Section — Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)
I. On the Intrinsic Nature of This Precept
1.
- "The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor. But among neighbors we are most bound to parents. And therefore immediately after the precepts ordering us to God there is placed the precept ordering us to parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle. And thus there is a certain affinity of this precept to the precepts of the first table." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5.
2.
- This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, but secondarily and implicitly looks to the obligations of parents toward children, and also to the mutual obligations of other blood-relations, and of other Superiors and inferiors. "The use of this Precept extends most widely, for besides those who begot us, there are many others whom we ought to reverence in the place of parents, under the title of power, or dignity, or usefulness, or of some eminent duty and office." Roman Catechism, P. 3, C. 5, nn. 2, 8. "Something is owed first to parents rather than to country and blood-relations, because through the fact that we were born of parents, both blood-relations and country pertain to us. And therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of law, through them man is ordered more to parents than to country or to other blood-relations. Nevertheless, in this precept, which concerns the honoring of parents, there is understood to be commanded whatever pertains to rendering what is due to any person whatever, just as the secondary is included in the principal." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 2.
3.
- This fourth precept, as regards acts per se, belongs to the virtue of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, and besides, gratitude.
4.
- Piety is taken 1. in a broader sense for religion, and thus to be pious is the same as to be religious; and the pious are called worshipers of God, but the impious idolaters and sinners. "God is the principle of being and governance in a far more excellent way than father or country. And therefore religion, which offers worship to God, is a virtue other than piety, which offers worship to parents and country. But the things which belong to creatures are transferred to God through a certain superexcellence and causality... Hence by excellence piety is named the worship of God; just as God is excellently called Our Father." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2. - It is taken 2. likewise in a broader sense for mercy or a benign affection toward those needing our help. "As Augustine says: ... according to common usage the name of piety is also frequently used in works of Mercy. I think this has happened for this reason, because God principally commands these things to be done, which He testifies please Him before sacrifices; from this custom it has happened that even God Himself is called pious." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 2. - Piety is taken 3. properly; and it is a special virtue, to which it belongs to offer worship to parents and country. "It must be said that some virtue is special from the fact that it regards some object according to some special reason. But since it pertains to the notion of justice that it render to another what is due, wherever there is found a special reason of debt to some person, there is a special virtue there. Now something is owed to someone specially because he is the connatural principle producing into being and governing. But piety regards this principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and country, and upon those who are ordered to these." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3.
5.
- As in every virtue pertaining to justice, which is a virtue toward another, so also in piety a threefold object is distinguished, namely the object to whom, the object which, or material object, and the objective formal reason.
6.
- The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.
7.
- Therefore piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "since between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as cohelpers for the conservation of the blood-relationship of each, which each spouse has from his own parents: for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is conserved. And we say the same about children, because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as conservers of the blood-relationship received from the parents." Cajetan on 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.
8.
- The object which, or material object, of piety is worship, service, and duty; worship indeed and service per se, duty per accidens. "Something is owed to parents and fellow citizens in two ways: in one way per se, in another way per accidens. Per se there is owed to them that which befits a father insofar as he is a father, who, since he is superior, existing as a kind of principle of the son, is owed reverence and service by the son. But per accidens something is owed to a father which it befits him to receive according to something that happens to him; for instance, if he is sick, that he be visited and that attention be given to his cure; if he is poor, that he be sustained, and so with other things of this kind; all of which are contained under the debt of service. And therefore Tully says... piety exhibits both duty and worship, so that duty is referred to service, but worship to reverence or honor; because, as Augustine says... we are said to cultivate men whom we honor with either remembrance or presence." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2.
9.
- Therefore the worship due to parents consists in reverence and honor to be shown to them; service, in this, that the son "obey their command, and while living repay their benefits according to his manner," St. Thomas, l. c., q. 102, a. 2; duty, in supplying to them any necessary assistance of life, if they need it. As duty is contained in service, so duty and service are comprehended in worship. For "in worship not only honor is understood, but also whatever other things pertain to fitting acts by which man is ordered to another." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 1. Likewise "in the honoring of parents there is understood every assistance which ought to be shown to parents, as the Lord interprets in Matthew 15. And this is because assistance is given to a father from debt as to one greater." St. Thomas, l. c., q. 101, a. 2, ad 1. "To parents as such there is owed the honor of reverence. But sustenance and other things of this kind are owed to them by reason of some accident, for instance insofar as they are needy, or servants, or something of this kind, as was said above, q. 101, a. 2. And because what is per se is prior to that which is per accidens, therefore among the first precepts of the law also, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, the honoring of parents is specially prescribed, in which, as in a certain principal thing, sustenance is understood to be commanded, and whatever else is owed to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 3. "With this honor," says the Roman Catechism, P. 3, c. 5, n. 7, "all these things are conjoined: love, observance, obedience, and worship. But wisely in the Law the word of honor was placed, not of love or fear, although parents are greatly to be loved and feared. For he who loves does not always observe and venerate; he who fears does not always love; but whom someone honors from the soul, he also loves and reveres."
10.
- The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.
11.
- Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. Hence the object to whom, the object which, and the objective formal reason of observance are clear.
12.
- The object to whom of observance is all persons constituted in dignity, namely superiors who actually govern us, and all others endowed with some excellence, since they are fit to govern us. "It is necessary that virtues be distinguished in an ordered descent in the same way as the excellence of the persons to whom something is to be rendered. But just as the carnal father particularly participates in the account of principle, which is universally found in God, so also a person who in some respect exercises providence over us particularly participates in the account of father; because the father is the principle both of generation and education and discipline and all things which pertain to the perfection of human life; but a person constituted in dignity is as a principle of governance with respect to certain matters: as the prince of the city in civil matters, the leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines, and there is the like in other matters. And thence it is that all such persons are called fathers because of the likeness of care; just as in 4 Kings 5 the servants of Naaman said to him: Father, and if the Prophet had told thee some great thing, etc. And therefore, just as under religion, through which worship is given to God, there is found piety, through which parents are worshiped, so under piety there is found observance, through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. And hence it is clear that persons constituted in dignity, as has already been said, are properly here those who not only have excellence, but also power of governing: kings, masters, teachers, the Supreme Pontiff, Bishops, and all others who have fitness to govern us by reason of their excellence. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 2, says: "It must be said that someone, from the fact that he is constituted in some dignity, not only has a certain excellence of status, but also a certain power of governing subjects, whence the account of principle belongs to him, insofar as he is governor of others. But from the fact that someone has perfection of knowledge or virtue, he does not obtain the account of principle as regards others, but only a certain excellence in himself. And therefore a certain special virtue is determined to showing honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity. But because through knowledge and virtue, and all other things of this kind, someone is rendered fit for the state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some persons because of any excellence whatsoever pertains to the same virtue." But because of the various dignity there is various observance: civil, religious; natural, supernatural, which, offered to the saints, is called dulia.
13.
- The object which, or material object, of observance is honor, and worship or service; the former is owed by reason of the excellence of the person constituted in dignity, the latter by reason of power over subjects. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, "that to those who are constituted in dignity it belongs to govern subjects. But to govern is to move some persons to a due end, as a sailor governs a ship by leading it to port. Now everything moving has a certain excellence and power above that which is moved. Hence it is necessary that in him who is constituted in dignity there be considered first the excellence of status with a certain power over subjects, and second the office itself of governance. Therefore by reason of excellence honor is owed to him, which is a certain recognition of someone's excellence. But by reason of the office of governance worship is owed to him, which consists in a certain service, namely while someone obeys their command and repays in turn their benefits according to his manner... To the excellence of those who are constituted in dignity there is owed honor by reason of the higher grade, but fear by reason of the power which they have for coercing; but to the office of their governance there is owed obedience, by which subjects are moved to the command of those presiding, and tributes, which are certain stipends of their labor."
14.
- Honor certainly imports a certain testification concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, as by inclinations, or even by exterior things, for instance by the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 1.
15.
- The objective formal reason of observance is that special honesty which shines forth in worship and honor shown to persons constituted in dignity, which arises proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from that dignity. Now there is a twofold debt. "One indeed is legal, to the rendering of which man is compelled by law, and thus man owes honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity and have prelation over him. But the other is a moral debt, which is owed from a certain honesty; and in this way we owe worship and honor to those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to them." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2. Now persons constituted in dignity can be considered in two ways: according to their personal dignity, and according as they are ordered to the common good. Worship shown to them insofar as it is ordered to the common good pertains not to observance, but to piety. But worship shown to them which pertains specially to their personal usefulness and glory properly pertains to observance, according as it is distinguished from piety. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3. But since piety shows worship and honor, as observance also shows worship and honor, piety, although properly distinguished from observance, can by a certain excellence be called observance; just as, although piety properly so called is distinguished from religion, religion by a certain supereminence is called piety. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 1.
16.
- As regards dulia, "dulia can be taken in two ways. In one way commonly, according as it shows reverence to any man whatsoever by reason of any excellence whatsoever. And thus it contains under itself piety and observance, and any virtue of this kind which shows reverence to man. And according to this it will have parts diverse in species. In another way it can be taken strictly, insofar as, according to it, a servant shows reverence to a master: for dulia is called servitude... And according to this it is not divided into diverse species, but is one species of observance... because by one account a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher, and so concerning other things of this kind." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 4. Dulia "is a certain species of observance; because through observance we honor any persons whatsoever excelling in dignity; but through dulia properly taken servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3. And hence it is clear that observance is not a special virtue in the most specific species, but a special virtue in a subalternate species. And the Angelic Doctor insinuates this by saying, q. 102, a. 1, that it pertains to observance to cultivate and honor prince, commander, teacher, master, etc., whom he asserts, q. 103, a. 4, to be cultivated and honored by a diverse account.
17.
- Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.
18.
- Finally, as regards gratitude, "it must be said that according to the diverse causes from which something is owed, it is necessary that the account of rendering what is due be diversified; yet so that always in the greater that which is lesser is contained. But in God first and principally is found the cause of debt, because He Himself is the first principle of all our goods. But secondarily in a father, because he is the proximate principle of our generation and discipline. Thirdly, in a person who excels in dignity, from whom common benefits proceed. Fourthly, in some benefactor, from whom we have received certain particular and private benefits, for which we are particularly obligated to him. Therefore, because not whatever we owe to God, or to a father, or to a person excelling in dignity, do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit, thence it is that after religion, by which we pay due worship to God; and piety, by which we worship persons excelling in dignity; there is grace, or gratitude, which recompenses favor to benefactors; and it is distinguished from the foregoing virtues, as each of the later is distinguished from the prior, as it were falling short of it." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 106, a. 1. Therefore to a benefactor there is owed also per se honor and reverence, because he has the account of principle, and per accidens assistance or sustenance, if he is in need. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107, a. 3. But grace or gratitude recompenses a benefit by thanksgiving and by bestowing something gratuitously. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 6. To it is opposed ingratitude, which, according to the diversity of circumstances, is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude has been great. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107.