Commentary V: On Ignorance

1. In the preceding Commentaries we have spoken about the nature of the human act; now we must speak about the impediments of the same human act. For having a human act there is required the exercise of an adverting intellect, the exercise of the free choice of the will, and the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from the free will. If we consider the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are truly doing, thinking that we are doing something else. Often also we act, impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear. Not rarely also we are forced to suffer, wholly unwilling, by an extrinsic force inflicted on the members of our body. Hence it is asked whether acts of this kind are truly human acts and imputable to the agent, since ignorance, concupiscence, fear, force, or violence seem to take away or diminish the aforesaid conditions and endowments of the human act. For ignorance takes away the prerequired cognition; concupiscence clouds and diminishes it; likewise concupiscence, fear, and violence hinder the inclination of the will. In the present Commentary there will be discussion only of ignorance. Concerning concupiscence, concerning fear, concerning force, there will be discourse in the following Commentaries.

2. Ignorance is distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Ignorance can be compared either to the will of the one ignorant, or to the action done ignorantly. With respect to the will, every ignorance is either antecedent, because it precedes the consent of the will, or consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. The former is involuntary, the latter voluntary. With respect to the action, it is either antecedent, because it is the cause of the act, or concomitant, because it is not the cause of the act. Hence the same ignorance can be antecedent and consequent in a diverse respect: antecedent, because it is the cause of the act; consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. Becanus, Tr. 1, C. 2, q. 10, n. 36.

3. The first question which is raised concerning ignorance, and which the Angelic Doctor in fact raises, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8, is: “whether ignorance causes the involuntary.” The question is not whether ignorance causes the non-voluntary, or the involuntary merely privatively. For it is evident and not disputable that an act from ignorance, or done with ignorance, destitute of the condition essentially required for the voluntary, is a non-voluntary act. Therefore the question is only whether an act of this kind is, besides, involuntary, namely involuntary contrarily. Understand involuntary with respect to the condition ignored, not with respect to the object known and willed. For he who, for example, eats meat on a forbidden day can be understood to will and operate two things. The first is to eat meat, which is not unknown by him; the other, that he transgresses the precept, is unknown by him.

4. Therefore ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly “when ignorance is about that which is done; nevertheless even if it were known, it would nonetheless be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to will that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is both done and ignored; as in the example posited, namely when someone indeed wished to kill an enemy, but, being ignorant, kills him, thinking that he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary (namely contrarily), because it does not cause something which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary (or the involuntary merely privatively), because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. And this holds whether that concomitant ignorance is voluntary or is involuntary. Hence it is that the Angelic Doctor speaks generally and does not distinguish. Nevertheless a difference is present between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case, because, although neither causes the involuntary, concerning which the Holy Doctor properly treats, l. c., nevertheless involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes the simply non-voluntary; but voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, indeed makes the non-voluntary in itself, but voluntary in the cause. “Therefore because that which is caused from the will is regarded as voluntary in morals, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary, to that extent it falls short from this, that it causes the non-voluntary.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.

5. If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is a cause, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or is antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is then done from the ignorance itself. “Consequently,” says St. Thomas in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary.” Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, “since it itself is voluntary..... it cannot cause the simply involuntary (namely contrarily, since that which is done is voluntary in the cause whence it proceeds, namely in that willed ignorance); nevertheless it causes the involuntary secundum quid, insofar as it precedes the motion of the will toward doing something, which would not exist if knowledge were present”; ib.; namely, although that motion of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is wholly involuntary; for it would not be if knowledge were present. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4.

6. But if the ignorance causing, or which is the cause of doing that which is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not exist if knowledge were present, and thus is against the will. Nor indeed is it, in itself, willed; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. “Antecedently,” says the Holy Doctor in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act, which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for instance when someone, diligence having been applied, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passer-by. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply.”

7. Whether ignorance renders an act objectively null? — Resp. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot alter the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who, in baptizing, thinks that a man is not in reality justified by baptism, if nevertheless he has the intention of doing what the Church does, validly baptizes. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the true water is natural, validly baptizes. A parish priest who assists at matrimony, falsely thinking that he still needs a certain special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Cf. Bonac., De Sacram., D. 1, Q. 2, P. 1, n. 28.; Sporer, De Matr., n. 48.

8. Whether ignorance is always a sin? — Ignorance differs from nescience and from error. Nescience is the simple negation of knowledge; whence anyone who lacks knowledge of certain things can be said not to know them. Nescience, as is clear, is not a sin. But ignorance is the privation of knowledge, namely when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is apt by nature to know. Error is to approve false things as true. “Whence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for there can be ignorance without the fact that someone makes a judgment concerning things unknown, and then the one ignorant is not erring; but when he now makes a false judgment about the things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err. And because sin consists in act, error manifestly has the account of sin (namely of itself or objectively); for it is not without presumption that someone make a judgment concerning things ignored, and especially in those things in which danger exists.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 7. It is not without presumption, namely again of itself or objectively; for subjectively and as to formal sin, or fault, presumption yields to truth, if in good faith, if invincibly, someone has erred, as must presently also be said concerning ignorance.

9. Although ignorance is joined with error, nevertheless it is distinguished from error. Likewise, although ignorance is joined with sin, nevertheless it is not always sin itself. “Since the will is of the good or of the apparent good, the will is never moved into evil unless that which is not good appears in some way to reason as good; and on account of this the will would never tend into evil except with some ignorance or error of reason.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 2. Ignorance indeed takes away cognition of the thing ignored, but it does not take away the use of reason. If the use of reason itself is lacking, as in infants, the insane, those sleeping, the drunk, the voluntary and the human act cannot be had from defect of the use of reason, unless perhaps in the cause. Yet practically it is not always easy to determine whether sometimes in these there is had a use of reason sufficient for grave sin.

10. Further, as concerns ignorance, a twofold ignorance must be distinguished by reason of the voluntary: one invincible, the other vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects absolutely nothing concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or, although he has fallen into a suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after moral diligence has been applied, he could not know the thing. It is said, after moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be applied be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportioned to the person and to the matter in question. Cf.

St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 3. Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, but besides has the occasion of coming to knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by.

11. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary. Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary per accidens. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether on account of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse for sin, or so that he may simply not be drawn back from sin, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9., q. 76. a. 3., De Malo q. 3. a. 8. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study for knowing, or neglects to learn on account of mere laziness or sloth, on account of the labor of learning, on account of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine and into purely vincible. Crass or supine is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless applies no or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible is when someone applies some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, with consideration of the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter. Finally, ignorance voluntary per accidens is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had “when someone directly or indirectly wills something upon which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as is clear in the drunk man who wills to drink wine superfluously, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; indirectly, however, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, increasing, bind the use of reason in a particular eligible thing.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.; 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

12. Moreover forgetfulness, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Wherefore the same moral judgment must be passed concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Cf. Suarez, D. 4, S. 3.; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 169.

13. Further, invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin, if it is of those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which someone is not bound to know. The reason of the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to a man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason of the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or do, sins by a sin of omission. Whence, on account of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. But the sin is graver in proportion as the ignorance is more voluntary. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 2., q. 19. a. 6., Quodl. 8. a. 15.

14. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which someone cannot rightly exercise a due act. Whence all are commonly bound to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is born apt to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and particular contingencies, unless perhaps in a particular case occurring. S. Th. l. c.

15. Having posited that ignorance can be sin, it is asked further: whether ignorance can also be a cause of sin? — Sin can be taken in two ways: formally, for subjective fault itself; materially, for the objective act itself of sin. — If the discussion is about the objective act itself of sin, how ignorance can be a cause of sin is shown thus. Toward that which is unknown as to all things, the will cannot be borne. But if something is known according to something and unknown according to something, the will can will it. And in this way ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this one whom he kills is a man, but does not know that he is his father; or when someone knows that some act is pleasurable, yet does not know that it is sin. Further, the moving cause is twofold, one per se and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its proper power; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, or as the very removal of what prohibits. And in this way ignorance can be the cause of an act of sin. For it is the privation of knowledge perfecting reason, which prohibits the act of sin insofar as it directs human acts. Whence it is clear that not every ignorance of one sinning is a cause of sin, but only that which takes away the knowledge prohibiting the act of sin, not that which simply takes away the knowledge of the act of sin. If the will of someone, for example, is so disposed that, recognizing his father, he certainly would not kill him, and this man kills a man not knowing that he is his father, ignorance is the cause of the act of parricide; if on the contrary the will of someone is so disposed that he would not be prohibited from the act of parricide even if he recognized his father, ignorance of the father is not the cause of sin for this man, but has itself concomitantly to the sin; and therefore such a one does not sin because of ignorance, but sins while ignorant. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. — If the discussion is about the subjective fault itself of sin, vincible ignorance can be a cause of sin or fault. The reason is that “ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting.” But someone can deliberately will not to know certain things, lest he be drawn back from sin; someone can, on account of other occupations, neglect to learn those things by which he would be drawn back from sin. But invincible ignorance cannot be the formal cause of sin. For invincible ignorance can be the cause of effecting an act which would be sin if it were done voluntarily; yet simply it is never a cause of sin, because when it is present, not only is the act not sin, but it can even be virtue. Cf. n. 6. — S. Th. l. c. a. 3.; Suarez, Tr. 5, D. 4, S. 1, n. 5.

16. “But it must be considered that reason is directive of human acts according to a twofold knowledge, namely according to universal and particular knowledge. For one conferring about things to be done uses a certain syllogism, whose conclusion is judgment, or election or operation. But actions are in singulars. Whence the conclusion of the operative syllogism is singular; but a singular proposition is not concluded from a universal except by means of some singular proposition. Thus a man is prohibited from the act of parricide by this, that he knows that a father is not to be killed, and by this, that he knows this one to be his father. Therefore ignorance of either can cause the act of parricide, namely both of the universal principle, which is a certain rule of reason, and of the singular circumstance.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. The former, by reason of the object, is ignorance of law; the latter is ignorance of fact. The first is had when either the general law itself is ignored, or the comprehension of some particular case under the aforesaid law. But the other is had when either the thing itself morally taken, concerning which the matter is, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing a wolf and you kill a man; or when some circumstance of the thing, likewise morally inspected, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing an enemy and you kill your brother. Ignorance of law happens both in the uneducated and in learned men themselves, who often go off into contrary opinions; ignorance of fact likewise can happen in all, from inconsideration, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence. Ignorance of law is one thing simply of law, commanding or prohibiting something; another is of the penalty constituted by law against transgressors of the law. This ignorance can happen more easily when the penalty is extraordinary.

17. Since ignorance can be a cause of sin, another question arises: whether ignorance can excuse entirely from sin? — Ignorance which is the cause of an act has of itself that it excuses from sin. The reason is that the voluntary belongs to the account of sin. But that ignorance causes the involuntary; since, as has already been said, ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting; and thus such an act, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will, which the name involuntary imports.

18. But sometimes it does not excuse totally from sin, sometimes it excuses totally from sin. And this the Angelic Doctor declares thus, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 3: “That it sometimes does not excuse totally from sin can happen from two things. In one way from the part of the thing itself ignored. For ignorance excuses from sin insofar as something is ignored to be sin. But it can happen that someone indeed ignores some circumstance of sin, which if he knew, he would be drawn back from sinning, whether that circumstance makes for the account of sin or not; and nevertheless there still remains in his knowledge something through which he knows that it is an act of sin; for instance, if someone striking someone knows indeed that he is a man, which suffices for the account of sin, but nevertheless does not know him to be his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin; or perhaps he does not know that the one defending himself strikes him back, which, if he knew it, he would not strike him, which does not pertain to the account of sin. Whence although such a one sins on account of ignorance, nevertheless he is not totally excused from sin, because there still remains to him cognition of sin. In another way this can happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, that ignorance itself is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know certain things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and a sin, provided that it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know. And therefore such ignorance does not totally excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is such as to be wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which someone is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin,” if namely ignorance of this kind, invincible, is total by reason of the bad object unknown, and not only partial; for example, if someone in the example already adduced not only invincibly were ignorant of the circumstance of father, but also of the circumstance of man, and believed that he was striking and killing a beast.

19. Ignorance which is not the cause of sin does not excuse from sin. The reason is that ignorance of this kind does not cause the involuntary, but only makes the man not willing; but of the account of sin, as has been said, is the voluntary; and the voluntary is taken away by the involuntary, not by the non-voluntary; for the non-voluntary is simple lack and negation, just as white is taken away by black, but is not taken away by non-white, because non-white is a mere negation. — Wherefore when it is said that ignorance which is not the cause of the act does not excuse from sin, the sense is that of itself it does not excuse from sin, or does not have the force of taking sin away from the act, because it permits or leaves the act to be perfectly voluntary; but the sense is not that in the act in fact there perseveres the account of formal sin, for while ignorance stands, if it is invincible, the act lacks the condition required for sin, namely cognition of the malice of that act. But the Angelic Doctor, in the cited place, says simply that ignorance of this kind does not excuse from sin, because this ignorance in relation to the act has itself merely per accidens and not per se, as is clear from what has been said, since it influences nothing in the act, and knowledge considers those things which are per se, not those which are per accidens. — Wherefore, since that ignorance merely happens accidentally to sin, it neither accuses nor excuses the sin. It does not excuse, since it does not cause the involuntary; it does not accuse, because nevertheless it makes the act non-voluntary. But that by these things the Holy Doctor does not wish to affirm that in an act posited with such ignorance the account of sin is had, is confirmed from q. 6. a. 8., where, speaking of concomitant ignorance, which namely is not the cause of that which is done, and of what would be done still even if it were known, he says: “and such ignorance does not make the involuntary, because it does not cause anything which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” Moreover formal sin cannot exist in the non-voluntary. Cf. also q. 19. a. 2. ad 3.

20. The question now follows: whether ignorance diminishes sin? — “Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. The reason is that that ignorance influences nothing in the act of sin; whence, just as it does not excuse from sin, cf. n. 19, so also it neither increases nor diminishes sin, but leaves it wholly in that state in which it is. If a confessor, for example, is so disposed in soul that he absolves all penitents, whether prepared or indisposed for sacramental absolution, the fact that he is ignorant, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, of the principles of Moral Theology, this ignorance, as it is not the cause of the sin and does not excuse from that sin, so neither does it increase or lessen it. The same should be said of an ignorant physician of the healing art who is so disposed in soul that he wills to procure, as much as is in him, not the health, but the death of the sick.

21. But ignorance which is the cause of sin, and “which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but wholly takes it away.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

22. Ignorance alone which is the cause of sin, and yet does not totally excuse from sin, can diminish sin, because it diminishes the voluntary. Cf. n. 4. 5. Wherefore consequent ignorance indirectly voluntary, namely crass or supine ignorance, or purely vincible ignorance, and ignorance voluntary per accidens, since they diminish the voluntary, consequently diminish sin.

23. “Sometimes,” says the Angelic Doctor in the cited place, “ignorance which is the cause of sin is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or per accidens; as when someone does not will to labor in study, from which it follows that he is ignorant; or when someone wills to drink wine immoderately, from which it follows that he is made drunk and lacks discretion. And such ignorance diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin. For when something is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens. Whence there is less contempt there, and consequently less sin.”

24. Consequent ignorance directly voluntary, that is, affected ignorance, seems on the contrary to increase the voluntary, and consequently sin. “But it happens sometimes,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “that such ignorance is directly and per se voluntary, as when someone of his own accord does not know something, so that he may sin more freely. And such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and sin. For from the intention of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the freedom of sinning.” Thus indeed St. Thomas and others. But others deny it, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. Tr. 19. n. 8., in reality cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat.

25. But it seems that one must distinguish, for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives. If someone affects ignorance merely on account of weariness or labor in learning, or not precisely lest he be drawn back from sin, but lest he be drawn back from such an action, to which he strongly clings, the sin certainly is not increased: for example, if someone were unwilling to know what the Church has defined concerning some matter, because he does not wish to depart from the Church’s definition, and otherwise wishes to think freely, as long as the Church’s definition is not certain to him. For then, if it happens in the matter that he dissents from the definition of the Church, without doubt this is with a lesser will, and without pertinacity, and with less contempt. But if someone affects ignorance for this end, lest he be drawn back from sin, the sin is increased precisely in the account of intrinsic inclination, and of the inclined will, and, in this sense, of the voluntary, since the man so loves that thing that on account of it he wills even to undergo the loss of ignorance; but it is diminished simply in the account of a human act, for ignorance, from whatever cause it may arise, per se lessens the account of a human act and the formal contempt of law. Moreover, in such a case that man wills to be ignorant for this reason, lest he be drawn back from sin. Therefore, if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows that the will is not so firmly established in such a sin. Finally, if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, wholly contemning the law, the sin certainly is increased, because that ignorance is a sign of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt, since he pursues sin with such affection that he wills even to suffer the loss of ignorance and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not sin; as if someone, in the example adduced, should be unwilling to know the definition of the Church, because he has decreed to think thus, whatever the Church may think. And in this sense indeed St. Thomas in the cited place seems to be understood. Cf. Suarez D. 4. S. 2.; Lugo, On Penance, D. 4. S. 4. n. 183.; Struggl, cited place, n. 36.

26. As regards the species of sins from ignorance, concerning sins not foreseen, which are done from voluntary ignorance totally depriving one of the use of reason, such as the sins of the drunken and of those voluntarily insane, let us neither say that these are not in the genus of morals, considering those acts in themselves, nor confess that the aforesaid are according to themselves sins, because at length they are somehow voluntary; but let us say that they are circumstances of sins, and pertain to the circumstance what, signifying the effect. And the reason is that these are voluntary only in their causes.

For from this, that they are in some way voluntary, since to be voluntary in the cause is to be voluntary in some way, they are in the genus of human and moral acts, and they are not excused from all fault. But from the fact that they are voluntary only in their causes, they are not sins according to themselves, but, drawn away from their proper species, they are circumstances of the sins of which they are effects, and they look to the species of those sins in which they are voluntary. And thus homicide and blasphemy of God from drunkenness are reduced to the species of drunkenness, insofar as those two subsequent sins pass over into the circumstance of this first sin, the sin of drunkenness. Whence Augustine, in book 22 Against Faustus, says: “Lot is to be blamed not as much as that incest, but as much as the drunkenness merited.” Not foreseen; for if sins are foreseen in some way, with their proper objects, then the sins are of the same species of which they would be if they were done by one knowing. And in this way the Jews were guilty of the death of Jesus Christ, although, if they had known, they would not have crucified him. 1 Cor. 2:8. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

27. Concerning sins likewise not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of fact, culpable on account of negligence, as when one occupied with hunting kills a man instead of a stag, it must be said that they pertain to the species of sins directly willed, for instance of dangerous hunting, and of similar acts by which those sins are caused. The reason is that more is required for the account of a proper species than the simple account of the voluntary; for that from which the species of sin is taken must be intended per se. Whence, although those sins are voluntary in their causes, nevertheless, because they are not voluntary in themselves, they are not intended per se, and because of this they are not according to themselves sins, neither as elicited acts, nor as commanded acts; but they are events, or effects of sins, not intended nor foreseen, although foreseeable, and because of this aggravating circumstances, yet not themselves drawing into their own species, but they themselves are drawn away into the species of their causes. “For when something,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4., “is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens.” The Holy Doctor is speaking of ignorance indirectly voluntary and culpable. — Concerning sins also not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of law culpable on account of negligence, the very same seems to be said on account of the same reason. And thus he who on a fasting day eats twice on account of culpable negligence in knowing the Church’s laws of fasting does not contract any malice specifically other than that of that voluntary ignorance. Cf. Cajetan in the cited place of St. Thomas, La Croix, l. 1. n. 757-760.

28. And here it is asked: whether vincible ignorance of law is a special sin per se? — R. Negatively. For every law commanding the observance of itself implicitly indeed commands cognition of the same law. But it does not command this except in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression itself of the law, of which it supplies the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of these, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and by itself, and therefore, if one rests in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is per se culpable, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the virtue of that same faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence disbelieves the things which are said by God. Cf. Lugo, On Penance, D. 16. n. 182 seq.; Laymann l. 1. Tr. 2. c. 4. n. 10.; Viva, On Human Acts, q. 3. final article; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

29. Therefore, since sins which proceed from ignorance are only voluntary in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in positing the cause itself, it follows that the gravity also of that malice is not to be judged from the thing itself viewed in itself, which is the effect of that ignorance, but from the quantity of malice of the same ignorance. And thus the measure of the guilt of a physician in homicide, the guilt of an advocate in the harm of his client, the guilt of a confessor in the harm of his penitent, the guilt of a parish priest in the harm of his parishioner, is not from harm of this kind viewed in itself, but from the degree of negligence in examining some particular fact, or in considering some law; which negligence indeed can be very slight, although from it even the gravest harm can follow. — But guilt for a bad effect from ignorance is incurred, although an effect of this kind does not follow; and the sin can be repeated, if, while advertence of ignorance of this kind remains, someone again determines to persevere in it. For example, a parish priest is ignorant of the impediments of matrimony, and knowingly and prudently goes on exercising his office, but meanwhile no matrimony is contracted; attending to his ignorance, he neglects again and again to acquire due knowledge. The parish priest is guilty of errors, not only those which he commits, but also those which he probably is going to commit, voluntarily neglecting to acquire knowledge altogether necessary to his office, and he multiplies sins as often as with a new will he neglects to give effort to the study of those impediments. — But if someone grieves over that ignorance, and henceforth applies study according to his powers, those things which arise from the prior negligence will not further be imputed to him.

30. Whether actions which someone does from a contracted habit are to be held as human, and therefore imputable. — R. 1.º Speculatively. They are human and imputable, if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise in the cause only, as long as nevertheless he has not retracted the habit, nor tries to root it out. 2.º Practically. “Sinners of this kind who are badly habituated, although they have cognition less ready than others, nevertheless always have some actual cognition of their crimes sufficient for rendering the acts deliberate and mortal.” St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4. par. Thirdly, l. 3. n. 127., Treatise on Human Acts XIV.

31. But he who knowingly and prudently sins from habit, and not from some passion arising, or from ignorance, sins from malice; for he who has a habit always rejoices in this, that he operates from habit, as long as he uses the habit. “For to anyone having a habit, that which is fitting to him according to his proper habit is per se lovable, because thus it becomes in some way connatural to him, according as custom and habit is turned into nature. But that which is fitting to someone according to a vicious habit is that which excludes spiritual good; from which it follows that man chooses spiritual evil in order to obtain the good which is fitting to him according to the habit. And this is to sin from certain malice. Whence it is manifest that whoever sins from habit sins from certain malice.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. Sins from malice are those which are committed with the full affection of the will. He who has been accustomed to commit a sin is indeed proved to love and foster it. But he who studies to amend a custom, if sometimes by force of custom he slips, sins rather from infirmity. Cf. following Commentary n. 27.