Chapter V: On the Internal Sins of Lust

We have hitherto explained the external sins of lust; it remains that we speak of internal sins.

224. In this matter, besides thought on the part of the intellect and imagination on the part of the phantasy, three internal acts are chiefly and generally distinguished: morose delight, desire, and joy.

Impure thoughts and imaginations excite venereal delight, and of themselves they have a great influence upon it.

Thoughts of dishonorable things of themselves contain no sin. Consequently, to have them from an honorable end, even not without the wrong effect of venereal delight, is of itself no sin.

But if an honorable and just end is lacking, if they are had from a wrong affection, or if they are of things very dishonorable, even from mere curiosity or levity, or if one dwells on them too long, they contain a grave influence upon venereal delight, and then they cannot be excused from grave sin. But impure thoughts of things not very dishonorable and only slightly moving are not of themselves, by reason of their light influence upon venereal delight, except a light sin. And, since impure thoughts of this kind tend only to exciting venereal delight, they are all of the same species; and consequently then there is no need to explain their various objects in Confession.

225. Delight, in its most general acceptance, is the resting of a cognitive or appetitive faculty in its own proper object, from the conformity of such an object with that faculty. It is threefold according to the threefold faculty: spiritual or intellectual, which has place in the intellect and the will; such, for example, is the delight of the intellect in the contemplation of truth; sensible, which arises in an organ of sense, the organs of generation being excluded, for example, the delight of sight from a beautiful thing, of hearing from music, of touch from smoothness, of taste from flavor, of smell from sweetness of odor; carnal or venereal, which is felt in the organs of generation, and so is the resting of the sensitive faculty in matters of generation.

Sensible delight and carnal or venereal delight look to exterior acts. Concerning both, with respect to the present matter, it has already been said above, n. 2, and in the preceding chapters.

But spiritual delight is contained under interior acts; and when it regards a prohibited thing, it is usually called in moral theology morose delight; and it is a simple and voluntary complacency concerning an illicit thing. Simple, that is, without desire and intention of accomplishing it by deed, so that one is content with delight alone, with an interior thought, for example, concerning the killing of an enemy, or carnal copulation. Voluntary: hence delight is not called morose on account of any delay of time whatever, but on account of its continuation after full advertence of the intellect to the malice of the thing; and so delight is morose, even if the will, after such advertence, persists and freely dwells in it for one instant, or moment of time.

Therefore morose delight concerning a venereal thing merely spiritual, namely one which remains in the will alone, even joined with no base commotion of the flesh, will always be grave sin outside legitimate marriage, because it concerns an object gravely prohibited. Cf. here n. 2. And consequently the same must be said of desire and of joy concerning a venereal thing, which likewise are always grave. - Morose delight regards an object present according to apprehension, as "when through the imagination of the phantasy someone renders the work of sin present to himself, namely the act of fornication, and delights in it by deliberate consent, as though he were actually fornicating, yet without a desire of executing it." L. l. 5. numero 15.

Desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends the object itself as future, and therefore as to be placed in himself. It is twofold: one is simple desire, or desire of itself inefficacious, and it is the mere concupiscence of the external work and of the means without intention of executing such a work, the means not being applied; the other is desire of itself efficacious, or purpose, and it is the interior concupiscence of the external work and of the means with an absolute intention, or at least a hypothetical one, if it could be done, of executing the work, the due means being applied.

Joy, finally, is an act of the will by which someone deliberately approves, and is complacent within himself concerning, the past object itself, that is, the object carried out in execution, and therefore as that object was placed in himself. Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 2-6.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. 1. III.; Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 363 and following.

Note. "Not a few, especially from the ruder sort, are involved in this deception, that they think they consent only when they have the will of executing, and of perpetrating by the work itself, fornication, deflowering, or some other external lustful act. This error is enormous and must be extirpated by priests, according to their strength." Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 5.

226. Desire, whether it be efficacious or inefficacious, takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances of that object. Joy likewise takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances annexed to it. Morose delight varies in species according to the variety of the apprehended objects and of the circumstances exhibited to the mind. - This is established from the very intrinsic tendency of such acts, already explained. Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c.

Corollary 1. The sentence is very probable "that if someone delights concerning copulation with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is a beautiful woman, etc., he does not contract the malice of adultery; for the circumstance of adultery then does not enter into the delight. For this reason chastity only is harmed, not justice. And Tamburini probably says the same, if someone, with venereal affection, without desire, looks upon a married woman. Yet, this notwithstanding, what Holzmann has greatly pleases me, namely that although by reason of the delight there is no obligation of explaining the circumstance of adultery, nevertheless in practice it must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of coveting, at least inefficaciously, that married woman, into which danger one casts himself who delights concerning her. But there is no doubt that adultery is committed as often as joy, or complacency, is had concerning copulation had, or desire concerning copulation to be had, with a married woman, because then the will embraces the whole wrong object with all its circumstances, and cannot prescind from them, and therefore harms chastity and justice. Likewise, if someone delights concerning sodomitic copulation. Likewise, if the person who delights is bound by a vow of chastity, he also sins against the vow." L. l. c. Cf. Billuart, l. c. Sect. III.; Lugo, l. c.

2. Delight concerning the evil work itself, for example, of fornication, etc., is always evil, gravely or lightly, according as the work itself is gravely or lightly evil. But delight concerning the thought of an evil work, so that not the evil work itself, but only cognition of it, is the object of the delight, is of itself indifferent; and so it can be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., always with abhorrence of the object itself; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, levity, etc.; or it can also be gravely evil, if it is done from an end mortally evil, or if proximate danger is present of deliberate delight in the object itself. What has been said concerning delight of thought must also be said concerning delight in the artful, skillful, etc., manner of an evil work carried out; for example, if you delight in the ingenious abduction of a bride carried out by another, from an honorable end the delight will be honorable, but if from an evil end, the delight is evil. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 33.

3. The doctrine of St. Thomas saying, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 4, that it is not a sin if nocturnal pollution pleases as an unloading or relief of nature, can in no way be understood of the delight inherent in pollution, which, as being base, is in itself and objectively evil; and in this way the holy Doctor explains himself in IV. Dist. 9. q. 1. a. 4. q. 1. ad 5. Indeed St. Alphonsus, lib. V. n. 20, wishes St. Thomas to be understood of a purely natural pollution, which naturally proceeds from nature unloading itself, and by no means of nocturnal pollution which has happened from touch or from a base dream, because under this respect it is again objectively evil. Moreover, in practice complacency of this kind, although in itself and speculatively honorable, is to be avoided because of the danger which it brings. G. Dumas, v. 1. n. 173. "Concerning pollution had in sleep," says Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 6, "someone can rejoice, not insofar as it is venereally delightful, but insofar as it is useful, either for quieting temptations, or for consulting health." Cf. Scavini, Tr. 4. d. 1. c. 2. a. 4. q. 13.; Ithur. Cas. 23. n. 31 and following.; Sanchez, in Dec. l. 1. c. 2. n. 19.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 14, I say 1, I say 2.; D'Annib., p. 1. n. 275. (18), ed. 4.

4. "It is not a sin, at least not mortal, if spouses delight by the rational appetite only concerning a past, future, or possible act of marriage, with respect to the partner present or absent. Likewise if a betrothed man desires future copulation, or delights concerning it; or a widow concerning past copulation. The reason is because these acts have a lawful object. I said: by the rational appetite; because if a betrothed man or a widow voluntarily consents to sensitive and carnal delight, which arises naturally from the remembrance of future or past copulation, he or she sins mortally, as Lessius, Bonacina, Tanner, Palaus, and Diana teach against Medina. But since sensitive and carnal delight, and indeed also the danger of consent to fornication, for the most part follows the aforesaid delight of the will, that delight of the will scarcely has a place in practice, at least in a widow and the betrothed; among spouses, however, provided danger of pollution is absent, Filliucci, Bonacina, Sanchez, Lessius, and Diana teach that even sensitive and venereal delight is not mortal; both because the state of marriage excuses these things, as also immodest touches undertaken for the sake of pleasure alone, and because these tend of themselves to the conjugal work, although by accident the work is not exercised." Busembaum apud S. Alph., l. V. n. 23. - Struggl, Tr. VII. q. 7. art. 2. nn. 18. 19.; Sporer, de matr. n. 505.; Ithur. Cas. 18.; L. l. c. n. 24, 25, lib. VI. n. 937.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. IV.