Article IV: On the Placing of an Impediment to Generation

123. Spouses sin if before or after or in the very use they do something by which generation is impeded, because they act directly against the end of marriage.

Hence, first, the wife sins gravely by reason of the depraved intention of impeding generation, who in the act of coitus diverts her mind to other things, lest she be excited to semination, or who immediately after copulation rises or urinates. It is said by reason of the depraved intention, etc.; for the semination of the woman is not in reality necessary for generation, but only very useful for it; and since the womb in a short time draws in the semen and is very tightly closed, those various attempts to cast out the semen by rising, urinating, etc., are in reality vain and ineffectual. Hence also all agree that there is no need for the wife after copulation to remain long unmoved and lying on her back. L. l. VI. n. 954.; Debreyne, 2 p. ch. 2. art. 2. Sect. 2.

Second, spouses sin if by mutual consent the husband after begun copulation withdraws himself before semination and pours forth semen outside the vessel, in order to impede generation. This sin is called onanism, from Onan, who committed such a sin, Gen. 38. 9. 10., and it is true and properly so-called pollution, containing the special malice as it were of adultery. Cf. here n. 69. Outside marriage, however, after copulation has begun, to withdraw oneself and to pour forth semen outside the vessel has, besides the malice of consummated pollution, also the malice of begun fornication, or at least of fornication in affection. Cf. here n. 44. 103.

124. Note. "The conjugal act is lawfully interrupted, even if pollution will follow by the stirring of nature, provided there is a just cause for interrupting it, for example, if from its continuation there threatens danger of disease, or death from an enemy, or someone else intervenes." Busembaum, L. 6. n. 954.

125. Can a woman lawfully render the debt to a husband using marriage onanistically?

Resp. Diana has these words: "I say, therefore, that the man and the woman indeed sin mortally if it is done with her consent; but if she does not consent, I think that she can lawfully ask and render the debt from her husband, even if at the end of copulation he pours forth semen outside the vessel. And the reason is that, as often as I ask an act from someone which he can perform well or badly, I do not sin, nor do I provide the cause of sin; for the other acts badly by his own malice, although he could act rightly. But this whole thing proceeds in our case." Tr. 6. de Matrimon. R. 181. Cf. also ibid. R. 184. It is confirmed from various decisions of the Sacred Penitentiary and of the Holy Office: G. t. 2. n. 927. and following; Enchir. Morale 1058. 1066.

126. Is some grave extrinsic cause required, so that a woman may lawfully render the debt to an onanist husband?

Resp. Several affirm, relying chiefly on declarations of the Sacred Congregation. They list these grave causes: first, if death, blows, or grave acts of savagery are feared; second, if there is a reason to fear that the husband will have a concubine either at home or outside the home; third, if the woman knows certainly that the husband, angered by refusal, will utter blasphemies against God and religion, injuries against the confessor and priests in general, scandalous words before servants or children; fourth, a fortiori the fear of divorce, or separation, or infamy, or grave scandal. But these theologians wisely warn that it is by no means necessary that the woman repel the husband until she has experienced the acts of savagery, troubles, or other inconveniences mentioned; for then, by rendering or offering the debt, she would often not avert an evil already existing, and besides she is not bound to undergo it in order to impede the sin of her husband; it is enough, therefore, that she reasonably fear it.

But a grave extrinsic cause does not seem necessary. For, first, the responses of the Sacred Congregation do not evince the necessity of this cause, since they declare only that the woman is to be excused who renders the debt to an onanist husband from a grave cause. But they pronounce nothing concerning her who renders it without that grave extrinsic reason. Second, it is proved from the authority of St. Alphonsus, who says that a wife not only can, but even is bound more probably to render the debt to an onanist husband, without a grave reason. "The reason," he says, "is that when the fault holds itself on the part of the person asking, since he has a right to copulation, the other cannot deny the debt without injustice, if she cannot by warning him turn him away from such fault; and then it is clear that the one rendering does not even materially cooperate in that one's sin, since she does not cooperate in the semination outside the vessel, but only in the begun copulation, which of itself is altogether lawful to each." L. l. 6. n. 947. Third, the same is proved from the authority of other most grave theologians; thus Sanchez, Tamburini, Sporer, Pontas apud St. Alphonsus l. c., and D. Bouvier in the Supplement to Tr. de Matr., think, to whom can be added the very learned Struggl, de Matr. n. 83. third. Fourth, because if the woman dissents from the action of the man withdrawing himself, she is engaged in nothing except a lawful action; and precisely insofar as in that act she uses marriage, she uses her own right. For she does nothing except what, with marriage posited, she can lawfully do. She ought not to be deprived of her own right because of the malice of the husband; for the man approaching her and penetrating the vessel does not sin, but only by withdrawing himself and pouring forth semen outside the vessel, in which action the woman in no way participates and cooperates, but it is uniquely from the malice of the man. Nor is anyone bound, even by reason of charity, to yield his right, when this is not without notable inconvenience, so that another may avoid a sin which depends uniquely on his own malice. It is said that she in no way participates and cooperates; for in reality the woman only permits the sin of the man, by not denying the debt to him. The permission of sin is certainly one thing, properly speaking cooperation is another. The sin of the man is indeed not in the legitimately begun copulation, but in the cessation from it and withdrawal, with which the woman in no way cooperates. Fifth, lastly, if a grave cause is desired, it is certainly not necessary that there be a grave extrinsic cause, but an intrinsic cause suffices; for it is of itself grave for a woman who has married in order to exercise the work of marriage to abstain for a long time, and thus to be deprived of her right in an altogether grave matter. Moreover, in practice, grave extrinsic causes also are almost always had; for example, a founded fear of gravely displeasing the husband and of lacking peace in married life, etc. Gury, Cas. Cf. here n. 136. 2. n. 1106.

127. Is warning on the part of the woman necessarily required, so that she may lawfully render the debt to an onanist husband?

Resp. In the case this warning can and ought to be done only for a twofold cause: first, so that the man may be aware of the woman's dissent, lest the man become more emboldened in his perverse way of acting; and for this reason a formal warning by words is not necessarily to be made, if the husband is otherwise morally aware of the dissent of the wife, for example by the sincere displeasure and repugnance which she shows in that action. Second, the cause is that the man be drawn back from sin, by reason of charity, by which in that case the wife is bound toward the husband; and certainly for this reason a warning is to be made if it is prudently judged that it will be profitable. But if it is certainly judged that it will in no way be profitable, but rather harmful, such a warning is indeed to be omitted, because one wishing then to impede one sin would be in the cause that others also would be perpetrated, such as blasphemies against God, injuries against the confessor, against the sacraments, etc. L. l. 6. n. 944.

128. Is a woman bound to render the debt to a husband using marriage onanistically?

Resp. Negatively, at least speaking of itself and by reason of justice. The reason is that by the contract of marriage the wife did not bind herself except to the use of marriage which is of itself apt for generation. The same St. Alphonsus, who in the cited place teaches as more probable that a woman can and is bound to render the debt, nevertheless adds that she can probably and is bound to deny the debt, if she can do so without grave inconvenience. Therefore, given the probability of each opinion, the woman can, but is not bound to, render the debt. But it is said, speaking of itself and by reason of justice, because if this would be an occasion for the husband of indignation, dissension, and other more grave sins, with the grave inconvenience of the wife excluded, then by reason of charity she is bound to render the debt. L. l. 6. nn. 947. 944. Moreover the wife would also be bound to render the debt if the man, warned, promises that he will complete the act and at least sometimes completes it; for in doubt a certain right cannot be denied because of abuse. Sporer, de Matr. 513.

129. Can a wife ask the debt from an onanist husband?

Resp. Affirmatively, if there is a grave cause. The reason is that she has a right to copulation, and a sufficient reason of cooperation, or rather of permission of another's sin, is present. But the grave cause is from St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 947: "If she herself were in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise she would have to be deprived of her right of asking more than once or twice, with perpetual scruple whether it is a sufficiently grave inconvenience for her or not to contain herself." And with scruple excluded, it is certainly a grave inconvenience for a married woman, who has married for this end, that she might exercise the work of marriage, to abstain for a long time and, in the state of marriage, to lead a continent life. And, as is clear, a grave cause is always regularly present, either extrinsic or at least intrinsic. Moreover, the theologians reported in the preceding response, n. 126, universally affirm that it is lawful for a wife both to render and to ask, because, as they say, when a woman renders or asks, she gives work to a lawful thing, nor ought she herself to be deprived of her own right because of the malice of the man. L. l. c.

130. Does a wife sin by giving internal consent to pleasure, when she can permit the conjugal act to an onanist husband?

Resp. Negatively, provided she does not give assent to the sin of the man. The reason is that, since she by no means sins by permitting an act of this kind, neither does she sin by admitting the pleasure arising from it, although she foreknows that the man will not complete the copulation; for that act is in itself honorable and lawful for the woman, and it does not stand through her that it is not completed in the due manner. G. v. 2. n. 926.

131. Does a wife sin if, after the onanist husband has withdrawn from the imperfect copulation, she excites herself to complete the act, or, already aroused, delights in the subsequent pollution?

Resp. Affirmatively; for that act is true pollution, since, when the husband has withdrawn, it is no longer referable to intercourse as the complement of marital copulation; for the husband has departed, the copulation being imperfect. L. l. 6. n. 909.; Tamburini, Expl. Decal. l. 7. c. 3. n. 19.; Struggl, de matr. n. 91.

There are more recent authors who, when the conjugal act is not completed because the man withdraws himself, permit the woman afterward to complete it by semination, if she had not done so before in the very act of copulation. The reason is that an act legitimately begun can be brought to its due end. But this reason proves the contrary. For if the man did not seminate, that act of the woman can no longer be brought to the due end, and has the true notion of pollution.

132. Does a wife sin if at the very beginning of copulation, or in its continuation, she excites herself so that she may seminate, when she knows that an onanist husband will by no means complete the copulation, and delights in it?

Resp. 1. If that excitation and semination arise naturally immediately after the beginning of copulation or in the very continuation of conjugal copulation, she does not sin in any way, since indeed the woman gives work to a lawful thing by beginning copulation with her husband and continuing it.

If semination naturally follows because nature has been excited, this is not then illicit of itself; and therefore even in the semination itself the woman gives work to a lawful thing, since that whole act is of itself orderable and referable to the perfecting of conjugal intercourse and to generation. But if that act remains without its natural and necessary complement, this is not from the fault of the wife, but exclusively of the husband, who in that case ought to consummate the copulation, and although he could do so, himself does not will it. Hence it does not seem that the woman is bound by a positive effort to impede semination, and, when it has followed naturally, not to delight in it; for this would render marriage very burdensome to her and make her subject to many anxieties, since she would be in perpetual and very grave danger of sinning.

2. The difficulty seems greater if the woman would not be naturally excited, but, lest she be deprived of that pleasure which it would be most hard for her constantly to lack, she of herself by effort would excite herself all the way to semination. Nevertheless, not even in this case does the woman seem to sin gravely, since she gives work to a thing which of itself is not illicit and contrary to generation, and she has a most grave reason for doing this, if, because of a great inclination toward that thing, she would have to be deprived of that pleasure, which would make marriage burdensome for her. The whole turpitude in that matter is from without, from the malice of the husband not completing the thing, as we have already observed in the first point.

133. Note. What was said in the preceding questions about the wife having an onanist husband, who withdraws himself after copulation has begun and pours out semen, seems likewise to be said about the wife having a husband who, immediately before copulation, in order to impede generation, pollutes himself alone, and then immediately has copulation. This can be more easily admitted under this aspect, namely that notwithstanding the preceding pollution, he can still pour forth semen in that copulation which he undertakes, since almost immediately semen is reproduced in the testicles, or some part of the semen remains. For experience establishes that men can pollute themselves once, and again, and a third time successively, with a very brief interval of time interposed. Longet, loc. cit. p. 125.

134. Can a woman who has procured sterility in herself by medicated potions or by another way afterward continue in asking and rendering the debt?

Resp. If she has become merely sterile, although she sinned gravely by deliberately causing this, because by deliberate work semen is impeded from its natural end of generation, which is against nature, nevertheless she can still both render and ask the debt, like all other naturally sterile women, because that act is of the same nature whether sterility has proceeded from nature itself or from art. But if she has been rendered impotent, it seems evident that she cannot do anything except exercise only those imperfect acts which in the case of impotence are permitted to spouses. The reason is that perfect copulation on the part of the man, when this is physiologically impossible on the part of the woman, is essentially against generation, and has the true nature of pollution, whose malice is in the vain effusion of semen from the nature of the act itself.

If this were lawful because the act by its nature is not against generation, it would certainly be lawful also for a man, when he performs copulation, to use a preservative so that the semen may not pass beyond the vagina and penetrate the uterus, in order to impede generation; it would be lawful for the woman to use an astringent substance, lest sperm pass from the vagina to the uterus. For whether generation is impeded in this or that way, in a transitory or permanent manner, is it not always to impede generation positively? is not that act always from its own nature against generation?

Nevertheless there are modern authors who affirm this, because, with marriage now standing, spouses have a right to that act. But this would truly have to be proved, since that act is against generation and has the true nature of pollution on the part of the man. But, they insist, that act is not pollution, because the malice of pollution is in complete pleasure sought outside copulation. But the intrinsic malice of the act of pollution can in no way be taken from pleasure, since pleasure is not intrinsically evil of itself, but from the intrinsic end of that act, which is generation, and to which it is opposed; whence the act is against nature.

The same is the question, as is clear, if not the woman but the man, after a validly contracted marriage, becomes impotent: whether he can have copulation with his wife. Here also there are two opinions.

Laymann affirms, L. 5. tr. 10. part. 4. cap. 11. n. 3., saying: "If after a contracted marriage someone has become a eunuch, he is not prohibited from exercising imperfect copulation with the emission of semen that is not true, as Toletus teaches, lib. 7. cap. 16. num. 4., Sanchez, lib. 7. disp. 102. n. 7. Because although such persons cannot contract marriage, nevertheless, once it is contracted, to use it is lawful for them, insofar as this can be done." But this is the practical difficulty: whether it is lawful for them to use it insofar as this can be done. Certainly it is lawful for them to use it if the act remains incomplete on the part of the man and the woman, because nothing is done against generation; but not when the act is now positively opposed to generation and consequently pollution is had on the part of the woman. If such an act of a man whose two testicles have been perfectly amputated after the validly entered marriage is lawful, then it must be said that it is not an act against nature, or against generation. And if it is not against the good of offspring, why could such a man not then, after the death of his wife, contract another valid marriage?

Sanchez, however, l. c. n. 6. 7., reports two opinions. The first denies. For "it seems then that copulation is not lawful, because the woman emits true semen, and this is frustrated of its due end of generation, with male semen lacking." The second, to which the same Sanchez adheres, affirms, "because that man uses his own right, applying himself to the conjugal act which marriage permits." But the whole question precisely concerns this right: whether it is present, since also in this other case that whole act is positively against generation, and on the part of the woman that act assumes the nature of pollution.

It is urged by modern doctors that in a woman there is not pollution, but only complete venereal delectation. But if this doctrine is admitted, it is certainly not apparent how there can be grave sin in a married woman from that complete delectation. For simple venereal delectation is not gravely illicit for spouses. And as the modern doctors themselves say, and rightly, from the common doctrine: "grave sin in spouses is only that which is voluntary pollution, whether solitary, or the crime of onanism and sodomy.... All other actions in themselves, or considered in their nature, are lawful for spouses, and become sins if they are exercised for pleasure alone, or with foreseen danger of pollution, without a just cause." Besides, they add: "incomplete venereal delectation does not differ in species from complete." And their reason is that "the circumstance of pollution does not change the species of the sin." And consequently they deduce: "if women accuse themselves either of venereal delectation or of immodest touches, they are not to be interrogated further as to whether they have been polluted." But consequently it is also deduced that in a married woman there is never grave sin in a venereal matter, the thing considered in itself, or according to its nature, in relation to a woman joined in marriage. But this conclusion does not seem to cohere with the repeated responses of the Sacred Penitentiary. Cf. following numbers 135. 136. 153.