Section — Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)
XVI. On the Obligation of Paying Taxes
200.
- By the name tax is understood generally that which is paid for making the common expenses of the commonwealth. A tax is called direct if it is imposed on persons by reason of their goods; it is called indirect if it is imposed on things by reason of some act which regards them, for example, transfer of ownership, sale, succession, transport of merchandise from one place to another, etc. For making the common expenses of the commonwealth. Therefore those things which are paid also to public administrations for transporting letters from place to place, for journeys of persons on railroads, etc., do not have the character of taxes; and they are to be paid by force of the contract entered with the public administration, and consequently from commutative justice.
201.
- The public authority of the commonwealth altogether has the right of imposing taxes. For it has the obligation of caring for and promoting the common good. Consequently it has the right to exact from subjects those things which are necessary for the aforesaid end, and subjects have the obligation of giving them.
202.
- Yet it is necessary that taxes be just. But they will be just if they are imposed by public and legitimate authority; if they are imposed from a just cause of necessity or utility of the common good; if they do not exceed the measure of this necessity and utility; if they are distributed with due proportion according to the faculties of citizens.
203.
- The laws of taxes oblige, as other civil laws do, which oblige per se from legal justice by reason of the common good. Yet it cannot be denied that in tax laws legal justice is intimately connected with commutative justice. Certainly from legal justice prince and subjects are bound, each for his own part, to contribute necessary safeguards to society. But commutative justice commands foreigners to compensate the damages which they bring upon another's society by carrying away and selling merchandise; it commands both subjects and foreigners to compensate the necessary expenses in the construction and custody of roads, bridges, aqueducts, etc., which they use. And it cannot be denied that a certain tacit contract or quasi-contract is present between prince and subjects, when, for example, subjects demand several and certain greater conveniences, and the prince then sustains the necessary burdens for procuring them; surely subjects in such a case owe him, from strict justice, to supply the necessary expenses?
204.
- That laws of this kind per se oblige in conscience is expressly clear from the Apostle Paul, Rom. 13:5-7: "Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience. For therefore you pay taxes: for they are ministers of God, serving unto this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: to whom tax, tax; to whom tribute, tribute." But that per se also laws of this kind look not only to legal justice, but also to commutative justice, is also clearly apparent from the Roman Catechism, on the seventh Precept of the Decalogue, n. 10: "In this crime of rapacity are included those who do not pay, or divert and transfer to themselves, the customs, taxes, tithes, and other things of this kind which are owed to the Prelates of the Church and Magistrates."
205.
- Nevertheless, since collectors of these taxes are publicly constituted, this seems to be the mind of legislators, that payment of taxes not be judged owed unless it is exacted. Likewise, since a grave penalty is imposed on those not paying, at the established time, taxes owed by law, without their first having to be sought by the collectors, many and grave doctors have tax laws generally as merely penal laws. Yet from this it does not follow that someone ought not to pay just taxes when the time established by law has arrived, or when they are legitimately sought by collectors; but it follows only that unless the law to be observed is urged, or unless they are legitimately sought, he is not indeed bound in conscience to pay them, but is bound to undergo the penalty if he is detected not to have paid the tax and the penalty is imposed. Therefore someone sins only when, the tax owed by law not having been paid, or the duty as regards taxes sought by collectors not having been paid, he would afterwards be unwilling to pay the fine and undergo the penalty. And this opinion is confirmed also by common practice and persuasion, namely that these laws do not oblige in conscience to paying taxes spontaneously. Wherefore, with at least a doubt standing concerning the obligation, no one seems to be disquieted also under this head if he has not paid taxes not sought by collectors, or other taxes not first to be sought. Indeed, even if someone merely eludes the vigilance of collectors, by hiding things or not manifesting them, namely so that they do not exact or urge, as even the timorous are accustomed to do, or by declaring a smaller value of things in order to diminish the tax, provided, however, lies and frauds are absent, which are always illicit, for deceiving public officials and collectors and for not paying, and provided at least the just price, the lowest true price of the things, is declared. - L. l. 3, n. 614-617; H. A., tr. 10, n. 81; St. Thomas, Quodl. 6, a. 10; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 36, s. 4; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 2, c. 33; Ithur., Cas. 2; Struggl. 32; Elbel 303-306; Kenrick, tr. 6, c. 3, n. 20-22, 25.
206.
- You will resolve: The following are to be condemned: 1. Those who violently resist ministers exacting customs. These sin against obedience: He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God. Rom. 13:2. They also sin against legal justice; for the law which regards taxes, even if it is held as merely penal, nevertheless grants to rulers a certain right of exacting a fine if subjects are detected in fraud. - 2. Those who through right and wrong exercise defrauding as a kind of trade, and wander day and night armed even with the mind of resisting. Men of this kind become rebellious citizens and most pernicious to society. - 3. Those who, although they never resist and do not have the mind of resisting, nevertheless with all zeal and work devote themselves to the art of defrauding taxes, and have it as a profession of life. These not rarely are exposed to dangers both of temporal goods and of life and of soul. Besides, it is one thing sometimes not to manifest one's things or to hide them so that a tax may not be exacted; it is another thing to exercise the art of defrauding taxes, which certainly is prohibited, since this is altogether damaging to society, both on account of the very defrauding of taxes and on account of several other crimes which are naturally associated with it. - All these incur confiscation, Dig. l. 39, t. 4.
207.
- Do officials sin against justice whenever they do not exact a just tax? - R. Affirmatively, per se generally, and indeed gravely in grave matter. The reason is clear, since they obligated themselves to watch rightly, and diligently to exact taxes otherwise just. Therefore, if they fail in their office, they are bound to restitution toward the Prince or the commonwealth. Generally, because according to many, those placed over exacting customs are not always to be condemned when now and then they act more benignly in a light matter, especially with the poor, or also with those who otherwise diligently pay; because in such a case the Princes themselves are reasonably presumed to remit it. - "Besides, if toll-collectors detect defrauders and only dissemble, probably they are not bound to repay the fine. The reason for this is that toll-collectors by force of their office are bound only to exact the custom for the good of the Prince, but not to enrich him by fines. Besides, a fine is not owed from elsewhere before the sentence of a judge, nor before this does the fisc have a right to the fine. Whence also guards paid to observe lest tolls be declined through hidden passes, if by their own fault they permit passage, are bound from justice to repay the loss of the toll, but not of the fine." Struggl. 30. Others, however, affirm that they ought also to repay the fine, because by omitting the denunciation to which they are bound by reason of office, they are the cause why the fisc does not exact that to which it has a right. - But those are to be condemned who corrupt those placed over exacting customs by unjust means, so that they may not perform their office by exacting an otherwise just tax; for they sin at least by cooperating in the sin of these, and are bound to restitution. - L. l. 3, n. 583, 614-617; l. 4, n. 237; Struggl. 32; Gousset 1000.