Article IX: On Kisses, Embraces, and Other Touches with Respect to Spouses

27. It is a principle, already commonly admitted among theologians, that in this matter all things are lawful for spouses, except pollution and those things which participate in the malice of pollution, without grave sin, and without even venial sin, if a reasonable cause is present. Hence kisses, embraces, and other touches, even base ones, and generally all incomplete acts, whatever they may be and in whatever way they are performed, per se speaking, contain among spouses no grave guilt of fault, and with a sufficient reason added are not imputed even to venial fault. The reason is that in the married state, since intercourse is lawful, venereal delectation not consummated outside intercourse is lawful. For to him to whom the complete and consummated act is lawful, the incomplete begun act also is lawful, which from its intrinsic nature tends to the complete and consummated act; and such is the carnal venereal motion bringing venereal delectation. But those incomplete acts, which from their intrinsic nature do not pertain to lust but to sensuality, are prohibited insofar as they contain the proximate danger of venereal delectation, which, outside intercourse, not consummated, is not prohibited to spouses. Therefore, etc. Busenbaum apud L., l. 6, n. 932.

28. Corollaries. 1. Looks, kisses, embraces, and touches upon parts both honorable and even less honorable, indeed even simply base, are free from grave fault among spouses, provided, however, that they are done cautiously, so that the danger of pollution is absent. Thus the commoner and truer opinion from St. Alphonsus. "The reason is that, just as the conjugal state makes intercourse honorable, so also it makes touches and looks of this kind honorable; otherwise, since there is so great a society between spouses, and they often cannot have intercourse, they would be exposed to continual dangers if such acts were gravely illicit for them. But just as delectation sought in intercourse does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and looks." L., l. 6, n. 933; G., v. 2, n. 910.

2. The aforesaid looks and touches are per se altogether free from every fault, provided, however, as has been said, that they are done cautiously, so that danger of pollution is absent, whenever they are exercised for the sake of showing conjugal affection or fostering love. The reason is that such acts are in reality from their intrinsic nature means to this end of signifying and fostering conjugal love, and therefore lawful to those who by the matrimonial bond ought to become one heart and one flesh. - A fortiori the aforesaid looks and touches are per se free from fault if they are immediately referred to intercourse, or are necessary or useful for exciting nature; for then they are a certain preparation for intercourse and, as it were, its beginning. But if these acts, by which a spouse disposes himself or herself to the conjugal act, are such that they per se easily provoke pollution, they can be culpable if diligence is lacking for avoiding pollution outside congress; and omission of diligence of this kind, where it is such that through it one is thought nearly to will pollution outside the vessel, can even be grave fault. But if, due diligence having been used, such pollution follows beyond intention, there is no fault. G., l. c.; L., l. 6, n. 934.

3. Spouses do not sin gravely, even if from the aforesaid looks and touches, had even without intention of intercourse, there arises a commotion of the spirits or of the members serving generation, or if distillation follows; although these would be mortal in the unmarried. The reason is that, the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy being excluded, nothing is done against the good of marriage. But the light fault which can be in acts of this kind is easily excused by ends intrinsic to marriage itself or other extrinsic ends; for example because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence. - Indeed it is even probable, and an opinion sufficiently common, that these acts are excused from every fault even in the one requesting, although pollution is foreseen as about to follow in oneself or in the other, if nevertheless the pollution is not intended, nor is there danger of consent to it, and provided some grave cause is present, for example to foster mutual love or to avert the jealousy of the other. The reason is that then that just cause makes such acts honorable, which otherwise are not illicit among spouses; and if pollution occurs this will be per accidens. Wherefore, as is consequent, it is also probable that these acts are altogether lawful for the one rendering, although there is danger of pollution in either one, because then the one rendering gives his work to a lawful thing. - Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 207; L., l. 6, n. 934; Tamburini, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 56; G., l. c.

But this doctrine, as is clear of itself, is not to be extended to those acts which so tend to pollution that they are, as it were, pollution begun, as if a woman were very lingeringly to touch and stimulate the genital members of the man, or a man were wholly lingeringly to insert a finger within the female vessel. Cf. Sanchez, l. 9, D. 45, 46.

Finally, to this doctrine a question is joined: Do spouses sin if, intercourse having been begun, they restrain insemination? - R. Per se speaking, they do not sin, at least mortally, if both spouses consent in this. The reason is that this penetration of the female vessel is reckoned as, so to speak, a touch of the private parts, which is by no means prohibited under grave sin to spouses. But it is said: 1. per se speaking; for an act of this kind, considered concretely, since it tends to pollution and is, as it were, pollution begun, is illicit concretely. Wherefore, if pollution would always or at least ordinarily follow in reality, then that withdrawal would per se in reality tend to pollution, and then it would be gravely illicit. But if pollution either never followed, or at least did not follow ordinarily, and only sometimes pollution followed, since this would be per accidens and beyond intention, that withdrawal would not then be gravely illicit. 2. At least mortally; for if there is a just cause for acting thus, for example because of poverty and multitude of offspring, and at the same time for calming concupiscence, every fault will be absent. 3. If both consent; for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely. - L., l. 6, n. 918; Diana, tr. 6, de Sacr. Matr., R. 205, n. 2; R. 207; Sporer, de Matr., n. 500; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 19, n. 3.

4. "Touches with oneself from venereal delectation, the other spouse being absent, according to the opinion of many, cannot be excused from grave sin, even with pollution or its proximate danger excluded. The reason is that the spouse does not have the right of using his own body in order to unfold pleasure with himself, but only in order to intercourse. La-Croix, n. 339, etc.; L., l. 6, n. 936. Yet not a few others apud St. Alphonsus say that, with the danger of pollution excluded, this does not exceed venial fault. St. Alphonsus judges the first opinion more probable and to be recommended." G. 920. Tamburini, however, says that each opinion is probable, Explic. Decal., l. 7, c. 3, n. 45. And Sanchez says the second is more probable, l. 9, d. 44, n. 16.

Now it must be noted here, according to the reason explained above in n. 27, that these acts, if they are venial, are venial only on account of the extrinsic disorder of the agent. Wherefore, consequently to the principle established above, we say that even these acts, exercised by one spouse alone, altogether apart from the other, per se speaking, or from their intrinsic nature, probably contain not even venial fault. And the reason is: 1. because if these acts are intrinsically culpable, since the matter here is always grave, they are either gravely culpable or in no way; 2. because mutual touch of a spouse with a spouse is probably lawful outside consummated intercourse precisely because that touch from its intrinsic nature is ordered to intercourse. Wherefore, just as consummated intercourse is lawful for spouses, so also intercourse only begun is lawful, which is contained in those acts. But any voluptuous touch of a married person from itself is referred to intercourse, which is already lawful to him or her. Therefore the light fault which can be in these acts can easily also be excused on account of an honorable end, because, for example, they are suitable for calming concupiscence and for avoiding another grave sin.

29. "How ought a woman conduct herself who is touched by a man not her own?" - R. "If she is touched in dishonorable parts, she ought in every morally possible way to repel the one touching. But that is called morally impossible which cannot be applied without such inconvenience as would outweigh, or at least be equal to, the endurance of this touch, such as would be danger of death, infamy, grave loss of goods, and similar things, if she resisted the one touching; in which cases, according to Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 64, and Loth, the woman would not be bound to resist the exterior touch, because such a touch according to species is not evil on the part of the woman, as fornication would be, provided, however, that danger of consenting to interior lust is absent. Since I judge this to be very rare and very difficult, I also think that a woman is regularly bound to resist in every possible and lawful way, whatever may threaten her. But if a woman is touched in honorable parts, yet notices the lustful mind of the one touching, a distinction is needed. Either she is touched in the presence of others, who from the woman's resistance would conceive an evil suspicion concerning the one touching or embracing, or not. If the first, she is not bound to withdraw herself, because there is present a cause of neglecting the other's sin; if the second, she is bound, because we are bound to impede the sin of our neighbor when we conveniently can. Thus Sylvius here, conclusion 1, and others." Billuart, l. c. See about corollary 4. Cf. here n. 25.