Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary X: On the Moral Goodness and Malice of Human Acts
1.
- Human or moral acts, as has already been said in the preceding Commentary, are divided into two species; for some are morally good, others morally evil. For differences which are such of themselves diversify the species. Good and evil, as being that which is according to nature or contrary to nature, namely according to the fittingness or requirement of nature, or contrary to this fittingness and requirement, are differences of themselves, and consequently constitute diverse species. For the good for each thing is what agrees with it according to its form, and evil is what is beyond the order of its form. Whence evil is commonly defined as the privation of due form. Therefore, just as in natural things good and evil, which are according to nature and contrary to nature, diversify the species of nature, for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species, similarly in morals, good insofar as it is according to reason, and evil insofar as it is contrary to reason, diversify the moral species, since acts are called moral insofar as they are from reason: reason is the principle of moral acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5; q. 19. a. 1 ad 3. — It is confirmed: “good and evil are differences of the act of the will of themselves. For good and evil pertain of themselves to the will, just as true and false pertain to reason, whose acts are distinguished of themselves as true and false, as when we say that an opinion is true or false. Whence a good will and an evil will are acts differing according to species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 1. Indeed the difference of species in acts is according to objects. For every act has its species from its object; whence it is necessary that some difference of the object make diversity of species in acts. But this is that which through itself and not accidentally, with respect to the faculty whence the act proceeds, because nothing that is accidental constitutes a species, but only what is of itself. And thus knowledge of sound and of color, with respect to the intellect, do not differ of themselves, and consequently the acts are not diverse in species; but they differ of themselves with respect to sense, and consequently by comparison to sense the acts are diverse in species. But the differences of good and evil are differences of themselves by comparison to the will; for good, which is the proper object of the will, is what is fitting to the rational will, and evil is what is unfitting to the rational will, namely what fits the will according to reason or is unfitting to it according to reason. “The good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is what is beyond reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5; q. 19. a. 1.
2.
- Here the question is raised whether there are indifferent human acts, i.e. acts which are neither morally good nor morally evil, neither honorable nor base. — If human acts are considered in the abstract, or according to their species, which they intrinsically have from their proper object, with precision made from the end and from determining circumstances, then indeed there are indifferent acts, namely those which from their species are neither evil nor good, just as man according to himself, or according to his species, is neither virtuous nor vicious. And the reason is that every object has some goodness or malice, at least natural; nevertheless it does not always import moral goodness or malice, which is considered by comparison to reason, namely to the order of reason. For not every object of a human act includes something pertaining to this order of reason: indeed not all actions are of themselves necessarily connected with the ultimate end, nor are all commanded by law or prohibited by law, but many are merely permitted, such as to walk, to go into the field, to lift a straw from the ground, and things of this sort. Therefore such acts according to their species are indifferent. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8. — But if human acts are considered in the individual, or concretely, namely according as they are determined both by particular circumstances and by the end, the Scotists affirm that there are indifferent acts in the individual. The reason is that no certain law commands that they be directed to the ultimate end of human life, namely God, nor that one always act from a higher motive of honorableness and virtue; but, human frailty and infirmity being considered, God Himself permits man to act from this very infirmity and frailty on account of the necessity and advantage of nature itself, as, for example, sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, to be refreshed by the sight of the sky, a field, etc. Therefore these and other similar actions can be exercised from a merely indifferent end. The Thomists, on the contrary, deny that indifferent acts are given in the individual, and more truly. And this indeed is the opinion of the Angelic Doctor. The reason is that either someone does a thing necessary, useful, fitting to rational nature, namely to soul, to body, to exterior things themselves, which are ordered to both; or he does something wholly useless and idle. If the first, this action tends to an end naturally good, and it is good. If the second, he does a thing unfitting to rational nature, as being at least superfluous; for reason dictates that beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, or utility, or some fittingness. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9, paragraph Sed contra; 2 D. 40. q. 1. a. 5. Moreover, since this is proper to reason, to direct and order human acts which are done from deliberation to a due end, either a human act is in reality ordered to the due end, and has the character of good, or it is not ordered to the due end, and then by this very fact it is repugnant to right reason and has the character of evil. St. Thomas, q. 18. a. 9; Suarez, D. 9, S. 3. And from the reason adduced it is luminously clear that those indifferent acts of the Scotists are not truly such, but are morally honorable; for if they are done on account of necessity, utility, or fittingness, they are according to the order of reason and consequently morally honorable. Nor indeed is it necessary to intend another extrinsic honorable end, besides the end intrinsic to acts of this sort, in order that one act honorably. For indeed sometimes to eat more abundantly, to hold banquets, and to be refreshed in mind and body are acts according to reason, if these are contained within due limits. Therefore these acts are truly done from a motive of honorableness and virtue, although they are done from natural frailty, necessity, utility, or fittingness, since honorableness and virtue consist in this, that the rectitude of reason be observed. Moreover they are also ordered to God, at least implicitly, although not explicitly, as we shall soon explain more, since, by the very fact that they are according to reason and good, they are referred by their nature to God. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9 ad 3; q. 39. a. 2; 2. 2. q. 23. a. 3; q. 141. a. 6 ad 2; q. 145. a. 1, 2, 3; q. 168. a. 3 ad 3; S. q. 49. a. 2 ad 6; q. 169. a. 1 ad 1; 2 D. 39. q. 3. a. 3 ad 6; D. 40. q. 1. a. 5; 4 D. 16. q. 2. a. 2 q. 1; C. G. l. 2, c. 29; de Caritate q. un. a. 7 ad 13 and ad 14; Suarez, D. 4, S. 1, n. 12.
3.
- Another question arises here: whether, for the moral goodness of human acts, it is necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God? — The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said: since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end, and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends to and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary that they be morally good. “The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end; but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. “The whole that man is, and that he can do and has, must be ordered to God,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or in the very act exercised, namely by acting on account of the end of some virtue, or an honorable end, and one consonant with rational nature; for such an act from its intrinsic nature tends to the glory of God. To the point is St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: “Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely.” And q. 21. a. 4: “He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end.” Cajetan, on the same q. 8. a. 3, says: “one always seeking what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself also to virtually. For it is virtually, as using something within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports actually to operate.” Much more, besides, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. These are the words of Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: “Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does without doing evil, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only of such a virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually to God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially.”
4.
- From all things which have thus far been said, the distinction is clear between a good and evil human act, a right and sinful one, a laudable and culpable one. — A human act, from the fact that it has the form fitting to it, or on the contrary lacks the form fitting to it, namely from the fact that it is according to the order of reason or beyond this order, is good or evil. For a human act is so called according as it is from reason directing and ordering. “In (human) acts good and evil are said by comparison to reason; because, as Dionysius says, the good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is what is beyond reason. For the good for each thing is what agrees with it according to its form, and evil is what is beyond the order of its form. Therefore it is clear that the difference of good and evil considered about the object is compared of itself to reason, namely according as the object is fitting or not fitting to it. But certain acts are called human or moral according as they are from reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5.
5.
- Moreover an order of reason of this sort is the order of the eternal law, and the order of human acts to the end. And thus a human act, good or evil, has the character of rectitude and of sin according to this order to the law and to the end. “Therefore whenever the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent away from this rectitude, then it is called sin. But it is manifest from the premises, q. 19. a. 3 and 4, that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law, and every good act accords with reason and the eternal law. Whence it follows that a human act, from the fact that it is good or evil, has the character of rectitude or of sin.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 1. Therefore evil is more common than sin, good more common than right.
6.
- A good or evil human act, according as it proceeds freely from the will, has the character of laudable or culpable. For a laudable or culpable act is an act imputable to the agent for praise or blame; and this cannot be unless the agent is the author of that act, or the cause determining it in its being. Whence it is clear that if sin is taken for any defect whatsoever of an act, or for the deviation of an act from the end, sin is more common than fault. But if sin is not taken in a merely objective sense, but subjectively and morally, sin is the same as fault, and so it is commonly taken by theologians. Hence St. Thomas says: “It must be said that just as evil is broader than sin, so sin is broader than fault. For from this an act is called culpable or laudable, that it is imputed to the agent; for to be praised or blamed is nothing other than for the malice or goodness of one’s act to be imputed to someone. But then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over his act. But this is in all voluntary acts, because through the will man has dominion over his act, as is clear from what was said above, q. 1. a. 1 and 2. Whence it remains that good or evil only in voluntary acts constitutes the character of praise or blame, in which evil, sin, and fault are the same.” 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2.
7.
- From all things said thus far it is also clear that the moral good is the same in reality as the honorable. For the moral good is what is according to the order of reason; and the honorable is said to be what fits man insofar as he is man, and what is sought for its own sake by a rational appetite. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3 ad 1. Nevertheless they differ in reason. For something is called honorable insofar as it has a certain comeliness from fittingness with rational nature and from the ordering of reason. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 3. For honorableness is said as though “a state of honor.” Whence from this something is called honorable, because it is worthy of honor. Honor is owed to excellence. But the excellence of man according to virtue is a certain disposition of someone holding himself fittingly according to the mode of his nature, or a disposition of the perfect toward the best. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 1, and 1. 2. q. 71. a. 1. Moreover both clarity and due proportion concur in the account of comeliness or beauty. Whence the beauty of the body consists in this, that man has the members of the body well proportioned, with a certain due clarity of color. And similarly spiritual beauty consists in this, that the conduct of a man, or his action, is well proportioned according to the spiritual clarity of reason. And this renders man worthy of honor. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 2. But glory is the effect of honor. For from this, that someone is honored or praised, he is rendered clear in the eyes of others. And therefore, just as the honorable and the glorious are the same, so also the honorable and the comely are the same. St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 2 ad 2.
8.
- As the moral good is the same in reality as the honorable, although distinguished in reason, so the moral good and the honorable are the same in reality as the pleasurable and the useful, although they are distinguished in reason. For that which is morally good and honorable, or ordered according to reason, is naturally fitting to man. But each thing is naturally delighted in what is fitting to itself. And therefore the honorable is naturally pleasurable to man. Nevertheless not every pleasurable thing is honorable, because something can also be fitting according to sense, and not according to reason. But this pleasurable thing is beyond man’s reason, which perfects his nature. Moreover even virtue itself, which according to itself is honorable, is referred to something else as to an end, namely to happiness. “And according to this the honorable and the useful and the pleasurable are the same in subject. But they differ in reason; for something is called honorable according as it has a certain excellence, worthy of honor because of spiritual beauty; pleasurable insofar as it quiets the appetite; and useful insofar as it is referred to another. Nevertheless the pleasurable is broader than the useful and the honorable, because every useful and honorable thing is in some way pleasurable, but not conversely.” St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 3. But nothing “can be simply and truly useful which is repugnant to honorableness, because it must be repugnant to man’s ultimate end, which is good according to reason, although perhaps it can be useful in a certain respect, with respect to some particular end.” St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad 3. Whence it is clear that, as not every pleasurable thing reaches the account of the honorable, so also not every useful thing reaches the account of the honorable, but only that which is pleasurable and useful according to reason.
9.
- Therefore the moral good is always an honorable good. For moral good is good according to reason, and honorable good is nothing other than good fitting to rational nature, and therefore according to reason. But the moral good is not always a useful good and a pleasurable good, but only when they observe the right norm of reason.