XVIII. On the Tyrant and on Rebellion

214. A tyrant is either of regime or of usurpation. The first is a prince who, possessing the principate legitimately and justly, exercises its power wickedly and unjustly. The latter is a prince who possesses the principate illegitimately and unjustly, by reason of wicked usurpation made by force or fraud.

215. A tyrant of regime, from the fact that he abuses his authority, does not therefore, per se, lose it. Wherefore no obedience indeed is owed to his unjust laws, and by passive resistance subjects can defend themselves against them; but to deprive a tyrant of the kingdom, or to kill him, is lawful to absolutely no one. - To deprive the king of the kingdom. "Too pernicious in this matter," says St. Alphonsus, "was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the prince by judging and punishing him. Hence the objection is dissolved which is made from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "that tyrannical rule is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler... And therefore disturbance of this rule does not have the character of sedition," which is opposed to the common good. For indeed, although that disturbance of rule does not have the character of sedition, it does not therefore follow from the Angelic Doctor that it is lawful. For from the same St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 60, a. 6: "just as it would be unjust that someone should compel another to observe a law which was not sanctioned by public authority; so also it is unjust if someone compels someone to undergo a judgment which is not borne by public authority... and therefore it is unjust that someone be judged by him who does not have public authority."

216. And from these things it is clear much more that it is lawful to absolutely no one to kill a tyrant. Nor likewise is it valid to object from the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 70, a. 1, that "as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful to resist bad princes." For St. Thomas is treating there of just defense, in the case of actual unjust aggression, namely of one condemned unjustly to death. Wherefore the objection taken from procuring the common good is also of no value. For it is not sufficient for the honesty of an action that the end be good, but the means also must be good. And the means assumed in the case is intrinsically evil.

217. Aptly Leo XIII, encyclical Quod apostolici muneris: "If at any time it should happen that public power is exercised rashly and beyond measure by princes, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not permit rising up against them by one's own force, lest the tranquillity of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society take greater detriment from this. And when the matter has come to such a point that no other hope of safety shines forth, it teaches that remedy is to be hastened by the merits of Christian patience and by urgent prayers to God. But if the decrees of legislators and princes have sanctioned or commanded something which is repugnant to divine or natural law, the dignity and office of the Christian name and the apostolic sentence persuade that God must be obeyed rather than men."

218. Therefore from a twofold head it is illicit to rise up against a legitimate prince: because one rising up by his own force violates the rights of justice, and because from this violation of justice a greater damage of the commonwealth follows, against the common good, under pretext of which that insurrection is attempted to be made honorable. "Wherefore," says Gregory XVI absolutely, Ep. a. 1832, "both divine and human rights cry out against those who by the most disgraceful machinations of treason and seditions strive to withdraw from fidelity to princes and to cast them down from command." Therefore rebellion against legitimate princes, possessors of the supreme authority or principate, is altogether illicit. It is a manifest denial of due obedience; for the legitimate right of authority exacts the office of obedience on the part of subjects. Besides, it is manifest injury against commutative justice; for a legitimate prince cannot be despoiled of the right to authority which he legitimately possesses. Each crime is proscribed in proposition 63 of the Syllabus, which is condemned thus absolutely: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, indeed even to rebel."

219. The same certainly must be said, in proportionate reason, of a tyrant of usurpation after he is already in peaceful possession of the kingdom. Before the usurper comes into this possession, it is clear from what has been said that subjects are bound, according to their powers, to defend the legitimate prince, nor can they in any way help the usurper to despoil the legitimate prince of supreme authority. But after the usurper has now despoiled the legitimate prince of this authority, and he himself now possesses it peacefully in fact, he himself is certainly bound to restore it while he possesses it; but by reason of the common good subjects are bound to obey him, because the commonwealth cannot ruin itself, if that usurper truly provides for the public good by his laws, just as the obligation rests upon him and at the same time he has the right of doing this, by reason namely of the usurped authority itself, not of the legitimacy of the usurper. For although that authority is detained unjustly, nevertheless it cannot be deprived of its own force and its own proper effect. Therefore subjects are bound to obey those laws which conduce to the common good, to public order, and to public peace; but they cannot furnish obedience to laws which would tend directly to confirming the usurper in the unjust possession of supreme authority. Yet the usurper can become legitimate, in various cases, in various ways: by consent of the people, by spontaneous cession of the legitimate prince, by natural prescription; for society cannot always endure in a violent state.

220. But if subjects are bound to observe the common good, public order, and peace, how indeed could they promote sedition, which is opposed to the common good, public order, and public peace? How could they themselves, private persons, kill the usurper? "A fight which is lawful," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, "is done for the common utility. But sedition is done against the common good of the multitude." And St. Alphonsus: "It belongs to subjects to obey, not to judge concerning the prince, who is subject to God alone concerning the things of his dominion, nor depends on any other earthly power. If subjects could bear judgment concerning the title or possession of the prince, those who are affected with a depraved mind would never lack a pretext to find for stirring themselves against the prince... Neither prince nor private person can be despoiled of his life and things, unless first he is heard, or at least condemned by his legitimate judge. But subjects can never have the right of bearing judgment upon their actual lord." The contrary opinion, which even now some sustain at least speculatively, is soon called by the Holy Doctor "improbable, false, most false." And then the same St. Alphonsus adds: "But he who occupies the kingdom of another without any title and possesses it without any reason is neither its lord nor prince, but a thief and usurper. Let him indeed be, I answer, a thief, usurper, and not prince nor lord. I ask: is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot himself be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to despoil him of life or goods. The doctrine of the Holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, although private, and however wicked he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life... But St. Thomas gives the reason for this, saying: To kill an evildoer is lawful insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the whole community, 2.2, q. 64, a. 5. Then he adds that killing evildoers is permitted only to princes, who have public authority and to whom care of the common good has been committed: But care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority, and therefore it is lawful for them alone to kill evildoers and not for private persons." Homo Apost., tr. 8, n. 13.

221. "But it is altogether false that in the community of subjects there is present a certain superior authority, independent from the prince, so that in a case in which the prince governs the kingdom perversely, the whole community can despoil him of kingdom and life. Too pernicious in this matter was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that the monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly; for he said that, since the nation is the whole of the kingdom in respect to the prince, who is only a part, supreme authority must necessarily exist with the nation itself. A principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious; for in this way there would be two supreme powers in the kingdom, whence most enormous schisms and the desolation of the kingdom would occur. St. Thomas recognizes no other supreme authority except that which princes have, to whom care of the common good is attributed. Care of the common good has been committed to princes having public authority. Wherefore, even if the prince were perverse and burdensome to the people, nevertheless the people is bound to furnish obsequium and obedience to him, since subjects can never have the right of judging concerning the deeds of the prince, and much less of condemning him to losing life or kingdom." St. Alphonsus, l. c.

222. Therefore it is not valid to object that a tyrant cannot be deposed by the proper authority of some private person, which is the crime of treason, but can be deposed by the common judgment of the whole nation. The whole nation certainly could do this if it retained the principate itself, which is contrary to the hypothesis; but if it does not retain the principate itself, it would do that by no authority, and it would indeed be treason not of one, but of all.

223. Nor likewise is a better objection taken from the fact that public power is for the public good. For even private ownership of things is for the good of the proprietor himself and of others. If someone abuses it to his own evil and that of others, he does not therefore lose ownership of his things. And the reason is that the title or cause of having dominion, whether of property or of jurisdiction, is not the use of it. Therefore, so long as that title or cause remains, each dominion remains.

224. Lastly, it cannot be objected that society can cast out a tyrant by force not by the right of punishing, but by the right of defense. For for this no jurisdiction is needed; but the right of proper conservation, which belongs to society just as to individuals, seems to suffice, and this certainly prevails over the right existing in such tyrants to possession of authority. - But these things, speciously said, in reality are nothing. For if the question concerns individuals, legitimate defense will not be lawful to them except in the act of unjust aggression, and by repelling force with force, with the moderation of blameless defense. But if the discourse is of the whole commonwealth or society rising up against a tyrant and moving war against him, to undertake war against him, whether offensive or defensive, besides a just cause, public authority is needed, which, from the hypothesis, is in no private person nor in the whole nation. For the question concerns a prince in whom supreme authority is found absolutely. Besides, just defense is not lawful except with the moderation of blameless defense, which is held to be most sufficient and most efficacious by passive resistance, by not obeying wicked laws. Therefore, speculatively speaking, it is illicit to disturb a tyrant from possession of authority, and to deprive him of kingdom and life. But practically all agree that it is illicit from the fact that greater damages follow, and greater detriment of the public good is had from the consequent disturbance; then true sedition is had, which from its kind is a mortal sin. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3.

And, as the distinguished adversaries themselves confess, there exists much hallucination in that matter practically; and the people does not rise up to disturb a tyrant without a ruin greater than the tyranny following.

225. This condemnation is had concerning tyrannicide: The Sacred Synod of Constance, a. 1414-1418, declares and defines that this sentence: "Any tyrant whatever can and ought licitly and meritoriously to be killed by any vassal or subject of his, even by secret ambushes and subtle flatteries and adulations, notwithstanding any oath given, or confederation made with him, without waiting for the sentence or mandate of any judge whatsoever" is erroneous in faith and morals; and it reproves and condemns it as heretical, scandalous, and giving a way to frauds, deceptions, lies, betrayals, and perjuries. It declares besides, decrees, and defines that those pertinaciously asserting this most pernicious doctrine are heretics.