IV. On the Obligations of Parents Toward Children

66. What is the proper obligation of parents? - Parents are the principle of the existence of children; and children are something of the father. Wherefore, besides love, parents owe providence to children, whether legitimate or illegitimate; namely, they ought to provide for children as to body, as to soul, as to state. L. 336; St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 100, a. 5, ad 4; 2.2, q. 26, a. 9.

67. They owe love. For just as each one ought to love himself, so parents are bound sincerely to love children as something of themselves, flesh of their flesh; and thus, as much as is in them, they ought to care for their good, and to look to them in every matter both as to body and as to soul. This obligation of love never ceases, although another obligation of education ceases with the greater age of the son or with his emancipation.

Aptly St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 100, a. 5, ad 4: "It must be said that natural reason at once dictates to man that he should do injury to no one. And therefore the precepts of the Decalogue prohibiting harm extend themselves to all. But natural reason does not at once dictate that something should be done for another, unless to one to whom a man owes something. But the debt of a son to a father is so manifest that it can be denied by no tergiversation; because the father is the principle of generation and existence, and besides of education and teaching. And therefore it is not placed under a precept of the Decalogue that some benefit or service be bestowed on anyone except parents. But parents do not seem to be debtors to children because of some benefits received, but rather conversely. A son also is something of the father, and fathers love sons as something of themselves, as the Philosopher says in Ethics VIII. Hence by the same reasons there are not set forth some precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to love of children, just as neither are there some ordering man to himself."

68. They owe providence as to the body; and thus parents sin gravely if they expose those not yet brought forth into the light to the danger of abortion, if they expose those already born in public places of mercy, unless they do this from a grave cause. Besides, they must feed them, unless nevertheless they can feed themselves from elsewhere and are not in need, whether they are legitimate, or illegitimate, or spurious, C. Cum haberet 5, de Eo qui dux.; C. I. 752; C. G. 762; C. H. 139; C. A. 166; C. B. 1602, 1667, 1705, 1708. And if there is question of food necessary for life, they are bound to feed the son, although he has dissipated the portion of goods given to him by the parents, because he is always a son. - To this, however, father and mother are bound together from C. I. 138; C. G. 203; or the father first, as from Common Law, L. 9, C. de Patr. potest.; from Canon Law, C. 2, de Convers. infid.; C. A. 141, 143, 167; C. A. 155; C. B. 1634, 1709, 1739; C. L. 140. - The adopting person also must feed the adopted, C. B. 1766; in a case of necessity from C. I. 211. - But the mother is bound to nurse the offspring with her own milk. For the natural law itself demands this. Nevertheless this obligation of itself does not urge under grave sin, since otherwise no grave disorder is had. But necessity excuses from light fault, if, for example, the mother is weak; notable utility, if, for example, the mother would have to abandon another occupation by which she procures sustenance for herself and her family; custom prevailing among noble families. But then the mother is bound under grave sin to seek a good nurse. - L. 336, 949, 951; C. A. 218; C. B. 1635; C. L. 148.

69. They owe providence as to the soul; wherefore under grave sin parents must teach children those things which are necessary for eternal salvation, imbue them with good morals by words and examples, keep them away from proximate occasions of sinning, correct them with due moderation lest, provoked to anger, they become worse, and coerce them when they do wrong, even imploring the office of a judge if necessary, C. I. 222; C. G. 377; C. H. 155, 156; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631; C. L. 143. For this reason parents sin gravely when they permit children freely to accompany wicked companions, to read wicked books and newspapers, to frequent wicked workshops and schools, unless there is a most grave cause excusing them, and the dangers of these workshops and schools are removed. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Sapientiae christianae, Jan. 10, 1890, sect. Locus admonet. - L. 339.

In the absence of parents, ascendants, grandfather and grandmother, are bound to educate children or grandchildren; but in the first place the paternal grandfather, who succeeds in the place of the father, before the maternal. The obligation of education, since it is from the law of nature, extends also to illegitimate children. From civil laws the absence of parents is supplied by a tutor or curator. C. L. 100, 185.

70. The power of the father over the son is not a power of property, as over some thing useful to himself, but is a certain power of jurisdiction over the person of the son and for the good of the son himself, which is properly called and is dominative power, since nevertheless children are something of the father. The power is not only of ruling or directive, but also of urging or coercive. Wherefore the father has the power of educating the son by discipline and correction, according to Eph. 6:4. But this power is circumscribed by due moderation, as the Apostle Paul also admonishes in the same place. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 65, a. 2: "The father and the master, who preside over the domestic family, which is an imperfect community, have an imperfect power of coercing, according to lighter punishments which do not inflict irreparable harm, and of this kind is whipping."

71. They owe providence as to state; whence parents must instruct children in some art or letters, according to the custom of the region and the condition of the family. They must take care that children who wish to enter marriage enter an honorable marriage; and, if the chastity of daughters is for this reason in danger, they ought at least from charity to endow them. Indeed there are not lacking those who hold absolutely that the father is obligated to give a dowry to a daughter; which is prescribed in C. H. 1340, 1341 and C. A. 1220, 1222, 1231, whether she contracts a worthy marriage or enters religion; likewise that he is obligated to give a patrimony to a son who wishes to undertake the priesthood, L. l. 6, n. 819. The reason is that, as a father ought to procure for his children an honorable and suitable placement, so he is bound to supply to them the means necessary for obtaining it. Nevertheless from C. I. 147 and from C. G. 204, no action belongs to children against parents unwilling to subtract anything from their patrimony, so that sons or daughters may be able to enter marriage, or by another similar title. Cf. C. B. 1610, 1620, 1621. - If parents squander their goods, and for this reason leave children needy, they certainly are not free from grave sin. Nor can they be excused from sin if they do not apply at least moderate diligence, that they acquire goods by which the children may be fed and may have an inheritance according to their state. But especially are they bound to leave freedom to their offspring as regards the election of a state; and they sin gravely by forcing the unwilling into marriage or religion, or by averting them from such a state. - L. 336, 337, 339, 740; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2; Ferraris, v. Dos, a. 2, n. 1, 5; Sanchez de Matr. d. 26, n. 7; C. I. 138, 230; C. G. 203, 385; C. A. 139, 148; C. H. 155.

"Possessions... are ordained to the conservation of natural life; and because natural life, which cannot be preserved in the father perpetually, is preserved in the son, as by a certain succession according to the likeness of species, according to nature it is fitting that in those things which are the father's the son should succeed. Therefore it is natural that the solicitude of the father for the son should remain unto the end of his life." St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 123.

72. Can parents sometimes disinherit children? - R. Affirmatively; yet on account of a just and grave cause of crime against the parents themselves, which merits such a penalty. This is clear first by natural law. For it is altogether equitable that parents be able to punish with such a penalty children gravely injurious to themselves, and to keep them in their proper duty by fear of the same penalty. It is clear besides by positive law. For Roman Law acknowledges this power in parents, and determines several cases in which parents can disinherit children. And on account of the same reason of crime, children can disinherit parents, and brothers disinherit brothers. Novella 115, cap. 3, 4; Novella 22, cap. 47. - The same is had from Spanish Law 848 seqq.; and from Austrian Law 768 seqq.

From Italian Law 725, 1081, and from French Law 727, 955, 1046, 1047, there is not indeed disinheritance properly so called, but generally there is established incapacity and unworthiness of succeeding by reason of crime, and the revocability of a donation made by reason of ingratitude, on account of certain determined delicts: namely, 1. if they have laid snares for the life of the testator; 2. if by another crime, cruelties, or grave injuries they have been guilty against him; 3. if they have denied him maintenance; 4. if by calumny they have accused him of a grave capital crime, from French Law; and 5. from Italian Law, if they have compelled him to make or change a testament, or have impeded him from making or revoking it. - L. 340, 948, 949; Ferraris, v. Exhaeredatio.

From German Law 1938, 2333 seqq., 2339 seqq., one can by testament exclude a blood-relation or spouse from succession, without instituting an heir. - Various causes of unworthiness for succession are assigned besides; and, once the succession has devolved, any one who has an interest in the exclusion of the unworthy person can oppose those causes. - And on account of certain graver crimes, especially crimes against piety, almost the same as those which constitute unworthiness from C. I. and from C. G., one can by testament take away from his necessary heir the portion reserved to him by law. - When some descendant has been prodigal, or gravely burdened with debt, the testator can reduce the portion reserved by law for that descendant, attributing it to other legitimate heirs, as fideicommissary substitutes. He can also commit the administration to a testamentary executor, and the descendant then has a right to the whole annual revenues.

73. Are parents bound in the forum of conscience to leave to children the legitimate share according to the laws? - Parents, more truly and according to the common doctrine, ought by civil law to leave after death the legitimate share to their children, whether males or females, natural and legitimate, indeed even those natural by law acknowledged and legitimated, as well as legitimate or adoptive, unless a grave cause is present. For the law is just, and indeed obligating in conscience. Parents by the natural law owe providence to children as to body and as to state. Wherefore the positive law determining the legitimate share in reality interprets and defines the natural law. But it does not exclude certain rarer cases of necessity, in which the good itself of the children and of the family persuades that one act otherwise; and this is also confirmed by the practice of those who fear God. - L. 215, 740, 947, 950; H. A. 237; La Croix p. 3, l. 2, n. 1173; Gousset 794.

But there is no doubt that parents can, with attention to the civil laws, make manual gifts, especially remunerative ones, to children; for if these are not prohibited in favor of friends, neither are they prohibited in favor of those joined by blood, or for pious causes. Besides, they can also make gifts of greater moment to the same persons, if they are made from mere revenues; because of these they are full and free owners, nor, by the civil laws themselves, are they bound to increase the patrimony by revenues. Finally, if a just, proportionate, grave cause is present, they can also, if the legitimate share of the children is not injured, make a donation from those things also which constitute the patrimony. The reason is that the law, determining the legitimate shares, gives to parents this faculty, that they freely dispose of the remaining goods in favor of others. Therefore if a father can leave those things to other strangers, he can also give them to the children themselves, if a reasonable cause of acting thus is present, and the legitimate share is not injured. - But this must be noted, which Lugo has, d. 23, n. 147, namely that "parents, if they have donated inofficiously, that is, to the prejudice of the legitimate share of the children, their donations can be revoked by the children. Yet the donation is not invalid, but it can be made void." And this has force also in Italian and French Law; for in each of these Laws it is not said that it is void, but that it will be void. C. I. 821; C. G. 920. - L. 740, 950.

74. The distinguished D'Annibale has these things, Summ. Theol. Mor. P. 2, n. 601, ed. 2; n. 573, ed. 4: "More truly by civil law, parents ought after their death to leave to their children, whether males or females, born from just nuptials, or adoptive, indeed also natural children acknowledged by law, yet not to spurious children, the legitimate share. By civil law; for if they were held by natural law, it would have to be left also to spurious children. Do they therefore sin lethally who leave to children less than the legitimate share, more to strangers, or by giving largely to pious uses; or indeed the whole legitimate share, but not an equal one to each? Namely, if neither the children, from whom they subtract, need the thing subtracted, and they add to others from a just cause.... If it is lawful to estimate the matter from the common sense and affection of nearly all parents, as though from a certain natural law, I think that they are not to be disturbed, regularly: 1. as regards donations or largitions which are made by short hand; for scarcely is there anyone who judges this unlawful to himself, provided this is not some enormous thing, or done in hatred of the children. Nor 2. if they subtract something from females, especially married females, that they may add it to males; and in reality there is scarcely anyone who does not take pains to do this, with whatever art and fallacy applied for eluding the law. Nor finally 3. those who from a grave cause leave more to one of the males. And thus neither will those be disturbed who have received from them, until by sentence of a judge they are compelled to restore."