the corporate property and privileges; and the word successors is generally necessary" (in the grant) "for the succession of property in a corporation sole.⁴ The corporations generally in use with us are aggregate;⁵ but there are instances also in this country of sole corporations.

2° Into religious and lay.¹

Lay corporations are again divided into eleemosynary and civil.²

Civil corporations ... are either public or private. Public corporations are such as are created by the government for political purposes, as counties, cities, towns, and villages. ... If the foundation be private, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted by the founder, or by the nature of the institution."⁴

616. How they are created. - "With us they are created by authority of the legislature," and also de facto by that of the Congress,⁵ which has exercised it twice by the incorporation of a national bank.

617. The powers and capacities of corporations. - "The ordinary incidents to a corporation are: 1° To have perpetual succession, and, of course, the power of electing members in the room of those removed by death or otherwise. 2° To sue and be sued, and to grant" (except by will) "and to receive" (except also by will unless specially authorized by their charter) "by their corporate name. 3° To purchase and hold lands and chattels. 4° To have a common seal. 5° To make by-laws for the government of the corporation; this power, however, must be exercised within the limits of the charter, and in subordination to the Constitution and general law of the land, and the rights dependent thereon. 6° The power of amotion, or removal of members." But this power also must be exercised for good cause, and for some offence that has an immediate relation to the duties of the party as a corporator.

"It is now very generally the practice to specify, in the act or charter of the corporation, the powers and capacities with which it is intended to endow the corporation."⁶

618. Dissolution of corporations. - A corporation may be dissolved, 1° by statute; 2° by the natural death or loss of all the members, or of an integral part; 3° by surrender of its franchises; 4° by forfeiture of its charter through negligence or abuse of its franchises.

For Louisiana see "Civ. Code of Louis."²